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LIBRARIAN'S  FUivO 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1865, 
BY  CHAELE*  B.  EICIIAEDSON. 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Southern  District  ol 

New  York. 


PRESS  OF  GEO.  C.  RAND  &  AVERT. 


on 


PREFACE. 


THIS  history  of  SHERMAN'S  army  is  written  in  the  single  in 
terest  of  truth. 

Using  the  authentic  sources  of  information  at  our  command, 
we  have  endeavored  to  render  full  and  exact  justice  to  all,  and 
to  perpetuate  no  errors  that,  under  the  circumstances,  it  was 
possible  to  avoid. 

It  is  hoped  that  the  disadvantages  usually  attending  the 
publication  of  a  biography  during  the  lifetime  of  its  subject, 
are  to  some  extent  neutralized,  in  the  present  instance,  by  the 
co-operation  in  our  task  of  many  of  those  who  themselves 
made  the  history  we  propose  to  recount. 

Nevertheless,  and  in  spite  of  the  most  friendly  offers  of 
material  assistance  from  Lieutenant-General  GRANT  and  Ma 
jor-General  SHERMAN  ;  from  the  army  commanders,  THOMAS, 
HOWARD,  SLOCUM,  and  SCHOFIELD  ;  from  Major-Generals  LO 
GAN,  BLAIR,  and  JEFFERSON  C.  DAVIS  ;  brevet  Major-General 
KILPATRICK,  brevet  Brigadier-General  HICKENLOOPER,  of  the 
staff  of  the  lamented  McPnERSON,  and  from  very  many  other 
officers  whose  names  we  cannot  now  give  at  length,  several  of 
whom  generously  tendered  free  access  to  their  reports,  jour 
nals,  and  private  letter-books ;  the  editors  cannot  but  feel 
that,  on  many  points  of  interest,  their  work  is  lacking  in  those 
details  essential  to  historical  completeness,  which  time  alone 
can  supply. 


4  PREFACE. 

The  events  treated  are,  in  some  instances,  perhaps  too 
recent  for  enlightened  and  impartial  criticism ;  in  others, 
respect  for  the  living  or  for  the  honored  dead,  whose  memo 
ries  are  yet  green,  may  have  imposed  reticence  or  silence  upon 
the  lips  of  those  on  whose  evidence  depends  our  knowledge  of 
the  truth ;  in  still  others,  it  will  probably  require  the  careful 
collection  and  severe  analysis,  in  the  future,  of  minute  frag 
ments  of  evidence,  to-day  widely  scattered,  neglected,  or  in 
accessible,  in  order  to  refute  errors  now  prevalent,  but  un 
suspected. 

The  editors  believe,  however,  that  laboring  with  a  sincere 
and  constant  desire  to  attain  correctness,  they  have,  at  least, 
succeeded  in  establishing  the  essential  outlines  which  the 
criticism  and  controversy,  hostile  as  well  as  friendly,  they 
cannot  hope  to  escape,  and  the  new  testimony  that  will  there 
by  be  elicited,  will  enable  them  or  their  more  favored  suc 
cessors  to  perfect  and  finish. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   I. 

BEFORE  THE  WAR.— GENERAL  SHERMAN'S  ANCESTRY  AND  BIRTH.— CAREER 
AT  WEST  FOINT.— SERVICE  IN  FLORIDA  — AT  MOBILE  — IN  CHARLESTON  HAR 
BOR—IN  GEORGIA— IN  NORTH  CAROLINA  — IN  CALIFORNIA. —  His  MARRIAGE. 
SERVICE  AT  ST.  Louis.  —  His  RESIGNATION.  —  IN  CALIFORNIA.  —  PRESIDENT 
OF  LOUISIANA  STATE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  — RE-ENTERS  THE  ARMY 


CHAPTER  II. 

AN  EXPERIMENT.  — BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.— APPOINTED  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  26 

CHAPTER   III. 

THE  SECESSION  JUGGLE  IN  KENTUCKY.  —  KENTUCKY  NEUTRALITY.  —  SHER 
MAN  IN  COMMAND  IN  KENTUCKY  —  AT  ST.  Louis  —  AT  PADUCAH     ...       37 

CHAPTER  IV. 

SHILOH.  — BATTLE  OF  PITSBURGH  LANDING 47 

CHAPTER  V. 

CORINTH.  — THE  BATTLE  OF  CORINTH.— THE  EVACUATION.— APPOINTED  MAJOR- 
GENERAL  OF  VOLUNTEERS 60 


CHAPTER  VI. 

MEMPHIS.— REPAIRING  RAILWAYS.— IN  COMMAND  AT  MEMPHIS. —ORGANIZA 
TION  OF  ARMY  CORPS.— PREPARATION  FOR  THE  MOVEMENT  ON  VICKSBURG      71 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  ATTEMPT  ON  VICKSBURG.— SHERMAN'S  ORDERS.  — THE  MOVEMENT  BE 
GUN.  —  THE  NAVY  CO-OPERATING.  —  THE  ATTACK  ON  CHICKASAW  BLUFFS.  — 
FAILURE  OF  THE  ATTACK.  —  CHANGE  OF  COMMANDERS 80 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

ARKANSAS  POST.  — SHERMAN  IN  COMMAND  OF  THE  THIRTEENTH  CORPS.— THE 
ATTACK  ON  ARKANSAS  POST.  —  ITS  SURRENDER 91 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  SIEGE  AND  FALL  OF  VICKSBURG.  — PREPARATION  FOR  THE  SIEGE.— 
UP  THE  YAZOO.  — GRAND  GULF.  — JACKSON.— VICKSBURG.  — THE  SURRENDER 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  LULL  AFTER  VICKSBURG.  —  THE  ARMIES  AT  REST.  —  SHERMAN'S  COR 
RESPONDENCE  119 

CHAPTER   XI. 

TO  CHATTANOOGA.  —  BATTLE  OF  MISSIONARY  RIDGE. —THE  MARCH  TO 
CHATTANOOGA.  —  CHANGE  OF  COMMANDERS.  —  LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN.  —  MIS 
SIONARY  RIDGE.  —  RINGGOLD 131 

CHAPTER  XII. 

KNOXVILLE.— RELIEF.— RE-ORGANIZING.— TREATMENT  OF  THE  INHABITANTS    147 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE  MERIDIAN  RAID.  — A  NEW  COM.MAND.— FOLK'S  DEFEAT.—  BANKS'S  EXPE 
DITION  TO  RED  RIVER.  —  GRANT'S  LETTER  TO  SHERMAN  UPON  HIS  PROMOTION  159 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

THE  ARMY  OF  THE  CENTRE.  — ITS  ORGANIZATION  AND  POSITION.  —  SKETCH 
OF  GENERALS  THOMAS  AND  MCPHERSON.  —  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  ARMY    .     169 


CHAPTER  XV. 

BEYOND  THE  MOUNTAINS.— TUNNEL  HILL.— Buzz ARD'S-ROOST  GAP.— RESACA. 
—  ROME.  — KINGSTON.  — ALLATOONA  PASS 183 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

ACROSS  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE.  —  ATTACK  ON  KENESAW  MOUNTAIN.—  DEATH 

OF  MCPHERSON 190 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

ATLANTA  WON.  —  STONEMAN'S  RAID  ON  ANDERSONVILLE.—  HOOKER  RELIEVED   204 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 

TAKING  BREATH.  —  REMOVAL  OF  CITIZENS  FROM  ATLANTA.  —  HOOD'S  LETTER 
TO  SHERMAN.  — THE  NEGRO  QUESTION 219 

CHAPTER  XIX. 

HOOD'S  INVASION.  —  SKETCH  OF  GENERAL  RANSOM 241 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

THE  COLORS  POINT  TO  THE  SOUTH.  —  SKETCHES  OF  GENERALS  HOWARD, 
BLAIR,  SLOCUM,  KILPATIUCK,  AND  OSTERIIAUS.  — DESTRUCTION  OF  ATLANTA   25fi 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

THE  LOST  ARMY 273 

CHAPTER  XXII. 

TO  THE  SEA.  —  LINE  OF  MARCH.  —  APPROACH  TO  SAVANNAH    ....     279 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 

A  CHRISTMAS  GIFT.  —  ASSAULT  ox  FORT  MCALLISTER.  —  MEETING  OF  SHER 
MAN  AND  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR.  —  THANKS  OF  THE  PRESIDENT        .       .     291 

CHAPTER  XXIV. 

THE  END  OF  HOOD.  — BATTLE  AT  FRANKLIN.  —  VICTORY  AT  NASHVILLE     .     301 

CHAPTER  XXV. 

SAVANNAH.  —  SHERMAN'S  ORDERS  RESPECTING  THE  FREEDMEN.  —  DUTIES  OF  A 
CONQUERED  PEOPLE 314 

CHAPTER  XXVI. 

NORTHWARD.  — SKETCH  OF  GENERAL  LOGAN.  — CAPTURE  OF  COLUMBIA       .     330 

CHAPTER  XXVII. 

THROUGH  SOUTH  CAROLINA. —  BURNING  OF  COLUMBIA.— DESTRUCTION  OF 
COTTON 339 

CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

CO-OPERATIVE  MOVEMENTS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA.- STARTING  FOR  GOLDS- 
BORO'.  — CAPTURE  OF  FORT  FISHER  AND  WILMINGTON 357 

CHAPTER  XXIX. 

TO  GOLDSBORO'.  — BATTLE  OF  BENTONSVILLE 367 

CHAPTER  XXX. 

THE  LAST  STROKE.  —  ORDERS  TO  THE  ARMY.  —  STONEMAN'S  RAID  ...     378 


8  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XXXI. 

DAWN.  — NEWS  OF  LEE'S  SURRENDER.  —  SURRENDER  OF  GENERAL  JOHNSON  .     388 

CHAPTER  XXXII. 

CORRESPONDENCE  DURING  THE  TRUCE.  —  ORDERS  TO  GENERAL  STONEMAN 
— GENERAL  GILLMORE— GENERAL  WILSOX.— LETTERS  TO  GENERAL  JOHNSTON 
AND  FROM  HIM— To  ADMIRAL  DAHLGREN  — To  GENERAL  THOMAS  .  .  405 

CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

THE  REJECTED  AGREEMENT.  —  SECRETARY  STANTON'S  NINE  REASONS.  — THE 
VIRGINIA  LEGISLATURE.  — PRESIDENT  LINCOLN'S  POLICY.  — THE  TRUCE.  — ITS 
REJECTION.  —  GENERAL  HALLECK'S  ACTION 417 

CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

HOMEWARD.  —  THE  HOMEWARD  MARCH.  —  ARRIVAL  AT  WASHINGTON.  —  THE 
GRAND  REVIEW.  — SHERMAN'S  FAREWELL  TO  HIS  ARMY 436 

CHAPTER  XXXV. 

DIGRESSIVE.  —  NEWSPAPER  CORRESPONDENTS.  —  RAILWAYS.  —  DISLOYAL  NEWS 
PAPERS.  —  NEGRO  RECRUITING 447 

CHAPTER  XXXVL 

AT  HOME.  —  SHERMAN'S  SPEECHES  AT  LANCASTER  —  CINCINNATI  —  ST.  Louis     464 

CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

CONCLUSION — SHERMAN'S  PERSONAL  APPEARANCE  AND  CHARACTERISTICS.— 
REGARD  FOR  THE  DISABLED.  — PROMPTNESS  AND  DECISION.— RELIGIOUS  CON 
VICTIONS.  —  ANDERSON VILLE  PRISONERS.  — His  VIEWS  ON  RECONSTRUCTION  475 

APPENDIX. 

TESTIMONY  OF  GENERAL  SHERMAN  BEFORE  THE  COMMITTEE  ON  THE  CONDUCT 
OF  THE  WAR  RELATIVE  TO  THE  TRUCE 493 


|)0riraits  mtir 


PORTRAITS. —  MAJOR-GENERAL  WM.  T.  SHERMAN  —  MAJOR-GENERAL  O.  O.  HOWARD  —  MAJOR- 
GENERAL  H.  N.  SLOCUM  —  MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  A.  LOGAN  —  MAJOR-GENERAL  FRANK  P. 
BLAIR,  JR. —MAJOR-GENERAL  JOHN  M.  SCHOFIELD  —  BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  J.  C.  DAVIS 
—  BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  J.  KILPATRICK. 

MAPS.  —  THE  ATLANTA  CAMPAIGN,  AND  SIEGB  OF  ATLANTA  —  FROM  ATLANTA  TO  THE  SEA  — 
FROM  SAVANNAH  TO  GOLDSBORO'  — OPERATIONS  AROUND  RESACA. 


SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 


CHAPTEE  I. 

BEFORE    THE    WAR. 

WILLIAM  TECUMSEH  SHERMAN  was  born  in  Lancaster,  Ohio, 
on  the  8th  of  February,  1820.  The  branch  of  the  Sherman 
family  to  which  he  belongs  is  descended  from  the  Honorable 
Samuel  Sherman,  of  Dedham,  in  the  County  of  Essex,  Eng 
land,  who  came  to  Massachusetts  in  the  year  1634,  in  company 
with  his  brother,  the  Eeverend  John  Sherman,  and  their 
cousin,  Captain  John  Sherman.  The  two  latter  settled  at  Mil- 
ford,  in  Connecticut,  and  became  the  founders  of  useful  and 
influential  families.  Koger  Sherman  was  a  descendant  of  the 
captain's.  Samuel  Sherman,  after  residing  for  a  time  at  Weth- 
ersfield,  Connecticut,  removed  to  Stamford,  and  finally  to 
Stratford,  in  the  same  State.  His  son,  Deacon  John  Sherman, 
went  early  in  life  to  Woodbury,  Connecticut,  where  the  family 
remained  until  the  death,  in  1815,  of  his  great  grandson,  Tay 
lor  Sherman,  for  many  years  judge  of  one  of  the  courts 
of  his  native  State.  His  widow  removed,  with  her  children, 
to  what  is  now  the  town  of  Lancaster,  in  Fairfield  County,  in 
the  State  of  Ohio.  Charles  Eobert  Sherman,  the  son  of  Tay 
lor  Sherman,  and  the  father  of  the  subject  of  this  sketch,  was 
born  on  the  26th  of  September,  1788.  He  was  an  accomplished 
lawyer,  very  successful  as  an  advocate,  and  from  1823  to 
1829,  when  he  died  of  cholera,  was  one  of  the  judges  of  the 


10  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Superior  Court  of  tlie  State  of  Ohio.  On  the  8th  of  May, 
1810,  he  married  Mary  Hoyt,  by  whom  he  had  eleven  children ; 
first,  Charles  Taylor,  a  prominent  lawyer,  formerly  of  Mans 
field,  Ohio,  now  of  Washington  City ;  second,  Mary  Elizabeth  ; 
third,  James;  fourth,  Amelia;  fifth,  Julia;  sixth,  William 
Tecumseh  ;  seventh,  Parker ;  eighth,  John,  for  many  years  an 
influential  member  of  the  House  of  Eepresentatives  from 
Ohio,  now  senator  from  the  same  State ;  ninth,  Susan ;  tenth, 
Hoyt ;  and  eleventh,  Frances. 

His  death  left  this  large  family  in  very  moderate  circum 
stances.  Shortly  afterwards,  being  then  but  little  past  nine 
years  of  age,  William  Tecumseh  was  adopted  by  the  Honor 
able  Thomas  Ewing,  one  of  his  father's  most  intimate  friends, 
as  a  member  of  his  own  family.  Mr.  Ewing  sent  him  to 
school  in  Lancaster  until  the  spring  of  1836,  when  having,  as 
a  member  of  Congress  from  Ohio,  the  privilege  of  nominating 
a  youth  from  his  congressional  district  for  appointment  as  a 
cadet  at  the  United  States  Military  Academy  at  West' Point, 
he  exercised  this  right  by  procuring  the  warrant  for  his  youth 
ful  charge. 

In  June,  1836,  Cadet  Sherman  entered  the  Academy,  where, 
with  the  exception  of  the  months  of  July  and  August,  1838, 
which  his  class  was  permitted  to  spend  at  home  on  furlough,  he 
remained,  pursuing  the  course  of  studies  and  military  duties 
then  in  force,  until  the  30th  of  June,  1840,  when  he  graduated, 
standing  sixth  in  the  order  of  general  merit  of  his  class  of 
forty-two  members — all  that  were  left  of  a  hundred  and  forty 
who  had  entered  the  institution  with  him.  Among  his  class 
mates  were  Stewart  Yan  YLiet,  George  H.  Thomas,  Richard  S. 
Ewell,  George  W.  Getty,  William  Hays,  Bushrod  E.  Johnson, 
and  Thomas  Jordan. 

His  letters  to  his  friends  during  the  four  important  if 
uneventful  years  of  cadet  life,  are  very  interesting,  as  ex 
hibiting  the  variety  and  force  of  his  thoughts,  and  the 
energy  and  decision  of  his  character,  at  that  early  age. 
Through  them  all  runs  the  elastic  spirit  of  youth,  and  a 
manly  candor  and  directness  of  speech  that  have  never  left 


BEFORE   THE  WAR.  H 

Tn'm  since.  In  one  of  these  letters,  dated  February  17,  1839, 
lie  writes : — 

"  Bill  is  very  much  elated  at  the  idea  of  getting  free  of  West 
Point  next  June.  He  does  not  intend  remaining  in  the  army 
more  than  one  year,  then  to  resign,  and  study  laiv,  prob 
ably.  No  doubt  you  admire  his  choice ;  but,  to  speak 
plainly  and  candidly,  I  would  rather  be  a  blacksmith.  Indeed 
the  nearer  we  come  to  that  dreadful  epoch,  graduation-day, 
the  higher  opinion  I  conceive  of  the  duties  and  life  of  an  officer 
of  the  United  States  Army,  and  the  more  confirmed  in  the 
wish  of  spending  my  life  in  the  service  of  my  country.  Think 
of  that.  The  church  bugle  has  just  blown,  and  in  a  moment 
I  must  put  on  my  sidearms  and  march  to  church,  to  listen  to 
a  two-hours'  sermon,  with  its  twenty  divisions  and  twenty-one 
subdivisions  ;  .  .  .  but  I  believe  it  is  a  general  fact,  that 
what  people  are  compelled  to  do  they  dislike."  ..... 

"  As  we  have,  then,  two  or  three  dancing-parties  each  week, 
at  which  the  gray  bobtail  is  sufficient  recommendation  for  an 
introduction  to  any  one,  you  can  well  conceive  how  the  cadets 
have  always  had  the  reputation,  and  have  still,  here  in  the 
East,  of  being  great  gallants  and  ladies'  men.  God  only  knows 
how  I  will  sustain  that  reputation  !" 

Speaking  of  the  appointment,  by  the  War  Department,  of 
the  Board  of  Visitors  to  attend  the  annual  examination,  he 
says,  May  18,  1839  :— 

"  There  is  but  little  doubt  of  its  being  nearly  as  well  selected 
as  circumstances  would  admit  of.  Party  seems  to  have  had 
no  influence  whatever ;  and,  for  my  part,  I  am  very  glad  of  it. 
I  hope  that  our  army,  navy,  or  the  Military  Academy  may 
never  be  affected  by  the  party  rancor  which  has  for  some  time 
past,  and  does  now,  so  materially  injure  other  institutions." 

Here  is  a  glimpse  of  his  tastes  and  occupations  : — 

"  The  last  encampment,  taken  all  in  all,  I  think  was  the  most 
pleasant  one  I  have  ever  spent,  even  to  me,  who  did  not  par 
ticipate  in  the  dances  and  balls  given  every  week  by  the  dif 
ferent  classes ;  besides,  the  duties  were  of  altogether  a  different 
nature  from  any  of  the  previous  ones,  such  as  acting  as  officers 


12  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

upon  guard  and  at  artillery  drills,  practising  at  target  firing 
with  long  twenty-fours  and  thirty-twos,  mortars,  howitzers,  &c., 
as  also  cavalry  exercise,  which  has  been  introduced  this  year. 
As  to  lording  it  over  the  plebs,  to  which  you  referred,  I  had 
only  one,  whom  I  made,  of  course,  tend  to  a  pleb's  duty,  such 
as  bringing  water,  policing  the  tent,  cleaning  my  gun  and 
accoutrements,  and  the  like,  and  repaid  in  the  usual  and  cheap 
coin — advice ;  and  since  we  have  commenced  studying  I  make 
him  bone  (study),  and  explain  to  him  the  difficult  parts  of  al 
gebra  and  the  French  grammar,  since  he  is  a  good  one  and 
fine  fellow ;  but  should  he  not  carry  himself  straight,  I  should 
have  him  found  in  January  and  sent  off,  that  being  the  usual 
way  in  such  cases,  and  then  take  his  bed,  table,  and  chair,  to 
pay  for  the  Christmas  spree 

"  I  presume  you  have  seen  the  register  of  cadets  for  the  last 
year,  and  remarked  that  I  still  maintain  a  good  stand  in  my 
class  ;  and  if  it  were  not  for  that  column  of  '  demerit'  it  would 
be  still  better,  for  they  are  combined  with  the  proficiency  in 
study  to  make  out  the  standing  in  general  merit.  In  fact,  this 
year,  as  well  as  the  last,  in  studies  alone,  I  have  been  among 
the  stars.  ...  I  fear  I  have  a  difficult  part  to  act  for  the 
next  three  years,  because  I  am  almost  confident  that  your 
father's  wishes  and  intentions  will  clash  with  my  inclinations. 
In  the  first  place,  I  think  he  wishes  me  to  strive  and  graduate 
in  the  engineer  corps.  This  I  can't  do.  Next,  to  resign,  and 
become  a  civil  engineer.  .  .  .  Whilst  I  propose,  and  intend, 
to  go  into  the  infantry,  be  stationed  in  the  far  "West,  out  of  the 
reach  of  what  is  termed  civilization,  and  there  remain  as  long 
as  possible." 

He  had  already  imbibed  from  his  association  with  Mr.  Ewing 
the  doctrines  of  the  Whig  party,  but  his  nature  and  education 
compelled  him  to  repel  with  indignation  the  trickery  and  shams 
even  of  his  own  side.  Thus,  he  writes,  April  13,  1840,  of  the 
approaching  presidential  election  : — 

"  You,  no  doubt,  are  not  only  firmly  impressed,  but  abso 
lutely  certain,  that  General  Harrison  will  be  our  next  president. 
For  my  part,  though  of  course  but  a  '  superficial  observer,'  I 


BEFORE  THE  WAR.  13 

do  not  think  there  is  the  least  hope  of  such  a  change,  since 
his  friends  have  thought  proper  to  envelop  his  name  with  log 
cabins,  gingerbread,  hard  cider,  and  such  humbugging,  the 
sole  object  of  which  plainly  is  to  deceive  and  mislead  his  ig 
norant  and  prejudiced,  though  honest,  fellow-citizens ;  whilst 
his  qualifications,  his  honesty,  his  merits  and  services  are 
merely  alluded  to." 

In  the  same  letter  is  this  dash  of  descriptive  humor  : — 

"  Sometimes  it  appears  that  war  with  England  is  inevitable  ; 
books  are  thrown  in  the  corner,  and  broadswords  and  foils 
supply  their  place.  Such  lunging,  cutting,  and  slashing — 
enough  to  dispose  of  at  least  a  thousand  British  a  day ;  but 
the  mail  or  recitation  soon  destroys  the  illusion  with — '  It's  all 
a  hoax ;'  or,  '  Sir,  you've  been  neglecting  your  studies.'  " 

Immediately  after  his  graduation,  Cadet  Sherman  was  ap 
pointed,  in  accordance  with  the  customary  recommendation  of 
the  Academic  Board,  to  a  second  lieutenancy  in  the  Third 
Regiment  of  Artillery,  then  commanded  by  Colonel  "William 
Gates,  and  was  assigned  to  Company  A  of  that  regiment. 
After  enjoying  the  usual  furlough  of  three  months  granted  to 
cadets  on  graduating,  he  was  ordered  to  join  his  company  at 
Fort  Pierce,  in  East  Florida,  where  he  served  until  November, 
1841,  when  the  company  was  removed  to  Fort  Lauderdale. 
In  January,  1842,  he  received  his  commission  as  a  first  lieu 
tenant  in  the  same  regiment,  dating  from  November  30,  1841, 
and  also  an  order  from  the  "War  Department  transferring  him 
to  Company  G,  stationed  at  Saint  Augustine.  This  was 
rapid  promotion  for  those  days,  when  six  or  seven  years  were 
often  required  for  a  second  lieutenant  to  obtain  the  next  grade. 
Lieutenant  Sherman  was  now  placed  in  command  of  a  small 
detachment  of  his  new  company  engaged  in  guarding  the  post 
of  Picoluta,  situated  on  the  Saint  John's  Eiver,  opposite  the 
town  of  Saint  Augustine. 

The  service  in  Florida  was  not  of  a  very  inviting  character. 
The  summer  was  generally  passed  in  idleness,  the  heat  of  the 
almost  tropical  sun  and  the  swarms  of  mosquitoes  rendering 
active  exertion  nearly  impossible  ;  and  the  winter  was  spent  in 


14  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

frequent  incursions  against  the  hostile  Seminoles,  under  the 
leadership  of  the  wily  and  cruel  chief  Sam  Jones.  These 
expeditions,  sometimes  scouting  on  foot,  sometimes  penetrat 
ing  the  everglades  in  boats,  were  always  attended  by  severe 
labors,  and  involved  no  slight  degree  of  risk,  the  numbers 
of  our  troops  being  small,  and  unceasing  vigilance  being 
necessary  to  guard  against  an  ambuscade.  The  climate  dur 
ing  the  long  summer  season  was  exceedingly  unhealthy. 
Lieutenant  Sherman  was,  however,  contented,  as  long  as  there 
was  a  prospect  of  activity,  and,  fortunately,  continued  to  en 
joy  good  health  during  his  entire  tour  of  duty  in  this  section. 
From  the  outset,  he  conceived  a  clear  and  decided  opinion  of 
the  policy  that  should  govern  the  war  against  the  Seminoles. 
He  was  earnestly  opposed  to  parleys  or  truces,  believing  that 
no  reliance  could  be  placed  in  the  promises  of  the  Indians ; 
and  was  strongly  in  favor  of  the  energetic  exertion  of  the 
whole  military  power  in  the. Territory  in  combined  operations, 
having  in  view  the  prompt  and  relentless  extermination  of  all 
the  Indians  who  should  continue  to  carry  on  hostilities,  and 
the  removal,  in  accordance  with  treaty  stipulations,  of  those 
who  should  sue  for  peace.  By  such  a  course,  he  considered, 
and  events  have  fully  justified  the  opinion,  that  the  war  .would 
be  ended  in  a  single  campaign,  thousands  of  human  lives 
saved,  both  of  whites  and  Indians,  and  peace  permanently 
given  to  the  Territory.  The  Government  should  then  en 
deavor,  he  thought,  to  attract  to  the  country  a  better  class 
of  white  settlers,  organize  them  into  small  communities, 
and  require  them  to  defend  themselves  for  the  future.  Thus 
the  army  could  be  withdrawn  from  Florida,  with  the  excep 
tion  of  small  garrisons  at  the  more  important  permanent 
posts. 

Here  is  a  view  of  his  life  in  quarters  at  Fort  Pierce,  written 
April  10, 1841  :— 

"  Now  that  we  are  at  peace,  and  our  minds  withdrawn  from 
those  pleasant  excursions  and  expeditions  in  which  we  have 
been  engaged  for  the  four  past  months,  we  are  thrown  upon 
our  ingenuity  to  devise  means  of  spending  the  time.  Books 


BEFORE  THE  WAR.  15 

we  have  few,  but  it  is  no  use,  you  cannot  read  any  but  the 
lightest  trash;  and  even  the  newspapers,  which  you  would 
suppose  we  would  devour,  require  a  greater  effort  of  mind  to 
search  than  we  possess.  We  attribute  it  to  the  climate,  and 
bring  up  these  native  lazy  Minorcans  as  examples,  and  are 
satisfied.  *  Yet,  of  course,  we  must  do  something,  however 
little.  Well,  in  this,  each  pursues  his  own  fancy.  The  major 
and  I  have  a  parcel  of  chickens,  in  which  we  have,  by  com 
petition,  taken  enough  interest  to  take  up  a  few  minutes  of 
the  day ;  besides,  I  have  a  little  fawn  to  play  with,  and  crows, 
a  crane,  &c. ;  and  if  you  were  to  enter  my  room  you  would 
hesitate  whether  it  was  the  abode  of  man  or  beasts.  In  one 
corner  is  a  hen,  sitting ;  in  another,  some  crows,  roosted  on 
bushes ;  the  other  is  a  little  bed  of  bushes  for  the  little  fawn ; 
whilst  in  the  fourth  is  my  bucket,  wash-basin,  glass,  &c.  So 
you  see  it  is  three  to  one." 

In  a  subsequent  letter  he  touches  the  same  vein  : — 

"  I've  got  more  pets  now  than  any  bachelor  in  the  country 
— innumerable  chickens,  tame  pigeons,  white  rabbits,  and  a 
full-blood  Indian  pony — rather  small  matters  for  a  man  to 
deal  with,  you  doubtless  think,  but  it  is  far  better  to  spend 
time  in  trifles  such  as  these  than  drinking  or  gambling." 

His  desire  for  the  freedom  of  frontier  life  is  thus  again 
shown : — 

"  We  hear  that  the  new  Secretary  of  War  intends  proposing 
to  the  next  Congress  to  raise  two  rifle  regiments  for  the  West 
ern  service.  As  you  are  at  Washington,  I  presume  you  can 
learn  whether  it  is  so  or  not,  for  I  should  like  to  go  in  such  a 
regiment,  if  stationed  in  the  far  West ;  not  that  I  am  the  least 
displeased  with  my  present  berth,  but  when  the  regiment 
goes  North,  it  will,  in  all  likelihood,  be  stationed  in  the  vicinity 
of  some  city,  from  which  God  spare  me." 

His  indignation  at  any  thing  not  perfectly  straightforward,, 
shows  itself  in  an  energetic  remonstrance  to  a  friend  : — 

"  If  you  have  any  regard  for  my  feelings,  don't  say  the  word 
'  insinuation'  again.  You  may  abuse  me  as  much  as  you 
please,  but  I'd  prefer,  of  the  two,  to  be  accused  of  telling  a 


16  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

direct  falsehood  than  stating  any  thing  evasively  or  under 
hand  ;  and  if  I  have  ever  been  guilty  of  such  a  thing,  it  was 
unintentionally. ' ' 

In  March,  1842,  his  company  was  removed  to  Fort  Morgan, 
situated  on  Mobile  Point,  at  the  entrance  of  the  Bay  of  Mo 
bile,  and  twenty  miles  from  the  city.  Here  Lieutenant  Sher 
man  remained,  performing  garrison  service,  varied,  in  the 
intervals  of  duty,  by  fishing,  boating,  and  occasional,  though 
not  frequent,  visits  to  the  city,  until  the  following  June,  when 
the  station  of  the  company  was  again  changed  to  Fort  Moul- 
trie,  on  Sullivan's  Island,  Charleston  Harbor.  Moultrieville, 
on  Sullivan's  Island,  quite  near  the  fort,  was,  at  that  time,  a 
place  of  fashionable  resort  during  the  summer  season  for  the 
wealthy  families  of  Charleston  and  South  Carolina  generally, 
many  of  whom  had  temporary  residences  there,  to  which  they 
removed  on  the  approach  of  hot  weather,  to  escape  from  the 
malarious  influences  of  the  city  and  lower  country,  and  enjoy 
the  cool  breezes  and  the '  sea-bathing.  Officers  of  the  army 
were  at  that  time  sought  after,  and  hospitably  entertained  by 
nearly  all  of  the  better  classes  of  society  in  the  South,  and 
Lieutenant  Sherman  was  thus,  upon  his  arrival  at  Fort  Moul- 
trie,  ushered  into  a  life  entirely  new  to  him.  During  the  sum 
mer  he  made  many  agreeable  and  some  valuable  acquaint 
ances,  which  were  cemented  and  extended  during  the  following 
winter,  when  he,  in  common  with  the  other  officers,  was 
almost  overwhelmed  with  invitations  to  accept  the  hospitali 
ties  of  the  citizens  of  Charleston,  to  whom  they  had  been 
attentive  at  the  fort. 

Hunting  was  always  a  favorite  amusement  with  him,  and 
while  stationed  at  Fort  Moultrie,  he  enjoyed  frequent  oppor 
tunities  of  indulging  this  taste.  Thus,  with  boating  and 
drum-fishing,  were  passed  his  leisure  hours  during  the  first 
year  of  his  stay.  In  the  fall  of  1843,  he  availed  himself 
of  a  four-months'  leave  of  absence  to  visit  his  home  at 
Lancaster,  and  while  there  became  engaged  to  Miss  Ellen 
Ewing,  the  accomplished  daughter  of  his  guardian,  and  the 
friend  and  companion  of  his  school-days.  At  the  expira- 


BEFORE  THE  WAR.  17 

tion  of  his  leave,  in  December,  1843,  he  rejoined  his  post, 
making  an  interesting  detour  down  the  Mississippi  river  to 
New  Orleans,  and  thence  by  way  of  Mobile  and  Savannah. 
During  the  months  of  February,  March,  and  April,  1844,  he 
was  associated  with  Colonel  Sylvester  Churchill,  on  a  board 
of  three  officers,  appointed  by  the  War  Department,  to  inves 
tigate  a  large  number  of  claims  for  horses  lost  by  the  Georgia 
and  Alabama  militia,  in  the  Florida  war  in  1837  and  1838. 
Most  of  these  claims  were  supposed  by  the  Government  to  be 
fraudulent,  and  the  members  of  the  board  were  required  to 
hear  and  patiently  sift  the  evidence  on  the  spot,  and  after 
wards  report  the  facts  and  their  opinions  to  the  War  Depart 
ment.  During  the  course  of  the  investigation  the  board  was 
in  session  at  Marietta,  Georgia,  at  Bellefonte,  Alabama,  and 
at  several  other  places  in  the  central  and  northern  sections  of 
those  States.  Their  report  gave  great  satisfaction  to  the  De 
partment,  and  was  considered  by  it  as  the  means  of  saving 
vast  sums  of  money  to  the  treasury,  while,  at  the  same  time, 
awarding  justice  to  all  concerned. 

All  this  time  the  young  officer  was  not  unmindful  of  the 
necessity  of  professional  study  and  improvement.  He  took 
care  to  inform  himself  of  the  topographical  features  of  the 
country  in  which  he  was  stationed  or  through  which  he* 
travelled,  as  well  as  in  regard  to  the  occupations,  character, 
social  organization,  and  sentiments  of  the  inhabitants.  The 
value  of  geography  he  specially  appreciated.  He  wrote  to  his 
friend,  Philemon  Ewing  : — 

"  Every  day  I  feel  more  and  more  in  need  of  an  atlas,  such 
as  your  father  has  at  home ;  and  as  the  knowledge  of  ge 
ography,  in  its  minutest  details,  is  essential  to  a  true  military 
education,  the  idle  time  necessarily  spent  here  might  be  prop 
erly  devoted  to  it.  I  wish,  therefore,  you  would  procure  for 
me  the  best  geography  and  atlas  (not  school)  extant." 

After  the  adjournment  of  the  Board,  he  began  to  turn  his 
attention  to  such  legal  studies  as  might  prove  useful  to  him  in 
his  profession.  Thus  he  writes,  under  date  of  June  12,  1844, 
from  Fort  Moultrie  : — 

2 


18  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

"  Since  mj  return,  I  have  not  been  running  about  in  the 
city  or  the  island,  as  heretofore,  but  have  endeavored  to 
interest  myself  in  Blackstone,  which,  with  the  assistance  of 
Bouvier's  Dictionary,  I  find  no  difficulty  in  understanding.  I 
have  read  all  four  volumes,  Starkie  on  Evidence,  and  other 
books,  semi-legal  and  semi-historical,  and  would  be  obliged  to 
you  ifryou  would  give  me  a  list  of  such  books  as  you  were  re 
quired  to  read,  not  including  your  local  or  State  law.  I  in 
tend  to  read  the  second  and  third  volumes  of  Blackstono 
again,  also  Kent's  Commentaries,  which  seem,  as  far  as  I  am 
capable  of  judging,  to  be  the  basis  of  the  common-law  prac 
tice.  This  course  of  study  I  have  adopted,  from  feeling  the 
want  of  it  in  the  duties  to  which  I  was  lately  assigned." 

And  again,  on  the  20th  of  October  : — 

"  I  have  no  idea  of  making  the  law  a  profession,  by  no 
means ;  but,  as  an  officer  of  the  army,  it  is  my  duty  and  inter 
est  to  be  prepared  for  any  situation  that  fortune  or  luck  may 
offer.  It  is  for  this  alone  that  I  prepare,  and  not  for  profes 
sional  practice." 

Early  in  1845,  he  again  paid  a  brief  visit  to  his  home  in 
Ohio,  to  recover  from  the  effects  of  illness.  After  his  return 
to  the  South,  he  was,  for  a  short  time,  stationed  on  detached 
service  at  the  arsenal  at  Augusta,  Georgia ;  and,  on  another 
occasion,  was  detailed  as  a  member  of  a  general  court-martial 
sitting  at  "Wilmington,  North  Carolina,  where  he  had  the  pleas 
ure  of  meeting  once  more  with  his  old  comrades  of  Company 
A,  Third  Artillery. 

On  the  breaking  out  of  the  Mexican  war,  Lieutenant  Sher 
man  was  assigned  to  duty  as  recruiting  officer  at  Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania.  He  remained  there,  however,  but  little  more 
than  a  month,  when  his  repeated  applications  for  active  ser 
vice  were  met  by  an  order  from  the  War  Department,  trans 
ferring  him  to  Company  F,  of  his  regiment,  then  about  to  sail 
for  California,  to  meet  Colonel  Kearny's  expedition  across  the 
plains.  The  first  intimation  he  received  of  this  change  was 
conveyed  by  a  letter,  which  reached  him  on  the  28th  of  June, 
1846,  from  his  friend,  Lieutenant  E.  O.  C.  Ord,  who  was 


BEFORE  THE  WAR.  19 

attached  to  his  new  company.  On  the  29th  of  June  he  re 
ceived  the  official  orders,  and  on  the  following  day,  without 
seeking  to  visit  his  home  and  friends,  pausing  only  to  make  a 
few  hasty  arrangements  with  regard  to  his  private  affairs,  he 
set  out  for  New  York.  The  company  sailed  from  New  York 
about  the  middle  of  July,  in  the  ship  Lexington,  and  after  a 
voyage  marked  by  no  special  incidents,  touching  at  Rio  de 
Janeiro  and  Valparaiso,  landed  at  San  Francisco.  Contrary 
to  the  anticipations  of  active  service  entertained  at  the  outset, 
the  career  of  the  company  in  California,  far  away  from  the 
theatre  of  war,  proved  uneventful.  During  his  service  there, 
Lieutenant  Sherman  was  detailed  as  acting  assistant  adjutant- 
general  of  the  forces  in  the  Tenth  Military  Department,  under 
the  command  of  Brigadier-General  Stephen  W.  Kearny,  after 
wards  under  that  of  Colonel  Richard  B.  Mason,  First  Dra 
goons  ;  and  in  this  capacity  attracted  the  notice  of  his  brother 
officers  by  the  efficiency,  clearness,  and  administrative  ability 
he  showed  in  the  discharge  of  the  responsible  duties  confided 
to  him.  In  1850  he  returned  to  the  Atlantic  States,  and  on 
the  1st  of  May,  in  the  same  year,  was  married  to  Miss  Ellen 
Ewing,  at  the  residence,  in  Washington  City,  of  her  father, 
then  Secretary  of  the  Interior  under  President  Taylor.  In 
the  following  September  he  received  what  was,  in  those  days, 
considered  one  of  the  highest  prizes  the  military  profession 
had  in  store  for  the  subaltern,  being  appointed  a  commissary 
of  subsistence  with  the  rank  of  captain.  He  was  immediately 
assigned  to  duty,  as  such,  upon  the  staff  of  the  commanding 
officer  of  the  military  department  of  the  "West,  and  stationed 
at  St.  Louis.  In  March  of  the  following  year  he  received 
from  the  President,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate,  a  commission  as  captain,  by  brevet,  to  date  from  May 
30,  1848,  "for  meritorious  services  in  California  during  the 
war  in  Mexico." 

On  the  6th  of  September,  1853,  Captain  Sherman  resigned 
his  commission  in  the  army,  and  like  many  of  his  companions 
at  that  time,  sought  for  such  advancement  in  civil  life  as  the 
army  seemed  little  likely  to  afford.  He  was  offered  and 


20  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

accepted  the  position  of  manager  of  the  branch  banking-house 
of  Messrs.  Lucas,  Turner  &  Company,  at  San  Francisco, 
California,  and  accordingly  went  a  second  time  to  the  Pacific, 
intending  now  to  establish  his  home  there. 

During  all  this  time  the  seeds  of  discord  had  been  ripening 
in  the  hot  soil  of  slavery.  The  Southern  statesmen,  accus 
tomed  to  rule,  began  to  perceive  that  the  country  would  not 
always  submit  to  be  ruled  by  them ;  that  hostility  to  slavery 
was  a  sentiment  deeply  rooted  in  the  minds  of  the  people  of 
the  Free  States,  and  daily  spreading  its  influence ;  and  that 
the  accession  of  men  holding  these  opinions  to  power  in  the 
national  councils  and  the  national  executive,  meant  nothing 
less  than  such  a  limitation  of  the  further  extension  of  slavery 
as  would  be  fatal  to  its  existence,  even  where  it  was  already 
established.  Slavery,  they  believed,  could  not  thrive  in  con 
tact  with  freedom ;  and  they  had  come  to  regard  slavery  as 
essential  to  their  political  and  social  existence.  Without  a 
slave  caste,  they  could  have  no  aristocratic  caste.  No  class 
can  enjoy  exclusive  rights  except  at  the  expense  of  another, 
whose  rights  are  curtailed  or  extinguished.  They  began  to 
isolate  themselves  from  the  North,  as  they  termed  the  Free 
States ;  from  its  dangerous  opinions,  by  refusing  to  read  or 
hear  them  ;  from  its  society,  by  withdrawing  their  sons  and 
daughters  from  Northern  schools  and  colleges,  and  by  declin 
ing  to  associate  with  Northern  men  and  women  who  were  not 
well  known  to  be  free  from  the  pernicious  doctrines ;  and  finally, 
they  prepared  to  throw  off  their  political  allegiance  to  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  the  moment  it  should  have 
passed  beyond  their  control.  The  Northern  politicians,  accus 
tomed  to  follow  the  lead  of  their  Southern  associates,  gen 
erally  believed  that  the  defeat  of  Fremont,  in  1856,  as  the 
Republican  candidate  for  the  presidency,  had  insured  the 
perpetuity  of  the  Union ;  the  Southern  politicians,  generally, 
believed  that  the  date  of  its  dissolution  was  postponed  during 
the  next  presidential  term,  and  that  four  years  and  a  facile 
President  were  given  them  to  prepare  for  it.  And  they  began 
to  do  so. 


BEFORE  THE  WAR,  21 

The  pro-slavery  leaders  were  well  aware  that  the  attempted 
overthrow  of  the  National  Government  would  be  likely,  even 
in  the  disguise  of  peaceable  secession,  to  be  resisted  by  force. 
They  accordingly  got  every  thing  in  readiness  to  carry  out 
their  plans  by  force.  The  wiser  heads  among  them  hoped,  if 
they  did  not  altogether  expect,  to  be  allowed  to  secede  in 
peace,  but  they  were  as  determined  as  the  rest  to  appeal  to 
war  in  the  last  resort.  Accordingly,  during  Mr.  Buchanan's 
Administration,  there  was  set  on  foot  throughout  the  slave- 
holding  States  a  movement  embodying  the  reorganization  of 
the  militia,  the  establishment  and  enlargement  of  State  mili 
tary  academies,  and  the  collection  of  arms,  ammunition,  and 
warlike  materials  of  all  kinds.  The  federal  Secretary  of  War, 
Mr.  Floyd,  thoroughly  in  the  interests  of  the  pro-slavery 
conspirators,  aided  them  by  sending  to  the  arsenals  in  the 
Slave  States  large  quantities  of  the  national  arms  and  mili 
tary  supplies ;  the  quotas  of  the  Southern  States  under  the 
militia  laws  were  anticipated,  in  some  cases  by  several  years ; 
and  he  caused  large  sales  of  arms  to  be  secretly  made,  at  low 
prices,  to  the  agents  of  those  States.  The  pro-slavery  leaders 
then  began,  quietly,  to  select  and  gather  round  them  the  men 
whom  they  needed,  and  upon  whom  they  thought  they  could 
rely.  Unable  always  to  explain  to  these  men  their  purposes, 
they  were  often  compelled  to  trust  to  circumstances  and  the 
force  of  association  to  complete  the  work ;  and  in  doing  so, 
they  occasionally,  though  not  often,  made  mistakes. 

Among  the  men  they  fixed  upon  was  Captain  Sherman. 
Becognizing  his  aptitude  in  military  art  and  science,  the  lead 
ers  in  Louisiana  determined  to  place  him  at  the  head  of  the 
new  State  Military  Academy  at  Alexandria.  It  was  explained 
to  him  that  the  object  of  establishing  the  school  was  to  aid  in 
suppressing  negro  insurrections,  to  enable  the  State  to  protect 
her  borders  from  the  Indian  incursions,  then  giving  trouble  in 
Arkansas  and  Texas,  and  to  form  a  nucleus  for  defence,  in  case 
of  an  attack  by  a  foreign  enemy. 

It  is  rare,  indeed,  that  a  man  whose  youth  has  been  spent 
in  the  army  does  not,  in  his  maturer  years,  retain  a  lurking  de- 


22  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

sire  for  the  old  life,  the  old  companions,  the  old  ways.  Let 
the  temptation  be  offered  in  a  moment  when  the  cares  and  de 
tails  of  civil  life  look  more  than  ordinarily  dull,  when  the  future 
seems  clouded,  and  the  warm  memories  of  former  days  may 
present  a  contrast  too  vivid  for  most  men  to  resist.  Cincin- 
natus  leaves  the  plough  and  returns  with  the  senators  to  the 
camp.  So  it  was  with  Captain  Sherman.  Messrs.  Lucas 
Turner  &  Company  had  broken  up  their  branch-house  at  San 
Francisco.  The  offer  was  in  a  line  with  his  associations,  his 
tastes,  and  his  ambition.  He  accordingly  accepted  the  office, 
and  entered  upon  his  duties  as  Superintendent  of  the  Louisiana 
State  Military  Academy,  early  in  the  year  1860.  The  liberal 
salary  of  five  thousand  dollars  a  year  was  attached  to  the 
office. 

The  efficiency  which  Captain  Sherman  here  displayed  con 
firmed  the  leaders  in  that  State  in  the  correctness  of  their 
choice,  and  satisfied  them  that  he  was  a  man  to  be  kept  at  any 
price.  They  were  met  at  the  outset  by  a  deep-seated  loyalty, 
by  a  deep-rooted  attachment  and  fidelity  to  the  Union,  upon 
which  they  had  by  no  means  calculated.  Every  effort  was 
expended  to  convert  him  to  their  way  of  thinking,  but  in  vain. 
Surface  opinions  change  with  the  wind,  but  it  is  useless  to 
argue  against  fundamental  beliefs.  And  such  was  the  charac 
ter  of  Sherman's  attachment  to  the  Union. 

As  events  ripened,  he  saw  clearly  that  the  election  of  Mr. 
Lincoln  to  the  presidency  would  be  followed  by  the  general 
secession  of  the  Southern  States,  and  that  secession  meant 
war.  When,  at  length,  after  using  his  influence  to  its  fullest 
extent  in  favor  of  the  Union,  he  perceived  that  the  result  could 
no  longer  be  avoided,  he  decided  upon  his  own  course,  and 
communicated  his  decision  to  the  Governor  of  the  State  in 
this  clear  and  straightforward  letter,  dated  January  18,  1861 : 

"  Sni — As  I  occupy  a  gw<m'-military  position  under  this  State, 
I  deem  it  proper  to  acquaint  you  that  I  accepted  such  position 
when  Louisiana  was  a  State  in  the  Union,  and  when  the  motto 
of  the  seminary,  inserted  in  marble  over  the  main  door,  was : 


BEFORE  THE  WAR.  23 

*  By  tlie  liberality  of  the  General  Government  of  the  United  States  : 
The  Union — Esto  Perpetual 

"  Recent  events  foreshadow  a  great  change,  and  it  becomes 
all  men  to  choose.  If  Louisiana  withdraws  from  the  Federal 
Union,  I  prefer  to  maintain  my  allegiance  to  the  old  Constitu 
tion  as  long  as  a  fragment  of  it  survives,  and  my  longer  stay 
here  would  be  wrong  in  every  sense  of  the  word.  In  that 
event,  I  beg  you  will  send  or  appoint  some  authorized  agent 
to  take  charge  of  the  arms  and  munitions  of  war  here  belong 
ing  to  the  State,  or  direct  me  what  disposition  should  be  made 
of  them. 

"  And  furthermore,  as  President  of  the  Board  of  Supervisors, 
I  beg  you  to  take  immediate  steps  to  relieve  me  as  superin 
tendent  the  moment  the  State  determines  to  secede  ;  for  on  no 
earthly  account  will  I  do  any  act,  or  think  any  thought,  hostile 
to  or  in  defiance  of  the  old  Government  of  the  United  States." 

His  resignation  was,  of  course,  promptly  accepted,  and  he 
at  once  returned  to  St.  Louis.  In  consequence  of  the  uncer 
tain  aspect  of  political  affairs,  he  had  deemed  it  most  prudent 
that  his  family  should  not  accompany  him  to  the  South. 

He  was  not  destined  to  remain  long  inactive.  The  crisis  for 
which  the  pro-slavery  leaders  had  been  so  long  preparing  was 
precipitated  by  the  rashness  of  the  more  incautious  among 
themselves,  and  hurried  forward  by  the  frenzy  of  the  people. 
The  far-sighted  conspirators  had  proposed  .to  themselves  to 
capture  Washington  before  the  North  should  be  able  to  organ 
ize  resistance,  and  to  proclaim  themselves  the  true  and  lawful 
Government  of  the  United  States.  They  would  have  declared 
Mr.  Lincoln's  election,  with  the  avowed  purpose,  among  others, 
of  disregarding  what  they  considered  as  their  constitutional 
right  of  holding  slaves  in  the  Territories,  as  unconstitutional,  and 
therefore  null,  and  would  have  based  their  assumption  of  power 
on  the  right  of  self-preservation.  From  their  knowledge  of  the 
disposition  of  most  of  the  foreign  ministers  resident  at  the  Fed 
eral  capital,  they  expected  their  recognition  by  the  leading 
European  powers  to  follow  closely  upon  the  act.  They  counted 


24  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

upon  the  trade-loving  and  the  peace-loving  instincts  of  the  people 
of  the  Free  States  to  keep  the  North  inert.  The  great  Central 
and  Western  States  would  probably  be  with  them,  and  New 
England  they  would  gladly  leave,  as  they  were  accustomed  to 
say,  "  out  in  the  cold."  But  while  the  cool-headed  conspira 
tors  plotted  thus  skilfully,  one  element  of  their  calculation 
failed.  It  had  been  necessary  to  their  plans  to  fire  the  Southern 
heart  to  the  point  of  rebellion  :  the  Southern  brain  took  fire 
as  well.  Events  took  the  bit  in  their  teeth.  On  the  12th  of 
April,  1861,  Mr.  Davis  gave  the  order  to  open  upon  Eort  Sum- 
ter.  At  noon  the  first  gun  was  fired,  and  the  war  was  begun. 

Sherman  had  gone  to  Washington  about  the  time  of  Mr.  Lin 
coln's  inauguration,  and  had  talked  of  the  state  of  affairs  with 
characteristic  freedom.  He  believed  that  war  was  inevitable ; 
that  it  would  be  no  pantomime  of  wooden  swords,  but  a  long 
and  bitter  struggle.  He  endeavored  in  vain,  in  earnest 
nervous  language,  to  impress  his  convictions  upon  the  Ad 
ministration.  Nobody  listened  to  him  except  the  President, 
who  listened  to  everybody.  Sherman  went  to  him  to  offer  his 
services  in  any  capacity.  His  strong  words  and  strong 
thoughts  elicited  a  smile  from  Mr.  Lincoln.  "We  shall  not 
need  many  men  like  you,"  he  said ;  "  the  affair  will  soon  blow 
over."  Some  of  Sherman's  friends  in  the  army,  who  knew  his 
talents,  and,  like  him,  believed  there  would  be  a  war,  urged 
his  appointment  to  the  chief  clerkship  of  the  War  Department, 
a  position  which  at  that  time  was  always  held  by  a  confiden 
tial  adviser  of  the  Secretary  of  War ;  and  somewhat  later  he 
was  strongly  recommended  for  the  position  of  quartermaster- 
general  of  the  army,  made  vacant  by  the  resignation  of  Briga 
dier-General  Joseph  E.  Johnston.  Neither  application  was 
successful. 

Sherman  knew  the  Southern  people;  the  Administration 
did  not,  nor  did  the  people  of  the  North  in  general.  In  his 
own  words,  we  were  sleeping  upon  a  volcano. 

On  the  15th  of  April,  1861,  the  President  called  for  seventy- 
five  thousand  men  to  serve  for  three  months,  to  be  employed 
for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  and 


BEFORE  THE  WAR  25 

to  hold  and  occupy  the  forts,  arsenals,  navy-yards,  and  other 
public  places  belonging  to  the  National  Government  which 
had  been  seized  by  the  rebels.  Sherman  was  urged  by  his 
friends  to  go  home  to  Ohio,  and  raise  one  of  the  three  months' 
regiments.  He  declined  to  have  any  thing  to  do  with  such  a 
trifling  expedient,  as  he  considered  it.  He  did  not  believe 
that  the  three  months'  men  would  do  any  good,  or  that  they 
could  do  any  good.  This  affair  was  no  riot,  but  a  revolution. 
It  was  not  a  mob,  to  be  put  down  by  the  posse  comitatus,  but  a 
war,  to  be  fought  by  an  army.  "  Why,"  he  said,  "  you  might 
as  well  attempt  to  put  out  the  flames  of  a  burning  house  with 
a  squirt-gun." 

He  used  all  the  influence  at  his  command  to  induce  the 
authorities  to  recognize  his  view  of  the  case,  and,  by  at  once 
organizing  the  whole  military  force  of  the  country,  to  crush 
the  rebellion  in  its  infancy.  But  the  authorities  still  believed 
there  would  be  no  fight,  that  the  rebellion  would  succumb  at 
the  sight  of  the  power  of  the  Union. 

When  the  Government  presently  decided  to  add  a  regiment 
of  artillery,  one  of  cavalry,  and  nine  of  infantry  to  the  regular 
army,  Sherman  at  once  applied  for  a  command  in  this  force, 
and,  on  the  13th  of  June,  received  a  commission  as  colonel  of 
the  Thirteenth  Eegimeiit  of  Infantry,  to  date  from  May  14th. 
As  very  little  was  done,  just  then,  in  regard  to  the  organization 
of  the  new  regiments,  beyond  the  appointment  of  officers  and 
a  little  feeble  recruiting,  Colonel  Sherman's  services  were,  like 
those  of  most  of  the  newly-appointed  officers  who  were  known 
to  possess  military  skill,  made  use  of  in  another  direction. 
Eichmond  had  been  made  the  capital  of  the  Confederate 
States.  A  force  was  collected  to  move  on  that  city,  capture 
it,  and  so  suppress  the  rebellion  at  a  blow.  Major  Irvin 
McDowell,  assistant  adjutant-general  on  the  staff  of  Lieuten- 
ant-General  Scott,  had  been  appointed  a  brigadier-general  in 
the  regular  army,  and  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  these 
troops.  Colonel  Sherman  was  ordered  to  report  to  him,  and 
received  the  command  of  a  brigade  in  the  division  of  Brigadier- 
General  Daniel  Tyler. 


SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 


CHAPTEK  II. 

AN     EXPERIMENT. 

THE  troops  which  were  to  move  "on  to  Richmond,"  in 
accordance  with  the  popular  cry,  were  encamped  in  some  sort 
of  order  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Potomac,  from  the  Cham 
Bridge  to  Alexandria,  and  were  thrown  together,  with  more  or 
less  haste,  into  what  were  called  five  divisions,  of  two,  three, 
or  four  brigades  each.  Brigadier-General  Daniel  Tyler,  of 
the  Connecticut  Volunteers,  commanded  the  First  Division, 
Colonels  David  Hunter,  Sixth  Cavalry,  Samuel  P.  Heintzel- 
man,  Seventeenth  Infantry,  and  Dixon  S.  Miles,  Second  In 
fantry,  the  Second,  Third,  and  Fifth,  respectively,  and  Briga 
dier-General  Theodore  Runyon,  of  the  New  Jersey  militia,  the 
Fourth  Division.  Three  of  these  were  old  and  experienced 
officers  of  the  regular  army,  who  had  seen  service  in  Mexico 
and  in  many  Indian  fights.  Brigadier-General  Robert  C. 
Schenck  commanded  the  First  Brigade  of  Tyler's  division; 
Colonel  Erasmus  D.  Keyes,  Eleventh  Infantry,  the  Second; 
Colonel  Sherman  the  Third  Brigade,  composed  of  the  Thir 
teenth,  Sixty-ninth,  and  Seventy-ninth  New  York,  and  Second 
Wisconsin  regiments  of  infantry,  with  Captain  Ayres's  Battery 
E,  Third  Regular  Artillery ;  and  Brigadier-General  Israel  B. 
Richardson  commanded  the  Fourth  Brigade.  The  troops 
were  all  raw.  Most  of  them  had  volunteered  for  three  months. 
As  the  end  of  that  period  approached,  these  men  naturally 
thought  more  of  home  than  they  did  of  battle,  more  of  living 
to  see  their  friends  than  of  dying  for  their  country.  Many  of 
the  volunteers  had  never  fired  a  gun  before,  and  felt  nearly  as 
much  trepidation  in  loading  their  own  pieces,  and  as  much 


AN    EXPERIMENT.  07 

alarm  in  discharging  them,  as  the  most  deadly  fire  of  the  ene 
my  could  have  occasioned.  Captains  knew  little  or  nothing 
of  tactics  beyond  the  manual  of  arms  and  the  facings.  Colonels 
could  not  put  their  regiments  through  the  simplest  manoeuvres. 
Regimental  commanders  did  not  know  their  brigade  command 
ers,  and  brigade  commanders  made  the  acquaintance  of  their 
division  commanders  upon  the  field  of  battle.  According  to 
the  ideas  of  those  days,  there  was  a  deficiency  of  transporta 
tion  ;  that  is  to  say,  each  regiment  had  not  a  score  of  wagons  : 
and  the  quartermasters  in  Washington  were  at  their  wits' 
end  to  supply  the  demand.  Wagons  intended  for  General 
McDowell's  army  went  to  General  Patterson's,  and  General 
McDowell's  army  must  therefore  wait.  The  District  of  Columbia 
was  embraced  in  a  separate  military  department,  called  the 
Department  of  Washington.  Its  commander  was  overwhelmed 
by  office  details ;  so  the  troops  which  were  to  go  to  the  Army 
of  Northeastern  Yirginia  got  mislaid,  and  had  to  be  hunted 
up  and  hurried  into  brigades  at  the  fifty-ninth  minute  of  the 
eleventh  hour.  Every  thing  that  was  done  was  rushed  into 
the  newspapers,  and  most  things  that  were  intended  to  be 
done.  The  railroad  lines  .leading  South,  with  only  slight 
breaks,  were  still  in  use,  and  passes  over  them  were  freely 
issued,  so  that  the  rebel  authorities  might  read  the  plan  of  to 
day's  operations  at  breakfast.  But  the  people,  drunk  with 
hope,  saw  none  of  these  things,  or  saw  them  double ;  and 
those  who  might  have  led  the  people,  ran  after  them. 

It  may  be  said,  in  defence  of  the  delusions  of  the  hour,  that 
our  army  was  numerically  stronger,  as  well  officered,  better 
equipped,  and  as  well  instructed  as  the  rebel  forces ;  and  so 
indeed  it  was.  But  the  rebel  army  was  to  act  upon  the  defen 
sive,  ours  upon  the  offensive.  The  advantage  of  ground  would 
be  with  the  enemy,  the  advantage  of  surprise,  and  the  great 
advantage  of  cohesion  at  the  moment  of  attack.  On  the  other 
hand,  our  troops  would  have  to  move,  to  find  the  enemy,  and 
to  attack  him  in  his  chosen  position,  or  sustain  his  fire  de 
livered  from  behind  cover  or  behind  earthworks.  But  the 
salient  point  of  this  question  is,  that  the  result  of  any  move- 


28  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

ment,  by  either  side,  was  left  to  chance ;  no  man  could  have 
indicated  the  causes  which  would  determine  the  result.  It 
was  purely  chance  whether  any  movement  ordered  from  head 
quarters  would  be  made  at  all;  a  rare  chance  whether  it 
would  be  made  at  the  time  designated  in  orders ;  a  miracu 
lous  chance  if  it  were  made  exactly  as  ordered.  By  waiting  a 
very  little  while,  the  result  might  have  been  reasonably 
assured.  We  could  not  wait.  In  the  American  character, 
Hope  crowds  Patience  to  the  wall. 

After  much  public  discussion  and  excitement,  the  order  was 
given  to  General  McDowell  to  move  forward. 

The  enemy  had  a  force  of  about  twenty-two  thousand  men, 
organized  in  eight  brigades,  with  twenty-nine  guns,  encamped 
and  intrenched  at  Manassas  Junction,  and  commanded  by 
General  Gustave  T.  Beauregard.  They  had  outposts  at  Fair 
fax  Courthouse,  and  at  Centreville,  seven  miles  from  the  Junc 
tion.  The  brigades  were  commanded  by  Brigadier-Generals 
Ewell,  Holmes,  D.  It.  Jones,  Longstreet,  and  Bonham,  and 
Colonels  Cocke,  Evans,  and  Early. 

General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  was  at  Winchester,  with  about 
twelve  thousand  men,  watching  our  forces  under  Major-Gen 
eral  Kobert  Patterson,  one  of  the  Pennsylvania  three  months' 
militia.  Generals  Bee  and  Bartow  and  Colonel  Jackson  com 
manded  the  brigades  of  General  Johnston's  army.  General 
Patterson's  force  amounted  to  twenty-three  thousand  men  of 
all  arms,  chiefly  three  months'  militia. 

General  McDowell  was  to  move  directly  upon  Manassas  on 
the  9th  of  July,  and,  turning  the  enemy's  right  flank,  cut  off 
his  forces  from  Richmond.  The  movement  began  on  the  16th. 
The  men,  unaccustomed  to  marching,  moved  very  slowly. 
Long  years  of  peace  had  nourished  in  the  minds  of  our  citizens 
a  reluctance  to  endure  pain  and  privation,  and  the  citizens  had 
not  become  soldiers  by  a  mere  change  of  clothing.  The  men 
stopped  every  few  moments  to  pick  blackberries,  stepped 
aside  to  avoid  mud-puddles,  crossed  fords  gingerly,  emptied 
their  canteens  and  filled  them  with  fresh  water  whenever  they 
came  to  a  stream.  Thus  the  army  did  not  reach  Centreville 


AN  EXPERIMENT.  29 

until  the  night  of  the  18th.  Two  days  were  spent  here  in  re- 
connoissances,  and  on  the  21st  the  final  movement  began.  All 
this  time  the  enemy,  fully  advised  of  our  movements  by  the 
daily  papers,  was  busily  engaged  in  concentrating  his  avail 
able  forces  to  meet  our  attack.  That  he  would  do  so  was 
obvious.  General  Scott  had  undertaken  to  guard  against  this, 
so  far  as  the  army  under  Johnston  was  concerned,  by  instruct 
ing  General  Patterson  to  observe  him.  Accordingly,  after 
many  delays,  General  Patterson  moved  from  Martinsburg  to 
Bunker  Hill,  nine  miles  from  "Winchester,  and  then  turned 
aside  and  marched  to  Charlestown.  At  the  very  moment 
when  Johnston  was  withdrawing  with  all  speed  from  Winches 
ter,  and  hurrying  to  Beauregard's  aid,  Patterson  was  retreat 
ing  to  the  Potomac. 

Tyler's  division,  which  had  marched  from  its  camp  near  the 
Chain  Bridge,  on  the  extreme  right  of  our  lines,  by  the  Yienna 
Eoad,  was  the  first  to  reach  Centreville.  General  Tyler's 
orders  were  to  seize  and  hold  this  position,  but  not  to  bring  on 
an  engagement.  He  had  no  sooner  arrived  there  than,  elated 
at  finding  our  progress  undisputed  by  the  enemy,  he  took  the 
road  to  the  left  and  pushed  on,  with  Richardson's  brigade, 
Ayres's  battery,  and  a  few  cavalry,  to  Blackburn's  Ford,  where 
the  Manassas  and  Centreville  road  crosses  Bull  Eun.  The 
ground  on  the  left  bank  of  that  stream  is,  just  here,  open  and 
gently  undulating ;  on  the  other  side  it  becomes  at  once 
heavily  wooded,  and  ascends  rather  abruptly  to  the  elevated 
plateau  on  which  Manassas  Junction  is  situated.  General 
Tyler  was  surprised  to  find  that  the  enemy  had  not  occupied 
the  left  bank  at  the  ford ;  and  still  more,  that  they  permitted 
our  men  to  approach  it  unmolested.  Nor  was  the  enemy  to 
be  seen  on  the  opposite  bank.  He  deployed  the  infantry,  and 
caused  Captain  Ayres  to  open  fire  from  his  battery  on  the 
woods  opposite.  Instantly  a  hot  fire,  as  if  from  four  thousand 
muskets  at  once,  says  the  general,  was  opened  from  the  woods. 
Our  troops  replied  for  a  short  while,  and  then  retired.  This 
movement  was  contrary  to  orders ;  had  no  object  worth  mention 
ing  ;  and  its  result  had  a  most  dispiriting  effect  upon  the  whole 


30  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

army  of  General  McDowell.  Before  it,  the  men  had  been  all  en 
thusiasm.  They  either  would  not  meet  the  enemy  at  all,  they 
dreamed,  or  they  would  whip  him  and  chase  him  to  Eichmond. 
The  enemy  had  been  met,  had  not  fled  at  the  sight  of  us,  and 
had  not  been  whipped.  The  enthusiasm,  which  had  been  at  the 
boiling  point,  was  chilled  by  a  doubt.  The  delay  of  the  19th 
and  20th,  while  waiting  for  the  subsistence  to  come  up,  spread 
and  increased  the  flatness. 

The  original  plan  was  to  turn  the  enemy's  right,  and  so  cut 
off  his  communication  with  Richmond.  General  McDowell 
had  objected  to  moving  by  his  right  to  turn  the  enemy's  left, 
because  the  movement  would  be  indecisive.  At  the  eleventh 
hour,  this  indecisive  course  was  adopted,  for  the  reasons  that 
the  roa.ds  on  the  left  appeared  impracticable,  that  the  enemy's 
attention  had  been  attracted  to  Blackburn's  Ford  by  the 
blunder  of  the  18th,  and  that  it  had  now  become  an  object  to 
guard  against  the  expected  arrival  of  Johnston,  by  occupying 
his  line  of  railway  communication. 

On  the  night  of  Saturday,  the  20th  of  July,  General  Mc 
Dowell  issued  his  orders  for  the  attack.  Bunyon's  Fourth 
Division  was  left  in  the  rear  near  Fairfax  Courthouse.  Tyler's 
division — except  Eichardson's  brigade,  which  was  to  remain 
at  Blackburn's  Ford  and  report  to  Colonel  Miles — was  to 
march  at  half-past  two  o'clock  on  Sunday  morning  down  the 
Warrenton  road,  and  threaten  the  Stone  Bridge.  Schenck's 
and  Sherman's  brigades  were  encamped  on  the  Warrenton 
road,  about  a  mile  beyond  Centreville ;  Keyes's  brigade, 
which  had  become  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  division,  had 
gone  into  camp  half  a  mile  east  of  Centreville.  Hunter's 
division,  which  was  about  a  mile  and  a  half  beyond  Keyes's, 
was  to  move  at  two  o'clock,  and  close  up  on  Tyler.  Heintzel- 
man's  division,  which  was  encamped  on  the  Braddock  road, 
two  miles  east  of  Centreville,  was  to  march  at  half-past  two, 
and  fall  in  in  the  rear  of  Hunter.  Under  cover  of  Tyler's 
attack,  Hunter  and  Heintzelman  were  to  move  to  the  right, 
cross  Bull  Eun  at  Sudley's  Springs,  and  turn  the  enemy's  left. 
Milos's  division  was  held  in  reserve  at  Centreville,  to  guard 


AN  EXPERIMENT.  31 

against  a  movement  of  the  enemy  by  Blackburn's  Ford,  to  cut 
off  our  rear. 

Tliese  dispositions,  except  as  to  Bunyon's  division,  were 
well  made.  Had  they  been  executed,  the  result  of  the  day 
must  have  been  very  different. 

At  a  blacksmith's  shop,  about  a  mile  in  advance  of  Tyler's 
position,  a  branch  road  leads  from  the  Warrenton  pike  towards 
Sudley's  Springs.  If  Tyler  had  marched  boldly  forward,  the 
rear  of  his  division  should  have  cleared  that  point  in  an  hour, 
or,  at  the  very  latest,  in  an  hour  and  a  half.  This  would  have 
enabled  Hunter  to  file  to  the  right  certainly  by  four  o'clock. 
In  fact,  the  .rear  of  Tyler's  division  did  not  pass  the  junction 
of  the  roads  until  half-past  five,  or  fully  an  hour  and  a  half 
later  than  it  should  have  done.  Schenck's  brigade,  which  led 
the  advance,  started  punctually  at  the  time  fixed  in  orders, 
but,  as  General  Tyler  himself  explains,  he  felt  called  upon  to 
move  slowly  and  with  caution,  feeling  his  way  down  to  the 
Stone  Bridge.  Thus  occurred  a  fatal  delay. 

The  head  of  Schenck's  brigade  reached  the  Stone  Bridge 
about  six  o'clock,  and  the  artillery  of  his  and  Sherman's 
brigades  opened  fire  about  half  an  hour  later.  Hunter's  di 
vision  could  not  find  the  road  by  which  it  was  to  march,  and 
having  been  led  by  its  guide  by  a  wide  detour  through  the 
woods,  did  not  reach  the  ford  until  between  half -past  nine  and 
ten  o'clock,  and  occupied  more  than  an  hour  in  passing,  so 
that  it  was  after  eleven  o'clock  before  Heintzelman  began  to 
cross.  The  head  of  Hunter's  column  became  engaged  almost 
immediately  after  crossing  Bull  Bun,  and  drove  the  enemy 
steadily  until  about  noon.  While  Hunter  was  crossing,  orders 
were  sent  to  Tyler  to  press  his  attack.  Colonel  Sherman,  with 
his  brigade,  accordingly  crossed  Buh1  Bun  at  a  ford  just  above 
the  Stone  Bridge,  and  pushed  forward  down  the  Warrenton 
road  until  he  joined  the  left  of  Burnside's  brigade  of  Hunter's 
division,  then  hotly  engaged;  Ayres's  battery,  being  unable 
to  cross  the  ford,  was  left  behind.  Sherman  came  into  action 
about  half-past  twelve,  and  was  at  once  ordered  by  General 
McDowell  to  join  in  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  then  falling 


32  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

back  on  the  left  of  the  Groveton  road.  Placing  Colonel 
Quimby's  Thirteenth  New  York  regiment  in  front,  in  column 
by  division,  Colonel  Sherman  ordered  the  other  regiments  to 
follow  in  line  of  battle,  in  the  order  of  the  Second  "Wisconsin, 
Seventy-ninth  New  York,  and  Sixty-ninth  New  York. 

Thus  far  the  tide  of  success  had  been  unbroken.  Our  troops 
had  effected  the  passage  of  Bull  Kun,  had  driven  the  enemy 
before  them  in  confusion  a  mile  and  a  half,  and  we  had  suc 
ceeded  in  uniting  three  divisions  under  the  crest  of  the  hill, 
which  was  to  be  the  decisive  point  of  the  battle.  On  the  left 
Keyes  was  driving  back  the  enemy,  enabling  Schenck  to  cross 
and  remove  the  obstructions  in  his  front,  and  to  turn  the 
enemy's  right.  The  crisis  was  at  hand. 

In  his  official  report,  Colonel  Sherman  thus  graphically  de 
scribes  the  operations  of  his  brigade  at  this  time  :  "  Quimby's 
regiment  advanced  steadily  down  the  hill  and  up  the  ridge, 
from  which  he  opened  fire  upon  the  enemy,  who  had  made  an 
other  stand  on  ground  very  favorable  to  him  ;  and  the  regiment 
continued  advancing  as  the  enemy  gave  way,  till  the  head  of 
the  column  reached  the  point  near  which  Eicketts's  battery 
was  so  severely  cut  up.  The  other  regiments  descended  the 
hill  in  line  of  battle,  under  a  severe  cannonading;  and  the 
ground  affording  comparative  shelter  against  the  enemy's  ar 
tillery,  they  changed  direction  by  the  right  flank  and  followed 
the  road  before  mentioned.  At  the  point  where  this  road 
crossed  the  bridge  to  our  left  the  ground  was  swept  by  a  most 
severe  fire  by  artillery,  rifle,  and  musketry,  and  we  saw  in  suc 
cession  several  regiments  driven  from  it,  among  them  the 
Zouaves  and  battalion  of  Marines.  Before  reaching  the  crest 
of  the  hill  the  roadway  was  worn  deep  enough  to  afford  shelter, 
and  I  kept  the  several  regiments  in  it  as  long  as  possible ;  but 
when  the  Wisconsin  Second  was  abreast  of  the  enemy,  by 
order  of  Major  Wadsworth,  of  General  McDowell's  staff,  I 
ordered  it  to  leave  the  roadway  by  the  left  flank  and  to  attack 
the  enemy.  This  regiment  ascended  to  the  brow  of  the  hill 
steadily,  received  the  severe  fire  of  the  enemy,  returned  it  with 
spirit,  and  advanced,  delivering  its  fire.  This  regiment  is  uni- 


AN  EXPERIMENT.  33 

formed  in  gray  cloth,  almost  identical  with  that  of  the  great 
bulk  of  the  secession  army,  and  when  the  regiment  fled  in  con 
fusion,  and  retreated  towards  the  road,  there  was  a  universal 
cry  that  they  were  being  fired  upon  by  our  own  men.  The 
regiment  rallied  again,  passed  the  brow  of  the  hill  a  second 
time,  and  was  again  repulsed  in  disorder.  By  this  time  the 
New  York  Seventy-ninth  had  closed  up,  and,  in  like  manner,  it 
was  ordered  to  cross  the  brow  of  the  hill  and  drive  the  enemy 
from  cover.  It  was  impossible  to  get  a  good  view  of  the  ground. 
In  it  there  was  one  battery  of  artillery,  which  poured  an  in 
cessant  fire  upon  our  advancing  column,  and  the  ground  was 
irregular,  with  small  clusters  of  pines,  affording  shelter,  of 
which  the  enemy  took  good  advantage.  The  fire  of  rifles  and 
musketry  was  very  severe.  The  Seventy-ninth,  headed  by  its 
colonel  (Cameron),  charged  across  the  hill,  and,  for  a  short 
time,  the  contest  was  severe.  They  rallied  several  times  under 
fire,  but  finally  broke,  and  gained  the  cover  of  the  hill.  This 
left  the  field  open  to  the  New  York  Sixty-ninth,  Colonel  Cor 
coran,  who,  in  his  turn,  led  his  regiment  over  the  crest,  and 
had  a  full,  open  view  of  the  ground  so  severely  contested. 
The  firing  was  very  severe,  and  the  roar  of  cannon,  musketry, 
and  rifles  incessant.  It  was  manifest  the  enemy  was  here  in 
great  force,  far  superior  to  us  at  that  point.  The  Sixty-ninth 
held  the  ground  for  some  time,  but  finally  fell  back  in  dis 
order." 

It  was  now  half-past  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  The 
men  had  been  up  since  two  in  the  morning,  had  been  on  their 
legs  ever  since,  had  been  engaged  for  four  hours,  and  had 
eaten  nothing.  The  day  was  intensely  hot.  The  troops,  un 
used  to  any  of  these  things,  were  fagged. 

There  was  a  slight  lull  on  the  extreme  right.  Porter's 
brigade  of  Hunter's  division,  and  Grifiin?s  and  Ricketts's 
batteries  were  sent  forward  to  occupy  the  crest  of  the  hill, 
from  which  the  enemy  had  been  pushed.  Hardly  had  they 
reached  the  new  position,  when  a  murderous  volley  was  poured 
into  them,  at  pistol  range,  from  the  clump  of  pines  that  skirted 
the  hill,  Early's  brigade,  of  Johnston's  army,  had  arrived, 

3 


34  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

and  thrown  itself  on  our  right  flank.  Our  line  began  to  melt. 
The  movement  was  taken  up  reluctantly  by  some  regiments, 
but  soon  became  general.  The  retreat  became  confused,  and, 
beyond  Bull  Run,  the  confusion  became  a  rout.  The  enemy 
did  not  pursue.  That  night,  while  a  council  of  war  was  dis 
cussing  the  expediency  of  holding  Centreville,  the  sea  of  panic- 
stricken  fugitives  was  making  for  Washington.  Orders  were 
issued  for  the  coherent  remains  of  the  army  to  follow. 

Colonel  Sherman  says,  of  his  own  command  :  "  This  retreat 
was  by  night,  and  disorderly  in  the  extreme.  The  men  of 
different  regiments  mingled  together,  and  some  reached  the 
river  at  Arlington,  some  at  Long  Bridge,  and  the  greater  part 
returned  to  their  former  camps  at  or  near  Fort  Corcoran.  I 
reached  this  point  at  noon  next  day,  and  found  a  miscellaneous 
crowd  crossing  over  the  aqueduct  and  ferries.  Conceiving 
this  to  be  demoralizing,  I  at  once  commanded  the  guard  to  be 
increased,  and  all  persons  attempting  to  pass  over  to  be 
stopped.  This  soon  produced  its  effect.  Men  sought  their 
proper  companies,  comparative  order  was  restored,  and  all  are 
now  (July  25)  posted  to  the  best  advantage." 

The  loss  in  Sherman's  brigade  was  one  hundred  and  eleven 
killed,  two  hundred  and  five  wounded,  two  hundred  and  ninety- 
three  missing ;  total,  six  hundred  and  nine.  Our  total  loss  in 
this  engagement,  exclusive  of  missing,  was  four  hundred  and 
eighty-one  killed,  one  thousand  and  eleven  wounded.  The 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded  in  Sherman's  brigade  was  nearly  a 
fourth  of  that  of  the  entire  army.  The  enemy  lost,  in  all,  three 
hundred  and  seventy-eight  killed,  fourteen  hundred  and  eighty- 
nine  wounded,  and  thirty  missing.  His  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  was  considerably  greater  than  ours,  but  he  picked 
up  many  prisoners  from  among  the  wounded  and  the  lagging 
stragglers. 

The  prime  causes  which  led  to  this  disgraceful  defeat  are  to 
be  sought  in  the  many  delays  attending  the  commencement 
and  execution  of  the  movement,  in  consequence  of  which  our 
forces  had  to  contend  with  the  combined  forces  of  Beauregard 
and  Johnston. 


AN  EXPERIMENT.  35 

The  panic  which  followed  the  defeat  must  be  traced  to 
internal  defects  ;  to  the  utter  absence  of  coherence  or  cohesion 
in  the  masses  of  militia ;  to  the  want  of  confidence  of  men  in 
their  officers,  of  officers  in  themselves  and  in  their  men ;  to  the 
sudden  apparition  of  a  new  and  undefined  terror  in  place  of  the 
confidently  expected  triumph.  The  mass  easily  became  a  jum 
bled  crowd  of  individuals,  because  it  had  never  been  an  army. 

As  to  the  general  plan  of  campaign,  it  was  certainly  a  fatal 
mistake  that  our  army  clung  to  the  banks  of  the  Potomac  a 
long  month  after  it  should  boldly  have  seized  upon  Centreville 
and  Manassas ;  and  equally  so,  that  a  force  of  nearly  eighty 
thousand  should  have  been  wasted  by  breaking  it  up  into 
three  fractions,  destined  to  stand  still  on  exterior  lines,  watch 
ing  the  enemy  concentrate  on  the  key-point. 

But  the  mortifying  and  humiliating  disaster  was  necessary, 
by  crushing  the  shell  at  once,  to  show  us  in  a  moment  our 
weakness  and  utter  want  of  solidity.  Disguised  until  the 
rebellion  had  developed  and  established  its  strength,  the  dis 
ease  would  have  been  incurable.  Laid  bare  at  a  stroke,  the 
reaction  set  in  at  once,  and  the  life'  of  the  nation  was  saved. 

Trust  in  every  thing  and  everybody  around  the  capital  was 
for  the  moment  destroyed.  Major-General  George  B.  Mc- 
Clellan,  who  had  been  successful  in  his  operations  in  Western 
Virginia,  an  accomplished  officer,  well  known  in  the  army,  and 
possessing  the  confidence  of  the  lieutenant-general,  was  at 
once  summoned  to  Washington,  and  assigned  to  the  command 
of  all  the  troops  for  its  defence.  At  the  end  of  July,  he  found 
a  few  scattered  regiments  cowering  upqn  the  banks  of  the 
Potomac.  The  militia  went  home.  The  North  rose.  Four 
months  later,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  counted  two  hundred 
thousand  soldiers  ready  for  their  work. 

The  sharpness  with  which  Colonel  Sherman  criticised  the 
conduct  of  some  of  the  officers  and  men  of  his  brigade  at  Bull 
Bun,  both  in  his  official  report  and  in  his  free  conversations, 
made  him  many  enemies ;  but  the  vigor  he  had  displayed  on 
the  field,  added  to  the  influence  of  his  brother,  the  Honorable 
John  Sherman,  led  the  Ohio  delegation  in  Congress  to  recom- 


36  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

mend  liis  promotion.  He  was  commissioned  as  a  Brigadier- 
General  of  Volunteers  on  the  3d  of  August,  1861,  to  date  back 
to  the  17th  of  May,  as  was  the  custom  at  that  time.  For  a 
short  time  after  this  he  had  command  of  a  brigade  in  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  but  early  in  September,  upon  the  organization 
of  the  Department  of  Kentucky,  he  was  transferred  to  that 
theatre  of  operations,  and  ordered  to  report,  as  second  in 
command,  to  Brigadier-General  Eobert  Anderson,  who  was 
placed  at  the  head  of  the  department. 


THE  SECESSION  JUGGLE  IN  KENTUCKY.  37 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  SECESSION  JUGGLE  IN  KENTUCKY. 

THE  legerdemain  by  which  the  extreme  Southern  States  were 
juggled  out  of  the  Union  to  feed  the  ambition  of  their  leaders, 
had  proved  eminently  successful.  A  Confederate  dictionary 
had  been  made,  in  which  slavery  was  called  "the  South ;"  re 
bellion,  "  secession ;"  the  execution  of  the  laws,  "  coercion ;" 
and  the  desires  of  the  conspirators,  "the  Constitution."  A 
Confederate  logic  had  been  constructed,  in  which  a  system  of 
postulates  was  substituted  for  the  old-fashioned  syllogism,  and 
every  thing  taken  for  granted  which  it  was  impossible  to  prove. 
Only  let  it  be  granted  that  where  thirteen  or  more  parties  have 
entered  into  an  agreement  with  each  other,  any  one  of  them 
can  rightfully  withdraw  from  the  arrangement  whenever  he 
chooses,  without  the  consent  of  the  others,  and  you  can  prove 
any  thing.  A  man  whose  mind  is  so  organized  that  he  can 
believe  that,  can  believe  any  thing.  And  the  Southern  people 
were  carefully  taught  to  believe  it. 

It  followed,  of  course,  that  while  those  States  which  chose 
to  "  secede"  could  not  rightfully  be  "  coerced"  to  remain  in  the 
Union,  those  States  which  chose  to  stay  must  be  forced  to 
secede. 

Unexpectedly,  Kentucky  chose  to  stay.  Then  the  inventors 
of  the  Confederate  dictionary  and  the  Confederate  logic  put 
their  heads  together  and  hatched  a  new  lie.  They  called  it 
Neutrality. 

It  meant  that  Kentucky  was  to  be  neutral  until  the  rebellion 
should  become  strong  enough  to  swallow  her  at  a  mouthful. 
She  was  to  arm  herself  to  resist  invasion  from  the  South  or 


38  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

from  the  North.  The  governor,  Beriah  Magoffin,  a  secessionist, 
organized  the  State  militia  in  the  interest  of  his  faction,  and 
issued  a  proclamation  declaring  that  Kentucky  would  remain 
neutral.  A  few  prominent  gentlemen,  still  retaining  an  at 
tachment  for  the  Union,  suffered  themselves  to  be  lulled  to 
rest  by  the  tranquil  sound  of  the  new  word.  Their  names  had 
great  weight  at  Washington.  The  unconditional  Union  men 
were  few  in  numbers  and  weak  in  influence.  The  Govern 
ment  could  not  make  up  its  mind  what  to  do.  9  The  secessionists 
prepared  for  war. 

Governor  Magoffin  called  a  special  meeting  of  the  Legisla 
ture,  and  urged  that  body  to  assemble  a  State  Convention  to 
consider  the  crisis.  The  Legislature  met  on  the  28th  of  April. 
Two  days  afterwards  the  governor  issued  a  proclamation  de 
claring  in  effect  that  Kentucky  would  assume  a  position  of 
belligerent  neutrality,  and  would  defend  herself  against  in 
vasion  from  any  quarter.  On  the  22d  of  May,  the  Legislature 
resolved  that  the  governor's  proclamation  of  neutrality  was  not 
a  true  exponent  of  the  views  of  the  people.  The  State  Militia 
law  was  so  amended  as  to  require  the  State  Guard  to  take  the 
oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United  States.  On  the  24th  of  May, 
the  last  day  of  the  session,  the  Senate  passed  resolutions  de 
claring  that  "  Kentucky  will  not  sever  connection  from  the 
National  Government,  nor  take  up  arms  for  either  belligerent 
party,  but  arm  herself  for  the  preservation  of  peace  within 
her  borders,  and  tender  their  services  as  mediators  to  effect  a 
just  and  honorable  peace."  The  resolutions  were  lost  in  the 
House  by  a  vote  of  forty-nine  to  forty-three.  The  secession 
ists  began  to  be  seriously  alarmed.  Their  fears  were  not 
diminished  when  the  result  of  the  election  for  members  of  Con 
gress,  held  on  the  1st  of  July,  showed  a  majority  for  the  Union 
candidates  of  more  than  fifty-five  thousand. 

The  Legislature  met  again  on  the  3d  of  September.  In  tKe 
mean  time,  the  Government  had  authorized  Lovell  H.  Rousseau 
to  raise  a  brigade  in  Kentucky  for  the  United  States  service, 
and  the  Confederate  troops,  under  Polk,  had  just  invaded  the 
State  and  occupied  Hickman  and  Chalk  Bluffs.  General  Grant, 


THE  SECESSION  JUGGLE  IN  KENTUCKY.  39 

who  had  been  watching  the  progress  of  affairs,  immediately 
took  the  responsibility  of  occupying  Paducah.  The  seces 
sionists,  headed  by  the  governor,  loudly  demanded  that  both 
belligerents  should  withdraw  their  forces.  They  hoped  to 
frighten  the  Government  of  the  United  States  into  compliance, 
while  the  rebel  authorities,  being  under  no  obligation  to  listen 
to  them,  should  absorb  the  State.  On  the  llth,  the  Legisla 
ture,  by  a  vote  of  71  to  26,  requested  the  Governor  to  order 
the  Confederate  troops  to  evacuate  the  State.  A  series  of 
test  resolves  was  at  once  introduced,  declaring  that  the  neu 
trality  of  Kentucky  and  the  rights  of  her  people  had  been  in 
vaded  by  the  so-called  Southern  Confederate  forces,  requesting 
the  governor  to  call  out  the  military  force  of  the  State  to  expel 
the  invaders,  and  invoking  the  assistance  of  the  United  States 
to  that  end.  In  the  Assembly,  the  vote  stood  sixty-eight  to 
twenty-six.  On  the  13th,  the  governor  vetoed  the  resolutions. 
The  Legislature  promptly  repassed  them  over  his  veto,  by 
more  than  a  two-thirds  vote. 

The  Confederate  tactics  changed  at  once.  The  men  who 
had  declared  they  must  go  with  their  State  found  they  were 
under  no  obligation  to  stay  with  their  State.  The  men  who 
had  protested  that  it  was  a  crime  to  coerce  a  State  to  remain 
in  the  Union,  discovered  that  it  was  their  sacred  duty  to  coerce 
Kentucky  to  leave  the  Union.  Buckner  and  Breckinridge  fled, 
and  at  once  took  commands  as  general  officers  in  the  Con 
federate  service.  They  were  followed  by  their  fellow-conspira 
tors,  and  by  all  whom  their  arguments  or  promises  had  se 
duced. 

On  the  17th  of  September,  Buckner  seized  a  railway-train, 
and  moved  from  Bowling  Green  upon  Louisville.  An  accident 
to  the  train  delayed  him  within  forty  miles  of  the  city,  and  by 
the  time  he  was  ready  to  move  again,  Rousseau's  brigade  and 
a  battalion  of  Home-guards  was  ready  to  oppose  him ;  so  he 
abandoned  the  attempt. 

In  compliance  with  the  call  of  the  Legislature,  and  by  order 
of  the  President,  Brigadier-General  Robert  Anderson  assumed 
command  of  the  Military  Department  of  Kentucky  on  the  21bt 


40  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

September,  and  immediately  made  preparations  for  organizing 
the  full  quota  of  troops  which  the  State  had  been  called  upon 
to  furnish  for  the  national  service.  The  invasion  of  the  State 
by  the  Confederate  troops  had  torn  the  mask  from  the  designs 
of  the  secessionists,  and  it  was  no  longer  possible  to  favor 
them  openly.  A  strong  pressure  was,  however,  still  exerted, 
in  more  or  less  secrecy,  to  keep  men  out  of  the  Union  army,  to 
encourage  their  enlistment  in  the  Confederate  army,  and  to 
obstruct  the  operations  of  the  Union  authorities.  The  young 
men  had  nearly  all  been  seduced  into  the  rebel  service,  at  first 
by  the  cry  that  they  must  fight  for  their  State,  and  next  by 
the  cry  that  they  must  fight  for  slavery,  under  the  name  of 
"  the  South,"  against  their  State.  Recruiting  for  the  Union 
army  went  on  very  slowly,  and  meanwhile,  at  Bowling  Green 
and  Nashville,  Polk  and  Zollicoffer  were  gathering  large  bodies 
of  rebel  troops  to  invade  and  hold  Kentucky. 

Brigadier-General  Anderson,  finding  his  health,  already  deli 
cate,  unequal  to  the  demands  made  upon  his  strength  by  the 
cares  and  responsibilities  of  his  position  under  these  trying 
circumstances,  asked  the  War  Department  to  relieve  him  from 
command.  His  request  was  complied  with,  and  on  the  7th  of 
October  he  was  relieved  by  Brigadier-General  Sherman,  then 
in  command  of  a  brigade  at  Lexington. 

General  Sherman  at  once  set  to  work  with  great  energy  to 
organize  his  department,  and  prepare  the  troops  for  the  task 
before  them. 

The  quota  of  volunteers  which  Kentucky  was  called  upon 
to  raise  was  forty  thousand,  and  with  these  General  Sherman 
was  expected  by  the  "War  Department  to  defend  the  State  and 
drive  the  enemy  from  her  soil.  They  were  raised  very  slowly, 
and  but  few  reinforcements  came  from  any  quarter.  At  the 
close  of  October,  Sherman  had  succeeded  in  collecting  and  or 
ganizing  a  force  of  nine  thousand  men  at  Lexington,  and  ten 
thousand  in  front  of  Louisville.  The  enemy  had  at  the  same 
time  about  fifteen  thousand  at  Bowling  Green,  under  Buckner, 
and  a  strong  force  at  Cumberland  Gap,  under  Zollicoffer. 
Bowling  Green  is  the  key  to  the  military  possession  of  Cen- 


THE  SECESSION  JUGGLE  IN  KENTUCKY.  Q 

tral  Kentucky,  and  Cumberland  Gap  to  that  of  Eastern 
Kentucky. 

General  McClellan,  who  succeeded  to  the  chief  command  of 
the  army  on  the  1st  of  November,  immediately  adopted  a 
general  plan  of  campaign,  in  which  the  operations  in  the  De 
partment  of  the  Cumberland  were  subordinate  to  and  formed 
a  co-operative  part  of  those  of  the  principal  army  on  the  Po 
tomac  ;  but  the  people,  the  press,  and  the  Administration  had 
become  impatient  of  the  general  inactivity  of  our  forces,  and 
were  clamoring  for  their  advance.  On  the  16th  of  October, 
the  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Cameron,  accompanied  by  Briga 
dier-General  Lorenzo  Thomas,  Adjutant-General  of  the  Army, 
visited  General  Sherman  at  Louisville,  for  the  purpose  of  as 
certaining,  in  a  personal  interview,  the  precise  condition  and 
prospect  of  affairs  in  this  quarter.  Sherman  shared  the  objec 
tions  entertained  by  Lieutenant-General  Scott,  and  now  by 
Major-General  McClellan,  to  what  the  former  termed  "  a  little 
war,"  and  believed,  with  them,  with  all  the  ardor  of  his  tem 
perament,  in  the  necessity  of  concentrated  and  decisive  move 
ments  by  armies  large  enough  not  merely  to  undertake  a  suc 
cessful  advance,  but  to  finish  the  war.  He  did  not,  however, 
as  General  McClellan  seems  to  have  done,  overlook  the  im 
portance  of  schooling  his  troops  by  minor  operations,  and 
keeping  up  their  spirits  by  minor  successes ;  but  he  looked 
further  ahead  than  was  agreeable  in  a  subordinate  commander. 
Short  views,  generally  the  happiest,  are  often  the  wisest ;  but 
it  is  not  always  possible  for  a  man  of  powerful  nervous  organ 
ization,  and  strong  perceptions  of  cause  and  effect,  to  take 
short  views.  He  frequently  sees  the  future  too  clearly  to  con 
template  the  present  with  calmness.  So  it  was  now  with  Sher 
man. 

The  secretary  of  war  asked  him  how  many  troops  he  would 
require  in  his  department.  Sherman  replied,  "  Sixty  thousand 
to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  Kentucky ;  two  hundred  thousand 
to  finish  the  war  in  this  section."  Convinced  of  the  inutility 
of  advancing  against  the  enemy  until  our  strength  would  ren 
der  success  decisive  as  well  as  reasonably  certain,  while  defeat 


42  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

would  not  be  irreparable,  and  aware  of  the  ease  with  which 
the  enemy,  driven  out  of  Kentucky,  could  concentrate  and 
recuperate  in  Tennessee,  and  calling  to  his  aid  the  vast  re 
serves  then  at  his  command,  would  finally  compel  us  hastily  to 
summon  to  the  field  at  the  eleventh  hour,  and  concentrate  upon 
an  advanced  and  exposed  position,  a  much  larger  force  than 
would  have  been  required  in  the  first  instance  ;  perceiving  these 
things  clearly  and  sharply,  he  'could  not  sympathize  with,  or 
even  comprehend  the  spirit  of  his  superiors,  who  were  all  for 
present  success,  and  for  trusting  to-morrow  entirely  to  the  fu 
ture.  On  the  other  hand,  the  secretary  of  war  and  the  adjutant- 
general  could  not  understand  Sherman,  nor  see  the  utility  of  a 
delay  which  they  regarded  as  merely  temporizing.  Looking 
only  at  the  force  of  the  enemy  then  actually  in  arms  in  Sher 
man's  immediate  front,  they  considered  that  he  vastly  over 
estimated  the  obstacles  with  which  he  would  have  to  contend. 
Calculations  of  difficulties  generally  seem  to  earnest  men,  not 
thoroughly  familiar  with  the  subject-matter,  to  spring  from 
timidity  or  want  of  zeal.  In  a  few  days  the  report  of  the 
adjutant-general,  embracing  full  particulars  of  the  condi 
tion  of  all  the  Western  armies,  as  shown  by  this  inspection, 
was  given  to  the  public  in  all  the  newspapers.  In  referring  to 
General  Sherman,  General  Thomas  simply  stated  that  he  had 
said  he  would  require  two  hundred  thousand  men.  Great  ex 
citement  and  indignation  was  occasioned  in  the  popular  mind 
by  this  announcement.  A  writer  for  one  of  the  newspapers 
declared  that  Sherman  was  crazy.  Insanity  is  hard  to  prove  ; 
harder  still  to  disprove,  especially  when  the  suspicion  rests 
upon  a  difference  of  opinion  ;  and  then  the  infirmities  of  great 
minds  are  always  fascinating  to  common  minds.  The  public 
seized  with  avidity  upon  the  anonymous  insinuation,  and  ac 
cepted  it  as  an  established  conclusion. 

On  the  12th  of  November,  Brigadier-General  Don  Carlos 
Buell  was  ordered  by  Major-General  McClellan  to  relieve 
Brigadier-General  Sherman  from  the  command  of  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  Cumberland  ;  and  the  latter  was  ordered  to  report 
to  Major-General  Halleck,  commanding  the  Department  of  the 


THE  SECESSION  JUGGLE  IN  KENTUCKY.  43 

West.  General  Buell  was  at  once  strongly  reinforced,  so  as 
to  enable  him  to  take  the  offensive  during  the  latter  part  of 
winter. 

These  events  embody  the  same  useful  lesson  of  tolerance 
for  the  conflicting  opinions  of  others  that  has  been  pointedly 
taught  us  again  and  again  during  this  war.  At  this  distance 
of  time,  Sherman's  views  seem  scarcely  so  extraordinary  as 
they  did  to  the  public  in  1861.  Many  more  than  two  hundred 
thousand  men  have  been  required  to  hold  permanently  Ken 
tucky  and  Tennessee ;  for,  indeed,  here  as  elsewhere,  we  have 
had  to  contend  not  alone  against  the  force  which  the  enemy 
has  actually  had  in  the  field  at  any  given  time,  but  against 
that  force  augmented  by  the  whole  able-bodied  male  popula 
tion  behind  it. 

Fortunately,  indeed,  under  a  powerful  nervous  organization, 
in  spite  of  the  workings  of  a  myriad  of  irritable  fibres,  there 
lay  at  the  bottom  the  germs  of  a  patience  that  was  to  render 
the  genius  of  Sherman  still  useful  to  the  republic. 

Although  thus  suffering  in  the  popular  estimation  and  in 
the  confidence  of  the  War  Department,  General  Sherman  did 
not  altogether  lose  the  hold  he  had  so  long  maintained  upon 
the  respect  of  his  brother  officers.  The  general-in-chief 
thought  he  might  still  be  useful  in  a  subordinate  capacity, 
although  he  had  failed  to  give  satisfaction  in  command  of  an 
important  department.  Major-General  Halleck,  to  whom  he 
now  reported,  considered  him  competent  to  the  charge  of 
the  rendezvous  for  volunteers  at  the  Be-nton  Barracks,  near 
St.  Louis,  and  assigned  him  to  that  duty.  With  the  monot 
onous  and  endless  details  of  such  a  camp,  Sherman  was 
occupied  during  the  winter  of  1861. 

General  Halleck's  command  was  the  largest  in  extent  of  any 
of  the  departments,  as  organized  at  the  time,  and  was  considered 
by  the  general-in-chief  as  only  inferior  in  importance  to  that 
of  the  Potomac,  to  which  his  personal  attention  was  given. 
It  embraced  two  distinct  theatres  of  operations,  extending  from 
the  line  of  the  Cumberland  Eiver  westward  towards  Kansas, 
and  divided  by  the  Mississippi  River.  Of  these,  the  chief  in 


44  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

importance  was  east  of  the  Mississippi.  The  enemy  held 
Columbus  on  the  Mississippi,  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson 
on  the  Tennessee,  and  Bowling  Green  in  the  adjoining  De 
partment  of  the  Cumberland.  These  positions  gave  him  the 
control  of  Western  and  Central  Kentucky,  and  each  of  them  was 
strongly  fortified  and  occupied  in  large  force.  Major-Gen 
eral  Leonidas  Polk  commanded  at  Columbus,  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  John  B.  Floyd  at  Fort  Donelson,  and  Brigadier-General 
Simon  B.  Buckner  at  Bowling  Green.  The  Cumberland  was 
the  dividing  line  between  the  Department  of  the  Ohio,  com 
manded  by  General  Buell,  and  the  Department  of  the  West. 
It  was  determined  to  endeavor  to  break  through  the  centre 
of  the  enemy's  long  line  by  ascending  the  Cumberland  and 
Tennessee  rivers,  aided  by  a  flotilla  of  gunboats  which  had 
been  prepared  at  Cairo  and  at  St.  Louis,  under  the  command 
of  Captain  A.  H.  Foote,  of  the  navy.  To  Brigadier-General 
Ulysses  S.  Grant,  then  commanding  at  Paducah,  was  assigned 
the  chief  direction  of  the  movement.  Very  little  was  known 
of  this  officer.  He  had  graduated  at  West  Point  in  1843, 
had  served  in  the  Fourth  Infantry  until  1854,  when  having 
risen  to  the  grade  of  captain,  he  resigned  his  commission 
and  settled  in  private  life,  in  Illinois,  as  a  surveyor.  On  the 
breaking  out  of  the  war,  having  offered  his  services  to  Gover 
nor  Yates  in  any  capacity  in  which  he  could  be  useful,  he  was 
for  some  time  engaged  in  assisting  the  adjutant-general  of  the 
State  in  organizing  the  three  months'  volunteers.  On  the  organ 
ization  of  the  three  years'  troops,  he  accepted  the  colonelcy  of 
tne  Sixty-Third  Illinois  regiment,  and  exhibited  such  marked 
efficiency  in  its  instruction  and  discipline,  that  he  was  soon 
commissioned  as  a  brigadier-general  of  volunteers.  He  had 
commanded  the  brigade  engaged  in  the  demonstration  against 
Behnont,  Missouri,  on  the  7th  of  November,  1861. 

Suddenly  the  gloom  of  that  dark  winter,  during  which  our 
large  armies  slept,  our  small  forces  encountered  defeat, 
and  the  signs  of  anarchy  gathered  ominously  from  every 
quarter,  was  broken  by  a  victory.  Fort  Henry  was  taken  by 
Brigadier-General  Grant  on  the  6th  February,  1862.  Or- 


THE   SECESSION  JUGGLE  IN  KENTUCKY.  45 

the  16tli  of  the  same  month,  Fort  Donelson  surrendered  un 
conditionally  to  the  same  officer,  with  a  garrison  of  about 
twelve  thousand  men.  In  answer  to  the  xequest  of  the  rebel 
commander  Buckner,  for  a  parley  and  more  favorable  terms, 
Grant  replied  that  he  could  consent  to  no  terms  but  those  of 
unconditional  surrender,  and  tersely  added,  "I  propose  to 
move  immediately  upon  your  works."  A  shout  of  joy  rang 
throughout  the  land.  Grant  was  made  a  major-general  with 
out  an  hour's  delay.  In  a  fervid  letter  to  the  New  York 
Tribune,  the  Secretary  of  "War,  Mr.  Stanton,  vented  his  en 
thusiasm  in  raptures  over  the  unconditional  surrender,  and 
cited  with  admiration  the  proposal  to  move  immediately  upon 
the  enemy's  works.  Grant  was  the  hero  of  the  hour. 

By  the  President's  "War  Order,  No.  3,  dated  March  11, 1862, 
relieving  Major-General  McClellan  from  the  chief  command 
of  the  army,  Major-General  Halleckwas  assigned  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  Department  of  the  Mississippi,  embracing  all  the 
troops  west  of  a  line  drawn  indefinitely  north  and  south 
through  Knoxville,  Tennessee,  and  east  of  the  western  bound 
aries  of  Missouri  and  Arkansas.  Major-General  Grant  was 
shortly  afterwards  assigned  by  General  Halleck  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  army  in  the  field,  operating  on  the  line  of  the 
Tennessee  River. 

"When  Grant  moved  upon  Fort  Donelson,  Sherman  was  or 
dered  to  Paducah,  to  take  charge  of  the  duty  of  forwarding 
supplies  and  reinforcements  from  that  point.  He  set  to  work 
with  a  characteristic  energy  that  must  have  found  room  enough 
to  expand  itself,  for  troops  were  hard  to  move  in  those  days, 
and  supplies,  owing  to  the  greenness  of  some  and  the  rusti- 
ness  of  other  officers  of  the  quartermaster's  department, 
harder  still.  General  Grant  took  occasion  to  acknowledge  the 
great  importance  of  the  services  thus  rendered. 

The  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  after  some  changes,  was 
finally  organized  in  six  divisions,  of  which  Major-General  John 
A.  McClernand  commanded  the  first ;  Major-General  Charles 
F.  Smith,  the  second ;  Brigadier-General  Lewis  Wallace,  the 
third;  Brigadier-General  Stephen  A.  Hurlbut,  the  fourth; 


46  SHEIptAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Brigadier-General  "William  T.  Sherman,  the  fifth ;  and  Briga 
dier-General  B.  M.  Prentiss,  the  sixth.  The  fifth  division  was 
composed  almost  entirely  of  the  rawest  troops,  hastily  gathered 
together  and  thrown  into  brigades,  none  of  whom  had  ever 
been  under  fire,  or,  indeed,  under  discipline.  Sherman  took 
command  of  his  division  at  Paducah  early  in  March. 

During  all  this  time  the  public  heard  nothing  of  Sherman. 
The  press  said  nothing  against  him ;  it  had  ostracised  and 
then  forgotten  him.  He  was  under  a  cloud  still,  but  it  was 
about  to  lift  for  a  brief  period. 


SHILOH.  „  47 


CHAPTEE    IV. 

SHILOH. 

THE  enemy's  forces  under  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  consisting 
of  the  corps  of  Polk,  Bragg,  and  Hardee,  of  two  divisions 
each,  and  the  reserve  division  of  Brigadier-General  Breckin- 
ridge,  having  successively  evacuated  Columbus  and  Nashville, 
and  abandoned  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  with  the  exception 
of  Memphis  and  Cumberland  Gap,  had  concentrated  at  Cor 
inth,  in  Mississippi,  and  were  there  awaiting  the  development 
of  our  plans,  ready  to  act  according  to  circumstances,  on  the 
offensive  or  defensive,  and  to  take  advantage  of  any  error  we 
might  make.  The  position  was  well  chosen  for  observing  our 
movements,  for  covering  the  line  of  the  Mississippi,  or  for 
menacing  the  flank  and  rear  of  an  army  invading  Mississippi 
.  and  Alabama. 

General  Halleck  decided  to  advance  up  the  Tennessee  River 
as  far  as  practicable  by  water ;  then  to  debark  on  the  west 
bank,  attack  the  enemy  at  Corinth,  and  endeavor  to  cut  him 
off  from  the  East,  and  compel  his  surrender  either  at  Corinth 
or  on  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi.  Grant  was  ordered  to 
move  up  the  Tennessee,  and  Buell  to  march  from  Nashville 
and  join  him  near  Savannah,  Tennessee. 

On  the  14th  of  March,  Sherman,  with  the  leading  division 
of  Grant's  army,  passed  up  the  Tennessee  on  transports,  and 
after  making  a  feint  of  landing  at  Eastport,  dropped  down  the 
stream  and  disembarked  at  Pittsburgh  Landing.  It  was  Sher 
man's  intention  to  march  from  this  point  seven  miles  in  the 
direction  of  luka,  and  then  halting  his  infantry,  to  dispatch 
the  cavalry  to  the  nearest  point  on  the  Memphis  and  Charles- 


48  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

ton  railway.  The  attempt  was  made,  but  the  enemy  was  en 
countered  in  greater  force  than  had  been  expected,  and  it  did 
not  succeed.  In  the  mean  while,  Major-General  Charles  F. 
Smith,  who  had  command  of  the  advance,  having  landed  his 
own  second  division  at  Savannah,  had  selected  Pittsburgh 
Landing  as  the  most  favorable  position  for  the  encampment 
.of  the  main  body  of  the  army,  and  under  his  instructions 
Sherman  and  Huiibut,  who,  with  the  fourth  division,  had 
closely  followed  him,  went  into  camp  there.  In  the  course  of 
a  few  days  they  were  joined  by  the  'first  and  sixth  divisions  of 
McClernand  and  Prentiss,  and  by  Smith's  own  division  from 
Savannah  ;  and  Major-General  Grant  himself  arrived  and  took 
command  in  person.  During  the  last  week  of  March,  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  only  waited  for  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio.  General  Buell  had  informed  General  Grant  that  he 
would  join  him  before  that  time ;  but  he  had  encountered 
great  delays,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  sixth  of  April  the 
Army  of  the  Ohio  had  not  yet  come.  It  was  hourly  expected. 
Instructions  had  been  sent  by  General  Grant  to  expedite  its 
advance,  and  to  push  on  to  Pittsburgh.  The  importance  of 
the  crisis  was  apparent,  for  Johnston  would  naturally  seek  to 
strike  Grant  before  Buell' s  arrival ;  but  Buell  marched  his 
troops  with  the  same  deliberation  as  if  no  other  army  depended 
upon  his  promptness.  By  express  orders  he  even  caused  in 
tervals  of  six  miles  to  be  observed  between  his  divisions  on 
the  march,  thus  lengthening  out  his  column  to  a  distance  of 
over  thirty  miles. 

Pittsburgh  is  not  a  village,  but  simply  a  steamboat  landing, 
containing  a  log  hut  or  two,  and  is  situated  in  a  deep  ravine, 
down  which  the  Corinth  road  leads  to  the  Tennessee  Biver. 
The  distance  to  Corinth  is  twenty  miles.  The  ground  in  front 
of  Pittsburgh  is  an  undulating  table-land,  about  a  hundred 
feet  above  the  road  bottom,  lying  between  two  small  tribu 
taries  of  the  Tennessee,  Lick  Creek  on  the  south,  and  Snake 
Creek  on  the  north,  and  having  a  front  of  about  three  miles 
between  the  two  streams.  Owl  Creek  rises  near  the  source  of 
Lick  Creek,  and  flowing  northeasterly,  empties  into  Snake 


SHILOH.  49 

Creek.  Towards  the  river  the  bank  is  broken  into  abrupt 
ravines,  and  rises  gradually  to  a  range  of  low  hills,  which 
form  the  steep  north  banks  of  Lick  Creek.  The  country  is 
covered  with  a  heavy  forest,  easily  passable  for  troops,  except 
where  the  dense  undergrowth  now  and  then  constitutes  an 
obstruction,  and  is  sparsely  broken  by  a  few  small  cleared 
farms  of  about  eighty  acres  each.  The  soil  is  a  tenacious 
clay.  About  two  miles  from  the  landing  the  road  to  Corinth 
forks  into  two  branches,  forming  the  Lower  Corinth  road  and 
the  Ridge  Corinth  road ;  and  another  road  leads  off,  still  fur 
ther  to  the  left,  across  Lick  Creek  to  Hamburgh,  a  few  miles 
up  the  Tennessee  River.  On  the  right,  two  roads  lead  almost 
due  west  to  Purdy,  and  another  in  a  northerly  direction  across 
Snake  Creek,  down  the  river  to  Crump's  Landing,  six  miles 
below.  Innumerable  smaller  roads  intersect  these. 

On  the  front  of  this  position,  facing  to  the  south  and  south 
west,  five  divisions  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  were  encamped 
on  the  morning  of  the  6th  of  April.  On  the  extreme  left  lay 
Stuart's  brigade  of  Sherman's  division,  on  the  Hamburgh 
road,  behind  the  abrupt  bank  of  Lick  Creek.  Prentiss's  small 
division,  facing  to  the  south,  carried  the  line  across  a  branch 
of  the  main  Corinth  road,  nearly  to  Sherman's  left.  Sherman 
facing  to  the  south,  with  his  right  thrown  back  towards  the 
landing,  extended  the  front  to  the  Purdy  road,  near  Owl  Creek. 
This  advanced  line  was  about  two  miles  from  the  landing. 
Near  the  river,  about  a  mile  in  rear  of  Prentiss  and  Stuart, 
Hurlbut's  division  was  encamped ;  McClernand's  was  posted 
to  the  left  and  rear  of  Sherman,  covering  the  interval  between 
him  and  Prentiss ;  and  C.  F.  Smith's  division,  commanded 
during  his  severe  illness  at  Savannah  by  Brigadier-General 
W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  was  on  the  right  of  Hurlbut.  Lewis  Wal 
lace's  division  was  six  miles  distant,  at  Crump's  Landing. 
Our  whole  force  in  front  of  Pittsburgh  was  about  thirty  thou 
sand  men. 

On  Friday,  the  4th  of  April,  the  enemy's  cavalry  had  made  a 
demonstration  upon  the  picket  line,  drove  it  in  on  Sherman's 
centre,  and  captured  a  lieutenant  and  seven  men.  They  were 

4 


50  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

driven  back  by  the  cavalry  of  Sherman's  division,  and  pursued 
for  a  distance  of  about  five  miles,  with  considerable  loss.  The 
next  day  the  enemy's  cavalry  had  again  showed  itself  in  our 
front,  but  there  was  nothing  to  indicate  a  general  attack  until 
seven  o'clock  on  Sunday  morning,  when  the  advance  guard  on 
Sherman's  front  was  forced  in  upon  his  main  line.  Sherman 
at  once  got  his  men  under  arms,  sent  a  request  to  General 
McClernand  to  support  his  left,  and  informed  Generals  Pren- 
tiss  and  Hurlbut  that  the  enemy  was  before  him  in  force.  Sher 
man's  division  was  posted  as  follows  :  The  first  brigade,  under 
Colonel  J.  A.  McDowell,  consisting  of  his  own  regiment,  the 
6th  Iowa ;  40th  Illinois,  Colonel  Hicks ;  46th  Ohio,  Colonel 
Worthington,  and  Captain  Behr's  "  Morton"  Battery  held  the 
right,  guarding  the  bridge  over  Owl  Creek,  on  the  Purdy  road. 
The  fourth  brigade,  commanded  by  Colonel  Buckland  of  the 
72d  Ohio,  and  including  that  regiment ;  the  48th  Ohio,  Colo 
nel  Sullivan,  and  the  70th  Ohio,  Colonel  Cockerill,  continued 
the  line,  its  left  resting  on  Shiloh  meeting-house.  The  third 
brigade,  commanded  by  Colonel  Hildebrand  of  the  77th  Ohio, 
was  composed  of  that  regiment,  the  53d  Ohio,  Colonel  Ap 
pier,  and  the  57th  Ohio,  Colonel  Mungen,  and  was  posted 
to  the  left  of  the  Corinth  road,  its  right  resting  on  Shiloh 
meeting-house.  Taylor's  battery  of  light  artillery  was  in 
position  at  the  meeting-house,  and  Waterhouse's  on  a  ridge 
to  the  left  commanding  the  open  ground  between  Appier's 
and  Mungen's  regiments.  Eight  companies  of  the  4th  Illinois 
cavalry,  Colonel  Dickey,  were  placed  in  a  large  open  field  in 
rear  of  the  centre  of  the  division.  Stuart's  second  brigade 
was,  as  we  have  seen,  detached,  and  on  the  extreme  left  of 
the  army. 

The  enemy  formed  under  cover  of  the  brush  that  lines  the 
Owl  Creek  bottom,  and  at  eight  o'clock  opened  fire  from  his 
artillery,  and  moved  forward  his  infantry  across  the  open 
ground  and  up  the  slope  that  separated  him  from  our  lines. 
It  now  became  evideat  that  a  general  and  determined  attack 
was  intended.  Under  cover  of  the  advance  on  Sherman's 
front,  the  enemy  was  seen  moving  heavy  masses  to  the  left  to 


SHILOH.  51 

attack  Prentiss.  About  nine,  the  firing  told  that  Prentiss  was 
giving  ground,  and  presently  Colonel  Appier's  Fifty-third 
Ohio  and  Colonel  Mungen's  Fifty-seventh  Ohio  regiments 
broke  in  disorder,  exposing  Waterhouse's  battery.  A  brigade 
of  McClernand's  division,  which  had  been  promptly  moved 
forward  by  General  McClernand  to  the  support  of  Sherman's 
left,  formed  the  immediate  supports  of  this  battery ;  but  the 
enemy  advanced  with  such  vigor,  and  kept  up  so  severe  a  fire, 
that  the  three  regiments  composing  it  were  soon  also  in  dis 
order,  and  the  battery  was  lost.  McDowell's  and  Buckland's 
brigades,  and  the  remaining  regiment  of  Hildebrand's  brigade, 
maintained  the  position  at  Shiloh  for  an  hour  longer ;  but  ten 
o'clock  found  the  enemy  pressing  heavily  upon  Sherman's 
front,  their  artillery  supported  by  infantry  entirely  in  rear  of 
the  left  flank  of  the  division,  and  Hildebrand's  own  regiment 
broken  up  also ;  so  that  it  was  found  necessary  to  change 
position  at  once,  and  Sherman  accordingly  gave  orders 
to  retire  his  line  to  the  Purdy  and  Hamburgh  road,  near 
McClernand's  first  position,  and  there  continue  the  defence. 
Taylor's  battery  was  sent  to  the  rear  at  once  to  take  up 
the  new  position,  and  hold  the  enemy  in  check  while  the 
movement  was  in  progress.  Riding  across  the  angle,  General 
Sherman  met,  at  the  intersection  of  this  road  with  the 
Corinth  road,  Captain  Behr's  battery,  attached  to  Colonel 
McDowell's  brigade,  and  ordered  it  to  come  into  battery. 
The  captain  had  hardly  given  the  order  to  his  men,  when 
he  was  struck  by  a  musket-ball  and  fell  from  his  horse. 
Dismayed,  the  drivers  and  gunners  incontinently  fled  without 
firing  a  single  shot,  carrying  with  them  the  caissons  and  one 
gun,  and  abandoning  the  other  six  to  the  enemy,  who  was 
vigorously  pressing  forward.  General  Sherman  being  thus 
reduced  to  the  necessity  of  again  choosing  a  new  line,  and  of 
abandoning  the  attempt  to  maintain  his  old  one,  promptly  moved 
the  coherent  remainder  of  his  division,  consisting  of  Colonel 
McDowell's  and  Colonel  Buckland's  brigades,  Captain  Tay 
lor's  battery,  and  three  guns  of  Captain  Waterhouse's  battery, 
to  the  support  of  General  McClernand's  right,  which  was  just 


52  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

then  seriously  menaced.  At  half-past  ten  the  enemy  made  a 
furions  attack  on  the  whole  front  of  McClernand's  division, 
and  for  some  time  pressed  it  hard ;  but  the  opportune  move 
ment  of  Colonel  McDowell's  brigade  directly  against  his  left 
flank,  forced  him  back,  and  relieved  the  pressure.  Taking 
advantage  of  the  cover  which  the  trees  and  felled  timber 
afforded,  and  of  a  wooded  ravine  on  the  right,  Sherman  held 
this  position  for  four  hours,  stubbornly  contesting  it  with  the 
enemy,  who  continued  to  make  the  most  determined  efforts  to 
drive  us  back  upon  the  river.  General  Grant  visited  this  part 
of  the  lines  about  three  in  the  afternoon,  conversed  with  Mc- 
Clernand  and  Sherman,  and  informed  them  of  the  condition 
of  affairs  on  the  other  parts  of  the  field,  where  our  resistance 
had  been  less  successful.  An  hour  later  it  became  evident  to 
both  the  division  commanders,  from  the  sounds  heard  in  that 
direction,  that  Hurlbut  had  fallen  back  towards  the  river ;  and 
having  been  informed  by  General  Grant  that  General  Lewis 
Wallace  was  on  his  way  from  Crump's  Landing  with  his  entire 
division,  they  agreed  upon  a  new  line  of  defence,  covering  the 
bridge  over  Snake  Creek,  by  which  these  reinforcements  were 
expected  to  approach.  The  retirement  to  the  position  so 
selected  was  made  deliberately,  and  in  as  good  order  as  could 
have  been  expected.  Many  stragglers  and  fragments  of  troops 
were  encountered  during  the  movement,  and  united  with  the 
two  divisions.  The  enemy's  cavalry  attempting  a  charge  was 
handsomely  repulsed.  The  Fifth  Ohio  cavalry  arriving  upon 
the  ground,  held  the  enemy  in  check  for  some  time,  until 
Major  Ezra  Taylor,  chief  of  artillery  of  Sherman's  division, 
came  up  with  Schwartz's  battery  of  McClernand's  division, 
and  opened  an  effective  fire  upon  the  enemy's  flank  as  he 
pressed  forward  against  McClernand's  right.  McClernand 
having  now  deployed  his  division  on  its  new  line,  ordered  a 
charge,  which  was  handsomely  executed,  driving  the  enemy 
from  his  front,  and  forcing  them  to  seek  cover  in  the  ravines 
in  advance  of  our  right.  It  was  now  five  o'clock.  The  new 
line  had  been  well  selected,  and  afforded  us  a  decided  advan 
tage,  the  ground  along  its  front  being  open  for  a  distance  of 


SHILOH.  53 

about  two  hundred  yards.  The  enemy's  momentum  was  spent, 
and  he  did  not  afterwards  attempt  to  cross  this  open  space. 

On  the  left  the  day  had  scarcely  gone  so  well.  The  weight 
of  the  enemy's  attack  was  chiefly  directed  against  this  wing. 
The  two  brigades  of  Prentiss  gave  way  early  in  the  morning, 
and  drifted  to  the  rear  as  Hurlbut  advanced  to  their  support, 
and  by  ten  o'clock  the  division  had  melted  aVay.  Hurlbut 
made  a  gallant  fight,  obstinately  contesting  the  ground  with 
varying  success,  until  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  when  his 
division  also  was  pressed  to  the  rear,  and  the  whole  line  com 
pelled  to  retire.  Smith's  division,  under  the  command  of 
Brigadier-General  W.  H.  L.  "Wallace,  had  been  moved  upon 
Hurlbut's  right,  and  had  materially  aided  in  holding  our 
ground  there,  but  had  in  its  turn  been  forced  back.  Colonel 
Stuart's  brigade  held  the  extreme  left  until  the  pressure  of 
the  enemy  on  its  front,  and  the  exposure  of  its  flank  by  the 
disaster  to  Prentiss,  forced  it  successively  to  take  up  new  lines 
of  defence  on  the  ridges  which  broke  the  ground  towards  the 
river.  Our  troops  held  this  last  line  firmly.  It  was  now  after 
six  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  The  battle  had  lasted  nearly 
twelve  hours.  Our  troops  had  been  driven  from  all  their  camps 
of  the  morning,  except  Wallace's,  to  the  line  of  woods  in  the 
rear,  had  been  dislodged  from  that  position,  and  again  pressed 
back,  and  now  held  a  line  perpendicular  to  the  river,  with  its 
left  resting  on  the  bluff  behind  which  the  landing  was  situated, 
and  only  half  a  mile  from  it.  The  enemy  gathered  up  his 
forces,  and  made  a  last  desperate  effort  to  gain  this  position. 
But  his  losses  had  been  very  heavy,  his  troops  were  much 
shaken  by  the  hard  fighting  they  had  encountered,  and  the 
spirit  which  characterized  their  first  onset  in  the  morning  had 
burned  out.  Cheatham's  division  and  Gladden's  brigade, 
which  now  held  the  extreme  right  of  the  Confederate  line  on 
the  river,  lay  directly  under  the  fire  of  our  artillery.  They 
attempted  to  take  it,  but  were  repulsed  in  great  disorder. 

A  galling  fire  of  artillery  and  musketry  was  poured  into  them  ; 
and  the  gunboats  "  Lexington"  and  "  Tyler"  swept  the  flanks 
with  their  nine-inch  shell.  Their  troops  were  re-formed  with 


54  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

difficulty.  Night  was  closing  in.  General  Beauregard  gave 
the  orders  to  retire  out  of  range,  and  the  battle  was  over. 

Darkness  fell  upon  the  disordered  and  confused  remnants 
of  two  large  armies.  In  each  the  losses  had  been  very  heavy, 
the  straggling  fearful,  and  the  confusion  almost  inextricable. 
But  the  enemy  had  failed.  He  had  attempted  to  force  us  back 
upon  the  river  land  compel  our  surrender,  and  had  not  done  so. 
In  the  morning  we  would  attack  him  and  seek  to  drive  him 
from  the  field.  General  Grant  had  given  verbal  orders  to 
that  effect  to  General  Sherman  about  3  P.  M.,  before  the  last 
repulse  of  the  enemy. 

General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  the  Confederate  eoni- 
mander-in-chief,  was  mortally  wounded  in  front  of  Sherman's 
division,  and  died  shortly  afterwards  at  half-past  two  o'clock. 
Two  regiments  of  Nelson's  division,  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
crossed  the  river,  and  arrived  upon  the  extreme  left  of  the 
field  about  six  o'clock,  in  time  to  fire  a  few  shots  just  before 
the  final  repulse.  As  Nelson's  troops  came  up,  they  met  an 
appalling  sight.  A  crowd  of  from  seven  to  ten  thousand 
panic-stricken  wretches  thronged  the  landing,  crouching  be 
hind  trees  and  under  the  bluff  to  avoid  the  enemy's  shell, 
which  had  begun  to  drop  in  among  them,  and  giving  vent  to 
the  most  sickening  cries  that  we  were  whipped,  and  cut  to 
pieces,  and  imploring  their  newly-arrived  comrades  to  share 
their  shame.  But  the  gallant  men  of  Nelson's  division  were 
unmoved  by  the  scene,  and  greeted  the  loathsome  pack  with 
jeers  and  sarcasm.  It  is  perhaps  natural  enough  that  those 
who  saw  only  the  stragglers  should  have  found  it  hard  to  be 
lieve  that  any  one  had  fought.  Yet  the  greater  portion  of  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  had  stood  to  their  arms,  and  had  re 
pulsed  the  enemy. 

The  troops  slept  that  night  in  good  spirits,  although  about 
midnight  they  were  drenched  by  the  heavy  rain  which  began 
to  fall.  They  knew  that  the  enemy  had  failed,  that  Lewis 
Wallace  would  be  up  during  the  night,  that  Buell  was  arriv 
ing,  and  that  in  the  morning  these  fresh  battalions  would  be 
hurled  against  the  shaken  and  broken  foe.  The  "  Lexington'* 


SHILOH.  55 

dropped  a  shell  into  the  enemy's  lines  every  ten  minutes,  until 

1  A.M.,  when  the  "Tyler"  took  her  turn   at  the  same  task, 
firing  every  quarter  of  an  hour  till  daylight.     The  demoraliz 
ing  shriek  of  the  navy  shells,  while  it  robbed  the  enemy  of  rest, 
was  inspiring  music  to  the  ears  of  our  wearied  troops.     Dur 
ing  the  night  the  remainder  of  Nelson's  division  crossed  the 
river,  and  took  position  in  the  left  front ;  and  later  came  Crit- 
tenden's  division,  followed  by  McCook's,  successively  extending 
the  line  to   the   right   and   connecting   with   Huiibut's   left. 
Lewis  Wallace  arrived  about  1  A.  M.,  and  came  into  position 
on  Sherman's  right. 

Daybreak  of  the  7th  found  the  enemy  out  of  sight  in  our 
front.  He  showed  no  signs  of  advancing.  Beauregard  did 
not  know  that  Buell  had  come,  and  yet  he  did  not  attack. 
As  soon  as  it  was  fairly  light,  the  division  commanders  re 
ceived  the  orders  promised  by  General  Grant  at  the  close  of 
the  previous  day's  battle,  to  move  upon  the  enemy  and  drive  him 
from  our  front.  By  six  o'clock  our  artillery  opened  fire  on  the 
left.  About  seven,  Nelson,  Crittenden,  and  McCook  pushed 
forward,  and  by  ten  were  warmly  engaged  with  the  enemy  in  a 
contest  for  the  possession  of  the  old  camps.  Hurlbut,  Mc- 
Clernand,  Sherman,  and  Wallace  now  moved  steadily  forward. 
The  open  fields  in  front  of  the  log  church  of  Shiloh  were 
reached.  The  enemy's  position  here  was  a  strong  one,  and 
he  contested  it  obstinately.  For  more  than  three  hours  he 
held  his  ground  in  the  scrub-oak  thicket.  But  by  one  o'clock 
his  weakness  had  become  apparent.  He  was  yielding  every 
where,  and  giving  palpable  signs  of  exhaustion.  General 
Beauregard  gave  orders  to  withdraw  from  the  contest.  About 

2  P.  M.  his  right  retired,  and  two  hours  later  his  left  followed. 
The  movement  was  made  in  tolerable  order.     Near  the  junc 
tion  of  the  Hamburgh  and  Pittsburgh  road  with  the  Ham 
burgh  and  Corinth  road,  his  rear-guard  under  Breckinridge 
made  a  stand ;  and  the  next  day  his  retreat  was  continued  to 
Corinth.     On  the  8th,  Sherman,  with  two  brigades,  followed 
Breckinridge  to  the  point  where  he  made  his  first  stand.     But 
our  troops  were  worn  out,  disorganized,  out  of  supplies,  and 


56  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

in  no  condition  to  enter  upon  a  campaign.  They  returned  to 
Pittsburgh  to  refit  and  reorganize.  Sherman  lost  318  killed, 
1,275  wounded,  and  441  missing;  total,  2,034.  Brigadier- 
General  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  was  killed  during  the  first  day,  and 
Brigadier-General  B.  M.  Prentiss  taken  prisoner,  and  their 
divisions  broken  up  and  distributed. 

The  enemy  went  into  battle  on  the  6th  with  forty  thousand 
three  hundred  and  fifty-five  effective  men.  His  losses,  as 
stated  by  General  Beauregard  in  his  official  report,  were,  in 
killed,  1,728;  wounded,  8,012;  missing,  959;  total,  10,699. 
General  Beauregard  says  :  "  On  Monday,  from  exhaustion  and 
other  causes,  not  twenty  thousand  men  could  be  brought  into 
action  on  our  side."  If  we  suppose  two-thirds  of  the  casual 
ties  to  have  occurred  on  Sunday,  there  should  still  have  been 
over  thirty-eight  thousand  men  with  the  rebel  colors  on  Mon 
day  ;  and  even  imagining,  for  the  sake  of  illustration,  that  all 
the  losses  took  place  on  the  first  day,  the  enemy  should  have 
had  nearly  thirty-five  thousand  fighting  men  on  the  second. 
Yet  that  number  was  less  than  twenty  thousand.  Here  are 
from  fifteen  to  eighteen  thousand  men  to  be  accounted  for,  or 
about  half  of  his  remaining  force.  These  are  the  stragglers. 

General  Beauregard,  in  his  official  report,  estimate  the 
Union  forces  engaged  on  Sunday  at  forty-five  thousand,  the 
remnant  of  General  Grant's  forces  on  Monday  morning  at 
twenty  thousand,  and  the  reinforcements  received  during  the 
preceding  night  at  thirty-three  thousand,  making  fifty-three 
thousand  arrayed  against  him  on  that  day,  or  seventy-eight 
thousand  on  both  days ;  and  he  set  down  our  aggregate  losses 
at  twenty  thousand. 

The  enemy's  troops  were  comparatively  old.  Bragg's  corps 
had  been  under  fire  at  Pensacola ;  Polk's,  at  Columbus ;  and 
Hardee's,  at  Mill  Spring,  in  Kentucky.  A  considerable  por 
tion  of  them  had  been  organized  and  drilled  since  the  summer 
of  1861,  but  there  was  also  a  large  infusion  of  new  regiments 
and  new  men,  troops  which  had  never  been  under  fire,  and 
militia  just  from  the  States.  The  commander-in-chief,  Gen 
eral  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  was  one  of  the  ablest  officers  of 


SHILOH.  57 

the  old  regular  army  of  the  United  States.  General  Beaure- 
gard,  his  second  in  command,  had  been  known  as  a  skilful 
officer  of  engineers,  and  by  the  exercise  of  his  popular  talents 
had  suddenly  achieved  a  reputation  which  his  subsequent  his 
tory  has  failed  to  sustain.  Of  Grant's  army  only  two  divisions 
had  been  under  fire.  Sherman's,  Prentiss's,  Hurlbut's,  and 
Lewis  Wallace's  were  all  new  and  raw. 

The  Union  soldiers  showed  that  they  could  fight,  and  that 
they  would.  They  proved  themselves  superior  to  defeat. 
General  Sherman  says  in  his  official  report : — 

"  My  division  was  made  up  of  regiments  perfectly  new,  all 
having  received  their  muskets  for  the  first  time  at  Paducah. 
None  of  them  had  ever  been  under  fire,  or  beheld  heavy 
columns  of  an  enemy  bearing  down  on  them,  as  this  did  on 
last  Sunday.  To  expect  of  them  the  coolness  and  steadiness 
of  older  troops  would  be  wrong.  They  knew  not  the  value  of 
combination  and  organization.  "When  individual  fear  seized 
them,  the  first  impulse  was  to  get  away.  My  third  brigade 
did  break  much  too  soon,  and  I  am  not  yet  advised  where 
they  were  Sunday  afternoon  and  Monday  morning.  Colonel 
Hildebrand,  its  commander,  was  as  cool  as  any  man  I  ever 
saw,  and  no  one  could  have  made  stronger  efforts  to  hold  his 
men  to  their  places  than  he  did.  He  kept  his  own  regiment, 
with  individual  exceptions,  in  hand  an  hour  after  Appier's  and 
Mungen's  regiments  had  left  their  proper  field  of  action. 
Colonel  Buckland  managed  his  brigade  well.  I  commend 
him  to  your  notice  as  a  cool,  intelligent,  and  judicious  gentle 
man,  needing  only  confidence  and  experience  to  make  a  good 
commander.  His  subordinates,  Colonels  Sullivan  and  Cocker- 
ill,  behaved  with  great  gallantry,  the  former  receiving  a  severe 
wound  on  Sunday,  and  yet  commanding  and  holding  his  regi 
ment  well  in  hand  all  day  ;  and  on  Monday  until  his  right  arm 
was  broken  by  a  shot,  Cockerill  held  a  larger  proportion  of  his 
men  than  any  colonel  in  my  division,  and  was  with  me  from 
first  to  last.  Colonel  J.  A.  McDowell,  commanding  the  first 
brigade,  held  his  ground  on  Sunday  till  I  ordered  him  to  fall 
bick,  which  he  did  in  line  of  battle  ;  and  when  ordered,  he  con- 


58  SHERMAN   AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

ducted  the  attack  on  the  enemy's  left  in  good  style.  In  falling 
back  to  the  next  position  he  was  thrown  from  his  horse  and 
injured,  and  his  brigade  was  not  in  position  on  Monday  morn 
ing.  His  subordinates,  Colonels  Hicks  and  Worthington, 
displayed  great  personal  courage.  Colonel  Hicks  led  his  regi 
ment  in  the  attack  on  Sunday,  and  received  a  wound  which  is 
feared  may  prove  fatal.  He  is  a  brave  and  gallant  gentleman, 
and  deserves  well  of  his  country.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Walcutt, 
of  the  Ohio  Forty-sixth,  was  severely  wounded  on  Sunday, 
and  has  been  disabled  ever  since.  My  second  brigade,  Colo 
nel  Stuart,  was  detached  near  two  miles  from  my  headquarters. 
He  had  to  fight  his  own  battle  on  Sunday  against  superior 
numbers,  as  the  enemy  interposed  between  him  and  General 
Prentiss  early  in  the  day.  Colonel  Stuart  was  wounded 
severely,  and  yet  reported  for  duty  on  Monday  morning,  but 
was  compelled  to  leave  during  the  day,  when  the  command 
devolved  on  Colonel  T.  Kilby  Smith,  who  was  always  in  the 
thickest  of  the  fight,  and  led  the  brigade  handsomely.  .  .  . 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Kyle,  of  the  Seventy-first  was  mortally 
wounded  on  Sunday.  .  .  .  Several  times  during  the  battle 
cartridges  gave  out,  but  General  Grant  had  thoughtfully  kept 
a  supply  coming  from  the  rear.  When  I  appealed  to  regiments 
to  stand  fast  although  out  of  cartridges,  I  did  so  because  to 
retire  a  regiment  for  any  cause  has  a  bad  effect  on  others.  I 
commend  the  Fortieth  Illinois  and  Thirteenth  Missouri  for 
thus  holding  their  ground  under  heavy  fire,  although  their 
cartridge-boxes  were  empty.  Great  credit  is  due  the  frag 
ments  of  men  of  the  disordered  regiments,  who  kept  in  the 
advance.  I  observed  and  noticed  them,  but  until  the  briga 
diers  and  colonels  make  their  reports,  I  cannot  venture  to  name 
individuals,  but  will  in  due  season  notice  all  who  kept  in  our 
front,  as  well  as  those  who  preferred  to  keep  back  near  the 
steamboat  landing." 

Sherman  was  everywhere ;  encouraging  his  troops,  rallying 
the  stragglers,  directing  the  batteries  with  his  own  hands,  ad 
vising  with  other  commanders,  superintending  every  movement 
in  person.  Those  who  still  fancied  him  crazy  did  not,  after 


SHILOH.  59 

this,  deny  his  energy,  coolness,  courage,  skill,  and  persever 
ance  upon  the  battle-field.  This  was  his  first  battle,  and  yet 
so  ingrained  were  the  details  of  war  upon  his  mind,  that  his 
spirit  leaped  at  once  above  the  novelty  of  the  situation,  and 
wore  the  new  experience  like  an  old  habit.  On  Sunday,  he  was 
wounded  by  a  bullet  through  the  left  hand,  but  bandaged  it,' 
and  went  on  with  his  work.  On  Monday,  he  was  again  wounded, 
and  had  three  horses  shot  under  him,  but  mounted  a  fourth 
and  stayed  on  the  field. 

General  Grant  says,  in  his  official  report,  otherwise  suffi 
ciently  formal :  "  I  feel  it  a  duty  to  a  gallant  and  able  officer, 
Brigadier-General  TV.  T.  Sherman,  to  make  special  mention. 
He  not  only  was  with  his  command  during  the  entire  two  days 
of  the  action,  but  displayed  great  judgment  and  skill  in  the 
management  of  his  men.  Although  severely  wounded  in  the 
hand  on  the  first  day,  his  place  was  never  vacant." 

A  few  days  later,  Major-General  Halleck,  not  given  to  un 
mixed  praise,  having  arrived  upon  the  ground,  went  so  far 
as  to  observe,  "  It  is  the  unanimous  opinion  here  that  Briga 
dier-General  TV.  T.  Sherman  saved  the  fortunes  of  the  day  on 
the  6th,  and  contributed  largely  to  the  glorious  victory  of 
the  7th.  ...  I  respectfully  recommend  that  he  be  made 
a  major-general  of  volunteers,  to  date  from  the  6th  instant." 

And  on  the  26th  of  July,  1863,  in  urging  Sherman's  pro 
motion  as  a  brigadier-general  in  the  regular  army,  General 
Grant  wrote  to  the  War  Department :  "At  the  battle  of  Shiloh, 
on  the  first  day,  he  held,  with  raw  troops,  the  key  point  of  tho 
landing.  It  is  no  disparagement  to  any  other  officer  to  say, 
that  I  do  not  believe  there  was  another  division  commander 
on  the  field  who  had  the  skill  and  experience  to  have  done  it. 
To  his  individual  efforts  I  am  indebted  for  the  success  of  that 
battle." 


60  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 


CHAPTEE  Y. 

CORINTH. 

IMMEDIATELY  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  Major-General  Hal- 
leek  left  Saint  Louis,  proceeded  to  Pittsburgh  Landing,  and 
there  took  personal  command  of  the  forces,  which  he  caused 
to  be  reinforced  from  other  parts  of  his  department.  Major- 
General  Pope  was  placed  in  command  of  the  left  wing,  Major- 
General  Buell  of  the  centre,  Major-General  Thomas  of  the 
right  wing,  and  Major-General  McClernand  of  the  reserve, 
while  Major-General  Grant  was  assigned,  by  General  Halleck, 
to  nominal  duty  as  second  in  command. 

After  his  repulse  at  Shiloh,  Beauregard  concentrated  his 
army  at  Corinth,  and,  strongly  fortifying  that  position,  and 
summoning  to  his  aid  all  the  available  troops  in  the  south 
west,  including  the  armies  of  Price  and  Van  Dorn,  from  Mis 
souri  and  Arkansas,  as  well  as  the  militia  of  the  States  oi 
Alabama,  Mississippi,  Louisiana,  prepared  for  a  determined 
defence.  "  Soldiers  of  Shiloh  and  Elkhorn !"  he  said  to  his 
troops,  "we  are  about  to  meet  once  more  in  the  shock  oi 
battle  the  invaders  of  our  soil,  the  despoilers  of  our  homes, 
the  disturbers  of  our  family  ties,  face  to  face,  hand  to  hand. 
.  .  .  With  your  mingled  banners,  for  the  first  time  during 
this  war,  we  shall  meet  the  foe  in  strength  that  should  give 
us  victory.  Soldiers,  can  the  result  be  doubtful  ?  Shall  we 
not  drive  back  into  Tennessee  the  presumptuous  mercenaries 
collected  for  our  subjugation  ?  One  more  manly  effort,  and, 
trusting  in  God  and  the  justness  of  our  cause,  we  shall  recover 
more  than  we  have  lately  lost." 

Bragg,  too,  addressed  his  men  in  the  same  strain,  telling 
them :  "  You  will  encounter  him  in  your  chosen  position,  strong 


CORINTH.  61 

by  nature  and  improved  by  art,  away  from  his  main  support 
and  reliance — gunboats  and  heavy  batteries — and  for  the  first 
time  in  this  war,  with  nearly  equal  numbers." 

Corinth,  ninety-three  miles  west-southwest  from  Memphis, 
and  twenty-nine  miles  from  Pittsburgh,  is  the  junction  of  the 
Mobile  and  Ohio  and  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  railroads. 
These  two  great  lines  intersecting  each  other  at  right  angles, 
connect  the  Mississippi  with  the  Atlantic  and  the  Ohio  with 
the  Gulf. 

On  the  13th  of  May,  having  three  thousand  four  hundred 
and  ten  absent,  sick,  and  wounded,  out  of  a  total  of  five  thou 
sand  four  hundred  and  sixty  men,  Sherman  found  it  necessary 
to  consolidate  his  division  into  three  brigades,  as  follows  :  First 
brigade,  to  be  commanded  by  Brigadier-General  Morgan  L. 
Smith,  Eighth  Missouri,  Fifty-fifth  Illinois,  Fifty-fourth  Ohio, 
and  Fifty-seventh  Ohio ;  second  brigade,  Colonel  J.  A.  Mc 
Dowell,  Sixth  Iowa,  Forty-sixth  Ohio,  Fortieth  Illinois,  and 
Seventy-seventh  Ohio  ;  third  brigade,  Colonel  R.  P.  Buckland, 
Seventy-second  Ohio,  Seventieth  Ohio,  Forty-eighth  Ohio,  and 
Fifty-third  Ohio.  On  the  following  day,  however,  Brigadier- 
General  James  W.  Denver  arrived,  reported  to  General  Sher 
man  for  duty,  and  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  third 
brigade. 

General  Halleck  advanced  cautiously  and  by  slow  marches, 
intrenching  at  every  step.  On  the  afternoon  of '17th  of  May, 
in  conformity  with  instructions  previously  received  by  him 
from  the  commander-in-chief,  General  Sherman  made  dispo 
sitions  to  drive  the  enemy  from  his  position  at  Eussell's  house, 
on  a  hill  situated  about  a  mile  and  a  quarter  from  the  outer 
intrenchments  of  Corinth,  and  about  two  miles  in  advance  of 
the  main  camps  of  our  army.  Requesting  General  Hurlbut 
to  put  in  motion  two  regiments  and  a  battery  of  artillery,  at 
three  o'clock  p.  M.,  on  the  road  which  passes  the  front  of  his 
line  and  runs  to  Eussell's  house,  Sherman  ordered  General 
Denver  to  take  a  right-hand  road  with  two  regiments  of  his 
brigade  and  one  battery  of  light  artillery,  namely,  the  Seven 
tieth  and  Seventy-second  Ohio,  and  Barrett's  battery,  and 


62  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

gave  him  a  guide  so  to  conduct  his  march  as  to  arrive  on  the 
left  of  the  enemy's  position  by  the  time  he  was  engaged  in 
front ;  and  ordered  General  Morgan  L.  Smith's  brigade,  with 
Bouton's  battery,  to  follow  the  main  road,  drive  back  a  brigade 
of  the  enemy's  forces  that  held  the  position  at  Russell's,  with 
their  skirmishers  and  pickets,  down  to  the  causeway  and  bridge 
across  a  small  stream  about  eight  hundred  yards  east  of  Rus 
sell's  house. 

All  these  forces  were  put  in  motion  at  three  p.  M.,  General 
Denver's  forces  taking  the  right-hand  road,  and  General 
Smith's  the  direct  main  road.  On  reaching  the  causeway, 
General  Smith  deployed  his  skirmishers  forward,  and  sent  out 
his  advance-guard.  The  column  advanced,  and  the  skirmish 
ers  became  engaged  at  once.  The  firing  was  very  brisk,  but 
the  enemy's  pickets  were  driven  steadily  back  till  they  reached 
the  position  of  their  brigade  at  Russell's  house,  where  their 
resistance  was  obstinate. 

The  ground  was  unfavorable  to  artillery  till  the  skirmishers 
had  cleared  the  hill  beyond  the  causeway,  when  Major  Tay 
lor,  chief  of  artillery,  of  Sherman's  division,  advanced  first  one 
of  Bouton's  guns,  and  very  soon  after  the  remaining  three 
guns  of  the  battery.  These,  upon  reaching  the  hill-top,  com 
menced  firing  at  Russell's  house  and  outhouses,  in  which  the 
enemy  had  taken  shelter,  when  their  whole  force  retreated, 
and  full  possession  was  obtained  of  Russell's  house  and  the 
ground  for  three  hundred  yards  in  advance,  where  the  roads 
meet.  This  being  the  limit  to  which  the  brigade  was  intended 
to  go,  it  was  halted.  The  head  of  General  Denver's  column 
reached  its  position  as  the  enemy  was  beginning  to  retreat. 

General  Morgan  L.  Smith  conducted  the  advance  of  his  bri 
gade  handsomely,  and  the  chief  work  and  loss  fell  upon  his  two 
leading  regiments,  the  Eighth  Missouri  and  Fifth-fifth  Illinois, 
He  held  the  ground  till  about  daylight  next  morning,  when, 
by  General  Sherman's  order,  he  left  a  strong  picket  there, 
and  placed  his  brigade  back  a  short  distance  in  easy  support, 
where  it  remained  until  relieved. 

No  loss  was  sustained  by  Hurlbut's  or  Denver's  commands 


CORINTH.  63 

in  their  flank  movements  on  Kussell's ;  the  loss  in  General 
Morgan  L.  Smith's  brigade  was  ten  killed  and  thirty-one 
wounded. 

The  position  thus  gained  proved  to  be  one  of  great  natural 
strength,  and  Sherman  at  once  proceeded  to  fortify  it.  Lines 
were  laid  off  by  the  engineers,  and  although  the  advance  on 
Corinth  had  witnessed  their  first  experiment  with  intrenching 
tools,  the  troops  in  Sherman's  division  succeeded  in  construct 
ing  a  parapet  that  met  the  approval  of  the  critical  eye  of  the 
commander-in-chief.  The  dense  woods  and  undergrowth 
were  cleared  away  in  front,  to  give  range  to  the  batteries. 
The  work  went  on  day  and  night  without  interruption.  The 
division  continued  to  occupy  the  intrenched  camp  at  Kussell's 
until  the  night  of  May  27th,  when  an  order  was  received  from 
General  Halleck  by  telegraph — through  which  means  regular 
communication  had  been  established  between  general  head 
quarters  and  the  several  division  commanders — directing  Gen 
eral  Sherman  to  send  a  force  the  next  day  to  drive  the  rebels 
from  his  front  on  the  Corinth  road,  to  drive  in  their  pickets  as 
far  as  possible,  and  to  make  a  strong  demonstration  on  Corinth 
itself.  Under  authority  conferred  upon  him  by  the  same 
order,  Sherman  called  upon  Major-General  McClernand,  com 
manding  the  Eeserve  Corps,  and  Major-General  Hurlbut,  who 
commanded  one  of  the  adjacent  divisions,  to  furnish  one  bri 
gade  each,  to  co-operate  in  the  proposed  movement  with  the 
two  brigades  of  Denver  and  Morgan  L.  Smith,  detached  from 
Sherman's  own  division  for  the  same  purpose.  Colonel  John 
A.  Logan's  brigade  of  Judah's  division,  of  McClernand's 
reserve  corps,  and  Brigadier-General  J.  C.  Veatch's  brigade 
of  Hurlbut's  division,  accordingly  reported  to  General  Sher 
man  for  this  duty. 

The  house  referred  to  was  a  double  log  building,  standing  on 
a  high  ridge  on  the  upper  'or  southern  end  of  a  large  field, 
and  was  used  by  the  enemy  as  a  block-house,  from  which  to 
annoy  our  pickets.  The  large  field  was  perfectly  overlooked 
by  this  house,  as  well  as  by  the  ridge  along  its  southern  line  of 
defence,  which  was  covered  by  a  dense  grove  of  heavy  oaks 


64  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

and  underbrush.  The  main  Corinth  road  runs  along  the  east 
ern  fence,  whilst  the  field  itself,  about  three  hundred  yards 
wide  bj  about  five  hundred  yards  long,  extended  far  to  the 
right  into  the  low  land  of  Phillip's  Creek,  so  densely  wooded  as 
to  be  impassable.  On  the  eastern  side  of  the  field  the  woods 
were  more  open.  The  enemy  could  be  seen  at  all  times  in  and 
about  the  house  and  the  ridge  beyond,  and  our  pickets  could 
not  show  themselves  on  our  side  of  the  field  without  attracting 
a  shot. 

Sherman  ordered  General  J.  W.  Denver,  with  his  third 
brigade,  and  the  Morton  battery  of  four  guns,  to  march  in 
perfect  silence  at  eight  A.  M.,  keeping  well  under  cover  as  he 
approached  the  field ;  General  Morgan  L.  Smith's  first  brigade, 
with  Barrett's  and  Waterhouse's  batteries,  to  move  along  the 
main  road,  keeping  his  force  well  masked  in  the  woods  to  the 
left ;  Brigadier-General  Yeatch's  brigade  to  move  from  Gen 
eral  Hurlbut's  lines  through  the  woods  on  the  left  of  and  con 
necting  with  General  M.  L.  Smith's  ;  and  General  John  A. 
Logan's  brigade  to  move  down  to  Bowie's  Hill  Cut  of  the 
Mobile  and  Ohio  railroad,  and  thence  forward  to  the  left,  so 
as  to  connect  with  General  Denver's  brigade  on  the  extreme 
right ;  all  to  march  at  eight  A.  M.,  with  skirmishers  well  to  the 
front,  to  keep  well  concealed,  and,  at  a  signal,  to  rush  quickly 
on  to  the  ridge,  thus  avoiding  as  much  as  possible  the  danger 
of  crossing  the  open  field,  exposed  to  the  fire  of  a  concealed 
enemy. 

The  preliminary  arrangements  having  thus  been  made,  two 
twenty-pounder  Parrot  rifle-guns  of  Silfversparre's  battery, 
under  the  immediate  supervision  of  Major  Taylor,  chief  of 
artillery  of  Sherman's  division,  were  moved  silently  through 
the  forest  to  a  point  behind  a  hill,  from  the  top  of  which  could 
be  seen  the  house  and  ground  to  be  contested.  The  guns 
were  unlimbered,  loaded  with  shell,  and  moved  by  hand  to  the 
crest.  At  the  proper  time  he  gave  the  order  to  commence  firing 
and  demolish  the  house.  About  a  dozen  shells  well  directed 
soon  accomplished  this  ;  then  designating  a  single  shot  of  the 
twenty-pound  Parrot-gun  of  Silfversparre  as  a  signal  for  the 


CORINTH.  (35 

brigades  to  advance,  he  waited  till  all  were  in  position,  and 
ordered  the  signal,  when  the  troops  dashed  forward,  crossed 
the  field,  drove  the  enemy  across  the  ridge  and  field  beyond 
into  another  dense  and  seemingly  impenetrable  forest.  The 
enemy  was  evidently  surprised.  By  ten  A.  M.  we  were  masters 
of  the  position.  Generals  Grant  and  Thomas  were  present 
during  the  affair,  and  witnessed  the  movement,  which  was  ad 
mirably  executed. 

An  irregular  piece  of  cleared  land  lay  immediately  in  front 
of  General  Denver's  position,  and  extended  obliquely  to  the 
left,  in  front  of  and  across  Morgan  Smith's  and  Veatch's  bri 
gades,  which  were  posted  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  main 
Corinth  road,  leading  directly  south.  About  three  p.  M.  Sher 
man's  troops  were  startled  by  the  quick  rattle  of  musketry 
along  our  whole  picket-line,  followed  by  the  cheers  and  yells 
of  an  attacking  column  of  the  enemy. 

Sherman's  artillery  and  Mann's  battery  of  Veatch's  brigade 
had  been  judiciously  posted  by  Major  Taylor,  and  before  the 
yell  of  the  enemy  had  died  away  arose  our  reply  in  the  cannon's 
mouth.  The  firing  was  very  good,  rapid,  well-directed,  and 
the  shells  burst  in  the  right  place.  Our  pickets  were  at  first 
driven  in  a  little,  but  soon  recovered  their  ground  and  held  it, 
and  the  enemy  retreated  in  utter  confusion.  On  further  ex 
amination  of  the  ground,  with  its  connection  on  the  left  with 
General  Hurlbut,  and  right  resting  on  the  railroad  *  near 
Bowie  Hill  Cut,  it  was  determined  to  intrench.  The  lines 
were  laid  out  after  dark,  and  the  work  substantially  finished 
by  morning.  All  this  time  Sherman  was  within  one  thousand 
three  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy's  main  iiitrenchments,  which 
were  concealed  by  the  dense  foliage  of  the  oak  forest,  and 
without  a  battle,  which  at  that  time  was  to  be  avoided,  Sher 
man  could  not  push  out  his  skirmishers  more  than  two  hundred 
yards  to  the  front.  For  his  own  security  he  had  to  destroy 
two  farmhouses,  both  of  which  had  been  loopholed  and  occu 
pied  by  the  enemy.  By  nine  A.  M.  of  the  twenty-ninth  our 
works  were  substantially  done,  and  our  artillery  in  position, 
and  at  four  p.  M.  the  siege-train  was  brought  forward,  and 

5 


6(5  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Colonel  McDowell's  second  brigade  had  come  from  the  formei 
lines  at  Russell's,  and  had  relieved  General  John  A.  Logan's 
brigade. 

Sherman  then  had  his  whole  division  in  a  slightly  curved 
line,  facing  south,  his  right  resting  on  the  Mobile  and  Ohio 
railroad,  near  a  deep  cut  known  as  Bowie  Hill  Cut,  and  left 
resting  on  the  main  Corinth  road,  at  the  crest  of  the  ridge, 
there  connecting  with  General  Hurlbut,  who,  in  turn,  on  his 
left  connected  with  General  Davies,  and  so  on  down  the  whole 
line  to  its  extremity.  So  near  was  the  enemy  that  the  Union 
troops  could  hear  the  sound  of  his  drums,  and  sometimes  of 
voices  in  command,  and  the  railroad  cars  arriving  and  depart 
ing  at  Corinth  were  easily  distinguished.  For  some  days 
and  nights  cars  had  been  arriving  and  departing  very  fre 
quently,  especially  in  the  night.  Before  daybreak,  Sherman 
instructed  the  brigade  commanders  and  the  field-officers  of 
the  day  to  feel  forward  as  far  as  possible,  but  all  reported 
the  enemy's  pickets  still  in  force  in  the  dense  woods  to  our 
front.  But  about  six  A.  M.  a  curious  explosion,  sounding  like 
a  volley  of  large  siege-pieces,  followed  by  others  singly  and  in 
twos  and  threes,  arrested  Sherman's  attention ;  and  soon  after 
a  large  smoke  arose  from  the  direction  of  Corinth,  when  he 
telegraphed  General  Halleck  to  ascertain  the  cause.  The 
latter  answered  that  he  could  not  explain  it,  but  ordered  Sher 
man  "  to  advance  his  division  and  feel  the  enemy,  if  still  in  his 
front."  Sherman  immediately  put  in  motion  two  regiments 
of  each  brigade,  by  different  roads,  and  soon  after  followed 
with  the  whole  division,  infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry. 

Somewhat  to  his  surprise,  the  enemy's  chief  redoubt  was 
found  within  thirteen  hundred  yards  of  our  line  of  intrench- 
ments,  but  completely  masked  by  the  dense  forest  and  under 
growth.  Instead  of  being,  as  had  been  supposed,  a  continuous 
line  of  intrenchments  encircling  Corinth,  the  defences  con 
sisted  of  separate  redoubts,  connected  in  part  by  a  parapet 
and  ditch,  and  in  part  by  shallow  rifle-pits,  the  trees  being 
felled  so  as  to  give  a  good  field  of  fire  to  and  beyond  the  main 
road.  General  M.  L.  Smith's  brigade  moved  rapidly  down  the 


CORINTH.  67 

main  road,  entering  the  first  redoubt  of  the  enemy  at  seven  A.  M. 
It  was  completely  evacuated,  and  he  pushed  on  into  Corinth,  and 
beyond,  to  College  Hill.  General  Denver  entered  the  enemy's 
lines  at  the  same  time,  seven  A.  M.,  at  a  point  midway  between 
the  wagon  and  railroad,  and  proceeded  on  to  Corinth,  and 
Colonel  McDowell  kept  further  to  the  right,  near  the  Mobile 
and  Ohio  Railroad.  By  eight  A.  M.  all  Sherman's  division  was 
at  Corinth  and  beyond. 

On  the  whole  ridge  extending  from  Sherman's  camp  into 
Corinth,  and  to  the  right  and  left,  could  be  seen  the  remains 
of  the  abandoned  camps  of  the  enemy,  flour  and  provisions 
scattered  about,  and  every  thing  indicating  a  speedy  and  con 
fused  retreat.  In  the  town  itself  many  houses  were  still  burn 
ing,  and  the  ruins  of  warehouses  and  buildings  containing 
commissary  and  other  confederate  stores  were  still  smoulder 
ing  ;  but  there  still  remained  piles  of  cannon-balls,  shells,  and 
shot,  sugar,  molasses,  beans,  rice,  and  other  property,  which 
the  enemy  had  failed  to  carry  off  or  destroy. 

From  the  best  information  obtained  from  the  few  citizens 
who  remained  in  Corinth,  it  appeared  that  the  enemy  had  for 
some  days  been  removing  their  sick  and  valuable  stores,  and 
had  sent  away  on  railroad-cars  a  part  of  their  effective  force 
on  the  night  of  the  28th.  But,  of  course,  even  the  vast 
amount  of  their  rolling-stock  could  not  carry  away  an  army 
of  a  hundred  thousand  men.  The  enemy  was  therefore  com 
pelled  to  march  away,  and  began  the  march  by  ten  o'clock  on 
the  night  of  the  29th — the  columns  filling  all  the  roads  leading 
south  and  west  all  night — the  rear-guard  firing  the  train,  which 
led  to  the  explosions  and  conflagration.  The  enemy  did  not 
relieve  his  pickets  that  morning,  and  many  of  them  were  cap 
tured,  who  did  not  have  the  slightest  intimation  of  the  pro 
posed  evacuation. 

Finding  Corinth  abandoned  by  the  enemy,  Sherman  ordered 
General  M.  L.  Smith  to  pursue  on  the  Eipley  road,  by  which 
it  appeared  they  had  taken  the  bulk  of  their  artillery. 

General  Smith  pushed  the  pursuit  up  to  the  bridges 
and  narrow  causeway  by  which  the  bottom  of  Tuscumbia 


68  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

Creek  is  passed.  The  enemy  opened  with  canister  on  the 
small  party  of  cavalry,  and  burned  every  bridge,  leaving  the 
woods  full  of  straggling  soldiers.  Many  of  these  were  gath 
ered  up  and  sent  to  the  rear,  but  the  main  army  had  escaped 
across  Tuscumbia  Creek.  Sherman  says,  in  his  official  report 
of  the  siege  : 

"  The  evacuation  of  Corinth,  at  the  time  and  in  the  manner 
in  which  it  was  done,  was  a  clear  back-down  from  the  high 
and  arrogant  tone  heretofore  assumed  by  the  rebels.  The 
ground  was  of  their  own  choice.  The  fortifications,  though 
poor  and  indifferent,  were  all  they  supposed  necessary  to  our 
defeat,  as  they  had  had  two  months  to  make  them,  with  an 
immense  force  to  work  at  their  disposal.  If,  with  two  such 
railroads  as  they  possessed,  they  could  not  supply  their  army 
with  reinforcements  and  provisions,  how  can  they  attempt  it 
in  this  poor,  arid,  and  exhausted  part  of  the  country  ?" 

From  the  time  the  army  moved  on  Corinth,  up  to  the  date 
of  its  evacuation,  the  troops  of  Sherman's  division  had  con 
structed  seven  distinct  lines  of  intrenchments.  Scarcely  had 
one  line  been  completed  before  they  were  called  upon  to  ad 
vance  a  short  distance,  take  up  a  new  position,  and  construct 
another  line.  Occupying  as  it  did  the  extreme  right  flank  of 
the  army,  this  division  wTas  necessarily  more  exposed,  and  was 
compelled  to  perform  harder  work,  and  furnished  heavier  de 
tails  than  any  other  single  division  in  the  entire  command. 
But  every  task  was  performed  with  a  cheerfulness  and  alacrity 
that  elicited  the  highest  encomiums  from  the  division  com 
mander. 

"  But  a  few  days  ago,"  he  says  in  his  congratulatory  order 
of  May  31st,  "  a  large  and  powerful  rebel  army  lay  at  Corinth, 
with  outposts  extending  to  our  very  camp  at  Shiloh.  They 
held  two  railroads  extending  north  and  south,  east  and  west, 
across  the  whole  extent  of  their  country,  with  a  vast  number 
of  locomotives  and  cars  to  bring  to  them  speedily  and  cer 
tainly  their  reinforcements  and  supplies.  They  called  to  their 
aid  all  their  armies  from  every  quarter,  abandoning  the  sea- 
coast  and  the  great  river  Mississippi,  that  they  might  over- 


CORINTH.  gg 

whelm  us  with  numbers  in  the  place  of  their  own  choosing. 
They  had  their  chosen  leaders,  men  of  high  reputation  and 
courage,  and  they  dared  us  to  leave  the  cover  of  our  iron-clad 
gunboats  to  come  to  fight  them  in  their  trenches,  and  still  more 
dangerous  swamps  and  ambuscades  of  their  Southern  forests. 
Their  whole  country,  from  Richmond  to  Memphis  and  Nash 
ville  to  Mobile,  rung  with  their  taunts  and  boastings,  as  to 
how  they  would  immolate  the  Yankees  if  they  dared  to  leave 
the  Tennessee  River.  They  boldly  and  defiantly  challenged 
us  to  meet  them  at  Corinth.  We  accepted  the  challenge,  and 
came  slowly  and  without  attempt  at  concealment  to  the  very 
ground  of  their  selection ;  and  they  have  fled  away.  We  yes 
terday  marched  unopposed  through  the  burning  embers  of 
their  destroyed  camps  and  property,  and  pursued  them  to 
their  swamps,  until  burning  bridges  plainly  confessed  they  had 
fled,  and  not  marched  away  for  better  ground.  It  is  a  victory 
as  brilliant  and  important  as  any  recorded  in  history,  and 
every  officer  and  soldier  who  lent  his  aid  has  just  reason  to 
be  proud  of  his  part. 

"  No  amount  of  sophistry  or  words  from  the  leaders  of  the 
rebellion  can  succeed  in  giving  the  evacuation  of  Corinth,  un 
der  the  circumstances,  any  other  title  than  that  of  a  signal 
defeat,  more  humiliating  to  them  and  their  cause  than  if  we 
had  entered  the  place  over  the  dead  and  mangled  bodies  of 
their  soldiers.  We  are  not  here  to  kill  and  slay,  but  to  vindi 
cate  the  honor  and  just  authority  of  that  government  which 
has  been  bequeathed  to  us  by  our  honored  fathers,  and  to 
whom  we  would  be  recreant  if  we  permitted  their  work  to  pass 
to  our  children  marred  and  spoiled  by  ambitious  and  wicked 
rebels. 

"The  general  commanding,  while  thus  claiming  for  his 
division  their  just  share  in  this  glorious  result,  must,  at  the 
same  time,  remind  them  that  much  yet  remains  to  be  done, 
and  that  all  must  still  continue  the  same  vigilance  and  pa 
tience,  industry  and  obedience,  till  the  enemy  lays  down  his 
arms,  and  publicly  acknowledges,  for  their  supposed  grievances, 
they  must  obey  the  laws  of  their  country,  and  not  attempt  its 


70  SHERMAN   AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

overthrow  by  threats,  by  cruelty,  and  by  war.  They  must  be 
made  to  feel  and  acknowledge  the  power  of  a  just  and  mighty 
nation.  This  result  can  only  be  accomplished  by  a  cheerful 
and  ready  obedience  to  the  orders  and  authority  of  our  lead 
ers,  in  whom  we  now  have  just  reason  to  feel  the  most  implicit 
confidence.  That  the  fifth  division  of  the  right  wing  will  do 
this,  and  that  in  due  time  we  will  go  to  our  families  and  friends 
at  home,  is  the  earnest  prayer  and  wish  of  your  immediate 
commander.*' 

The  ability  and  untiring  energy  displayed  by  General  Sher 
man  during  the  siege  elicited  the  warm  praise  of  General 
Grant,  who  afterwards,  in  an  official  dispatch  to  army  head 
quarters,  wrote  :  "  His  services  as  division  commander  in  the 
advance  on  Corinth,  I  will  venture  to  say,  were  appreciated  by 
the  now  general-in-chief  (General  Halleck)  beyond  those  of 
any  other  division  commander." 

On  the  2d  of  June,  Sherman  was  ordered  by  General  Hal 
leck  to  march  with  his  own  division  and  Hurlbut's  through 
Corinth  and  dislodge  the  enemy,  supposed  to  be  in  position 
near  Smith's  bridge,  seven  miles  southwest  of  Corinth,  where 
the  Memphis  and  Charleston  railway  crosses  Tuscumbia  Creek. 
He  set  out  immediately,  his  own  division  in  advance ;  but  on 
the  morning  of  the  3d,  Colonel  T.  Lyle  Dickey,  Fourth  Illinois 
Cavalry,  who  was  sent  forward  to  reconnoitre,  returned  and 
reported  the  bridge  burned,  and  no  enemy  near  it.  Sherman 
then  went  into  bivouac  near  Chewalla,  and  set  to  work  to  save 
such  of  the  rolling-stock  of  the  railway  as  could  probably  be 
rendered  serviceable,  and  by  the  9th,  chiefly  through  the  exer 
tions  of  the  Fifty-second  Indiana,  Major  Main,  which  was 
generally  known  as  "the  railroad  regiment,"  succeeded  in 
collecting  and  sending  to  Corinth  seven  locomotives  in  toler 
able  order,  a  dozen  platform-cars,  over  two  hundred  pairs  of 
truck-wheels,  and  the  iron-work  of  about  sixty  cars. 

On  the  26th  of  May,  Sherman  had  received  from  the  War 
Department,  and  had  accepted,  a  commission  as  Major-Gen 
eral  of  Volunteers,  dating  from  May  1st. 


MEMPHIS.  71 


CHAPTEE  VI. 

MEMPHIS. 

GRAND  JUNCTION,  fifty-two  miles  west  of  Memphis,  and  one 
hundred  and  fifty-four  south  from  Cairo,  is  the  junction  of 
the  Memphis  and  Charleston  with  the  Mississippi  Central 
Eailway.  Ninety-nine  miles  from  Memphis,  and  a  hun 
dred  and  two  from  Grand  Junction,  the  latter  road  joins 
the  Mississippi  and  Tennessee  Railway  at  Grenada.  An  army 
operating  from  Memphis  as  a  base,  and  holding  in  force 
Corinth,  Holly  Springs,  and  some  such  point  as  Hernando,  on 
the  Mississippi  and  Tennessee  Eailway,  are  in  a  position  to 
defend  West  Tennessee  from  the  Tennessee  Eiver  to  the 
Mississippi,  and  to  take  the  offensive  against  an  enemy  pro 
tecting  Northern  Mississippi. 

No  sooner  was  Corinth  occupied,  and  the  semblance  of  a  pur 
suit  of  the  enemy  ended,  than  General  Halleck  ordered  General 
Buell  to  march  with  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  by  Huntsville  and 
Stevenson  on  Chattanooga,  Tennessee,  and  seize  the  key  of 
the  debouches  from  the  mountain  region  of  the  centre ;  while 
General  Grant,  again  restored  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee,  was  left  in  command  of  the  District  of  West 
Tennessee  and  Northern  Mississippi,  and  General  Pope's 
troops  were  sent  back  to  Missouri.  The  enemy  was  concen 
trated  at  Tupelo,  Mississippi,  forty-nine  miles  below  Corinth, 
on  the  line  of  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Eailroad,  under  the  com 
mand  of  General  Braxton  Bragg,  who  had  relieved  Beaure- 
gard  in  consequence  of  the  latter's  illness. 

On  the  9th  of  June,  at  Chewalla,  Sherman  received  General 
Halleck's  orders  to  march  with  his  own  division  and  Hurlbut's 
Fourth  division  to  Grand  Junction,  to  repair  the  Memphis  and 


72  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Charleston  Railway  west  of  that  point,  and  then  to  assume 
the  duty  of  guarding  the  road  against  any  attempt  of  the 
enemy  to  interrupt  its  operations.  Sending  forward  Denver's 
third  brigade  of  the  fifth  division,  and  the  whole  of  Hurlbut's 
division  in  advance,  to  repair  the  bridges  on  the  road,  Sher 
man  marched  on  the  llth  with  the  remainder  of  his  command, 
reached  Grand  Junction  on  the  night  of  the  13th,  and,  finding 
no  water  there,  occupied  La  Grange,  three  miles  further  west, 
on  the  morning  of  the  14th.  "While  engaged  here  in  repair 
ing  two  pieces  of  broken  trestle-work,  he  sent  Yeatch's 
brigade,  of  Hurlbut's  and  Morgan  L.  Smith's  brigade  of  his 
own  division,  to  Holly  Springs  to  clear  his  flanks  of  the  enemy. 
After  driving  a  small  force  of  the  enemy  out  of  the  town,  and 
as  far  south  as  Lamar,  the  detachment  remained  two  days  at 
Holly  Springs,  and  then  rejoined  the  main  body.  On  the 
21st,  Sherman  marched  from  Holly  Springs ;  on  the  23d,  three 
miles  west  of  Lafayette,  met  a  railway  train  from  Memphis ; 
and  on  the  25th,  having  built  two  long  sections  of  trestle- 
work  at  La  Grange,  two  large  bridges  at  Moscow,  and  two 
small  ones  at  Lafayette,  was  able  to  report  his  task  accom 
plished,  and  the  railway  in  running  order  from  Memphis  to 
Grand  Junction.  His  force  was  then  disposed  so  as  to  pro 
tect  the  line  of  the  railway,  Hurlbut's  division  at  Grand  Junc 
tion  and  La  Grange,  his  own  at  Moscow  and  Lafayette. 

On  the  29th  of  June,  in  accordance  with  instructions 
received  by  telegraph  from  General  Halleck,  leaving  one  regi 
ment  and  a  section  of  artillery  at  each  of  these  points,  Sher 
man  marched  on  Holly  Springs,  twenty-five  miles  equidistant 
from  La  Grange  and  Moscow,  to  co-operate  with  Hamilton's 
division,  of  Bosecrans'  corps,  which  he  was  informed  would 
reach  there  at  a  given  time.  Concentrating  at  Hudsonville  by 
converging  roads,  the  two  divisions  reached  the  Coldwater, 
five  miles  from  Holly  Springs,  early  on  the  morning  of  the  ap 
pointed  day.  Denver's  brigade,  and  the  Fourth  Illinois  Cav 
alry,  the  latter  two  hundred  strong,  were  sent  forward,  and 
drove  the  enemy,  consisting  of  about  fifteen  hundred  cavalry, 
through  and  beyond  the  town  of  Holly  Springs.  Nothing  was 


MEMPHIS.  73 

heard  of  Hamilton,  who  had  approached  within  nineteen  miles 
of  Holly  Springs  and  then  retired  to  Corinth ;  but,  on  the  6th, 
orders  were  received  from  General  HaUeck  to  fall  back  to  the 
railway  and  protect  it,  and  the  command  accordingly  returned 
to  its  former  position. 

Early  in  July,  upon  the  appointment  of  General  Halleck 
as  general-in-chief  of  the  Armies  of  the  United  States,  the 
Department  of  the  Mississippi  was  broken  up,  and  General 
Grant  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Department  of 
the  Tennessee,  embracing  the  theatre  of  his  previous  opera 
tions.  That  officer  taking  advantage  of  the  period  of  in 
activity  which  now  followed,  turned  his  attention  to  the  con 
dition  of  the  country  occupied  by  his  command.  Memphis 
in  particular  was  in  a  sad  plight.  Nearly  all  of  its  young 
men  were  in  the  rebel  army,  many  of  its  old  men  had  fled 
upon  the  approach  of  the  Union  troops,  or  in  anticipation 
of  such  an  event,  an.d  in  their  places  appeared  a  horde  of 
unscrupulous  traders,  eager  to  make  money  in  any  legitimate 
way,  and  deeming  any  way  legitimate  that  brought  them  large 
profits.  They  struck  hands  with  other  men  of  the  same  stamp 
whom  they  found  in  Memphis  ready  for  their  use,  and  the  city 
became  a  nest  of  contraband  trade.  Commerce  and  war  are 
mortal  foes.  Wherever  they  meet  or  cross  each  other's,  path, 
one  of  them  must  die.  If  the  trader's  gold  is  stronger  than 
the  soldier's  honor,  the  soldier's  honor  trails  in  the  dust,  war 
grows  languid,  barter  dulls  the  sword,  treason  flourishes,  and 
spies  reign.  If  the  soldier  spurns  the  bribe,  in  whatever  in 
nocent  shape  it  may  creep,  trade  perishes,  merchants  walk 
the  streets  idly,  or  crowd  the  ,  headquarters  uselessly,  store 
houses  gape  vacantly  or  turn  into  hospitals,  women  and  chil 
dren  starve,  and  the  provost-marshal  is  king.  And  these 
things  are  necessarily  so.  War  itself  is  so  cruel  that  those 
means  are  most  truly  humane  which  tend  to  bring  the  con 
test  soonest  to  a  close,  regardless  of  every  intermediate  con 
sideration  apart  from  its  object.  The  general  must  think  only 
of  his  army. 

On  15th  of  July,  from  Corinth,  General  Grant  sent  tele- 


74  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

graphic  orders  to  Sherman,  to  march  at  once,  with  his  own 
and  Hurlbut's  division,  to  Memphis,  relieve  Brigadier-General 
Hovey  in  command  of  that  place,  and  send  all  the  infantry  of 
Wallace's  division  to  Helena,  Arkansas,  to  report  to  General 
Curtis.  Accordingly,  on  Monday,  July  21st,  Sherman  assumed 
command  of  the  district  of  Memphis,  stationing  his  own  di 
vision  in  Fort  Pickering,  and  Hurlbut's  on  the  river  below,  and 
on  the  24th  sent  the  other  troops  to  Helena. 

General  Grant  had  strongly  impressed  upon  him  the  neces 
sity  of  immediately  abating  the  evils  and  disorders  prevailing 
within  the  limits  of  his  new  command.  He  was  to  put  Mem 
phis  in  a  thorough  state  of  defence.  With  regard  to  civil 
matters,  his  instructions  were  few.  When  the  head  of  a  family 
had  gone  South,  the  family  must  be  made  to  follow.  The  quar 
termaster  was  to  seize,  and  rent  for  account  of  whom  it  may 
concern,  all  buildings  leased  or  left  vacant  and  belonging  to 
disloyal  owners.  All  negroes  working  for  the  United  States 
were  to  be  registered,  and  an  account  kept  of  their  time,  so 
that  an  adjustment  could  afterwards  be  made  with  their 
owners,  if  the  Government  should  decide  on  taking  that  course. 
It  will  be  remembered  that  the  Government  had  not  yet  de 
clared,  or  even  adopted,  any  definite  policy  with  respect  to  the 
slaves  in  the  country  occupied  by  our  forces. 

Memphis  was  a  camp  of  the  Confederate  Army,  was  cap 
tured  by  the  United  States  Army,  and  was  occupied  and  held 
by  it  as  a  military  post.  In  a  country,  or  in  any  part  of  it, 
held  by  an  army  in  time  of  war,  whether  offensively  or  defen 
sively,  there  is  no  law  but  the  law  of  war.  The  law  of  war  is 
the  will  of  the  commander.  He  is  accountable  only  to  his 
superiors.  Nothing  exists  within  the  limits  of  his  command, 
except  by  his  choice.  With  respect  to  his  army,  he  is  gov 
erned  by  the  Articles  of  War  and  the  army  regulations  ;  with 
regard  to  all  others,  his  power  is  unlimited,  except  to  the  ex 
tent  that  it  may  be  abridged  or  controlled  by  the  instructions 
of  his  Government. 

Sherman  permitted  the  mayor  and  other  civil  officers  of  the 
city  to  remain  in  the  exercise  of  their  functions,  restricting 


MEMPHIS.  75 

them  to  the  preservation  of  law  and  order  among  the  citizens, 
and  the  lighting  and  cleaning  of  the  streets,  and  confining  the 
action  of  the  provost-marshal  and  his  guards  to  persons  in  the 
military  service  and  to  buildings  and  grounds  used  by  the  army. 
The  expenses  of  the  local  government  were  to  be  defrayed 
by  municipal  taxes.  Sherman  held  that  all  persons  who  re 
mained  in  Memphis  were  bound  to  bear  true  allegiance  to  the 
United  States,  and,  therefore,  did  not  always  exact  an  oath  of 
loyalty ;  that  they  must  make  their  choice  at  once  between 
the  rebellion  and  the  Union ;  and  that  if  they  stayed  and 
helped  the  enemy  in  any  way,  they  were  to  be  treated  as  spies. 
He  required  no  provost-marshal's  passes  for  inland  travel,  but 
restricted  it  to  the  five  main  roads  leading  from  the  city,  and 
stationed  guards  on  them  to  minutely  inspect  all  persons  and 
property  going  in  or  out.  No  cotton  was  allowed  to  be  bought 
beyond  the  lines  and  brought  in,  except  on  contracts  to  be 
paid  at  the  end  of  the  war,  so  that  the  enemy  might  get  no 
aid  therefrom.  Gold,  silver,  and  treasury  notes,  when  sent  into 
the  Confederate  lines  in  exchange  for  cotton,  always  found 
their  way,  as  he  knew,  sooner  or  later,  voluntarily  or  by  force, 
into  the  Confederate  treasury,  and  were  used  to  buy  arms  for 
the  Confederate  army  in  the  British  colonies.  He,  therefore, 
absolutely  prohibited  their  use  in  payment.  He  forbade  the 
exportation  of  salt,  because  it  was  used  to  cure  bacon  and 
beef,  and  thus  to  mobilize  the  Confederate  army.  A  strict 
search  was  also  made  for  arms  and  ammunition,  which  were 
often  employed  by  the  rapacious  and  unscrupulous  traders  as 
a  means  of  accomplishing  their  ends.  All  able-bodied  male 
negroes  were  required  to  work,  either  for  their  masters  or  for 
the  Government,  and  the  women  and  children,  as  well  as  the 
feeble,  he  refused  to  support  or  feed ;  but  in  no  case  did  he 
permit  any  intimidation  or  persuasion  to  be  used,  with  those 
who  chose  to  leave  their  masters,  to  compel  or  induce  them  to 
return.  With  regard  to  all  these  subjects,  he  preferred  not  to 
meddle  with  details  or  individual  cases,  but  laid  down  full, 
clear,  and  precise  rules,  in  the  form  of  written  instructions  for 
the  guidance  of  his  subordinates,  and  left  the  execution  to 


76  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

them.  His  constant  endeavor  was  to  apply  severe  and  exact 
justice  to  all,  and  to  avoid  the  entanglements  and  anomalies 
of  exceptions  in  favor  of  particular  persons.  Shortly  after 
wards,  when  the  Government  issued  orders  removing  the  mil 
itary  restrictions  imposed  on  the  purchase  of  cotton,  Sherman 
yielded  a  ready  acquiescence,  but  at  once  addressed  strong 
remonstrances  on  the  subject  to  the  authorities  at  "Washington, 
assuring  them  that  the  measure  would  greatly  strengthen  the 
hands  of  the  Confederate  forces.  He  also  turned  his  attention 
to  the  depredations  of  the  guerrillas  who  had  hitherto  infested 
the  district,  harbored  and  assisted  by  the  more  evil-disposed 
of  the  inhabitants,  protected  against  capture  by  the  vicinity 
of  a  large  friendly  army,  and  secured  against  punishment  by 
threats  of  retaliation  upon  the  persons  of  our  prisoners  of 
war  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  A  guerrilla  is  a  person  who, 
alone  or  in  company  with  a  few  comrades,  wages  war  within 
or  behind  the  lines  of  an  enemy,  for  the  purpose  of  inflicting 
incidental  injury  upon  the  persons  or  property  of  isolated 
persons  or  parties  belonging  to  the  opposing  forces,  adhering 
to  the  cause,  or  not  adhering  to  the  cause,  of  the  army  by 
which  the  guerrilla  is  sustained.  He  is  careless  as  to  the  means 
he  employs  and  the  persons  against  whom  he  employs  them. 
He  wears  no  uniform.  Robbery,  arson,  and  murder  he  com 
mits  as  a  soldier.  When  in  danger  of  capture,  he  throws  away 
his  arms  and  becomes  a  citizen.  When  captured,  he  produces 
his  commission  or  points  to  his  muster-roll,  and  is  again  a 
soldier.  A  few  guerrillas  endanger  the  lives  and  property  of 
the  thousands  of  non-combatants  from  whom  they  cannot  be 
distinguished  by  the  eye.  The  rebel  government  and  the  rebel 
commanders  seem  to  have  considered  every  thing  justifiable 
that  could  be  done  by  them  in  connection  with  the  war :  so 
they  justified  guerrillas  and  upheld  them.  Sherman  regarded 
them  as  wild  beasts,  hunted  them  down  and  destroyed 
them.  Where  Union  families  were  harassed,  he  caused  the 
families  of  secessionists  to  be  punished.  Where  steamboats, 
engaged  in  peaceful  commerce,  were  fired  upon,  he  caused  the 
property  of  secessionists  to  be  destroyed,  and  he  finally  an- 


MEMPHIS.  77 

nounced  that,  for  every  boat  attacked  by  guerrillas,  ten  seces 
sion  families  should  be  exiled  from  the  comforts  of  Memphis. 
If,  however,  the  inhabitants  would  resist  the  guerrillas,  he  would 
allow  them  to  bring  in  produce  and  take  out  supplies.  Thus, 
order  and  quiet  were,  for  the  time  being,  restored  throughout 
the  limits  of  his  command. 

During  the  fall  several  important  expeditions  were  sent  out 
from  Memphis.  Early  in  September,  Hurlbut  moved  with  his 
division  to  Brownsville,  for  the  purpose  of  threatening  the 
flank  of  any  force  moving  from  the  line  of  the  Tallahatchie 
against  General  Grant's  position  at  Bolivar ;  while,  at  the 
same  time,  Brigadier-General  Morgan  L.  Smith  with  his 
brigade,  a  battery  of  artillery,  and  four  hundred  cavalry  under 
Colonel  B.  H.  Grierson,  Sixth  Illinois  Cavalry,  moved  to  Holly 
Springs,  destroyed  the  road  and  railway  bridges  over  the  Cold- 
water,  and  then  returned,  having  held  in  check  and  diverted 
the  enemy's  forces  assembling  at  Holly  Springs  to  threaten 
Grant's  communications,  and  by  destroying  the  bridges  having 
prevented  the  enemy  from  harassing  the  flank  of  a  column 
moving  eastward  from  Memphis. 

In  the  latter  part  of  October,  General  Grant  summoned 
General  Sherman  to  meet  him  at  Columbus,  Kentucky,  to 
arrange  the  plan  of  the  coming  campaign.  Grant's  army  occu 
pied,  substantially,  the  line  from  Memphis  eastward  along  the 
Chattanooga  railway  to  Corinth.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac 
remained  inactive  in  Western  Maryland;  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio,  having  defeated  Bragg's  invasion  by  the  decisive  victory 
?tt  Eichmond,  Kentucky,  held  the  passive  defensive ;  and  in 
Missouri,  General  Curtis  was  preparing  to  resist  invasion  from 
Arkansas.  The  great  work  before  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
was  the  capture  of  Yicksburg.  But  the  enemy,  about  forty 
thousand  strong,  under  Lieutenant-General  Pemberton,  must 
first  be  dislodged  from  the  line  of  the  Tallahatchie,  which 
they  held  in  force,  with  all  the  fords  and  bridges  strongly  for 
tified.  Grant  was  to  move  his  main  army  direct  from  Jackson 
by  Grand  Junction  and  La  Grange,  following  generally  the 
line  of  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railway.  Sherman  was  to  move 


78  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

out  of  Memphis  with  four  brigades  of  infantry  on  the  Tchula- 
homa  road,  to  strike  the  enemy  at  Wyatt's  simultaneously 
with  Grant's  arrival  at  Waterford.  Major-General  C.  C.  Wash- 
burne,  over  whom  Grant  had  been  authorized  to  exercise 
command  in  case  of  necessity,  was  instructed  by  Sherman 
to  cross  the  Mississippi  with  above  five  thousand  cavalry  from 
Helena,  Arkansas,  and  march  rapidly  on  Grenada,  to  threaten 
the  enemy's  rear.  Precisely  on  the  day  appointed,  the  three 
columns  moved  as  indicated.  While  Pemberton  was  intent 
in  preparations  to  meet  Grant  and  Sherman  behind  his  fortifi 
cations,  he  learned  that  Washburne,  with  a  force  of  which  he 
could  not  conjecture  the  size,  source,  or  destination,  had 
crossed  the  Tallahatchie,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Yallabusha, 
and  was  rapidly  approaching  the  railways  in  his  rear.  There 
was  no  time  to  hesitate.  Abandoning  his  works,  Pemberton 
relinquished  the  line  of  the  Tallahatchie  without  a  battle,  and 
hastily  retreated  on  Grenada. 

During  the  fall,  and  in  preparation  for  the  movement  on 
Vicksburg,  a  sufficient  number  of  the  regiments  called  out  by 
the  President,  after  the  failure  of  the  summer  campaign  in 
Virginia,  reported  to  General  Sherman,  to  swell  his  division  to 
six  brigades  ;  and  by  persistent  and  repeated  applications  he 
finally  succeeded  in  adding  the  only  organized  battalion  of  his 
own  regular  regiment,  the  Thirteenth  Infantry,  under  the  com 
mand  of  Captain  Edward  C.  Washington.  Early  in  Novem 
ber,  the  division,  which  in  the  latter  part  of  October  had  been 
renumbered  as  the  First  Division  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennes 
see,  was  organized  as  follows  : 

The  first  brigade,  Brigadier-General  Morgan  L.  Smith,  con 
sisted  of  the  Sixth  Missouri,  Eighth  Missouri,  Fifty-fourth 
Ohio,  One  Hundred  and  Thirteenth  Illinois,  and  One  Hundred 
and  Twentieth  Illinois. 

Second  brigade,  Colonel  John  A.  McDowell,  of  the  Sixth 
Iowa ;  Sixth  Iowa,  Fortieth  Illinois,  Forty-sixth  Ohio,  Thir 
teenth  U.  S.  Infantry,  and  One  Hundredth  Indiana. 

Third  brigade,  Brigadier-General  James  W.  Denver ;  Forty- 


MEMPHIS.  79 

eighth  Ohio,  Fifty-third  Ohio,  Seventieth  Ohio,  Ninety-seventh 
Indiana,  and  Ninety-ninth  Indiana. 

Fourth  brigade,  Colonel  David  Stuart,  of  the  Fifty-fifth  Illi 
nois  ;  Fifty-fifth  Illinois,  Fifty-seventh  Ohio,  Eighty-third  In 
diana,  One  Hundred  and  Sixteenth  Illinois,  and  One  Hundred 
and  Twenty -seventh  Illinois. 

Fifth  brigade,  Colonel  E.  P.  Buckland  of  the  Seventy-second 
Ohio ;  Seventy-second  Ohio,  Thirty-second  Wisconsin,  Ninety- 
third  Illinois,  and  One  Hundred  and  Fourteenth  Illinois. 

Sixth,  or  reserve  brigade ;  the  Thirty-third  Wisconsin,  and 
One  Hundred  and  Seventeenth  Illinois. 

Besides  these  regiments  of  infantry,  there  were  attached  to 
the  division,  and  unassigned  to  brigades,  seven  batteries  of 
light  artillery,  and  the  Sixth  Illinois  Cavalry,  Colonel  Ben 
jamin  H.  Grierson.  The  new  regiments  are  designated  in 
italics. 

Early  in  the  winter  of  1862,  the  organization  of  army  corps 
commenced  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  just  before  its  spring 
campaign  was  introduced  in  the  West.  In  December,  the 
troops  serving  in  the  Department  of  the  Tennessee  were  desig 
nated  as  the  Thirteenth  Army  Corps,  and  Major-General 
Grant  as  the  commander.  He  immediately  subdivided  his 
command,  designating  the  troops  in  the  district  of  Memphis 
as  the  right  wing  of  the  Thirteenth  Corps,  to  be  commanded 
by  Major-General  Sherman,  and  to  be  organized  for  active 
service  in  three  divisions.  .  Sherman  assigned  Brigadier- 
General  Andrew  J.  Smith  to  the  command  of  the  first  division, 
consisting  of  the  new  brigades  of  Burbridge  and  Landrum ; 
Brigadier-General  Morgan  L.  Smith  to  the  second  division, 
including  the  brigades  of  Colonel  Giles  A.  Smith,  Eighth 
Missouri,  and  David  Stuart,  Fifty-fifth  Illinois,  formerly  the 
first  and  fourth  brigades ;  and  Brigadier-General  George  W. 
Morgan  to  the  third  division,  comprising  the  new  brigades  of 
Osterhaus  and  Colonels  Lindsay  and  De  Courcey.  The  other 
brigades  remained  as  the  garrison  of  Memphis. 


80  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 


CHAPTEK  YII. 

THE  ATTEMPT   ON  VICKSBTJRG. 

GENERAL  GRANT  directed  General  Sherman  to  proceed  with 
the  right  wing  of  the  Thirteenth  Corps  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Yazoo  River,  and  there  disembark  and  attempt  the  capture  of 
Vicksburg  from  the  north  side,  while  he  himself,  with  the  left 
wing,  should  move  on  Jackson,  against  the  enemy  from  the 
rear,  and,  uniting  the  two  columns,  proceed  to  invest  the  place, 
in  the  event  of  the  first  part  of  the  plan  proving  impracti 
cable. 

Before  entering  upon  the  duty  now  confided  to  him,  Sher 
man  issued  the  following  characteristic  orders,  dated  Memphis, 
December  18,  1862  : 

"  I.  The  expedition  now  fitting  out  is  purely  of  a  military 
character,  and  the  interests  involved  are  of  too  important  a 
character  to  be  mixed  up  with  personal  and  private  business. 
No  citizen,  male  or  female,  will  be  allowed  to  accompany  it, 
unless  employed  as  part  of  a  crew,  or  as  servants  to  the  trans 
ports.  Female  chambermaids  to  the  boats,  and  nurses  to  the 
sick  alone,  will  be  allowed,  unless  the  wives  of  captains  and 
pilots  actually  belonging  to  the  boats.  No  laundress,  officer's 
or  soldier's  wife  must  pass  below  Helena. 

"  II.  No  person  whatever,  citizen,  officer,  or  sutler,  will,  on 
any  consideration,  buy  or  deal  in  cotton,  or  other  produce  of 
the  country.  Should  any  cotton  be  brought  on  board  of  any 
transport,  going  or  returning,  the  brigade  quartermaster,  of 
which  the  boat  forms  a  part,  will  take  possession  of  it,  and  in 
voice  it  to  Captain  A.  E.  Eddy,  chief  quartermaster  at  Mem 
phis. 

"  III.  Should  any  cotton  or  other  produce  be  brought  back 


THE  ATTEMPT  ON  VICKSBURG  81 

to  Memphis  by  any  chartered  boat,  Captain  Eddy  will  take 
possession  of  the  same,  and  seh1  it  for  the  benefit  of  the  United 
States.  If  accompanied  by  its  actual  producer,  the  planter  or 
factor,  the  quartermaster  will  furnish  him  with  a  receipt  for 
the  same,  to  be  settled  for  on  proof  of  his  loyalty  at  the  close 
of  the  war. 

"  IV.  Boats  ascending  the  river  may  take  cotto'n  from  the 
shore  for  bulkheads  to  protect  their  engines  or  crew,  but  on 
arrival  at  Memphis  it  must  be  turned  over  to  the  quarter 
master,  with  a  statement  of  the  time,  place,  and  name  of  its 
owner.  The  trade  in  cotton  must  await  a  more  peaceful  state 
of  affairs. 

"  Y.  Should  any  citizen  accompany  the  expedition  below 
Helena,  in  violation  of  those  orders,  any  colonel  of  a  regiment, 
or  captain  of  a  battery,  will  conscript  him  into  the  service  of 
the  United  States  for  the  unexpired  term  of  his  command.  If 
he  show  a  refractory  spirit,  unfitting  him  for  a  soldier,  the 
commanding  officer  present  wih1  turn  him  over  to  the  captain 
of  the  boat  as  a  deck-hand,  and  compel  him  to  work  in  that 
capacity,  without  wages,  until  the  boat  returns  to  Memphis. 

"  VI.  Any  person  whatever,  whether  in  the  service  of  the 
United  States  or  transports,  found  making  reports  for  publi 
cation  which  might  reach  the  enemy,  giving  them  information, 
aid,  and  comfort,  will  be  arrested  and  treated  as  spies." 

Sherman  embarked  at  Memphis  on  the  20th  of  December, 
1862,  two  days  later  than  the  time  originally  designated,  hav 
ing  been  delayed  by  the  great  want  of  steamboat  transporta 
tion. 

The  three  divisions  of  A.  J.  Smith,  M.  L.  Smith,  and  Mor 
gan,  reported  a  grand  aggregate  of  thirty  thousand  and 
sixty-eight  officers  and  men  of  all  arms  for  duty.  At  Helena 
his  force  was  increased  by  the  division  of  Brigadier-General 
Frederick  Steele,  twelve  thousand  three  hundred  and  ten 
strong,  comprising  the  brigades  of  Brigadier-Generals  C.  E. 
Hovey,  John  M.  Thayer,  Wyman,  and  Frank  P.  Blair,  Jr. 
The  place  of  rendezvous  was  at  Friar's  Point,  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Mississippi,  below  Helena.  The  fleet  reached  Milliken's 

G 


82  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Bend  on  the  night  of  the  twenty-fourth.  On  Christmas  day 
Brigadier-General  Bui-bridge  landed  with  his  brigade  of  A.  J. 
Smith's  division,  and  broke  up  the  Yicksburg  and  Texas 
railway  for  a  long  distance  near  the  crossing  of  the  Tensas ; 
and  without  waiting  for  his  return,  Sherman  pushed  on  to  a 
point  opposite  the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo,  landed  on  the  west 
bank,  and  «sent  Morgan  L.  Smith  with  his  division  to  break 
up  the  same  road  at  a  point  eight  miles  from  Yicksburg.  On 
the  26th,  the  transports,  led  and  convoyed  by  the  gunboat 
fleet,  under  Acting  Bear  Admiral  D.  D.  Porter,  ascended  the 
old  mouth  of  the  Yazoo  about  twelve  miles.  Of  the  tran 
sport  fleet,  Morgan's  division  led  the  advance,  f  oil  owed  in  order 
by  Steele,  Morgan  L.  Smith,  and  A.  J.  Smith.  By  noon  on 
the  27th,  the  entire  command  had  disembarked  on*  the  south 
bank  of  the  river,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Chickasaw  bayou,  a 
small  stream,  which,  rising  near  the  town  of  Yicksburg,  finds 
its  way  across  the  bottom  land  about  midway  between  the 
bluffs  and  the  river.  The  clay  bluffs,  which  are  about  three 
hundred  feet  high,  and  very  steep,  recede  from  the  Mississippi 
on  the  north  side  of  the  town,  and  follow  the  course  of  the 
river  at  a  distance  of  about  four  miles,  the  intermediate  space 
being  an  alluvial  swamp,  full  of  lagoons,  bayous,  and  quick 
sands,  and  covered  with  cottonwood,  cypress,  and  a  dense 
undergrowth  of  tangled  vines.  The  Yazoo  was  very  low,  and 
its  banks  were  about  thirty  feet  above  the  water.  On  reach 
ing  the  point  of  debarkation,  De  Courcey's,  Stuart's,  and 
Blair's  brigade,  were  sent  forward  in  the  direction  of  Yicks 
burg  about  three  miles,  and  as  soon  as  the  whole  army  had 
disembarked  it  moved  out  in  four  columns,  Steele's  above  the 
mouth  of  Chickasaw  bayou ;  Morgan,  with  Blair's  brigade  of 
Steele's  division,  below  the  same  bayou ;  Morgan  L.  Smith's 
on  the  main  road  from  Johnson's  plantation  to  Yicksburg, 
with  orders  to  bear  to  his  left,  so  as  to  strike  the  bayou 
about  a  mile  south  of  where  Morgan  was  ordered  to  cross  it, 
and  A.  J.  Smith's  division  on  the  main  road. 

All   the   heads  of   columns  met  the  enemy's  pickets,   and 
drove    them   towards   Yicksburg.     During  the  night  of  the 


THE  ATTEMPT  ON  VICKSBURGK  83 

27th,  the  ground  was  reconnoitred  as  well  as  possible,  and  it 
was  found  to  be  as  difficult  as  it  could  possibly  be  from  nature 
and  art.  Immediately  in  front  was  a  bayou,  passable  only  at 
two  points,  on  a  narrow  levee  and  on  a  sand-bar,  which  were 
perfectly  commanded  by  the  enemy's  sharpshooters  that  lined 
the  levee  or  parapet  on  its  opposite  bank.  Behind  this  was 
an  irregular  strip  of  beach  or  table-land,  on  which  were  con 
structed  a  series  of  rifle-pits  and  batteries,  and  behind  that  a 
high  abrupt  range  of  hills,  whose  scarred  sides  were  marked 
all  the  way  up  with  rifle-trenches,  and  the  crowns  of  the 
principal  hills  presented  heavy  batteries.  The  county  road 
leading  from  Yicksburg  to  Yazoo  City  ran  along  the  foot  of 
these  hills,  and  served  the  enemy  as  a  covered  way  along 
which  he  moved  his  artillery  and  infantry  promptly  to  meet 
the  Union  forces  at  any  point  at  which  they  attempted  to 
cross  this  difficult  bayou.  Nevertheless,  that  bayou,  with  its 
levee  parapet  backed  by  the  lines  of  rifle-pits,  batteries,  and 
frowning  hills,  had  to  be  passed  before  they  could  reach  firm 
ground,  and  meet  their  enemy  on  any  thing  like  fair  terms. 

Steele,  in  his  progress,  followed  substantially  an  old  levee 
back  from  the  Yazoo  to  the  foot  of  the  hills  north  of  Thomp 
son's  Lake,  but  found  that  in  order  to  reach  the  hard  land  he 
would  have  to  cross  a  long  corduroy  causeway,  with  a  batte'ry 
enfilading  it,  others  cross-firing  it,  with  a  similar  line  of  rifle- 
pits  and  trenches  before  described.  He  skirmished  with  the 
enemy  on  the  morning  of  the  28th,  while  the  other  columns 
were  similarly  engaged ;  but  on  close  and  critical  examination 
of  the  swamp  and  causeway  in  his  front,  with  the  batteries 
and  rifle-pits  well  manned,  he  came  to  the  conclusion  that  it 
was  impossible  for  him  to  reach  the  county  road  without  a 
fearful  sacrifice  of  life. 

On  his  reporting  that  he  could  not  cross  from  his  position 
to  the  one  occupied  by  the  centre,  Sherman  ordered  him  to 
retrace  his  steps  and  return  in  steamboats  to  the  southwest 
side  of  Chickasaw  bayou,  and  support  Morgan's  division. 
This  he  accomplished  during  the  night  of  the  28th,  arriving 
in  time  to  support  him,  and  take  part  in  the  assault  of  the  29th. 


84  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Morgan's  division  were  evidently  on  the  best  of  existing 
ways  from  Yazoo  to  firm  land.  He  had  attached  to  his  trains 
the  pontoons  with  which  to  make  a  bridge,  in  addition  to  the 
ford  or  crossing,  which  was  known  to  be  in  his  front,  and  by 
which  the  enemy's  picket  had  retreated. 

The  pontoon  bridge  was  placed  during  the  night  across  a 
bayou,  supposed  to  be  the  main  bayou,  but  which  turned  out 
to  be  an  inferior  one,  and  it  was  therefore  useless ;  but  the 
natural  crossing  remained,  and  Morgan  was  ordered  to  cross 
with  his  division,  and  carry  the  line  of  works  to  the  summit  of 
the  hill  by  a  determined  assault. 

During  the  morning  of  the  28th  a  heavy  fog  enveloped  the 
whole  of  the  country.  General  Morgan  advanced  De  Courcey's 
brigade  and  engaged  the  enemy :  heavy  firing  of  artillery  and 
infantry  was  sustained,  and  his  column  moved  on  until  he  en 
countered  the' real  bayou,  which  again  checked  his  progress, 
and  was  not  passed  until  the  next  day. 

At  the  point  where  Morgan  L.  Smith's  division  reached  the 
bayou  was  a  narrow  sand  strip  with  abattis  thrown  down  by 
the  enemy  on  our  side,  having  the  same  deep  boggy  bayou 
with  its  levee  parapet  and  system  of  cross-batteries  and  rifle- 
pits  on  the  other  side. 

*To  pass  it  in  the  front  by  the  flank  would  have  been  utter 
destruction,  for  the  head  of  the  column  would  have  been  swept 
away  as  fast  as  it  presented  itself  above  the  steep  bank. 
While  reconnoitring  it  on  the  morning  of  the  28th,  during  the 
heavy  fog,  General  Morgan  L.  Smith  was  shot  in  the  hip  by 
a  chance  rifle-bullet,  and  disabled,  so  that  he  had  to  be  re 
moved  to  the  boats,  and  thus  at  a  critical  moment  was  lost 
one  of  the  best  and  most  daring  leaders,  a  practical  soldier 
and  enthusiastic  patriot.  Brigadier-General  David  Stuart, 
who  succeeded  to  his  place  and  to  the  execution  of  his  orders, 
immediately  studied  the  nature  of  the  ground  in  his  front,  saw 
all  its  difficulties,  and  made  the  best  possible  disposition  to 
pass  over  his  division  as  soon  as  he  should  hear  General  Mor 
gan  engaged  on  his  left. 

To  his  right  General  A.  J.  Smith  had  placed  General  Bur- 


THE  ATTEMPT  ON  VICKSBURG.  35 

bridge's  brigade  of  his  division,  with  orders  to  make  rafts  and 
cross  over  a  portion  of  his  men,  to  dispose  his  artillery  so  as 
to  fire  at  the  enemy  across  the  bayou,  and  produce  the  effect 
of  a  diversion. 

Landrum's  brigade  of  A.  J.  Smith's  division  occupied  a  high 
position  on  the  main  road,  with  pickets  and  supports  pushed 
well  forward  into  the  tangled  abattis  within  three-fourths  of 
a  mile  of  the  enemy's  forts,  and  in  plain  view  of  the  town  of 
Yicksburg. 

The  boats  still  lay  at  the  place  of  debarkation,  covered  by 
the  gunboats  and  four  regiments  of  infantry,  one  of  each  di 
vision.  Such  was  the  disposition  of  Sherman's  forces  during 
the  night  of  the  28th. 

The  enemy's  right  was  a  series  of  batteries  or  forts  seven 
miles  above  us  on  the  Yazoo,  at  the  first  bluff  near  Snyder's 
house,  called  Drumgould's  Bluff ;  his  left  the  fortified  town  of 
Yicksburg  ;  and  his  line  connecting  these  was  near  fourteen 
miles  in  extent,  and  was  a  natural  fortification,  strengthened 
by  a  year's  labor  of  thousands  of  negroes,  directed  by  educated 
and  skilful  officers. 

Sherman's  design  was  by  a  prompt  and  concentrated  move 
ment  to  break  the  centre  near  Chickasaw  Creek,  at  the  head 
of  a  bayou  of  the  same  name,  and  once  in  position,  to  turn  to 
the  right,  Yicksburg,  or  left,  Drumgould's.  According  to 
information  then  obtained  he  supposed  the  organized  force  of 
the  enemy  to  amount  to  about  fifteen  thousand,  which  could 
be  reinforced  at  the  rate  of  about  four  thousand  a  day,  pro 
vided  General  Grant  did  not  occupy  all  the  attention  of  Pem- 
berton's  forces  at  Grenada,  or  Eosecrans  those  of  Bragg  in 
Tennessee. 

Nothing  had  yet  been  heard  from  General  Grant,  who  was 
supposed  to  be  pushing  south ;  or  of  General  Banks,  who  was 
supposed  to  be  ascending  the  Mississippi,  but  who  in  reality 
had  but  very  recently  reached  New  Orleans,  and  was  engaged 
in  gathering  his  officers  there  and  at  Baton  Kouge,  and  in 
regulating  the  civil  details  of  his  department.  Time  being  all- 
important,  Sherman  then  determined  to  assault  the  hills  in 


86  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

front  of  Morgan  on  the  morning  of  the  29th, — Morgan's  divi 
sion  to  carry  the  position  to  the  summit  of  the  hill,  Steele's 
division  to  support  him  and  hold  the  county  road.  General 
A.  J.  Smith  was  placed  in  command  of  his  own  first  division, 
and  M.  L.  Smith's  second  division,  with  orders  to  cross  on  the 
sand-spit,  undermine  the  steep  bank  of  the  bayou  on  the  fur 
ther  side,  or  carry  at  all  events  the  levee  parapet  and  first  line 
of  rifle-pits,  to  prevent  a  concentration  on  Morgan.  It  was 
nearly  noon  when  Morgan  was  ready,  by  which  time  Blair's 
and  Thayer's  brigades  of  Steele's  division  were  up  with  him, 
and  took  part  in  the  assault,  and  Hovey's  brigade  was  also 
near  at  hand.  All  the  troops  were  massed  as  closely  as  possi 
ble,  and  the  supports  were  wrell  on  hand. 

The  assault  was  made,  and  a  lodgment  effected  on  the 
hard  table-land  near  the  county  road,  and  the  heads  of  the 
assaulting  columns  reached  different  points  of  the  enemy's 
works  ;  but  here  met  so  withering  a  fire  from  the  rifle-pits,  and 
cross-fire  of  grape  and  canister  from,  the  batteries,  that  the 
columns  faltered,  and  finally  fell  back  to  the  point  of  starting, 
leaving  many  dead,  wounded,  and  prisoners  in  the  hands  of 
the  enemy. 

General  Morgan  at  first  reported  that  the  troops  of  his  di 
vision  were  not  at  all  discouraged,  though  the  losses  in  Blair's 
and  De  Courcey's  brigades  were  heavy,  and  that  he  would  re 
new  the  assault  in  half  an  hour. 

Sherman  then  urged  General  A.  J.  Smith  to  push  his  attack, 
though  it  had  to  be  made  across  a  narrow  sand-bar,  and  up  a 
narrow  path  in  the  nature  of  a  breach,  as  a  diversion  in  favor 
of  Morgan,  or  a  real  attack,  according  to  its  success.  During 
Morgan's  progress,  he  crossed  over  the  Sixth  Missouri,  covered 
by  the  Thirteenth  Kegulars  deployed  as  skirmishers  up  to  the 
bank  of  the  Bayou,  protecting  themselves  as  well  as  possible 
by  fallen  trees,  and  firing  at  any  of  the  enemy's  sharpshooters 
that  showed  a  mark  above  the  levee.  All  the  ground  was 
completely  swept  beforehand  by  the  artillery,  under  the  im 
mediate  supervision  of  Major  E.  Taylor,  chief  of  artillery. 
The  Sixth  Missouri  crossed  rapidly  by  companies,  and  lay 


THE  ATTEMPT  ON  VICKSBURG.  87 

under  the  bank  of  the  Bayou  with  the  enemy's  sharpshooters 
oyer  their  heads  within  a  few  feet,  so  near  that  these  sharp 
shooters  held  out  their  muskets  and  fired  down  vertically 
upon  our  men.  The  orders  were  to  undermine  this  bank  and 
make  a  road  up  it ;  but  it  was  impossible,  and  after  the  repulse 
of  Morgan's  assault,  Sherman  ordered  General  A.  J.  Smith  to 
retire  this  regiment  under  cover  of  darkness,  which  was  suc 
cessfully  done,  though  with  heavy  loss. 

Whilst  this  was  going  on,  Burbridge  was  skirmishing  across 
the  Bayou  in  his  front,  and  Landrum  pushed  his  advance 
through  the  close  abattis  and  entanglement  of  fallen  timber 
close  up  to  Vicksburg.  When  the  night  of  the  29th  closed  in 
we  stood  upon  our  original  ground,  and  had  suffered  a  re 
pulse.  During  the  night  it  rained  very  hard,  and  our  men 
were  exposed  to  it  in  the  miry,  swampy  ground,  sheltered 
only  by  their  blankets  and  rubber  ponchos,  but  during  the 
following  day  it  cleared  off,  and  the  weather  became  warm. 

After  a  personal  examination  of  the  various  positions,  Sher 
man  came  to  the  conclusion  that  he  could  not  break  the  ene 
my's  centre  without  being  too  much  crippled  to  act  with  any 
vigor  afterwards.  New  combinations  having  therefore  be 
come  necessary,  he  proposed  to  Admiral  Porter  that  the  navy 
should  cover  a  landing  at  some  point  close  up  to  the  Drum- 
gould's  Bluff  batteries,  while  he  would  hold  the  present 
ground,  and  send  ten  thousand  choice  troops  to  attack  the 
enemy's  right,  and  carry  the  batteries  at  that  point ;  which,  if 
successful,  would  give  us  the  substantial  possession  of  the 
Yazoo  River,  and  place  Sherman  in  communication  with  Gen 
eral  Grant.  Admiral  Porter  lent  his  hearty  concurrence  to 
this  plan,  and  it  was  agreed  that  the  expeditionary  force 
should  be  embarked  immediately  after  dark  on  the  night  of 
the  31st  of  December,  and  under  cover  of  all  the  gunboats, 
proceed  before  day  slowly  and  silently  up  to  the  batteries ; 
the  troops  there  to  land,  storm  the  batteries,  and  hold  them. 
Whilst  this  was  going  on,  Sherman  was  to  attack  the  enemy  be 
low,  and  hold  him  in  check,  preventing  reinforcements  going  up 
to  the  bluff,  and,  in  case  of  success,  to  move  all  his  force  thither. 


88  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Steele's  division  and  one  brigade  of  Morgan  L.  Smith's 
division  were  designated  and  embarked  ;  the  gunboats  were  all 
in  position,  and  up  to  midnight  every  thing  appeared  favorable. 

The  assault  was  to  take  place  about  four  A.  M.  Sherman  had 
all  his  officers  at  their  posts,  ready  to  act  on  the  first  sound 
of  cannonading  in  the  direction  of  Drumgould's  Bluff;  but 
about  daylight  he  received  a  note  from  General  Steele,  stating 
that  Admiral  Porter  had  found  the  fog  so  dense  on  the  river, 
that  the  boats  could  not  move,  and  that  the  expedition  must 
be  deferred  till  another  night.  Before  night  of  January  1, 
1863,  he  received  a  note  from  the  admiral,  stating  that  inas 
much  as  the  moon  would  not  set  until  twenty-five  minutes 
past  five,  the  landing  must  be  a  daylight  affair,  which  in  his 
judgment  would  be  too  hazardous  to  try. 

Thus  disappeared  the  only  remaining  chance  of  securing  a 
lodgment  on  the  ridge  between  the  Yazoo  and  Black  rivers, 
from  wiiich  to  operate  upon  Yicksburg  and  the  railway  to  the 
east,  as  well  as  to  secure  the  navigation  of  the  Yazoo  Eiver. 

One  third  of  the  command  had  already  embarked  for  this 
expedition,  and  the  rest  were  bivouacked  in  low,  swampy,  tim 
bered  ground,  which  a  single  night's  rain  would  have  made  a 
quagmire.  Marks  of  overflow  stained  the  trees  from  ten  to 
twelve  feet  above  their  roots.  A  further  attempt  against  the 
centre  was  deemed  by  all  the  brigade  and  division  command 
ers  impracticable. 

It  had  now  become  evident  to  all  the  commanders  that  for 
some  cause  unknown  to  them,  the  co-operating  column  under 
General  Grant  had  failed.  A  week  had  elapsed  since  the 
time  when  it  should  have  reached  the  rear  of  Yicksburg,  yet 
nothing  was  heard  from  it.  Sherman  accordingly  decided  to 
.  abandon  the  attack  and  return  to  Milliken's  Bend,  which  had 
a  large  extent  of  clear  land,  houses  for  storage,  good  roads  in 
the  rear,  plenty  of  corn  and  forage,  and  the  same  advantages 
as  any  other  point  for  operating  against  the  enemy  inland,  on 
the  river  below  Yicksburg,  or  at  any  point  above  where  he 
might  attempt  to  interrupt  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi 
Kiver. 


THE  ATTEMPT  ON  VICKSBURG.  89 

On  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  January,  the  troops  and 
materiel  were  embarked,  and  at  3  o'clock  that  afternoon  the 
last  of  the  transports,  under  convoy  and  protection  of  the 
gunboats,  passed  out  of  the  Yazoo.  At  the  mouth  of  that 
river,  General  Sherman  met  and  reported  to  Major-General 
McClernand,  who  had  come  down  on  the  steamer  "  Tigress," 
with  orders  to  assume  command  of  the  expedition.  On  arriv 
ing  at  Milliken's  Bend,  on  the  4th  of  January,  1863,  Sherman 
at  once  relinquished  the  command  to  General  McClernand, 
and  announced  the  fact  to  the  army  in  the  following  farewell 
order : 

"  Pursuant  to  the  terms  of  General  Order  No.  1,  made  this 
day  by  General  McClernand,  the  title  of  our  army  ceases  to 
exist,  and  constitutes  in  the  future  the  Army  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  composed  of  two  '  army  corps,'  one  to  be  commanded 
by  Gen.  G.  "W.  Morgan,  and  the  other  by  myself.  In  relin 
quishing  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and  re 
stricting  my  authority  to  my  own  '  corps,'  I  desire  to  express 
to  all  commanders,  to  the  soldiers  and  officers  recently  oper 
ating  before  Yicksburg,  my  hearty  thanks  for  the  zeal,  alac 
rity,  and  courage  manifested  by  them  on  all  occasions.  We 
failed  in  accomplishing  one  great  purpose  of  our  movement, 
the  capturing  of  Yicksburg ;  but  we  were  part  of  a  whole. 
Ours  was  but  part  of  a  combined  movement,  in  which  others 
were  to  assist.  We  were  on  time.  Unforeseen  contingencies 
must  have  delayed  the  others. 

"  We  have  destroyed  the  Shreveport  road,  we  have  attacked 
the  defences  of  Yicksburg,  and  pushed  the  attack  as  far  as 
prudence  would  justify,  and  having  found  it  too  strong  for  our 
single  column,  we  have  drawn  off  in  good  order  and  good 
spirits,  ready  for  any  new  move.  A  new  commander  is  now 
here  to  lead  you.  He  is  chosen  by  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  who  is  charged  by  the  Constitution  to  maintain  and 
defend  it,  and  he  has  the  undoubted  right  to  select  his  own 
agents.  I  know  that  all  good  officers  and  soldiers  will  give 
him  the  same  hearty  support  and  cheerful  obedience  they  have 


90  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

hitherto  given  me.  There  are  honors  enough  in  reserve  for  all, 
and  work  enough  too.  Let  each  do  his  appropriate  part,  and 
our  nation  must  in  the  end  emerge  from  this  dire  conflict 
purified  and  ennobled  by  the  fires  which  now  test  its  strength 
and  purity." 

The  disgraceful  surrender  of  Holly  Springs,  on  the  20th  of 
December,  with  its  immense  depot  of  supplies,  essential  to  the 
movement  of  the  column  under  General  Grant,  had  delayed 
the  march  of  that  officer,  and  unexpectedly  demanded  his  at 
tention  in  another  quarter,  while  the  enemy  was  thus  enabled 
to  concentrate  for  the  defence  of  Yicksburg,  behind  positions 
naturally  and  artificially  too  strong  to  be  carried  by  assault. 
Thus  it  was  that  the  expedition  under  Sherman  failed.  In  an 
official  communication,  written  after  the  capture  of  Yicksburg, 
General  Grant  says :  "  General  Sherman's  arrangement  as 
commander  of  troops  in  the  attack  on  Chickasaw  Bluffs,  last 
December,  was  admirable.  Seeing  the  ground  from  the  oppo 
site  side  from  the  attack,  afterwards,  I  saw  the  impossibility 
of  making  it  successful." 


AEKANSAS  POST.  91 


CHAPTER  YIII. 

AEKANSAS  POST. 

MAJOK-GENEBAL  MCCLERNAND  brought  with  him  an  order, 
issued  by  the  War  Department,  dividing  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee  into  four  separate  army  corps,  to  be  known  as 
the  Thirteenth,  Fifteenth,  Sixteenth,  and  Seventeenth,  and 
to  be  respectively  commanded  by  Major-Generals  John  A. 
Me  demand,  William  T.  Sherman,  Stephen  A.  Hurlbut,  and 
James  B.  McPherson,  while  General  Grant  was  to  retain 
command  of  the  whole.  The  army  corps  had  now  become 
the  unit  of  administration  and  of  field  movements.  Com 
pletely  organized,  generally  possessing  within  itself  all  the 
elements  of  a  separate  army,  its  commander  was  enabled 
to  dispose  promptly  of  the  great  mass  of  administrative  de 
tails  without  the  necessity  of  carrying  them  up  to  general 
headquarters,  to  breed  delay  and  vexation  and  to  distract  the 
mind  of  the  general-in-chief  from  the  essential  matters  upon 
which  his  mind  should  have  leisure  to  concentrate  its  energies. 

Immediately  on  assuming  command,  General  McClernand 
assigned  Brigadier-General  George  W.  Morgan  to  the  imme 
diate  command  of  his  own  corps,  the  Thirteenth,  composing 
the  left  wing,  and  consisting  of  A.  J.  Smith's  division  and 
Morgan's  own  division,  now  to  be  commanded  by  Brigadier- 
General  P.  J.  Osterhaus. 

Sherman's  Fifteenth  Corps,  which  was  to  constitute  the 
right  wing,  comprised  the  First  Division,  under  the  command 
of  Brigadier-General  Frederick  Steele,  and  the  Second  Divi 
sion,  temporarily  under  the  command  of  Brigadier-General 
David  Stuart,  in  the  absence  of  Brigadier-General  Morgan  L. 
Smith. 


92  SHEEMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Steele's  first  division  was  now  organized  as  follows  : 

First  brigade,  Brigadier-General  Frank  P.  Blair — Thirteenth 
Illinois,  Twenty-ninth  Missouri,  Thirty-first  Missouri,  Thirty- 
second  Missouri,  Fifty-eighth  Ohio,  Thirtieth  Missouri. 

Second  brigade,  Brigadier-General  C.  E.  Hovey — Seven 
teenth  Missouri,  Twenty-fifth  Iowa,  Third  Missouri,  Seventy- 
sixth  Ohio,  Thirty-first  Iowa,  Twelfth  Missouri. 

Third  brigade,  Brigadier-General  John  M.  Thayer — Fourth 
Iowa,  Thirty-fourth  Iowa,  Thirtieth  Iowa,  Twenty-sixth  Iowa, 
Ninth  Iowa,  infantry. 

Artillery — First  Iowa,  Captain  Griffiths  ;  Fourth  Ohio,  Cap 
tain  Hoffman,  and  First  Missouri  horse  artillery. 

Cavalry — Third  Illinois,  and  a  company  of  the  Fifteenth 
Illinois. 

The  second  division,  formerly  Sherman's  fifth  division,  of  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee,  consisted  of  the  following  named  troops  : 

First  brigade,  Colonel  G.  A.  Smith,  commanding — Eighth 
Missouri,  Sixth  Missouri,  One  Hundred  and  Thirteenth  Illinois, 
One  Hundred  and  Sixteenth  Illinois,  Thirteenth  United  States. 

Second  brigade,  Colonel  T.  Kilby  'Smith,  commanding — 
Fifty-fifth  Illinois,  One  Hundred  and  Twenty-seventh  Illinois, 
Fifty-fourth  Ohio,  Eighty-third  Indiana,  Fifty-seventh  Ohio, 
infantry. 

Artillery — Companies  A  and  B,  First  Illinois  Light  Artillery, 
and  Eighth  Ohio  battery. 

Cavalry — Two  companies  of  Thielman's  Illinois  battalion, 
and  Company  C,  Tenth  Missouri. 

On  the  4th  of  January,  1863,  the  expedition  sailed  on  the 
same  transports  that  had  brought  them  from  Yicksburg,  con 
voyed  by  Admiral  Porter's  fleet  of  gunboats,  to  attack  Fort 
Hindman,  commonly  known  as  Arkansas  Post,  an  old  French 
settlement  situated  on  the  left  or  north  bank  of  the  Arkansas 
River,  fifty  miles  from  its  mouth  and  one  hundred  and  seven 
teen  below  Little  Rock.  This  fort  was  a  very  strong  bastioned 
work,  constructed  by  the  rebels  at  the  head  of  a  horse-shoe 
bend,  on  an  elevated  bluff  which  here  touches  the  river  and 
defines  for  some  distance  its  left  bank.  The  work  has  four 


ARKANSAS  POST.  93 

bastion  fronts,  inclosing  a  space  about  one  hundred  yards 
square,  and  a  line  of  rifle-pits  extended  three-quarters  of  a  mile 
across  a  neck  of  level  ground  to  a  bayou  on  the  west  and 
north.  In  the  fort  three  heavy  iron  guns,  one  three-inch  rifled 
gun,  and  four  six-pounder  smooth  bores  were  mounted  at  the 
salients  and  flanks,  and  six  twelve-pounder  howitzers  and  three- 
inch  rifles  were  distributed  along  the  rifle-pits.  The  garrison 
consisted  of  about  five  thousand  men,  under  Brigadier-General 
T.  J.  Churchill,  of  the  Confederate  army.  He  was  ordered  by 
Lieutenant-General  Holmes,  commanding  the  rebel  forces  in 
Arkansas,  to  hold  the  post  "  till  all  are  dead." 

The  expedition  was  suggested  by  General  Sherman,  and  the 
idea  was  promptly  adopted  by  General  McClernand.  Its 
object  was  to  employ  the  troops,  which  would  otherwise  have 
remained  idly  waiting  for  the  'full  development  of  the  combina 
tions  against  Yicksburg,  in  opening  the  way  to  Little  Hock ; 
thus  placing  the  Arkansas  River  under  the  control  of  the  Union 
armies,  and  putting  an  end  to  the  dangerous  detached  opera 
tions  carried  on  from  that  point  against  our  communications 
on  the  Mississippi.  The  former  river  traversing  and  nearly 
bisecting  Arkansas  from  northwest  to  southeast,  is  the  key  to 
the  military  possession  of  the  State. 

The  expedition  moved  up  the  "White  River  through  the  cut 
off  which  unites  its  waters  with  those  of  the  Arkansas,  up  the 
latter  stream  to  Notrib's  farm,  three  miles  below  Fort  Hind- 
man,  where  the  troops  began  to  disembark  at  five  o'clock  on 
the  afternoon  of  January  9th.  By  noon  on  the  10th  the  land 
ing  was  completed,  and  the  troops  were  on  the  march  to  invest 
the  post.  Sherman's  Fifteenth  Corps  took  the  advance,  and  was 
to  pass  round  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  works,  and  form  line  with 
his  right  resting  on  the  river  above  the  fort.  The  Thirteenth 
Corps,  under  Brigadier-General  Morgan,  was  to  follow,  and 
connecting  with  General  Sherman's  right,  complete  the  invest 
ment  on  the  left.  The  gunboats  opened  a  terrific  fire  upon 
the  enemy  during  the  afternoon,  to  distract  his  attention.  By 
nightfall  the  troops  were  in  position,  Steele  on  the  right,  rest 
ing  on  the  bayou,  Stuart  next,  A.  J.  Smith's  division  on  Stuart's 


94  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

left,  and  Osterhaus's  division  on  the  extreme  left  near  the  river. 
During  the  night  of  the  9th  and  the  following  day  Colonel  D. 
W.  Lindsay's  brigade  of  Osterhaus's  division  had  landed  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  river  below  Notrib's  farm,  and  marching 
across  the  bend  had  taken  up  a  position  and  planted  a  battery 
on  that  bank  above  the  fort,  so  as  to  effectually  prevent  the 
succor  of  the  garrison,  or  its  escape  by  water. 

Admiral  Porter  kept  up  a  furious  bombardment  until  after 
dark.  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  llth,  Sherman  moved  his 
corps  into  an  easy  position  for  assault,  looking  south,  across 
ground  encumbered  by  fallen  trees  and  covered  with  low 
bushes.  The  enemy  could  be  seen  moving  back  and  forth 
along  his  lines,  occasionally  noticing  our  presence  by  some 
ill-directed  shots  which  did  us  little  harm,  and  accustomed  the 
men  to  the  sound  of  rifle-cannon.  By  ten  A.  M.  Sherman  re 
ported  to  General  McClernand  in  person  that  he  was  all  ready 
for  the  assault,  and  only  awaited  the  simultaneous  movement 
of  the  gunboats.  They  were  to  silence  the  fort,  and  save  the 
troops  from  the  enfilading  fire  of  its  artillery  along  the  only 
possible  line  of  attack. 

About  half-past  twelve  notice  was  received  that  the  gun 
boats  were  in  motion.  Wood's  Battery,  Company  A,  Chicago 
Light  Artillery,  was  posted  on  the  road  which  led  directly  into 
the  Post ;  Banett's  Battery  B,  First  Illinois  Artillery,  was  in 
the  open  space  in  the  interval  between  Stuart's  and  Steele's 
divisions,  and  Steele  had  two  of  his  batteries  disposed  in  his 
front.  Sherman's  orders  were,  that  as  soon  as  the  gunboats 
opened  fire  all  his  batteries  in  position  should  commence  firing, 
and  continue  until  he  commanded  "cease  firing,"  when,  after 
three  minutes'  cessation,  the  infantry  columns  of  Steele's  and 
Stuart's  divisions  were  to  assault  the  enemy's  line  of  rifle-pits 
and  defences. 

The  gunboats  opened  about  one  p.  M.,  and  our  field-batteries 
at  once  commenced  firing,  directing  their  shots  at  the  enemy's 
guns,  his  line  of  defences,  and  more  especially  enfilading  the 
road  which  led  directly  into  the  fort,  and  which  separated 
Morgan's  line  of  attack  from  Sherman's.  The  gunboats  could 


ARKANSAS  POST.  95 

not  be  seen,  and  their  progress  had  to  be  judged  by  the 
sound  of  their  fire, — at  first  slow  and  steady,  but  rapidly 
approaching  the  fort  and  enveloping  it  with  a  storm  of  shells 
and  shot.  The  field-batteries  continued  their  fire  rapidly  for 
about  fifteen  minutes,  the  enemy  not  replying,  when  Sherman, 
having  withdrawn  the  skirmish  line,  ordered  the  firing  to  cease 
and  the  columns  to  advance  to  the  assault.  The  infantry 
sprang  forward  with  a  cheer,  rapidly  crossed  the  hundred 
yards  of  clear  space  in  their  immediate  front,  and  dashed  into 
a  belt  of  ground  about  three  hundred  yards  wide,  separating 
them  from  the  enemy's  parapets,  slightly  cut  up  by  gulleys  and 
depressions,  and  covered  with  standing  trees,  brush,  and  fallen 
timber.  There  they  encountered  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  ar 
tillery  and  infantry,  well  directed  from  their  perfect  cover. 
The  speed  of  our  advance  was  checked,  and  afterwards  became 
more  cautious  and  prudent.  By  three  p.  M.  Sherman's  lines 
were  within  one  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy's  trenches,  and 
flanking  him  on  our  right,  and  completely  enveloping  his 
position.  The  gunboats  could  be  seen  close  up  to  the  fort,  the 
admiral's  flag  directly  under  it.  All  artillery  fire  from  the  fort 
had  ceased,  and  only  occasionally  could  be  seen  a  few  of  the 
enemy's  infantry  firing  from  its  parapets ;  but  the  strongest 
resistance  continued  in  our  immediate  front,  where  the  enemy's 
infantry  was  massed,  comparatively  safe  from  the  gunboats, 
which  were  compelled  to  direct  their  fire  well  to  the  front,  lest 
it  should  injure  our  own  troops.  A  brisk  fire  of  musketry 
was  kept  up  along  our  whole  front  with  an  occasional  discharge 
of  artillery  through  the  intervals  of  the  infantry  lines  until  four 
p.  M.,  when  the  white  flag  appeared  all  along  the  enemy's  lines. 
Sherman  immediately  ordered  General  Steele  to  push  a  brigade 
down  the  bayou  on  his  right,  to  prevent  the  escape  of  the 
enemy. 

Simultaneously  with  Sherman's  assault,  Burbriclge's  brigade 
with  the  One  Hundred  and  Eighteenth  Illinois  and  Sixty-ninth 
Indiana,  of  Landrum's,  and  the  One  Hundred  and  Twentieth 
Ohio,  of  Colonel  Sheldon's  brigade,  dashed  forward  under  a 
deadly  fire  quite  to  the  enemy's  intrenchments ;  the  Sixteenth 


96  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Indiana,  Lieutenant-Colonel  John  M.  Orr,  with  the  Eighty- 
third  Ohio,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Baldwin,  of  Burbridge's  bri 
gade,  and  the  One  Hundred  and  Twentieth  Ohio,  Colonel  D. 
French,  of  Colonel  Sheldon's  brigade,  being  the  first  to  enter 
the  fort.  Presenting  himself  at  the  entrance  of  the  fort,  Gen 
eral  Burbridge  was  halted  by  the  guard,  who  denied  that  they 
had  surrendered,  until  he  called  their  attention  to  the  white 
flag,  and  ordered  them  to  ground  their  arms. 

Colonel  Lindsay,  as  soon  as  a  gunboat  had  passed  above 
the  fort,  hastened  with  his  brigade  down  the  opposite  shore, 
and  opened  an  oblique  fire  from  Foster's  two  twenty,  and 
Lieutenant  Wilson's  two  ten  pounder  Parrott's,  into  the 
enemy's  line  of  rifle-pits,  carrying  away  his  battle-flag  and 
killing  a  number  of  his  men. 

The  fort  had  surrendered.  With  cheers  and  shouts  our 
troops  poured  into  the  works. 

As  soon  as  order  could  be  restored,  Brigadier-General  A. 
J.  Smith  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  fort  itself,  and 
Brigadier-General  David  Stuart  to  the  charge  of  the  prisoners 
and  the  exterior  defences. 

Our  entire  loss  in  killed  was  129  ;  in  wounded,  831 ;  and  in 
missing,  17 ;  total,  977.  Sherman's  corps  lost  4  officers  and 
75  men  killed,  and  34  officers  and  406  men  wounded ;  making 
a  total  of  519. 

General  Churchill,  in  his  official  report,  dated  Richmond, 
May  6,  1863,  to  Lieutenant-General  Holmes,  commanding  the 
Department  of  Arkansas,  states  that  his  loss  "will  not  ex 
ceed  —  killed,  and  75  or  80  wounded."  He  estimates  the 
Union  force  at  50,000,  his  own  at  3,000,  ancl  our  loss  at  from 
1,500  to  2,000. 

By  the  surrender  there  fell  into  our  hands  5,000  men,  in 
cluding  three  entire  brigades  of  the  enemy,  commanded  re 
spectively  by  Colonels  Garland,  Deshler,  and  Dunnington  ; 
seventeen  pieces  of  cannon  ;  three  thousand  serviceable  small- 
arms  ;  forty-six  thousand  rounds  of  ammunition  ;  and  five 
hundred  and  sixty-three  animals. 

After  sending  the  prisoners  to  St.  Louis,  having  destroyed 


ARKANSAS  POST.  97 

the  defences  and  all  buildings  used  for  military  purposes,  on 
the  15th  of  January  the  troops  re-embarked  on  the  transports 
and  proceeded  to  Napoleon,  Arkansas,  whence  on  the  17th,  in 
obedience  to  orders  received  from  Major-General  Grant,  they 
returned  to  Milliken's  Bend.  Sherman  had  been  in  favor  of 
taking  advantage  of  a  rise  in  the  Arkansas  to  threaten  Little 
Kock,  and  force  all  scattered  bands  of  the  enemy  to  seek 
safety  south  of  that  river  ;  but  General  McClernand  was  un 
willing  to  take  so  great  a  responsibility  in  addition  to  that  he 
had  already  incurred,  by  entering  upon  so  important  an  enter 
prise  without  orders. 

In  noticing  the  services  of  the  subordinate  commanders, 
General  McClernand  remarks :  "  General  Sherman  exhibited 
his  usual  activity  and  enterprise  ;  General  Morgan  proved  his 
tactical  skill  and  strategic  talent ;  while  Generals  Steele, 
Smith,  Osterhaus,  and  Stuart,  and  the  several  brigade  com 
manders  displayed  the  fitting  qualities  of  brave  and  successful 
officers." 

At  Napoleon,  Sherman  was  joined  by  the  brigade  of  Brig 
adier-General  Hugh  Ewing,  which  had  been  on  the  way  to 
join  General  Hosecrans  ;  but  that  officer  having  just  defeated 
Bragg  in  the  desperate  and  decisive  action  of  Stone  River,  no 
longer  needed  reinforcements.  Ewing' s  command  was  as 
signed  to  Morgan  L.  Smith's  second  division,  as  the  third 
brigade  of  that  division.  The  effective  force  of  the  Fifteenth 
Corps  was  now  fifteen  thousand  nine  hundred  and  nine  men 
of  all  arms. 

7 


SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 


CHAPTEK  IX. 

THE   SIEGE   AND    FALL    OF  YICKSBUEG. 

ON  the  19th  of  January,  Sherman  proceeded  with  his  corps 
to  Young's  Point,  opposite  Yicksburg,  and  reported  to  Grant. 
Here  he  was  joined  by  the  division  of  Brigadier-General  J.  M. 
Tuttle,  consisting  of  Mower's,  Buckland's,  and  Woods'  bri 
gades.  From  the  moment  of  taking  personal  command  of  the 
army  at  Milliken's  Bend,  General  Grant  became  convinced  that 
Vicksburg  could  only  be  taken  from  the  south.  He  immedi 
ately  caused  work  to  be  prosecuted  on  the  canal  begun  the  pre 
vious  summer  by  Brigadier-General  Thomas  "Williams,  under 
the  orders  of  Major-General  Butler,  with  the  view  of  effecting 
an  artificial  cut-off  across  the  peninsula  opposite  Yicksburg, 
through  which  transports,  troops,  and  supplies  might  safely 
pass  to  the  river  below  the  enemy's  batteries  at  that  place. 
Somewhat  later  he  also  caused  a  channel  to  be  cut  through 
the  west  bank  into  Lake  Providence,  with  the  design  of  pass 
ing  down  through  Bayou  Baxter,  Bayou  Macon,  and  the 
Tensas,  Wachita,  and  Ked  rivers ;  and  a  third  canal  through 
the  Yazoo  Pass  into  the  Coldwater  by  means  of  which  troops 
might  enter  the  Tallahatchie,  and  thence  descending  the 
Yazoo,  land  on  the  high  ground  above  Haines'  Bluff.  For 
various  reasons,  none  of  these  plans  succeeded. 

While  the  gunboats  and  troops  sent  through  Yazoo  Pass 
were  delayed  near  Greenwood  at  the  junction  of  the  Yalla- 
busha  and  Tallahatchie,  where  the  rebels  had  taken  advan 
tage  of  a  bend  in  the  river  to  construct  a  formidable  work, 
Admiral  Porter  reconnoitred  still  another  route.  Seven  miles 
above  the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo,  Steele's  bayou  empties  into 


THE   SIEGE  AND  FALL  OF  VICKSBURGK  99 

that  river ;  thirty  miles  up  Steele's  bayou,  Black  bayou  enters 
it  from  Deer  Creek,  six  miles  distant ;  ascending  Deer  Creek 
eighteen  miles,  Boiling  Fork  connects  it  with  the  Big  Sun 
flower  Biver,  ten  miles  distant ;  and  descending  the  Big  Sun 
flower  forty-one  miles,  you  again  enter  the  Yazoo,  sixty  miles 
from  its  mouth.  By  taking  this  course,  the  troops  and  gun 
boats  would  reach  a  strong  position  between  Haines'  Bluff 
and  Greenwood ;  the  enemy's  forces  at  the  latter  point  would 
be  placed  between  two  strong  columns  of  the  Union  army,  and 
would  be  compelled  to  fall  back  on  Yicksburg ;  one  of  the  most 
important  sources  of  supplies  would  be  lost  to  the  enemy,  and 
a  valuable  line  of  operations  gained  for  us.  Satisfying  him 
self  by  a  personal  reconnoissance,  in  company  with  Admiral 
Porter,  that  the  chances  of  success  were  sufficient  to  warrant 
so  important  an  undertaking,  on  the  16th  of  March,  General 
Grant  ordered  General  Sherman  to  take  Stuart's  second  divi 
sion  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  open  the  route,  in  co-operation  with 
the  gunboats,  and  seize  some  tenable  position  on  the  east 
bank  of  the  Yazoo,  whence  to  operate  against  Yicksburg  and 
the  forts  at  Haines'  Bluff.  Sherman  started  immediately -with 
the  Eighth  Missouri  regiment,  and  a  detachment  of  pioneers, 
to  open  the  bayou,  and  the  next  morning  was  followed  by  the 
remainder  of  the  troops,  who,  in  order  to  economize  trans 
portation,  ascended  the  Mississippi  to  Eagle's  Bend,  where 
Steele's  bayou  approaches  within  a  mile  of  the  river,  connected 
with  it  by  Mud  bayou,  and  there  disembarking,  marched  across 
by  land  to  Steele's  bayou.  The  18th  and  the  forenoon  of  the 
19th  were  spent  in  bridging  Mud  bayou,  which  was  greatly 
swollen  by  a  crevasse.  Marching  to  Steele's  bayou,  but  one 
transport  was  found  there,  and  the  three  following  days  were 
spent  in  transporting  the  troops  up  the  bayou,  in  such  boats 
as  became  available.  At  the  mouth  of  Black  bayou  the  troops 
were  transferred  from  the  steamers  to  coal  barges  and  taken 
in  tow  by  a  tug.  Admiral  Porter  had  started  on  the  14th  of 
March  with  the  gunboats  Louisville,  Lieutenant-Commander 
Owen ;  Cincinnati,  Lieutenant-Commanding  Bache ;  Caronde- 
let,  Lieutenant-Commanding  Murphy ;  Mound  City,  Lieuten- 


100  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

ant-Commanding  Wilson  ;  Pittsburgh,  Lieutenant-Commanding 
Hoel,  four  mortar-boats,  and  four  tugs.  The  fleet  easily 
passed  up  Steele's  bayou,  which,  though  very  narrow ,  con 
tained  thirty  feet  of  water ;  but  Black's  bayou  was  found  to 
be  obstructed  by  fallen  and  overhanging  trees,  which  had  to 
be  pulled  out  by  the  roots  and  pushed  aside  before  the  gun 
boats  could  pass,  and  the  frequent  bends  were  so  abrupt  that 
the  boats  had  to  be  heaved  around  them,  with  hardly  a  foot  of 
room  to  spare.  Twenty-four  hours  were  occupied  in  going 
four  miles  into  Deer  Creek.  The  gunboats  entered  D^ei  Creek 
safely,  aud  pushed  their  way  through  the  overhanging  branches 
of  cypress  and  willow,  with  which  it  was  obstructed,  at  the 
rate  of  about  a  mile  an  hour  at  first,  gradually  diminishing  as 
the  difficulties  increased,  to  half  a  mile  an  hour.  "When  within 
seven  miles  of  the  Boiling  Fork,  the  Confederate  agents  and 
some  of  the  planters  forcibly  compelled  the  negroes  to  cut 
down  immense  trees  directly  across  the  Creek,  for  the  purpose 
of  delaying  the  advance.  Removing  these  artificial  obstruc 
tions,  in  addition  to  the  natural  ones,  with  almost  incredible 
.labor,  when  within  three  miles  of  Boiling  Fork,  smoko  was 
discovered  in  the  direction  of  the  Yazoo,  and  information 
reached  Admiral  Porter  that  the  enemy  was  advancing  with 
five  thousand  men,  to  dispute  his  progress.  The  Carondekt, 
Lieutenant-Commanding  Murphy,  was  sent  ahead  to  hold  the 
entrance  to  Boiling  Fork,  and  on  the  night  of  the  20th  March 
found  the  gunboats  within  eight  hundred  yards  of  that  stream, 
with  only  two  or  three  trees  and  a  narrow  lane  of  willows  be 
tween  them  and  open  navigation.  The  next  morning  about 
six  hundred  of  the  enemy,  with  a  battery  of  field-pieces,  made 
their  appearance,  and  began  to  annoy  the  fleet  by  sharp 
shooters,  and  to  fell  trees  in  front  and  rear.  Sherman  had 
not  yet  arrived.  The  road  lay  along  the  banks  of  the  bayous, 
and  he  had  found  the  banks  overflowed  below  Hill's  planta 
tion  on  Deer  Creek,  at  the  head  of  Black  bayou,  so  that  the 
troops  had  to  be  transported  twenty-eight  miles  to  the  mouth 
of  Black  bayou,  on  two  small  steamers,  there  transferred  to  a 
single  coal-barge,  and  towed  by  a  small  tug  two  miles,  to  the 


THE   SIEGE  AND  FALL  OF  VICKSBURG.  1Q1 

first  dry  ground.  The  wooden  transports  encountered  the 
same  difficulties  that  met  the  iron-clad  gunboats,  without  the 
same  means  of  overcoming  them.  It  was  a  slow  process. 
Sherman  was  now  at  Hill's  plantation,  with  only  three  regi 
ments.  But  upon  receipt  of  a  note  from  Admiral  Porter, 
stating  his  condition,  on  the  morning  of  the  21st,  Colonel 
Smith,  with  the  Sixth  and  Eighth  Missouri  and  One  Hundred 
and  Sixteenth  Illinois  regiments  of  his  brigade,  was  at  once 
sent  forward,  and  by  a  forced  march  of  twenty-one  miles  over 
a  terrible  swamp  road,  succeeded  in  reaching  the  gunboats,  to 
find  them  almost  completely  surrounded  by  the  entire  force 
sent  out  by  the  enemy  through  the  Yazoo,  and  unable  to  move 
in  either  direction.  The  creek  was  so  narrow  that  the  broad 
side  guns  were  quite  useless,  and  only  one  bow-gun  could  be 
brought  to  bear  by  either  of  the  gunboats,  and  the  steep 
banks  required  this  to  be  fired  at  too  great  an  angle  to  have 
much  effect.  The  enemy  had  established  a  battery  of  fifteen 
guns  in  front.  Colonel  Smith  disposed  his  force  to  protect 
the  fleet,  and  prevent  the  felling  of  trees  in  the  rear.  On  the 
morning  of  the  22d,  after  removing  about  forty  of  the  felled, 
trees,  the  enemy  appeared  in  large  force  in  rear  of  the  gun 
boats,  and  opened  fire  with  artillery.  The  gunboats  replied, 
and  soon  drove  them  off.  The  enemy  then  attacked  Colonel 
Smith's  brigade,  and  after  a  sharp  skirmish,  was  again  repulsed. 
When  the  firing  began,  Sherman,  who  had  by  great  exertions 
succeeded  in  getting  up  the  remainder  of  Colonel  Giles  A. 
Smith's  brigade,  consisting  of  the  Thirteenth  Kegulars  and  One 
Hundred  and  Fifteenth  Illinois,  as  well  as  the  Eighty-third 
Indiana,  One  Hundred  and  Sixteenth  Illinois,  Fifty-fourth  and 
Fifty-seventh  Ohio,  of  Colonel  T.  Kilby  Smith's  brigade,  under 
the  command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Rice,  Fifty-seventh  Ohio, 
was  advancing  with  them  by  a  forced  march,  having  led  the 
troops  by  candlelight  through  the  dense  canebrake,  and  was 
six  miles  distant.  Hearing  the  guns,  he  pressed  rapidly  for 
ward  in  the  direction  of  the  sound,  and  arrived  just  in  time  to 
meet  and  disperse  the  enemy,  who  were  preparing  to  pass  round 
the  rear  of  the  boats,  and  again  dispute  their  movement.  The 


102  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

fleet  was  saved.  The  expedition  might  now  have  been  con 
tinued,  but  officers  and  men  of  army  and  navy  were  alike 
exhausted ;  the  army  had  not  brought  rations  for  so  long  a 
work,  and  the  navy  provision-boat  was  too  large  to  get  through ; 
moreover,  the  enemy  had  had  time  to  prepare,  and  full  indi 
cations  of  the  direction  and  progress  of  the  movement.  There 
was  nothing  to  do  but  to  return.  All  of  the  22d  and  23d,  and 
part  of  the  24th  of  March,  was  consumed  in  tediously  retracing 
the  route  to  Hill's  plantation.  The  enemy,  kept  at  bay  by  the 
army,  did  not  molest  the  gunboats  further.  At  Hill's  the  ex 
pedition  rested  on  the  25th,  and  on  the  26th  the  fleet  passed 
down,  and  in  accordance  with  orders  received  from  General 
Grant,  Sherman  returned  with  his  troops  to  Young's  Point. 

"  The  expedition  failed,"  says  General  Grant,  "  more  from 
want  of  knowledge  as  to  what  would  be  required  to  open  this 
route  than  from  any  impracticability  in  the  navigation  of  the 
streams  and  bayous  through  which  it  was  proposed  to  pass. 
Want  of  this  knowledge  led  the  expedition  on  until  difficulties 
were  encountered,  and  then  it  would  become  necessary  to 
send  back  to  Young's  Point  for  the  means  of  removing  them. 
This  gave  the  enemy  time  to  remove  forces  to  effectually 
checkmate  further  progress,  and  the  expedition  was  withdrawn 
when  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  free  and  open  navigation 
to  the  Yazoo." 

Admiral  Porter  also,  in  his  official  report,  speaks  of  the 
want  of  means  of  moving  the  troops  through  the  bayous  as 
the  chief  difficulty ;  "for,"  he  remarks,  "there  were  never  yet 
any  two  men  who  would  labor  harder  than  Generals  Grant 
and  Sherman  to  forward  an  expedition  for  the  overthrow  of 
Vicksburg."  He  continues :  "  The  army  officers  worked  like 
horses  to  enable  them  to  accomplish  what  was  desired.  .  .  . 
No  other  general  could  have  done  better,  or  as  well,  as  Sher 
man,  but  he  had  not  the  means  for  this  peculiar  kind  of  trans 
portation." 

General  Grant  now  determined  to  march  his  army  by  land 
to  New  .Carthage,  twenty-three  miles  below  Milliken's  Bend, 
to  run  the  transports  past  the  batteries  or  through  the  canal, 


THE   SIEGE  AND  FALL  OF  VICKSBURGK  1Q3 

should  the  latter  course  prove  feasible,  to  cross  the  river,  and 
to  attack  Vicksburg  from  the  south.  The  movement  was  com 
menced  by  McClernand's  Thirteenth  Army  Corps  on  the  29th 
of  March.  New  Carthage  was  found  to  be  an  island,  in  conse 
quence  of  the  breakage  of  the  levees,  and  the  march  had  to  be 
continued  twelve  miles  further  to  Perkins'  plantation.  The 
roads  were  found  to  be  level,  but  very  bad,  and  the  movement 
was  necessarily  slow.  Over  these  roads  the  supplies  of  ord 
nance  and  provisions  had  to  be  transported  thirty-five  miles  in 
wagons. 

On  the  night  of  the  16th  April,  Acting  Eear- Admiral  Porter, 
who  had  entered  with  alacrity  and  energy  into  the  general's 
plans,  ran  the  Yicksburg  batteries  with  his  fleet  and  three 
transports  carrying  stores,  and  protected  by  hay  and  cotton. 
One  of  the  transports  only  was  lost,  though  all  the  boats  were 
frequently  struck.  A  few  days  later,  five  more  transports, 
similarly  prepared,  and  towing  twelve  barges,  ran  the  batteries 
safely,  a  sixth  being  sunk,  and  half  the  barges  disabled.  The 
crews  of  the  transports  consisted  of  volunteers  from  the  army, 
picked  out  of  many  hundreds  of  officers  and  men  of  the  army, 
who  offered  themselves  for  this  dangerous  service.  The 
limited  amount  of  water  transportation  available  below  Yicks 
burg  now  rendered  it  necessary  for  the  army  to  march  by  a 
circuitous  route,  avoiding  the  flooded  lands,  thirty-five  miles 
further  to  Hard  Times,  thus  lengthening  the  line  of  communi 
cation  with  Milliken's  Bend  to  seventy  miles.  The  final  orders 
of  General  Grant  for  the  movement,  issued  on  the  20th  of 
April,  gave  McClernand's  Thirteenth  Corps  the  right,  Mc- 
Pherson's  Seventeenth  Corps  the  centre,  and  Sherman's  Fif 
teenth  Corps  the  left,  and  directed  the  army  to  move  by  the 
right  flank,  no  faster,  however,  than  supplies  and  ammunition 
could  be  transported  to  them.  On  the  26th  of  April,  when  it 
was  discovered  that  the  march  must  be  continued  below  New 
Carthage,  General  Grant  sent  orders  to  General  Sherman  to 
wait  until  the  roads  should  improve,  or  the  canals  be  finished ; 
and,  on  the  28th,  he  notified  Sherman  that  the  following  day 
was  fixed  upon  for  attacking  Grand  Gulf,  and  suggested  that 


104  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

a  simultaneous  feint  on  the  enemy's  batteries  on  the  Yazoo, 
near  Haines'  Bluff,  would  be  most  desirable,  provided  it 
could  be  made  without  the  ill-effect  on  the  army  and  the 
country  of  an  apparent  repulse.  The  object  was  to  make  as 
great  a  show  as  possible,  in  order  to  prevent  reinforcements 
being  sent  from  Yicksburg  to  the  assistance  of  the  forces 
which  would  have  to  be  encountered  at  Grand  Gulf.  "  The 
ruse,"  says  General  Grant,  "  succeeded  admirably."  In  his 
official  report,  dated  May  21st,  1863,  convinced  that  the  army 
could  distinguish  a  feint  from  a  real  attack  by  succeeding 
events,  and  that  the  country  would  in  due  season  recover 
from  the  effect,  Sherman  gave  the  necessary  orders,  embarked 
Blair's  second  division  on  ten  steamboats,  and  about  10  A.  M. 
on  the  29th  April,  proceeded  to  the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo,  where 
he  found  the  flag-boat  Black  Hawk,  Captain  Breese,  with  the 
Choctaw  and  De  Kalb,  iron-clads,  and  the  Tyler,  and  several 
smaller  wooden  boats  of  the  fleet,  already  with  steam  up,  pre 
pared  to  co-operate  in  the  proposed  demonstration  against 
Haines'  Bluff. 

The  expedition  at  once  proceeded  up  the  Yazoo  in  order ; 
lay  for  the  night  of  April  29th  at  the  mouth  of  Chickasaw 
bayou,  and  early  next  morning  proceeded  to  within  easy  range 
of  the  enemy's  batteries. 

The  gunboats  at  once  engaged  the  batteries,  and  for  four 
hours  a  vigorous  demonstration  was  kept  up.  Towards  evening, 
Sherman  ordered  the  division  of  troops  to  disembark  in  full 
view  of  the  enemy,  and  seemingly  prepare  to  assault ;  but  he 
knew  full  well  that  there  was  no  road  across  the  submerged 
field  that  lay  between  the  river  and  the  bluff.  As  soon  as  the 
troops  were  fairly  out  on  the  levee,  the  gunboats  resumed  their 
fire,  and  the  enemy's  batteries  replied  with  spirit.  The  enemy 
could  be  seen  moving  guns,  artillery,  and  infantry  back  and 
forth,  and  evidently  expecting  a  real  attack.  Keeping  up  ap 
pearances  until  night,  the  troops  were  re-embarked.  During 
the  next  day  similar  movements  were  made,  accompanied  by 
reconnoissances  of  all  the  country  on  both  sides  of  the  Yazoo. 

While  there,  orders  came  from  General  Grant  to  hurry  for- 


THE   SIEGE  AND  FALL  OF   VICKSfeURG.  1Q5 

ward  to  Grand  Gulf.  Dispatching  orders  to  the  divisions  of 
Steele  and  Tuttle  at  once  to  march  for  Grand  Gulf  via  Rich 
mond,  Sherman  prolonged  the  demonstration  till  night,  and 
quietly  dropped  back  to  his  camp  at  Young's  Point.  No  casu 
alties  were  sustained,  except  one  man  of  the  Eighth  Missouri, 
slightly  wounded. 

In  the  mean  time,  as  many  of  the  Thirteenth  Army  Corps  as 
could  be  got  on  board  the  transports  and  barges  were  embark 
ed,  and  were  moved  down  to  the  front  of  Grand  Gulf,  for  the 
purpose  of  landing  and  storming  the  enemy's  works  as  soon 
as  the  navy  should  have  silenced  the  guns.  Admiral  Porter's 
fleet  opened  at  eight  A.  M.  on  the  29th  of  April,  and  gallantly 
kept  up  a  vigorous  fire  at  short  range  for  more  than  five  hours ; 
by  which  time  General  Grant,  who  witnessed  the  engagement 
from  a  tug-boat,  became  convinced  that  the  enemy's  guns  were 
too  elevated  to  be  silenced,  and  his  fortifications  too  strong  to 
be  taken  from  the  water-front.  He  at  once  ordered  the  troops 
back  to  Hard  Times,  there  to  disembark  and  march  across  the 
point  to  the  plain  immediately  below  Grand  Gulf.  During  the 
night,  under  cover  of  the  fire  of  the  gunboats,  all  the  trans 
ports  and  barges  ran  safely  past  the  batteries.  They  were 
immediately  followed  by  the  fleet,  and  at  daylight,  on  the  30th, 
the  work  of  ferrying  the  troops  over  to  Bruinsburg  was  com 
menced.  The  Thirteenth  Corps  was  started  on  the  road  to 
Port  Gibson  as  soon  as  it  could  draw  three  days'  rations,  and 
the  Seventeenth  Corps  followed  as  fast  as  it  was  landed  on  the 
east  bank.  The  enemy  was  met  in  force  near  Port  Gibson  at 
two  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  the  1st  of  May,  was  driven  back 
on  the  following  day,  was  pursued  across  the  Bayou  Pierre, 
and  eight  miles  beyond  the  north  fork  of  the  same  bayou,  both 
which  streams  were  bridged  by  McPherson's  corps ;  and  on 
the  3d  of  May,  with  slight  skirmishing  all  day,  was  pushed  to 
and  across  the  Big  Black  River,  at  Hankinson's  Ferry.  Find 
ing  here  that  the  enemy  had  evacuated  Grand  Gulf,  and  that 
we  were  already  fifteen  miles  from  that  place  on  the  direct 
road  to  either  Yicksburg  or  Jackson,  General  Grant  halted 
his  army  to  wait  for  wagons,  supplies,  and  Sherman's  corps, 


106  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

and  went  back  to  Grand  Gulf  in  person,  to  move  the  depot  of 
supplies  to  that  point. 

Sherman  reached  Young's  Point  on  the  night  of  May  1st. 
On  the  following  morning,  the  second  division,  now  com 
manded  by  General  Blair,  moved  up  to  Milliken's  Bend  to 
garrison  that  place  until  relieved  by  troops  ordered  from 
Memphis  for  that  purpose;  and  at  the  same  time,  General 
Sherman  himself,  with  Steele's  and  Tuttle's  divisions,  took 
up  the  line  of  march  to  join  General  Grant.  They  reached 
Hard  Times  at  noon  on  the  6th,  crossed  the  Mississippi  to 
Grand  Gulf  during  the  night  and  the  following  day,  and  on 
the  8th  marched  eighteen  miles  to  Hankinson's  Ferry,  reliev 
ing  Crocker's  division  and  enabling  it  to  join  McPherson's 
corps.  General  Grant's  orders  for  a  general  advance  had 
been  issued  the  day  previous,  and  the  movement  had  already 
begun.  McPherson  was  to  take  the  right-hand  road  by  Kocky 
Springs  and  Utica  to  Eaymond,  and  thence  to  Jackson; 
McClernand,  the  left-hand  road,  through  Willow  Springs,  keep 
ing  as  near  the  Black  Kiver  as  possible  ;  Sherman  to  move  on 
Edwards'  Station,  and  both  he  and  McClernand  to  strike  the 
railroad  between  Edwards'  Station  and  Bolton.  At  noon  on 
the  10th,  Sherman  destroyed  the  floating  bridge  over  the  Big 
Black  and  marched  to  Big  Sandy ;  on  the  llth  he  reached 
Auburn,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  12th  encountered  and  dis 
persed  a  small  force  of  the  enemy  endeavoring  to  obstruct  the 
crossing  of  Fourteen  Mile  Creek.  Pausing  for  the  pioneers, 
to  make  a  new  crossing  in  lieu  of  a  bridge  burned  by  the 
enemy's  rear-guard,  towards  evening  Sherman  met  General 
Grant  on  the  other  side  of  Fourteen  Mile  Creek,  and  was 
ordered  to  encamp  there,  Steele's  division  towards  Edwards' 
Depot  and  Tuttle's  towards  Kaymond.  During  the  night,  news 
was  received  that  McPherson,  with  the  Seventeenth  Corps, 
had  the  same  day  met  and  defeated  two  brigades  of  the  enemy 
at  Eaymond,  and  that  the  enemy  had  retreated  upon  Jackson, 
where  reinforcements  were  constantly  arriving,  and  where 
General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  was  hourly  expected  to  take  per 
sonal  command. 


THE  SIEGE  AND  FALL  OF  VICKSBURGK  1Q7 

Determining  to  make  sure  of  Jackson,  and  to  leave  no 
enemy  in  his  rear,  if  it  could  be  avoided,  General  Grant  at 
once  changed  his  orders  to  McClernand  and  Sherman,  and 
directed  them  to  march  upon  Eaymond.  On  the  13th,  Mc- 
Pherson  moved  to  Clinton,  Sherman  to  a  parallel  position  at 
Mississippi  Springs,  and  McClernand  to  a  point  near  Eaymond. 
Having  communicated  during  the  night,  so  as  to  reach  their 
destination  at  the  same  hour,  on  the  14th,  Sherman  and  Mc- 
Pherson  marched  fourteen  miles,  and  at  noon  engaged  the 
enemy  near  Jackson.  At  this  time  McClernand  occupied 
Clinton,  Mississippi  Springs,  and  Eaymond,  each  with  one 
division,  and  had  Blair's  division  of  Sherman's  corps  near 
New  Auburn,  and  had  halted,  according  to  orders,  within 
supporting  distance.  The  enemy  marched  out  with  the  bulk 
of  his  forces  on  the  Clinton  road  and  engaged  McPherson's 
corps  about  two  and  a  half  miles  from  Jackson,  while  a  small 
force  of  artillery  and  infantry  took  a  strong  position  in  front 
of  Sherman,  about  the  same  distance  from  the  city,  on  the 
Mississippi  Springs  road,  and  endeavored  by  unusual  activity, 
aided  by  the  nature  of  the  ground,  to  create  the  appearance 
of  great  strength,  so  as  to  delay  Sherman's  advance  until  the 
contest  with  McPherson  should  be  decided. 

During  the  day  it  rained  in  torrents,  and  the  roads,  which 
had  been  very  dusty,  became  equally  muddy,  but  the  troops 
pushed  on,  and  about  10  A.  M.  were  within  three  miles  of  Jack 
son.  Then  were  heard  the  guns  of  McPherson  to  the  left,  and 
the  cavalry  advance  reported  an  enemy  in  front,  at  a  small 
bridge  at  the  foot  of  the  ridge  along  which  the  road  led. 

The  enemy  opened  briskly  with  a  battery.  Hastily  recon 
noitring  the  position,  Sherman  ordered  Mower's  and  Matthie's, 
formerly  Woods',  brigades  of  Tuttle's  division,  to  deploy  forward 
to  the  right  and  left  of  the  road,  and  Buckland's  to  close  up. 
Waterhouse's  and  Spohre's  batteries  were  placed  on  com 
manding  ground  and  soon  silenced  the  enemy's  guns,  when  he 
retired  about  half  a  mile  into  the  skirt  of  woods  in  front  of  the 
intrenchments  at  Jackson.  Mower's  brigade  followed  him  up, 
and  he  soon  took  refuge  behind  the  intrenchments. 


108  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

The  stream,  owing  to  its  precipitous  banks,  could  only  be 
passed  on  the  bridge,  which  the  enemy  did  not  attempt'  to 
destroy,  and  forming  the  troops  in  similar  order  beyond  the 
bridge,  only  that  Mower's  brigade,  from  the  course  he  took  in 
following  the  enemy,  occupied  the  ground  to  the  left  of  the 
road,  and  Matthie's  brigade  to  the  right,  the  two  batteries  in 
the  centre,  and  Buckland's  brigade  in  reserve. 

As  the  troops  emerged  from  the  woods  in  their  front,  and 
as  far  to  their  left  as  they  could  see,  appeared  a  line  of  in- 
trenchments,  and  the  enemy  kept  up  a  brisk  fire  with  artillery 
from  the  points  that  enfiladed  the  road.  In  order  to  ascertain 
the  nature  of  the  flanks  of  this  line  of  Retrenchments,  Sher 
man  directed  Captain  Pitzman,  acting  engineer,  to  take  the 
Ninety-fifth  Ohio,  and  make  a  detour  to  the  right,  to  see  what 
was  there.  While  he  was  gone  Steele's  division  closed  up. 
About  one  P.  M.  Captain  Pitzman  returned,  reporting  that  he 
found  the  enemy's  intrenchments  abandoned  at  the  point 
where  he  crossed  the  railroad,  and  had  left  the  Ninety-fifth 
Ohio  there  in  possession.  Sherman  at  once  ordered  General 
Steele  to  lead  his  whole  division  into  Jackson  by  that  route, 
and  as  soon  as  the  cheers  of  his  men  were  heard,  Tuttle's 
division  was  ordered  in  by  the  main  road.  The  enemy's  in 
fantry  had  escaped  to  the  north  by  the  Canton  road,  but  we 
captured  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  prisoners,  with  all  the 
enemy's  artillery  (eighteen  guns),  and  much  ammunition  and 
valuable  public  stores.  Meanwhile,  after  a  warm  engagement, 
lasting  more  than  two  hours,  McPherson  had  badly  defeated 
the  main  body  of  the  enemy,  and  driven  it  north.  The  pur 
suit  was  kept  up  until  nearly  dark. 

Disposing  the  troops  on  the  outskirts  of  the  town,  in  obe 
dience  to  a  summons  from  General  Grant,  Sherman  met  him 
and  General  McPherson  near  the  State-house,  and  received 
orders  to  occupy  the  line  of  rifle-pits,  and  on  the  following 
day  to  destroy  effectually  the  railroad  tracks  in  and  about 
Jackson,  and  all  the  property  belonging  to  the  enemy.  Ac 
cordingly,  on  the  morning  of  the  15th  of  May,  Steele's  divi 
sion  was  set  to  work  to  destroy  the  railroad  and  property  to 


THE   SIEGE  AND  FALL  OF  VICKRSBURG.  1Q9 

the  south  and  east,  including  Pearl  River  Bridge,  and  Tuttle's 
division  to  the  north  and  west.  The  railroads  were  destroyed 
by  burning  the  ties  and  warping  the  iron  for  a  distance  of  four 
miles  east  of  Jackson,  three  south,  three  north,  and  ten  west. 

In  Jackson  the  arsenal  buildings,  the  government  foundry, 
the  gun-carriage  establishment,  including  the  carriages  for  two 
complete  six-gun  batteries,  stable,  carpenter  and  paint  shops, 
were  destroyed.  The  penitentiary  was  burned,  as  is  supposed, 
by  some  convicts  who  had  been  set  free  by  the  Confederate 
authorities.  A  valuable  cotton  factory  was  also  burned  to  the 
ground,  as  machinery  of  that  kind  could  so  easily  be  convert 
ed  into  hostile  uses ;  and  the  United  States  could  better  afford 
bo  compensate  the  owners  for  their  property,  and  feed  the 
poor  families  thus  thrown  out  of  employment,  than  to  spare 
the  property.  Other  buildings  were  destroyed  in  Jackson  by 
some  mischievous  soldiers,  who  could  not  be  detected,  includ 
ing  the  Catholic  church  and  the  Confederate  hotel — the  former 
accidentally,  and  the  latter  from  malice. 

Immediately  on  entering  Jackson,  General  Grant  had  or 
dered  McClernand  with  his  corps  and  Blair's  division  of  Sher 
man's  corps  to  face  towards  Bolton,  and  march  by  roads  con 
verging  near  that  place  to  Edward's  Station.  McPherson  was 
also  directed  to  retrace  his  route  to  Clinton  and  follow  Mc 
Clernand.  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  16th,  hearing  that 
Pemberton,  with  a  force  estimated  by  the  enemy  at  ten  bat 
teries  of  artillery  and  twenty-five  thousand  men,  was  taking 
up  positions  to  attack  him,  General  Grant,  who  had  intended 
to  leave  one  division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  a  day  longer  in 
Jackson,  ordered  Sherman  to  bring  up  his  entire  command  at 
once,  and  move  with  all  possible  dispatch  until  he  should 
come  up  with  the  main  body  near  Bolton.  At  the  same  time 
McClernand  was  ordered  to  move  from  the  position  reached 
on  the  night  of  the  15th,  near  Bolton,  upon  Edward's  Station, 
and  McPherson  was  ordered  to  join  him. 

Sherman  received  his  orders  at  ten  minutes  past  seven  A.  M. 
In  an  hour  his  advance  division,  Steele's,  was  in  motion,  Tuttle's 
followed  at  noon,  and  by  night  the  corps  had  marched  twenty 


HO  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

miles  to  Bolton.  During  the  day  the  main  body  met  the 
enemy  in  strong  force  at  Champion  Hills,  and  after  a  terrible 
contest  of  several  hours'  duration,  fought  chiefly  by  Hovey's 
division  of  McClernand's  corps,  and  Logan's  and  Qnimby's 
divisions  of  McPherson's  corps,  defeated  him,  capturing  a 
large  number  of  guns  and  prisoners,  and  cutting  off  the  whole 
of  Loring's  division  from  Pemberton's  army.  That  night 
Sherman  was  ordered  to  turn  his  corps  to  the  right  and  move 
on  Bridgeport,  where  Blair's  division  was  to  join  him.  On 
the  morning  of  the  17th,  McClernand  and  McPherson  con 
tinued  the  pursuit  along  the  railroad,  the  former  in  advance. 
In  a  brilliant  affair,  Lawler's  brigade,  of  Carr's  division,  Mc 
Clernand's  corps,  stormed  the  enemy's  works  on  the  east  bank 
of  the  Big  Black,  defending  the  crossing  of  that  stream,  and 
captured  the  entire  garrison,  with  seventeen  guns.  The  enemy 
immediately  burned  the  bridge  over  the  Big  Black,  and  thus 
finally  isolated  his  forces  on  the  west  bank.  At  noon,  Sher 
man  reached  Bridgeport,  where  Blair  met  him  with  his  divi 
sion  and  the  pontoon  train,  which  was  the  only  one  in  the 
entire  army.  With  trifling  opposition  the  pontoon  bridge  was 
laid  by  night,  and  Blair's  and  Steele's  divisions  passed  over, 
followed  by  Tuttle's  division  in  the  morning.  During  the 
night  of  the  17th,  McClernand  and  McPherson  bridged,  the 
Big  Black,  and  by  eight  A.  M.,  on  the  18th,  began  to  cross,  the 
former  on  the  Jackson  and  Vicksburg  road,  the  latter  above 
it.  McClernand  marched  to  Mount  Albans  and  there  turned 
to  the  left,  on  the  Baldwin's  Ferry  road.  McPherson  came 
into  the  same  road  with  Sherman,  and  turned  to  the  left,  where, 
as  will  be  presently  seen,  the  latter  turned  to  the  right,  at  the 
fork  of  the  Bridgeport  road,  within  three  and  a  half  miles  of 
Vicksburg. 

Starting  at  daybreak,  Sherman  pushed  rapidly  forward,  and 
by  half-past  nine  A.  M.,  of  May  18th,  the  head  of  his  column 
reached  the  Benton  road  and  commanded  the  Yazoo,  inter 
posing  a  superior  force  between  the  enemy  at  Vicksburg  and 
the  forts  on  the  Yazoo.  Besting  a  sufficient  time  to  enable  the 
column  to  close  up,  Sherman  pushed  forward  to  the  point 


THE  SIEGE  AND  FALL  OF  VICKSBURGK 

where  the  road  forks,  and  sending  out  on  each  road  the 
Thirteenth  Regulars  to  the  right,  and  the  Eighth  Missouri  to 
the  left,  with  a  battery  at  the  fork,  awaited  General  Grant's 
arrival.  He  very  soon  came  up,  and  directed  Sherman  to 
operate  on  the  right,  McPherson  on  the  centre,  and  McCler- 
nand  on  the  left.  Leaving  a  sufficient  force  on  the  main  road 
to  hold  it  till  McPherson  came  up,  Sherman  pushed  the  head 
of  his  column  on  this  road  till  the  skirmishers  were  within 
musket-range  of  the  defences  of  Vicksburg.  Here  he  disposed 
Blair's  division  to  the  front,  Tuttle's  in  support,  and  ordered 
Steele's  to  follow  a  blind  road  to  the  right  till  he  reached  the 
Mississippi.  By  dark  his  advance  was  on  the  bluffs,  and 
early  next  morning  he  reached  the  Haines'  Bluff  road,  getting 
possession  of  the  enemy's  outer  works,  camps,  and  many 
prisoners  left  behind  during  their  hasty  evacuation,  and  had 
his  pickets  up  within  easy  range  of  the  enemy's  new  line  of 
defences.  By  eight  A.  M.  of  May  19th  we  had  encompassed 
the  enemy  to  the  north  of  Vicksburg,  our  right  resting  on  the 
Mississippi  River,  within  view  of  our  fleets  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Yazoo  and  Young's  Point ;  Vicksburg  was  in  plain  sight,  and 
nothing  separated  the  two  armies  but  a  space  of  about  four 
hundred  yards  of  very  difficult  ground,  cut  up  by  almost  im 
practicable  ravines  and  the  enemy's  line  of  intrenchments. 
Sherman  ordered  the  Fourth  Iowa  Cavalry  to  proceed  rapidly 
up  to  Haines'  Bluff  and  secure  possession  of  the  place,  it  being 
perfectly  open  to  the  rear.  By  four  p.  M.  the  cavalry  were  on  the 
high  bluff  behind,  and  Colonel  Swan,  finding  that  the  place 
had  been  evacuated,  dispatched  a  company  to  secure  it. 
Communication  was  opened  with  the  fleet  at  Young's  Point 
and  the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo,  and  bridges  and  i»oads  made  to 
bring  up  ammunition  and  provisions  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Chickasaw  bayou,  to  which  point  supply-boats  had  been 
ordered  by  General  Grant.  Up  to  that  time,  Sherman's  men 
had  literally  lived  upon  the  country,  having  left  Grand  Gulf 
May  8th  with  three  days'  rations  in  their  haversacks,  and 
having  received  little  or  nothing  from  the  commissary  until 
the  18th. 


112  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  .CAMPAIGNS. 

The  three  corps  being  in  position,  and  Vicksburg  as  com 
pletely  invested  as  our  strength  admitted,  and,  relying  upon 
the  demoralization  of  the  enemy,  in  consequence  of  his  re 
peated  and  disastrous  defeats  outside  of  the  works,  General 
Grant  ordered  a  general  assault  to  take  place  at  two  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon  of  the  19th.  At  that  hour,  Blair's  division 
moved  forward,  Ewing's  and  Giles  Smith's  brigades  on  the 
right  of  the  road,  and  Kilby  Smith's  brigade  on  the  left, 
with  artillery  disposed  on  the  right  and  left  to  cover  the 
point  where  the  road  enters  the  enemy's  intrenchments, 
Tuttle's  division  was  held  on  the  road,  with  Buckland's  bri 
gade  deployed  in  line  to  the  rear  of  Blair  and  the  othei 
two  brigades  under  cover.  At  the  appointed  signal  the 
line  advanced,  but  the  ground  to  the  right  and  left  was 
so  impracticable,  being  cut  up  in  deep  chasms,  filled  with  stand 
ing  and  fallen  timber,  that  the  line  was  slow  and  irregular  in 
reaching  the  trenches.  The  Thirteenth  Infantry,  on  the  left  of 
Giles  Smith,  reached  the  works  first,  and  planted  its  colors  on 
the  exterior  slope ;  its  commander,  Captain  Washington,  was 
mortally  wounded,  and  five  other  officers,  and  seventy-seven 
men,  out  of  two  hundred  and  fifty,  killed  or  wounded.  The 
Eighty-third  Indiana,  Colonel  Spooner,  and  the  One  Hundred 
and  Twenty-seventh  Illinois,  Colonel  Eldridge,  attained  the 
same  position  nearly  at  the  same  time,  held  their  ground,  and 
fired  upon  any  head  that  presented  itself  above  the  parapet ; 
but  it  was  impossible  to  enter.  Other  regiments  gained  posi 
tion  to  the  right  and  left  close  up  to  the  parapet ;  but  night 
found  them  outside  the  works,  unsuccessful.  As  soon  as  dark 
ness  closed  in,  Sherman  ordered  them  back  a  short  distance, 
where  the  formation  of  the  ground  gave  a  partial  shelter, 
to  bivouac  for  the  night.  McClernand  and  McPherson  only 
succeeded  in  gaining  advanced  positions  under  cover. 

Spending  the  20th  and  21st  in  placing  the  artillery  in 
commanding  positions,  in  perfecting  communications,  and 
in  bringing  up  supplies  to  the  troops — who,  having  now 
been  marching  and  fighting  for  twenty  days  on  about 
five  days'  rations  from  the  commissary  department,  were 


THE  SIEGE  AND  FALL  OF  VICKSBURGK  H3 

beginning  to  suffer  for  want  of  bread  — on  the  afternoon 
of  the  latter  clay,  General  Grant  issued  orders  for  a  second 
assault  to  be  made  simultaneously,  by  heads  of  columns,  at  ten 
o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  22d  of  May.  The  three  corps 
commanders  set  their  time  by  his.  Precisely  at  the  appointed 
hour,  and  simultaneously  along  the  whole  front,  the  assault 
commenced. 

In  Sherman's  corps,  Blair's  division  was  placed  at  the  head 
of  the  road,  Tuttle's  in  support,  and  General  Steele  was  to 
make  his  attack  at  a  point  in  his  front  about  half  a  mile  to 
the  right.  The  troops  were  grouped  so  that  the  movement 
could  be  connected  and  rapid.  The  road  lies  on  the  crown 
of  an  interior  ridge,  rises  over  comparatively  smooth  ground 
along  the  edge  of  the  ditch  of  the  right  face  of  the  enemy's 
bastion,  and  enters  the  parapet  at  the  shoulder  of  the  bas 
tion.  No  men  could  be  seen  in  the  enemy's  works,  except  oc 
casionally  a  sharpshooter,  who  would  show  his  head  and 
quickly  discharge  his  piece.  A  line  of  picked  skirmishers 
was  placed  to  keep  them  down.  A  volunteer  storming  party 
of  a  hundred  and  fifty  men  led  the  column,  carrying  boards 
and  poles  to  bridge  the  ditch.  This,  with  a  small  interval, 
was  followed  in  order  by  Ewing's,  Giles  Smith's,  and  Kilby 
Smith's  brigades,  bringing  up  the  rear  of  Blair's  division. 
All  marched  by  the  flank,  following  a  road  by  which  the 
men  were  partially  sheltered,  until  it  was  necessary  to  take 
the  crown  of  the  ridge  and  expose  themselves  to  the  full  view 
of  the  enemy.  The  storming  party  dashed  up  the  road  at  the 
double-quick,  followed  by  Ewing's  brigade,  the  Thirtieth  Ohio 
leading,  while  the  artillery  of  Wood's,  Barrett's,  Waterhouse's, 
Spoor's,  and  Hart's  batteries  kept  a  concentric  fire  on  the  bas 
tion  constructed  to  command  this  approach.  The  storming 
party  reached  the  salient  of  the  bastion,  and  passed  towards 
the  sally-port.  Then  rose  from  every  part  commanding  it  a 
double  rank  of  the  enemy,  and  poured  on  the  head  of  the  col 
umn  a  terrific  fire.  It  halted,  wavered,  and  sought  cover. 
The  rear  pressed  on,  but  the  fire  was  so  hot  that  very  soon  all 
followed  this  example.  The  head  of  the  column  crossed 

8 


114  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

the  ditch  on  the  left  face  of  the  bastion,  and  climbed  up 
on  the  exterior  slope.  There  the  colors  were  planted,  and 
the  men  burrowed  in  the  earth  to  shield  themselves  from 
the  flank  fire.  The  leading  brigade  of  Ewing  being  unable 
to  carry  that  point,  the  next  brigade  of  Giles  Smith  was 
turned  down  a  ravine,  and,  by  a  circuit  to  the  left,  found 
cover,  formed  line,  and  threatened  the  parapet  about  three 
hundred  yards  to  the  left  of  the  bastion  ;  while  the  brigade 
of  Kilby  Smith  deployed  on  the  further  slope  of  one  of 
the  spurs,  where,  with  E wing's  brigade,  they  kept  up  a  con 
stant  fire  against  any  object  that  presented  itself  above  the 
parapet. 

About  two  P.  M.,  General  Blair  having  reported  that  none  of 
his  brigades  could  pass  the  point  of  the  road  swept  by  the 
terrific  fire  encountered  by  Ewing's,  but  that  Giles  Smith  had 
got  a  position  to  the  left  in  connection  with  General  Hansom, 
of  McPherson's  corps,  and  was  ready  to  assault,  Sherman  or 
dered  a  constant  fire  of  artillery  and  infantry  to  be  kept  up 
to  occupy  the  attention  of  the  enemy  in  his  front,  while  Ran 
som's  and  Giles  Smith's  brigades  charged  up  against  the  par 
apet.  They  also  met  a  staggering  fire,  before  which  they 
recoiled  under  cover  of  the  hill-side.  At  the  same  time,  while 
McPherson's  whole  corps  was  engaged,  and  having  heard  from 
General  Grant  General  McClernand's  report,  which  sub 
sequently  proved  inaccurate,  that  he  had  taken  three  of  the 
enemy's  forts,  and  that  his  flags  floated  on  the  stronghold 
of  Yicksburg,  Sherman  ordered  General  Tuttle  at  once  to 
send  to  the  assault  one  of  his  brigades.  He  detailed  General 
Mower's,  and  while  General  Steele  was  hotly  engaged  on  the 
right,  and  heavy  firing  could  be  heard  all  down  the  line 
to  his  left,  Sherman  ordered  their  charge,  covered  in  like 
manner  by  Blair's  division  deployed  on  the  hill-side,  and  the 
artillery  posted  behind  parapets  within  point-blank  range. 
General  Mower  carried  his  brigade  up  bravely  and  well,  but 
met  a  fire  more  severe,  if  possible,  than  that  of  the  first  assault, 
with  a  similar  result.  The  colors  of  the  leading  regiment,  the 
Eleventh  Missouri,  were  planted  by  the  side  of  those  of  Blair's 


Jf       ^-' 


^  O 


THE  SIEGE  AND  FALL  OF  VICKSBURG.  H5 

storming  party,  and  there  remained  till  withdrawn,  after  night 
fall,  by  Sherman's  orders.  General  Steele,  with  his  division, 
made  his  assault  at  a  point  about  midway  between  the 
bastion  and  the  Mississippi  River.  The  ground  over  which 
he  passed  was  more  open  and  exposed  to  the  flank  fire  of  the 
enemy's  batteries  in  position,  and  was  deeply  cut  up  by 
gulleys  and  washes,  but  his  column  passed  steadily  through 
this  fire,  -and  reached  the  parapet,  which  was  also  found  to 
be  well  manned  and  defended  by  the  enemy.  He  could  not 
carry  the  works,  but  held  possession  of  the  hill-side  till  night, 
when  he  withdrew  his  command  to  his  present  position.  The 
loss  in  Sherman's  corps  in  this  attack  was  about  six  hundred 
killed  and  wounded. 

In  the  mean  while  portions  of  each  of  the  storming  columns 
on  McPherson's  and  McClernand's  fronts  planted  their  columns 
on  the  exterior  slope  of  the  parapet,  where  they  kept  them 
till  night.  But  the  assault  had  failed.  The  enemy's  works 
were  naturally  and  artificially  too  strong  to  be  taken  in  that 
way.  The  enemy  was  able  to  maintain  at  each  point  assailed, 
and  at  all  simultaneously  the  full  force  the  position  admitted  ; 
and  the  nature  of  the  ground  was  such  that  only  small  col 
umns  could  be  used  in  the  assault. 

General  Grant  now  determined  to  undertake  a  regular  siege. 
The  troops  worked  diligently  and  cheerfully.  On  the  evening 
of  the  3d  of  July  the  saps  were  close  to  the  enemy's  ditch, 
the  mines  were  well  under  his  parapet,  and  every  thing  was  in 
readiness  for  a  final  assault.  Meanwhile  the  investing  force 
had  been  strengthened  by  Landrum's  division  from  Memphis ; 
Smith's  and  KimbalTs  divisions  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps,  under 
Major-General  C.  C.  Washburne  ;  Herron's  division  from  Ar 
kansas,  and  two  divisions  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  under  Major- 
General  John  G.  Parke,  from  the  Department  of  the  Ohio. 
By  the  25th  of  June,  our  intrenchments  being  now  as  formidable 
against  a  sortie  as  the  enemy's  works  were  against  assault,  and 
there  being  more  troops  than  were  needed  for  the  investment, 
General  Grant  placed  Sherman  in  command  of  the  Ninth  Corps 
at  Haines'  Bluff,  Landrum's  division,  and  one  division  each  from 


116  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

the  Thirteenth,  Fifteenth,  and  Seventeenth  corps,  and  assigned 
to  him  the  duty  of  watching  the  movements  of  Johnston,  who 
had  collected  a  large  army  at  Jackson,  and  was  apparently 
about  to  attack  the  rear  of  the  investing  force,  with  the 
design  of  raising  the  siege.  Our  position  was  a  strong  one. 
The  Big  Black  covered  us  from  attack,  and  would  render 
Johnston's  escape  in  the  event  of  defeat  impossible.  Never 
theless  the  condition  of  affairs  with  his  army  was  so  desperate 
that  he  moved  from  Jackson  on  the  29th  of  June  ;  but  while 
he  was  making  reconnoissances  to  ascertain  the  best  point  for 
crossing  the  river,  on  the  4th  day  of  July,  1863,  Yicksburg 
surrendered. 

General  Grant  in  his  official  report  of  the  siege,  dated  July 
6th,  thus  alludes  to  Sherman's  operations  while  guarding  the 
rear :  "Johnston,  however,  not  attacking,  I  determined  to  attack 
him  the  moment  Yicksburg  was  in  our  possession,  and  ac 
cordingly  notified  Sherman  that  I  should  again  make  an  assault 
on  Yicksburg  at  daylight  on  the  6th,  and  for  him  to  have  up 
supplies  of  all  descriptions  ready  to  move  upon  receipt  of 
orders,  if  the  assault  should  prove  a  success.  'His  prepara 
tions  were  immediately  made,  and  when  the  place  surrendered 
on  the  4th,  two  days  earlier  than  I  had  fixed  for  the  attack, 
Sherman  was  found  ready,  and  moved  at  once  with  a  force 
increased  by  the  remainder  of  both  the  Thirteenth  and  Fif 
teenth  Army  corps,  and  is  at  present  investing  Jackson,  where 
Johnston  has  made  a  stand." 

Johnston  occupied  the  lines  of  rifle-pits  covering  the  front 
of  Jackson  with  four  divisions  of  Confederate  troops,  under 
Major-Generals  Loring,  Walker,  French,  and  Breckinridge,  and 
a  division  of  cavalry,  under  Brigadier-General  Jackson,  ob 
serving  the  fords. 

After  toiling  for  nearly  two  months  in  the  hot  and  stifling 
trenches,  without  pausing  to  share  the  general  outbreak  of  joy 
for  the  national  triumph  which  crowned  their  labors,  Sher 
man's  men  marched  fifty  miles  in  the  heat  and  dust  through  a 
country  almost  destitute  of  water,  to  meet  the  enemy. 

The  advance  of  his  troops  appeared  before  the  enemy's 


THE  SIEGE  AND  FALL  OF  VICKSBURG.  H7 

works  in  front  of  Jackson  on  the  9th  of  July,  and  on  the  12th 
had  invested  that  place,  until  both  flanks  rested  upon  Pearl 
River.  Constant  and  vigorous  skirmishing  was  kept  up  in 
front,  while  a  cavalry  expedition  was  sent  off  to  the  east  of 
Jackson  to  destroy  the  railroads,  until  the  night  of  the  16th  of 
July.  Sherman  now  had  all  his  artillery  in  position,  and  a  large 
ammunition  train  for  which  he  had  been  waiting  had  arrived 
during  the  day.  Learning  this  fact,  and  perceiving  the  im 
possibility  of  longer  maintaining  his  position,  Johnston  having 
previously  removed  the  greater  portion  of  his  stores,  marched 
out  of  Jackson  the  same  night,  and  destroyed  the  floating- 
bridges  over  the  Pearl  River.  Early  on  the  morning  of  the 
17th,  the  evacuation  was  discovered,  and  Sherman's  troops 
entered  and  occupied  the  city.  Johnston  continued  the  re 
treat  to  Morton,  thirty-five  miles  east  of  Jackson.  Two  divis 
ions  of  our  troops,  with  the  cavalry,  followed  as  far  as  Brandon, 
through  which  place  they  drove  the  enemy's  cavalry  on  the 
19th.  General  Sherman  at  once  sent  out  expeditions  in  all 
quarters,  to  thoroughly  and  permanently  destroy  all  the 
bridges,  culverts,  embankments,  water-tanks,  rails,  ties,  and 
rolling-stock  of  the  railways  centring  in  Jackson.  Our  loss 
during  the  operations  before  Jackson  was  about  one  thousand 
in  all ;  the  enemy's  was  estimated  by  General  Johnston  at  71 
killed,  504  wounded,  and  about  25  stragglers.  We  took  764 
prisoners  on  entering  the  city.  Leaving  a  small  garrison  in 
Jackson,  Sherman  returned  to  the  line  of  the  Big  Black,  to 
recuperate. 

Thus  terminated,  in  one  hundred  and  nine  days  from  its  first 
inception,  a  campaign  which  resulted  in  the  surrender  of  an 
entire  army  of  thirty-seven  thousand  prisoners,  including  fif 
teen  general  officers ;  the  discomfiture  and  partial  dispersion 
of  a  second  large  army  under  a  leader  of  approved  skill ;  the 
capture  of  Yicksburg ;  the  opening  of  the  Mississippi  River ; 
and  the  division  of  the  rebellion  in  twain. 

Of  Sherman's  part  in  the  campaign  General  Grant  remarks  : 
"  The  siege  of  Yicksburg  and  last  capture  of  Jackson  and 
dispersion  of  Johnston's  army  entitle  General  Sherman  to 


118  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

more  credit  than  usually  falls  to  the  lot  of  one  man  to  earn. 
His  demonstration  at  Haines'  Bluff,  in  April,  to  hold  the  ene- 
emy  about  Vicksburg,  while  the  army  was  securing  a  foothold 
east  of  the  Mississippi ;  his  rapid  marches  to  join  the  army 
afterwards ;  his  management  at  Jackson,  Mississippi,  in  the 
first  attack ;  his  almost  unequalled  march  from  Jackson  to 
Bridgeport,  and  passage  of  Black  Kiver  ;  his  securing  "Walnut 
Hills  on  the  18th  of  May,  attest  his  great  merit  as  a  soldier." 
The  army  now  rested. 


THE  LULL   AFTER   VICKSBURG.  H9 


CHAPTEE  X. 

THE    LULL    AFTER    VICKSBUKG. 

IMMEDIATELY  after  the  surrender,  while  waiting  for  the  move 
ment  of  his  columns,  Sherman  seized  a  few  moments  to  write 
these  hasty  lines  to  his  friend  Admiral  Porter  :— 

"  I  can  appreciate  the  intense  satisfaction  you  must  feel 
at  lying  before  the  very  monster  that  has  defied  us  with  such 
deep  and  malignant  hate,  and  seeing  your  once  disunited 
fleet  again  a  unit ;  and  better  still,  the  chain  that  made  an  in 
closed  sea  of  a  link  in  the  great  river  broken  forever.  In 
so  magnificent  a  result  I  stop  not  to  count  who  did  it.  It  is 
done,  and  the  day  of  our  nation's  birth  is  consecrated  and  bap 
tized  anew  in  a  victory  won  by  the  united  Navy  and  Army  of 
our  country.  God  grant  that  the  harmony  and  mutual  respect 
that  exists  between  our  respective  commanders,  and  shared  by 
all  the  true  men  of  the  joint  service,  may  continue  forever  and 
serve  to  elevate  our  national  character,  threatened  with  ship 
wreck.  Thus  I  muse  as  I  sit  in  my  solitary  camp  out  in  the 
wood  far  from  the  point  for  which  we  have  justly  striven  so 
long  and  so  well,  and  though  personal  curiosity  would  tempt 
me  to  go  and  see  the  frowning  batteries  and  sunken  pits  that 
have  defied  us  so  long,  and  sent  to  their  silent  graves  so  many 
of  our  early  comrades  in  the  enterprise,  I  feel  that  other  tasks' 
lie  before  me,  and  time  must  not  be  lost.  Without  casting 
anchor,  and  despite  the  heat  and  the  dust  and  the  drought,  I 
must  again  into  the  bowels  of  the  land  to  make  the  con 
quest  of  Yicksburg  fulfil  all  the  conditions  it  should  in  the 
progress  of  this  war.  Whether  success  attend  my  efforts  or 
not,  I  know  that  Admiral  Porter  will  ever  accord  to  me  the 


120  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

exhibition  of  a  pure  and  unselfish  zeal  in  the  service  of  our 
country. 

"  Though  further  apart,  the  navy  and  army  will  still  act  m 
concert,  and  I  assure  you  I  shall  never  reach  the  banks  of  the 
river  or  see  a  gunboat  but  I  will  think  of  Admiral  Porter, 
Captain  Breese,  and  the  many  elegant  and  accomplished  gen 
tlemen  it  has  been  my  good  fortune  to  meet  on  armed  or 
unarmed  decks  of  the  Mississippi  Squadron." 

There  was  now  a  lull  in  the  war.  After  the  great  struggles 
which  closed  the  summer  campaign  of  1863,  the  combatants 
relaxed  their  grasp  for  a  moment,  to  breathe.  The  Army  of 
the  Potomac  rested  upon  the  Eapidan.  The  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  gathered  for  the  leap,  lay  in  front  of  Tullahoma. 
The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  reposed  on  the  banks  of  the  river 
it  had  won.  Steele  was  sent  to  occupy  Little  Eock.  Ord  with 
the  Thirteenth  Corps,  went  to  New  Orleans.  By  the  remain 
der  of  Grant's  army  the  interval  was  spent  in  reorganizing 
and  recuperating.  The  Fifteenth  Corps  was  reorganized  so  as 
to  consist  of  four  divisions.  The  First,  commanded  by  Briga 
dier-General  P.  J.  Osterhaus,  was  composed  of  two  brigades, 
led  by  Brigadier-General  C.  E.  Woods  and  Colonel  J.  A.  "Wil 
liamson,  of  the  Fourth  Iowa.  The  Second,  commanded  by 
Brigadier-General  Morgan  L.  Smith,  comprised  the  brigades 
of  Brigadier-Generals  Giles  A.  Smith  and  J.  A.  D.  Lightburn. 
The  Third,  commanded  by  Brigadier-General  J.  M.  Tuttle, 
consisted  of  three  brigades,  under  Brigadier-Generals  J.  A. 
Mower,  and  E.  P.  Buckland,  and  Colonel  J.  J.  Wood,  of  the 
Twelfth  Iowa.  The  Fourth,  commanded  by  Brigadier-G  eneral 
Hugh  Ewing,  included  the  brigades  led  by  G  eneral  J.  M.  Corse, 
Colonel  Loomis,  of  the  Twenty-sixth  Illinois,  and  Colonel  J. 
E.  Cockerell,  of  the  Seventieth  Iowa.  Major-General  Frank 
P.  Blair  was  temporarily  relieved  from  duty  with  the  corps, 
and  Major-General  Steele's  division  accompanied  that  officer 
to  Arkansas. 

We  may  now  avail  ourselves  of  the  lull  to  glance  briefly  at 
General  Sherman's  correspondence,  during  this  period  and  the 


THE  LULL  AFTER  VICKSBURGK  121 

campaign  just  ended,  relating  to  other  matters  than  the  move 
ments  and  battles  of  his  corps. 

While  the  new  levies  of  1863  were  being  raised,  in  a  letter 
to  the  governor  of  his  native  State  he  took  occasion  to  urge 
the  importance  of  filling  up  the  ranks  of  the  veteran  regiments 
rather  than  raising  new  ones.  "I  believe,"  he  said,  "you 
will  pardon  one  who  rarely  travels  out  of  his  proper  sphere  to 
express  an  earnest  hope  that  the  strength  of  our  people  will 
not  again  be  wasted  by  the  organization  of  new  regiments, 
whilst  we  have  in  the  field  skeleton  regiments,  with  officers, 
non-commissioned  officers,  and  men,  who  only  need  numbers 
to  make  a  magnificent  army. 

"  The  President  of  the  United  States  is  now  clothed  with  a 
power  that  should  have  been  conferred  just  two  years  ago, 
and  I  feel  assured  he  will  use  it.  He  will  call  for  a  large  mass 
of  men,  and  they  should  all  be  privates,  and  sent  so  as  to 
make  every  regiment  in  the  field  equal  to  one  thousand  men. 
Time  has  convinced  all  reasonable  men  that  war  in  theory  and 
practice  are  two  distinct  things.  Many  an  honest  patriot, 
full  of  enthusiasm,  zeal,  and  thirst  for  glory,  has  in  practice 
found  himself  unequal  to  the  actual  requirements  of  war,  and 
passed  to  one  side,  leaving  another  in  his  place;  and,  now, 
after  two  years,  Ohio  has  in  the  field  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
six  regiments,  whose  officers  now  are  qualified,  and  the  men  of 
which  would  give  tone  and  character  to  the  new  recruits.  To 
fill  these  regiments  will  require  fifty  thousand  recruits,  which 
are  as  many  as  the  State  could  well  raise.  I  therefore  hope 
and  pray  that  you  will  use  your  influence  against  any  more 
new  regiments,  and  consolidation  of  old  ones,  but  fill  up  all 
the  old  ones  to  a  full  standard.  Those  who  talk  of  prompt 
and  speedy  peace  know  not  what  they  say." 

Reverting  to  the  enlarged  scope  of  the  war,  and  its  probable 
future,  he  continues  :  "  The  South  to-day  is  more  formidable 
and  arrogant  than  she  was  two  years  ago,  and  we  lose  far 
more  by  having  an  insufficient  number  of  men  than  from  any 
other  cause.  We  are  forced  to  invade — we  must  keep  the  war 
South ;  they  are  not  only  ruined,  exhausted,  but  humbled  in 


122  SHERMAN   AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

pride  and  spirit.  Admitting  that  our  armies  to  the  front  are 
equal  to  the  occasion,  which  I  know  is  not  the  case,  our  lines 
of  communication  are  ever  threatened'  by  their  dashes,  for 
which  the  country,  the  population,  and  character  of  the  ene 
my  are  all  perfectly  adapted. 

"  Since  the  first  hostile  shot  the  people  of  the  North  has  had 
no  option,  they  must  conquer  or  be  conquered.  There  can  be 
no  middle  course.  I  have  never  been  concerned  about  the 
copperhead  squabblings  ;  the  South  spurns  and  despises  this 
class  worse  than  we  do,  and  would  only  accept  their  overtures 
to  substitute  them  in  their  levies,  in  the  cotton  and  corn-fields, 
for  the  slaves  who  have  escaped.  I  do  not  pretend,  nor  have 
I  ever  pretended  to  foresee  the  end  of  all  this,  but  I  do  know 
that  we  are  yet  far  from  the  end  of  war.  I  repeat  that  it  is  no 
longer  an  open  question ;  we  must  fight  it  out.  The  moment 
we  relax,  down  go  all  our  conquests  thus  far.  I  know  my 
views  on  this  point  have  ever  been  regarded  as  extreme,  even 
verging  on  insanity;  but  for  years  I  had  associated  with 
Bragg,  Beauregard,  and  extreme  Southern  men,  and  long  be 
fore  others  could  realize  the  fact  that  Americans  would  raise 
their  hands  against  our  consecrated  government,  I  was  forced 
to  know  it,  to  witness  it.  Two  years  will  not  have  been  spent 
in  vain  if  the  North  now,  by  another  magnificent  upheaving 
of  the  real  people,  again  fill  the  ranks  of  your  proven  and 
tried  regiments,  and  assure  them  that,  through  good  report 
and  evil  report,  you  will  stand  by  them.  If  Ohio  will  do  this, 
and  if  the  great  North  will  do  this,  then  will  our  army  feel 
that  it  has  a  country  and  a  government  worth  dying  for. 
As  to  the  poltroons,  who  falter  and  cry  quits,  let  them  dig 
and  raise  the  food  the  army  needs — but  they  should  never 
claim  a  voice  in  the  councils  of  the  nation." 

A  general  order,  issued  from  the  adjutant-general's  office, 
directed  that  all  regiments  which  had  fallen  below  one  half 
their  maximum  strength  should  be  consolidated  by  reducing 
the  number  of  companies,  and  mustering  out  such  of  the 
field  and  staff  officers  as  should  thereby  be  rendered  super 
numerary.  Strictly  carried  out,  the  effect  of  this  order  would 


THE  LULL  AFTER  VICKSBURG.  123 

have  been  to  reduce  a  very  large  proportion  of  the  regiments 
composing  the  army  to  the  condition  of  feeble  battalions, 
with  impaired  powers  for  the  assimilation  of  recruits,  and  with 
the  loss  of  many  of  the  ablest  and  bravest  officers.  In  many 
cases  this  actually  occurred.  To  the  policy  of  this  order, 
Sherman  felt  called  upon  to  object.  "  If  my  judgment  do  not 
err,"  he  wrote  to  Adjutant-General  Thomas,  "  you  have  the 
power  to  save  this  army  from  a  disintegration  more  fatal  than 
defeat. 

"You  will  pardon  so  strong  an  expression,  when  I  illus 
trate  my  meaning ;  and  if  I  am  in  error  I  shall  rejoice  to 
know  it. 

"  The  Act  of  Congress,  known  as  the  '  Conscript  Bill,'  though 
containing  many  other  provisions,  was  chiefly  designed  to  or 
ganize  the  entire  available  military  strength  of  the  nation,  and 
provide  for  its  being  called  out  to  the  assistance  of  the  armies 
now  in  the  field.  These  armies  are  composed  in  great  part  of 
regiments  which,  by  death  in  battle,  by  disease,  and  discharges 
for  original  or  developed  causes,  have  fallen  far  below  the 
minimum  standard  of  law,  and  many  even  below  '  one-half  of 
the  maximum  strength.'  Yet  all  these  regiments,  as  a  general 
rule,  have  undergone  a  necessary  and  salutary  purgation. 
Field-officers  have  acquired  a  knowledge  which  they  did  not 
possess  when  first  called  to  arms  by  the  breaking  ouT;  of  the 
war ;  they  have  learned  how  to  drill,  to  organize,  to  provide 
for  and  conduct  their  regiments.  Captains,  lieutenants,  ser 
geants,  and  corporals,  have  all  been  educated  in  the  dear  but 
necessary  school  of  experience,  and  begin  to  have  a  knowl 
edge  which  would  enable  them  to  make  good  companies,  had 
they  the  proper  number  of  privates.  We  had  all  supposed 
the  conscript  law  would  furnish  these  privates,  and  that  at  last 
we  would  have  an  army  with  a  due  proportion  of  all  grades. 
The  receipt  of  General  Orders  No.  86  dispels  this  illusion, 
and  we  must  now  absolutely  discharge  the  colonels  and  majors, 
and  assistant-surgeons  of  all  regiments  below  the  standard  of 
'  one-half  the  maximum.'  This  will  at  once  take  the  -very  life 
out  of  our  army.  The  colonels  and  majors  of  our  reduced 


124  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

regiments  are  generally  the  best  men,  and  are  the  fruit 
of  two  years'  hard  and  constant  labor.  Then  the  ten  com 
panies  must  be  reduced  to  five,  and  of  course  there  will 
be  discharged  in  each  regiment — field  and  staff,  three ;  cap- 
tarns,  five  ;  lieutenants,  ten ;  sergeants,  twenty ;  corporals, 
forty ;  aggregate,  seventy-eight.  So  that  each  regiment 
will  be  reduced  in  strength  by  seventy-eight  of  its  chosen 
and  best  men.  Extend  this  to  the  whole  army,  for  the  army 
is  now  or  must  soon  fall  below  the  standard,  and  the 
result  will  be  a  very  heavy  loss,  and  that  confined  to  the  best 
men. 

"  Then,  after  regiments  are  made  battalions,  and  again  are 
restored  to  their  regimental  organization,  will  come  in  a  new 
set  of  colonels,  majors,  captains,  etc.,  etc.,  and  what  guarantee 
have  we  but  the  same  old  process  of  costly  elimination  will 
have  to  be  gone  over?  .  .  A  new  set  of  colonels  and  majors, 
and  a  strong  infusion  of  new  captains  and  lieutenants,  will 
paralyze  the  new  organization.  The  army  is  now  in  about  the 
right  condition  to  be  re-enforced  by  recruits — privates  ;  but  if 
this  consolidation  is  effected,  I  have  no  hesitation  in  saying 
that  my  army  corps  is  and  will  be  paralyzed  by  the  change. 
It  will  be  all  loss  and  no  gain.  Regiments  will  lose  their 
identity,  their  pride,  their  esprit.  If  there  be  no  intention  to 
enlarge  the  present  volunteer  army,  I  admit  that  consolida 
tion  is  economical  and  right ;  but  when  we  all  feel  the  armies 
must  be  filled  up,  it  does  seem  strange  we  should  begin  by 
taking  out  of  our  small  but  tried  regiments  some  of  the  very 
best  materials  in  them,  especially  their  colonels." 

To  a  lady  whose  sight  and  hearing  were  shocked  by  the  con 
duct  and  language  of  some  of  the  troops,  and  who  took 
occasion  to  represent  the  matter  at  length,  he  replied,  defend 
ing  his  men  against  the  charges  of  misconduct,  which,  as  in 
all  other  portions  of  the  army,  were  continually  brought 
against  them  in  terms  so  vague  and  general  that  no  civil 
magistrate  would  have  given  them  an  instant's  thought ;  and 
himself  against  the  allegation  that  he  tolerated  irregulari 
ties. 


THE  LULL  AFTER  VICKSBURG.  125 

"Mrs.  Z lias  fallen  into  a  common  error  in  saying 

it  was  useless  to  complain  of  a  whole  regiment  to  Brigadier- 
General  Smith  or  Major-General  Sherman.  We  naturally 
demanded  more  specific  complaint  against  incendiary  acts 
than  a  mere  vague  suspicion  that  the  -  -  did  all  iniquitous 
things,  when  twenty  other  regiments  were  camped  round 
about  Memphis,  six  thousand  vagabonds  and  refugees  hang 
ing  about,  and  the  city  itself  infested  by  gangs  of  thieves  and 
incendiaries,  turned  loose  upon  the  world,  and  sheltered  in 
their  deeds  of  darkness  by  charging  them  upon  soldiers. 
Neither  General  Morgan  L.  Smith  or  myself  ever  failed  to 
notice  a  specific  complaint  against  any  soldier  of  our  com 
mand,  if  accompanied  by  reasonable  proofs ;  but  we  did,  and 
rightfully  too,  resent  a  mere  general  charge,  that  every  fire 
originating  from  careless  chimneys,  careless  arrangement  of 
stove-pipes,  and  the  designing  acts  of  wicked  incendiaries, 
sh'ould  without  even  an  attempt  at  proof  be  charged  to  the 

— .  That  regiment  is  one  of  the  bravest  and  best  dis 
ciplined  in  our  service,  and  being  composed  mostly  of  young 
and  energetic  men  from  the  city  of  -  — ,  is  somewhat  fa 
mous  for  its  acts  of  fun,  frolic,  mischief,  and  even  .crime, 
with  a  perfect  skill  in  evading  detection  and  pursuit.  They 
are  lawless  and  violent,  and,  like  all  our  volunteer  soldiers, 
have  for  years  been  taught  that  the  people,  the  masses, 
the  majority,  are  'king,'  and  can  do  no  wrong.  They 
are  no  worse  than  other  volunteers,  ah1  of  whom  come  to  us 
filled  with  the  popular  idea  that  they  must  enact  war,  that 
they  must  clean  out  the  secesh,  must  waste  and  not  protect 
their  property,  must  burn,  waste,  and  destroy.  Just  such 
people  as  Mrs.  Z —  •  have  taught  this  creed,  sung  this 
song,  and  urged  on  our  men  to  these  disgraceful  acts ; 
and  it  is  such  as  Morgan  L.  Smith  and  W.  T.  Sherman 
who  have  been  combating  this  foul  doctrine.  During  my 
administration  of  affairs  in  Memphis,  I  know  it  was  raised 
from  a  condition  of  death,  gloom,  and  darkness,  to  one  of 
life  and  comparative  prosperity.  Its  streets,  stores,  hotels, 
and  dwellings  were  sad  and  deserted  as  I  entered  it,  and 


126  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

when  I  left  it,  life  and  business  prevailed,  and  over  fourteen 
hundred  enrolled  Union  men  paraded  its  streets,  boldly  and 
openly  carrying  the  banners  of  our  country.  No  citizen, 
Union  or  secesh,  will  deny  that  I  acted  lawfully,  firmly,  and 
fairly,  and  that  substantial  justice  prevailed  with  even  balance. 
I  do  feel  their  testimony  better  than  the  hearsay  of  any  would- 
be  notoriety." 

To  General  Steele,  while  temporarily  detached  from  the 
main  body  of  his  command,  Sherman  thus  wrote  respecting 
the  destruction  of  the  enemy's  property  : — 

"  I  most  heartily  approve  your  purpose  to  return  to  families 
their  carriages,  buggies,  and  farming  tools,  wherewith  to  make 
a  crop.  "War  at  best  is  barbarism,  but  to  involve  all — children, 
women,  old  and  helpless — is  more  than  can  be  justified.  Our 
men  will  become  absolutely  lawless  unless  this  can  be  checked. 
The  destruction  of  corn  or  forage  and  provisions  in  the  enemy's 
country  is  a  well-established  law  of  war,  and  is  as  justifiable 
as  the  destruction  of  private  cotton  by  the  Southern  Confed 
eracy.  Jeff.  Davis,  no  doubt,  agrees  that  they  have  a  right 
to  destroy  their  people's  cotton,  but  the  guerrillas  do  not  stop 
to  inquire  whose  cotton  they  burn  ;  and  I  know,  as  you  know, 
the  Confederate  Government  claim  the  war-right  to  burn  all 
cotton,  whether  belonging  to  their  adherents  or  to  Union  men. 
We  surely  have  a  similar  right  as  to  corn,  cotton,  fodder,  &c., 
used  to  sustain  armies  and  war.  Still,  I  always  feel  that  the 
stores  necessary  for  a  family  should  be  spared,  and  I  think  it 
injures  our  men  to  allow  them  to  plunder  indiscrrminately  the 
inhabitants  of  the  country." 

Near  Jackson,  Miss.,  at  a  house  called  "  Hurricane,"  formerly 
occupied  as  a  residence  by  Jefferson  Davis's  brother,  Joseph 
Davis,  some  men  of  Ewing's  division  discovered,  in  a  garret, 
only  reached  through  a  trap-door  in  the  ceiling,  a  box  of  letters 
and  papers.  By  the  time  the  box  reached  Sherman's  head 
quarters,  whither  it  was  forwarded,  many  of  the  contents  had 


THE  LULL  AFTER  VICKSBURGL  127 

been  abstracted,  but  the  remainder  were  found  to  consist  of 
letters  addressed  to  Jefferson  Davis  by  various  persons  during 
the  preceding  ten  years.  After  attempting  to  arrange  them 
in  convenient  shape  for  examination,  Sherman  found  the  task 
too  great  a  tax  on  his  time,  and  early  in  August  forwarded 
them  to  the  adjutant-general's  office  at  Washington. 

The  circumstances  which  form  the  groundwork  of  some  of 
Whittier's  finest  verses  are  thus  related,  in  an  official 'dispatch 
to  the  secretary  of  war,  dated  August  8th,  1863  : — 

"  I  take  the  liberty  of  asking,  through  you,  that  something 
be  done  for  a  young  lad  named  Orion  P.  Howe,  of  Waukegan, 
Illinois,  who  belongs  to  the  Fifty-fifth  Illinois,  but  is  at  presenj; 
at  his  home  wounded.  I  think  he  is  too  young  for  West  Point, 
but  would  be  the  very  thing  for  a  midshipman.  When  the 
assault  at  Vicksburg  was  at  its  height,  on  the  19th  of  May, 
and  I  was  on  foot  near  the  road  which  formed  the  line  of  at 
tack,  this  young  lad  came  up  to  me  wounded  and  bleeding, 
with  a  good  healthy  boy's  cry  :  '  General  Sherman,  send  some 
cartridges  to  Colonel  Walmbourg,  the  men  are  all  out.' 
'  What  is  the  matter  with  my  boy  ?'  '  They  shot  me  in  the 
leg,  but  I  can  go  to  the  hospital ;  send  the  cartridges  right 
away.'  Even  where  we  stood,  the  shot  fell  thick,  and  I  told 
him  to  go  to  the  rear  at  once,  I  would  attend  to  the  cartridges, 
and  off  he  limped.  Just  before  he  disappeared  over  the  hill, 
he  turned,  and  called,  as  loud  as  he  could,  '  Calibre  54.' 

"  I  have  not  seen  the  boy  since,  and  his  colonel,  Walm 
bourg,  on  inquiry,  gives  me  his  address  as  above,  and  says 
he  is  a  bright  intelligent  boy,  with  a  fine  preliminary  educa 
tion. 

"What  arrested  my  attention  then,  was — and  what  renews 
my  memory  of  the  fact  now,  is — that  one  so  young,  carrying 
a  musket-ball  wound  through  his  leg,  should  have  found  his 
way  to  me  on  that  fatal  spot,  and  delivered  his  message,  not 
forgetting  the  very  important  part,  even,  of  the  calibre  of  the 
musket,  which  you  know  is  an  unusual  one. 

"  I'll  warrant  that  the  boy  has  in  him  the  elements  of  a  man, 


128  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

and  I  commend  him  to  the  Government  as  one  worthy  the 
fostering  care  of  some  one  of  its  national  institutions." 

On  the  14th  of  August  he  received  from  the  "War  Depart 
ment  a  commission  as  brigadier-general  in  the  Regular  Army 
of  the  United  States,  dating  from  the  4th  of  July,  1863,  and 
thus  acknowledged  his  indebtedness  to  General  Grant  for  this 
new  honor  : — 

"  I  had  the  satisfaction  to  receive  last  night  the  appoint 
ment  as  brigadier-general  in  the  regular  army,  with  a  letter 
from  General  Halleck  very  friendly  and  complimentary  in  its 
terms.  I  know  that  I  owe  this  to  your  favor,  and  beg  to  ac 
knowledge  it,  and  add,  that  I  value  the  commission  far  less 
than  the  fact  that  this  will  associate  my  name  with  yours  and 
McPherson's  in  opening  the  Mississippi,  an  achievement  the 
importance  of  which  cannot  be  oyer-estimated. 

"  I  beg  to  assure  you  of  my  deep  personal  attachment,  and 
to  express  the  hope  that  the  chances  of  war  will  leave  me  to 
serve  near  and  under  you  till  the  dawn  of  that  peace  for  which 
we  are  contending,  with  the  only  purpose  that  it  shall  be  hon 
orable  and  lasting." 

President  Lincoln  had  at  the  same  time  conferred  on  Gen 
eral  Grant  himself  a  commission  as  major-general  in  the  regu 
lar  army  from  the  same  date ;  and  Meade  for  Gettysburg, 
and  McPherson  for  Yicksburg,  had  also  been  added  to  the 
list  of  the  regular  brigadier-generals.  To  understand  the 
nature  of  the  compliment  thus  bestowed  by  the  Government 
upon  its  faithful  servants,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the 
major-generals  of  the  regular  army  number  but  five,  and  the 
brigadier-generals  but  nine. 

It  has  been  alleged  in  some  of  the  newspapers  of  the  day, 
that  while  the  army  was  encamped  at  Young's  Point,  General 
Sherman  handed  to  General  Grant  a  written  protest  against 
the  proposed  movement  on  Grand  Gulf,  and  the  statement 
has  been  coupled  with  such  a  show  of  circumstances  as  to 


THE  LULL  AFTER  VICKSBURG.  129 

obtain  ready  credence  in  many  quarters.  In  fact,  General 
Sherman  never  protested,  either  in  writing  or  verbally,  against 
any  movement  ever  proposed  or  adopted  by  General  Grant ; 
and  throughout  the  entire  campaign  these  two  commanders 
acted  together  in  perfect  harmony  and  cordiality  ;  the  com- 
mander-in-chief  freely  and  constantly  availing  himself  of  Sher 
man's  advice,  the  subordinate  promptly  and  faithfully  carrying 
out  the  orders  o-f  his  superior.  But  the  movement  on  Grand 
Gulf  was  not  Sherman's  plan.  It  was  the  conception  of  Gen 
eral  Grant's  own  mind,  and  was  adopted  by  him,  against  the 
opinion,  though  with  the  full  consent  and  support  of  the 
Executive.  Sherman  considered  the  north  front  of  Yicksburg 
the  true  point  of  attack,  and  the  line  of  the  Yallabusha  the 
best  base  of  operations.  On  the  8th  of  April  he  frankly  ex 
pressed  this  opinion  to  General  Grant  in  the  following  com 
munication  : 

"  I  would  most  respectfully  suggest  that  General  Grant 
call  on  his  corps  commanders  for  their  opinions,  concise  and 
positive,  on  the  best  general  plan  of  campaign. 

"  My  own  opinions  are — 

"  1st.  That  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  is  far  in  advance  of 
the  other  grand  armies. 

"  2d.  That  a  corps  from  Missouri  should  forthwith  be  moved 
from  St.  Louis  to  the  vicinity  of  Little  Bock,  Arkansas,  sup 
plies  collected  while  the  river  is  full,  and  land  communication 
with  Memphis  opened  via  Des  Ark,  on  the  "White  and  Madi 
son,  on  the  St.  Francis  rivers. 

"  3d.  That  as  much  of  Yazoo  Pass,  Coldwater,  and  Tallahat- 
chee  rivers  as  can  be  regained  and  fortified  be  held,  and  the 
main  army  be  transported  thither  by  land  or  water ;  that  the 
road  back  to  Memphis  be  secured  and  reopened,  and  as  soon 
as  the  waters  subside,  Grenada  be  attacked,  and  the  swamp 
road  across  to  Helena  be  patroled  by  cavalry. 

"  4th.  That  the  line  of  the  Yallabusha  be  the  base  from  which 
to  operate  against  the  points  where  the  Mississippi  Central 
crosses  Big  Black  above  Canton,  and,  lastly,  where  the  Yicks- 

9 


130  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

burg  and  Jackson  Railroad  crosses  the  same  river.  The  cap 
ture  of  Yicksburg  would  result. 

"  5th.  That  a  force  be  left  in  this  vicinity  not  to  exceed  ten 
thousand  men,  with  only  enough  steamboats  to  float  and 
transport  them  to  any  desired  point.  This  force  to  be  held 
always  near  enough  to  act  with  the  gunboats,  when  the  main 
army  is  known  to  be  near  Yicksburg,  Haines'  Bluff,  or  Yazoo 
City. 

"  The  chief  reason  for  operating  solely  by  water  was  the  sea 
son  of  the  year,  and  high-water  in  Tallahatchee  and  Yalla- 
busha.  The  spring  is  now  here,  and  soon  these  streams  will 
be  no  serious  obstacle,  save  the  ambuscades  of  forest,  and 
whatever  works  the  enemy  may  have  erected  at  or  near 
Grenada.  North  Mississippi  is  too  valuable  to  allow  them  to 
hold  and  make  crops. 

"  I  make  these  suggestions  with  the  request  that  General 
Grant  simply  read  them,  and  simply  give  them,  as  I  know  he 
will,  a  share  of  h\s  thoughts.  I  would  prefer  he  should  not 
answer  them,  but  merely  give  them  as  much  or  as  little  weight 
as  they  deserve." 

And  he  added  in  conclusion  : — 

"  Whatever  plan  of  action  he  may  adopt  will  receive  from 
me  the  same  zealous  co-operation  and  energetic  support  as 
though  conceived  by  myself." 


MARCH  TO  CHATTANOOGA. 


CHAPTEE    XI. 

THE    MARCH    TO    CHATTANOOGA    AND    THE    BATTLE    OF    MISSIONARY 

RIDGE. 

WHILE  Sherman's  corps  was  resting  on  the  Big  Black,  the 
situation  of  affairs  in  the  central  region  became  such  as  to 
require  the  concentration  of  all  available  troops  for  operations 
in  that  theatre  of  war.  Rosecrans  had  in  August  expelled 
the  enemy  from  Middle  Tennessee,  and,  by  the  9th  of  Septem 
ber,  by  a  brilliant  series  of  flank  movements,  had  compelled 
Bragg  to  evacuate  his  strong  fortified  position  at  Chattanooga, 
and  fall  back  behind  the  Lookout  and  Mission  mountains. 
Burnside  had,  at  the  same  time,  driven  the  rebels  from  East 
Tennessee,  and  had  occupied  Knoxville  and  Cumberland  Gap. 
Having  lost  the  Mississippi,  the  enemy  was  now  endeavoring 
to  save  Tennessee,  and  was  bringing  troops  from  the  east  and 
from  the  west  to  reinforce  Bragg,  so  as  to  enable  him  to  take 
the  offensive,  and  drive  the  Union  army  to  the  Ohio.  Long- 
street's  corps  was  on  its  way  from  Virginia,  and  Loring's  di 
vision  had  arrived  from  Johnston's  army. 

On  the  13th  September,  orders  were  sent  from  Washington 
to  Burnside  to  move  down  the  Tennessee  towards  Chattanooga, 
and  to  Huiibut  at  Memphis  and  Grant  and  Sherman  at  Yicks- 
burg,  to  send  all  their  available  forces  to  Corinth  and  Tus- 
cumbia  to  co-operate  with  Rosecrans,  in  case  Bragg  should 
attempt  to  turn  his  right  flank  and  invade  Tennessee.  On 
the  23d,  Howard's  eleventh-  corps  and  Slocum's  twelfth 
corps  were  detached  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  united 
under  the  command  of  Major-General  Hooker,  and  ordered  to 
Nashville. 


132  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

On  the  22d,  having  received  a  telegram  from  General  Grant, 
directing  him  to  detail  one  division  to  march  to  Yicksburg, 
and  there  embark  for  Memphis,  Sherman  dispatched  Oster- 
haus  with  his  first  division.  At  four  o'clock  that  afternoon  it 
was  on  the  march,  and  embarked  the  next  day.  On  the  23d, 
Sherman  was  called  in  person  to  Yicksburg,  and  instructed  to 
prepare  to  follow  with  his  whole  corps,  except  Tuttle's  third 
division,  which  was  to  be  left  with  General  McPherson  to 
guard  the  line  of  the  Big  Black,  and  to  be  replaced  in  the 
Fifteenth  Corps  by  John  E.  Smith's  division  of  the  Seven 
teenth  Corps,  consisting  of  three  brigades,  commanded  respec 
tively  by  Brigadier-General  Matthias,  Colonel  G.  B.  Baum, 
Fifty-sixth  Illinois,  and  Colonel  J.  J.  Alexander,  Fiftieth  Illi 
nois.  This  division  was  already  on  the  way,  and,  by  the  27th, 
at  the  earliest  moment  when  it  was  possible  to  procure  steam 
boat  transportation,  Sherman  followed  in  person,  with  Morgan 
L.  Smith's  second  division,  and  Ewing's  fourth  division. 
Owing  to  the  low  stage  of  water  in  the  river  and  the  scarcity 
of  wood  on  the  banks,  the  last  of  the  fleet  did  not  reach  Mem 
phis  until  the  4th  of  October.  There  Sherman  found  orders 
from  the  general-in-chief,  General  Halleck,  to  conduct  the 
Fifteenth  Army  Corps,  with  all  other  troops  which  could  be 
spared  from  the  line  of  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  railway, 
to  Athens,  Alabama,  and  thence  report  for  orders  to  General 
Kosecrans,  at  Chattanooga.  He  was  substantially  to  follow 
the  railway  eastwardly,  repairing  it  as  he  moved,  looking  to 
his  own  lines  for  supplies,  and  was  in  no  event  to  depend  for 
them  upon  Kosecrans,  the  roads  in  whose  rear  were  already 
overtaxed  to  meet  the  wants  of  his  own  army.  Osterhaus' 
first  division  was  already  in  front  of  Corinth,  and  John  E. 
Smith's,  styled  the  third,  at  Memphis,  moving  out  by  rail, 
but  the  capacity  of  the  railroad  was  so  limited  that  it  was  soon 
found  that  animals  and  wagons  could  be  moved  more  rapidly 
by  the  common  road,  and  the  whole  of  Ewing's  fourth  division 
moved  in  the  same  manner. 

On  the  llth  of  October,  having  put  in  march  the  rear  of 
the  column,  Sherman  started  for  Corinth  by  railway,  in  a  special 


MARCH  TO  CHATTANOOGA.  133 

train,  escorted  by  the  battalion  of  the  Thirteenth  Regular  In 
fantry,  and  reached  Collierville  station  at  noon.  The  Sixty- 
ninth  Indiana,  under  Colonel  D.  C.  Anthony,  was  at  that 
moment  gallantly  defending  the  post  against  the  attack  by  the 
rebel  General  Chalmers  with  a  force  of  nearly  three  thousand 
cavalry  and  eight  field-guns,  and  Sherman's  escort  arrived  just 
in  time  to  assist  in  his  defeat.  The  next  day  Sherman  reached 
Corinth,  and  ordered  General  Frank  P.  Blair,  who  had  again 
reported  to  him  at  the  outset  of  the  march,  and  whom  he  had 
assigned  to  duty  as  his  second  in  command,  to  take  charge  of 
the  advance,  and  push  forward  to  luka  with  the  first  and 
second  divisions  of  Osterhaus  and  Morgan  L.  Smith,  while  he 
himself  remained  behind  a  few  days  to  push  forward  the  troops 
as  they  came  up,  and  to  direct  the  repairs.  On  the  19th,  he 
reached  luka,  and  on  the  following  day,  in  accordance  with  a 
previous  agreement  with  Hear- Admiral  Porter,  two  gunboats 
and  a  decked  coal-barge  reached  East  port  to  assist  in  crossing 
the  Tennessee.  While  the  repairs  of  the  railway  were  progress 
ing,  Sherman  ordered  General  Blair  to  push  forward  with  the 
two  divisions  under  his  command,  and  drive  the  enemy,  con 
sisting  of  Roddy's  and  Ferguson's  cavalry  brigades,  and  a 
number  of  irregular  cavalry,  in  all  about  five  thousand  strong, 
under  the  command  of  Major-General  Stephen  D.  Lee,  beyond 
Tuscumbia.  After  a  short  engagement,  Blair  drove  the  enemy 
from  his  front,  and  entered  Tuscumbia  on  the  27th  of  October. 
In  the  mean  time,  on  the  19th  and  20th  of  September,  Rose- 
crans,  endeavoring  to  concentrate  his  scattered  columns  in  the 
presence  of  the  enemy,  had  been  attacked  by  Bragg,  had  fought 
the  bloody  battle  of  Chickamauga,  had  retreated  to  Chatta 
nooga,  and  was  there  practically  invested.  On  the  18th  of 
October,  Major-General  Grant,  who  had  been  sent  for  some 
time  before,  arrived  at  Louisville,  and  in  pursuance  of  orders 
issued  by  the  War  Department  on  the  16th,  and  delivered  to 
him  by  the  Secretary  of  war  in  person,  assumed  command 
of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  comprising  the  de 
partments  of  the  Ohio,  the  Cumberland,  and  the  Tennessee, 
and  the  three  large  armies  operating  therein.  Upon  his 


134  SHERMAN   AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

recommendation,  the  secretary  of  war  immediately  issued 
orders  assigning  Major-General  Thomas  to  the  command  of 
the  Department  of  the  Cumberland,  and  Major-General  Sher 
man  to  that  of  the  Department  of  the  Tennessee.  Sherman 
received  these  orders  at  luka,  on  the  25th  of  October,  accom 
panied  by  instructions  from  General  Grant  to  retain  personal 
command  of  the  army  in  the  field.  Investing  Major-General 
McPherson,  at  Yicksburg,  with  full  authority  to  act  in  his 
stead  in  regard  to  the  State  of  Mississippi,  and  conferring 
upon  Major-General  Hurlbut  a  similar  authority  as  to  West 
Tennessee,  he  at  once  published  the  following  instructions 
for  the  guidance  of  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  his  department 
in  their  relations  with  the  citizens  : — 

"  Ah1  officers  in  command  of  corps  and  fixed  military  posts 
will  assume  the  highest  military  powers  allowed  by  the 
laws  of  war  and  Congress.  They  must  maintain  the  best 
possible  discipline,  and  repress  all  disorder,  alarms,  and 
dangers  in  their  reach.  Citizens  who  fail  to  support  the  Gov 
ernment  have  no  right  to  ask  favors  and  protection  ;  but  if 
they  actively  assist  us  in  vindicating  the  national  authority, 
all  commanders  will  assist  them  and  their  families  in  every 
possible  way.  Officers  need  not  meddle  with  matters  of  trade 
and  commerce,  which  by  law  devolve  on  the  officer  of  the 
Treasury  Department ;  but  whenever  they  discover  goods  con 
traband  of  war  being  conveyed  towards  the  public  enemy, 
they  will  seize  all  goods  tainted  by  such  transactions,  and  im 
prison  the  parties  implicated ;  but  care  must  be  taken  to  make 
full  records  and  report  such  case.  When  a  district  is  infested 
by  guerrillas,  or  held  by  the  enemy,  horses  and  mules,  wagons, 
forage,  etc.,  are  all  means  of  war,  and  can  be  freely  taken,  but 
must  be  accounted  for  as  public  property.  If  the  people  do 
not  want  their  horses  and  corn  taken,  they  must  organize  and 
repress  all  guerrillas  or  hostile  bands  in  their  neighborhood. 

"It  is  represented  that  officers,  provost-marshals,  and 
others  in  the  military  service,  are  engaged  in  business  or 
speculation  on  their  own  account,  and  that  they  charge  fees 


MARCH  TO  CHATTANOOGA.  135 

for  permits  and  passes.  All  tins  is  a  breach  of  honor  and 
law.  Every  salaried  officer  of  the  military  service  should  de 
vote  every  hour  of  his  time,  every  thought  of  his  mind,  to  his 
Government,  and  if  he  makes  one  cent  profit  beyond  his  pay, 
it  is  corrupt  and  criminal.  All  officers  and  soldiers  in  this 
department  are  hereby  commanded  to  engage  in  no  busi 
ness  whatever,  save  their  sworn  duty  to  their  Govern 
ment. 

"Every  man  should  be  with  his  proper  corps,  division, 
brigade,  and  regiment,  unless  absent,  sick,  wounded,  or  de 
tached  by  a  written  order  of  a  competent  commander.  Soldiers 
when  so  absent  must  have  their  descriptive  rolls,  and  when  not 
provided  with  them  the  supposition  is  that  they  are  improperly 
absent.  Mustering  officers  will  see  that  all  absentees  not 
away  by  a  written  order  from  their  proper  commander  are  re 
ported  on  the  muster-rolls  as  deserters,  that  they  may  lose 
their  pay,  bounty,  and  pensions,  which  a  generous  Government 
and  people  have  provided  for  soldiers  who  do  their  whole 
duty.  The  best  hospitals  in  the  world  are  provided  for  the 
wounded  and  sick,  but  these  must  not  be  made  receptacles  for 
absentees  who  seek  to  escape  the  necessary  exposures  and 
dangers  of  a  soldier's  life.  Whenever  possible,  citizens  must 
be  employed  as  nurses,  cooks,  attendants,  stewards,  etc.,  in 
hospitals,  in  order  that  enlisted  men  may  be  where  they  be 
long — with  their  regiments.  The  medical  inspectors  will  at 
tend  to  this  at  once.  The  general  commanding  announces 
that  he  expects  the  wounded  and  sick  to  have  every  care  pos 
sible  ;  but  this  feeling  must  not  be  abused  to  the  injury  of  the 
only  useful  part  of  an  army — a  soldier  in  the  field. 

"In  time  of  war  and  rebellion,  districts  occupied  by  our 
troops  are  subject  to  the  laws  of  war.  The  inhabitants, 
be  they  friendly  or  unfriendly,  must  submit  to  the  controlling 
power.  If  any  person  in  an  insurgent  district  corresponds  or 
trades  with  an  enemy,  he  or  she  becomes  a  spy ;  and  all  in 
habitants,  moreover,  must  not  only  abstain  from  hostile  and 
unfriendly  acts,  but  must  aid  and  assist  the  power  that  pro 
tects  them  in  trade  and  commerce." 


136  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Major-General  Blair  was  placed  in  immediate  command  of 
the  Fifteenth  Army  Corps,  and  Brigadier-General  George  M. 
Dodge  was  summoned  from  Corinth  to.  organize  and  assume 
command  of  a  picked  column  of  eight  thousand  men  from  the 
Sixteenth  Army  Corps,  and  with  it  to  follow  Sherman  east 
ward  as  rapidly  as  possible.  Having  made  these  dispositions, 
Sherman  pushed  forward  with  the  advance  of  his  troops. 

On  the  27th  of  October,  General  Blair  being,  as  has  been 
already  seen,  at  Tuscumbia,  with  the  first  and  second  di 
visions,  Sherman  ordered  General  Ewing,  with  the  fourth 
division,  to  cross  the  Tennessee,  by  means  of  the  gunboats 
and  scow,  as  rapidly  as  possible,  at  Eastport,  and  push  for 
ward  to  Florence  ;  and  the  same  day  a  messenger  from  Gen 
eral  Grant  floated  down  the  Tennessee  over  the  Muscle  Shoals, 
landed  at  Tuscumbia,  and  was  sent  to  headquarters  at  luka, 
bearing  this  short  message  :  "  Drop  all  work  on  the  railroad 
east  of  Bear  Creek.  Put  your  command  towards  Bridgeport 
till  you  meet  orders."  Instantly  the  order  of  march  was  re 
versed,  and  all  the  columns  directed  to  Eastport,  the  only 
place  where  the  crossing  of  the  Tennessee  was  practicable. 
At  first  the  troops-  had  only  the  gunboats  and  coal-barge, 
but  two  transports  and  a  ferry-boat  arrived  on  the  31st  of  Oc 
tober,  and  the  work  of  crossing  was  pushed  with  all  the  vigor 
possible.  Sherman  crossed  in  person,  and  passed  to  the  head 
of  the  column  on  the  1st  of  November,  leaving  the  advance 
division  of  Osterhaus,  now  become  the  rear,  to  be  conducted 
by  General  Blair  to  Eogersville  and  the  Elk  Eiver.  This 
stream  was  found  impassable,  and  there  was  no  time  to  bridge 
it  or  to  cross  in  boats,  so  that  no  alternative  remained  but  to 
ascend  the  Elk  to  the  stone  bridge  at  Fayetteville,  where  the 
troops  crossed'  and  proceeded  to  Winchester  and  Decherd. 
At  Fayetteville,  having  received  orders  from  General  Grant  to 
repair  to  Bridgeport  with  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  leaving  Briga 
dier-General  Dodge's  detachment  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps  at 
Pulaski  and  along  the  railroad  from  Columbia  to  Decatur,  to 
protect  it,  Sherman  instructed  General  Blair  to  follow  in  order 
with  the  second  and  first  divisions  of  Morgan  L.  Smith  and 


MARCH  TO  CHATTANOOGA.  137 

Osterhaus,  by  way  of  Newmarket,  Larkinsville,  and  Belle- 
fonte,  while  lie  himself  should  conduct  the  third  and  fourth 
divisions  of  John  E.  Smith  and  Ewing,  by  Decherd.  Sher 
man  reached  Bridgeport  on  the  night  of  the  13th,  reported 
by  telegraph  to  General  Grant,  was  immediately  summoned  to 
his  headquarters,  left  on  the  first  boat,  and  on  the  morning  of 
the  15th  of  November  rode  into  Chattanooga. 

Previous  to  this,  on  the  night  of  the  27th  of  October,  Briga 
dier-General  W.  F.  Smith,  chief  engineer  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  had  rapidly  thrown  a  pontoon  bridge  across  the 
Tennessee.  On  the  following  morning,  before  the  enemy  could 
recover  from  his  surprise,  Hooker  with  his  two  corps  had  crossed, 
seized  the  heights  rising  from  Lookout  Valley  at  its  outlet  to 
the  river,  emerged  into  the  valley,  and  taken  up  positions  de 
fending  the  road  over  which  he  had  marched,  and  the  roads 
leading  to  and  connecting  the  ferries ;  and  thus  two  lines  of 
supplies  had  been  gained  at  the  moment  when,  after  more  than 
ten  thousand  horses  and  mules  had  perished  in  supplying  half 
rations  to  the  troops  over  seventy  miles  of  terrible  roads,  the 
remaining  animals  were  so  reduced  that  they  could  not  have 
supplied  the  army  a  week  longer.  After  vainly  endeavoring 
to  regain  the  advantage  thus  lost,  Bragg  detached  Long- 
street  to  drive  Burnside  out  of  East  Tennessee,  and  in  order 
to  compel  the  rebel  commander  to  retain  all  his  force,  as  well 
as  to  recall  the  troops  he  had  sent  away,  it  was  Grant's  inten- 
tion  to  attack  Missionary  Kidge  the  moment  Sherman  should 
arrive  with  his  army  and  trains.  The  constraint  imposed  by 
the  immediate  presence  of  the  enemy  in  his  strong  positions, 
with  his  cavalry  constantly  threatening  our  exposed  and 
heavily-tasked  communications,  was  severely  felt,  and  the 
anxiety  for  Burnside's  safety  was  acute. 

Sherman  was  to  cross  the  Tennessee,  effect  a  lodgment  on 
the  end  of  Missionary  Kidge,  and  with  a  part  of  his  command 
demonstrate  against  Lookout  Mountain,  near  Trenton.  By 
General  Grant's  orders,  pontoons  liad  already  been  prepared 
for  laying  a  bridge  over  the  Tennessee,  and  all  other  necces- 
sary  arrangements  perfected. 


138  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Ordering  Ewing  to  march,  with  his  fourth  division  lead 
ing  the  advance,  by  way  of  Shell  Mound  to  Trenton  and 
to  demonstrate  against  Lookout  Mountain,  but  to  be  pre 
pared  rapidly  to  change  direction  on  Chattanooga,  Sher 
man  got  in  a  small  boat  at  Kelly's,  rowed  down  to  Bridge 
port,  there  put  his  troops  in  motion,  and,  on  the  after 
noon  of  the  20th,  upon  arriving  at  General  Hooker's  head 
quarters,  received  General  Grant's  orders  for  a  general  attack 
the  following  morning.  But  the  third  division  of  John  E. 
Smith  was  the  only  one  in  position  ;  Osterhaus'  first  and 
Morgan  L.  Smith's  second  division  were  slowly  making  their 
way  over  a  terrible  road  from  Shell  Mound  to  Chattanooga  ; 
and  E wing's  fourth  division  had  not  left  Trenton.  Learning 
these  facts,  General  Grant  postponed  the  attack. 

On  the  21st,  Morgan  L.  Smith's  second  division  crossed  the 
bridge  at  Brown's  Ferry,  in  spite  of  frequent  accidents  to  that 
frail  structure,  and  Ewing  reached  the  head  of  the  bridge  with 
his  fourth  division,  but  was  unable  to  cross  by  reason  of  its 
breakage,  in  spite  of  repeated  attempts  to  repair  it,  until  the 
23d.  The  bridge  having  again  broken,  leaving  Osterhaus  still 
on  the  left  bank,  at  Brown's  Ferry,  Sherman  then  proposed  to 
the  general-in-chief  to  go  into  action  with  the  three  divisions 
already  with  him,  supported  by  Jefferson  C.  Davis'  division  of 
the  Fourteenth  Corps,  while  Osterhaus'  first  division  should 
report  to  General  Hooker,  and  act  with  him  against  Lookout 
Mountain.  On  the  same  day,  Morgan  L.  Smith's  and  John 
E.  Smith's  divisions  being  behind  the  hills  opposite  the 
mouth  of  the  Chickamauga,  Sherman  caused  Brigadier-General 
Giles  A.  Smith,  with  his  second  brigade  of  the  former  division, 
to  march  under  cover  of  those  hills  to  a  point  opposite  the 
North  Chickamauga,  there  to  man  the  pontoon  boats  ;  at  mid 
night  to  drop  silently  down  to  a  point  above  the  South  Chicka 
mauga,  land,  move  along  the  river,  capture  the  enemy's  pickets 
along  its  banks  ;  and  then  to  re-embark,  drop  quickly  down  be 
low  the  mouth  of  the  Chickamauga,  take  position  there  on  the 
left  bank,  and  dispatch  the  boats  to  the  opposite  side  for  re-en 
forcements.  This  having  been  done,  the  remainder  of  Morgan 


MARCH  TO  CHATTANOOGA.  139 

L.  Smith's  division  was  rapidly  ferried  across,  followed  by  that 
of  John  E.  Smith,  and  by  daylight  of  the  24th,  these  two  di 
visions,  numbering  eight  thousand  men,  were  across  the 
Tennessee,  and  had  thrown  up  a  line  of  rifle-pits  to  cover 
the  crossing.  As  soon  as  it  was  light,  some  of  the  boats 
were  taken  from  the  ferry  for  use  in  the  construction  of  a 
pontoon  bridge,  under  the  direction  of  Major-General  William 
F.  Smith,  chief  engineer  of  the  military  division,  and  by  noon 
a  fine  bridge,  thirteen  hundred  and  fifty  feet  in  length,  had 
been  laid  down,  and  was  practicable  for  all  arms.  A  steamer 
having  arrived  during  the  morning  to  assist  in  the  crossing, 
all  three  divisions  were  now  con-centrated  on  the  left  bank ; 
and,  at  the  same  time,  General  Jefferson  C.  Davis  reported 
himself  ready  to  take  the  Missionary  Hills. 

At  one  p.  M.  the  troops  marched  from  the  river  in  three 
columns  in  echelon ;  the  left,  Morgan  L.  Smith,  the  column  of 
direction,  following  substantially  Chickamauga  Creek ;  the 
centre,  John  E.  Smith,  in  column,  doubled  on  the  centre  at  full 
brigade  intervals  to  the  right  and  rear ;  the  right,  Ewing,  in 
column  at  the  same  distance  to  the  right  and  rear,  prepared 
to  deploy  to  the  right,  to  meet  an  enemy  in  that  direction. 
Each  head  of  column  was  covered  by  a  line  of  skirmish 
ers,  with  supports.  A  light  drizzling  rain  prevailed,  and  the 
clouds  hung  low,  cloaking  the  movement  from  the  enemy's 
tower  of  observation  on  Lookout  Mountain.  The  foot  of  the 
hills  was  soon  reached,  the  skirmishers  continued  up  the  face 
followed  by  their  supports,  and  at  half-past  three  P.  M.  the 
ridge  was  gained  without  loss.  Not  until  a  brigade  of  each 
division  was  pushed  up  rapidly  to  the  top  of  the  hill  did  the 
enemy  seem  to  realize  the  movement,  but  it  was  then  too  late, 
for  our  troops  were  in  possession.  The  enemy  opened  with 
artillery,  but  General  Ewing  soon  got  some  of  Captain  Richard 
son's  guns  up  the  steep  hill,  and  returned  the  fire,  and  the 
enemy's  skirmishers  made  one  or  two  ineffectual  dashes  at 
General  Lightburn,  who  with  his  brigade  had  swept  around 
and  gained  the  real  continuation  of  the  ridge. 

Up  to  this  time  it  had  been  supposed,  from  the  map,  that 


140  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Missionary  Ridge  was  a  continuous  hill,  but  Sherman  now 
found  himself  on  two  high  points,  with  a  deep  depression  be 
tween  them,  and  a  third  hill  immediately  over  the  tunnel,  which 
was  his  chief  objective.  The  ground  gained,  however,  was  so 
important  that  nothing  could  be  left  to  chance,  and  it  was 
therefore  fortified  during  the  night.  One  brigade  of  each 
division  was  left  on  the  hill,  one  of  General  Morgan  L.  Smith's 
closed  the  gap  to  Chickamauga  Creek,  two  of  General  John  E. 
Smith's  were  drawn  back  to  the  base  in  reserve,  and  General 
Ewing's  right  was  extended  down  into  the  plain,  thus  crossing 
the  ridge  in  a  general  line  facing  southeast. 

The  enemy  felt  Sherman's  right  flank  about  four  p.  M.,  and 
a  sharp  engagement  with  artillery  and  muskets  ensued,  when 
he  drew  off.  Brigadier-General  Giles  A.  Smith  was  severely 
wounded,  and  the  command  of  the  brigade  devolved  on 
Colonel  Tupper,  One  Hundred  and  Sixteenth  Illinois.  Just 
as  Sherman  himself  had  crossed  the  bridge,  General  How 
ard  had  appeared,  having  come  with  three  regiments  from 
Chattanooga  along  the  east  bank  of  the  Tennessee,  con 
necting  Sherman's  new  position  with  that  of  the  main  army  in 
Chattanooga.  The  three  regiments  were  attached  temporarily 
to  General  Ewing's  right,  and  General  Howard  returned  to 
his  corps  at  Chattanooga.  As  night  closed,  Sherman  ordered 
General  Jefferson  C.  Davis  to  keep  one  brigade  at  the  bridge, 
one  close  up  to  the  main  body  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  and  one 
between  the  two.  Heavy  details  were  kept  at  work  on  the 
intrenchments  until  morning. 

During  the  night  the  sky  cleared  away  bright,  a  cold  frost 
filled  the  air,  and  the  camp-fires  revealed  to  the  enemy,  and  to 
the  army  in  Chattanooga,  Sherman's  position  on  Missionary 
Eidge.  About  midnight,  orders  came  from  General  Grant 
to  attack  the  enemy  at  dawn  of  day,  with  notice  that  Gen 
eral  Thomas  would  attack  in  force  early  in  the  morning. 
Accordingly,  before  light,  Sherman  was  in  the  saddle,  and, 
attended  by  all  his  staff,  rode  to  the  extreme. left  of  his  posi 
tion,  near  Chickamauga,  thence  up  the  hill  held  by  General 
Lightburn,  and  round  to  the  extreme  right  of  General  Ewing. 


MARCH  TO   CHATTANOOGA.  141 

Catching  as  accurate  an  idea  of  the  ground  as  was  possible  by 
the  dim  light  of  morning,  he  saw  that  his  line  of  attack  was  in 
the  direction  of  Missionary  Ridge,  with  wings  supporting  on 
either  flank.  A  valley  lay  between  him  and  the  next  hill  of 
the  series,  and  this  latter  presented  steep  sides ;  the  one  to 
the  west  partially  cleared,  the  other  covered  with  the  native 
forest.  The  crest  of  the  ridge  was  narrow  and  wooded.  The 
further  point  of  the  hill  was  held  by  the  enemy  with  a  breast 
work  of  logs  and  fresh  earth,  filled  with  men  and  mounting 
two  guns.  The  enemy  was  also  seen  in  great  force  on  a  still 
higher  hill  beyond  the  tunnel,  giving  a  plunging  fire  on  the 
ground  in  dispute.  The  gorge  between,  through  which  several 
roads  and  the  railway  tunnel  pass,  could  not  be  seen  from 
Sherman's  position,  but  formed  the  natural  citadel  where  the 
enemy  covered  his  masses,  to  resist  the  contemplated  move 
ment  to  turn  his  right  and  endanger  his  communications  with 
the  depot  at  Chickamauga. 

The  brigades  of  Colonel  Cockerell,  of  Ewing's  division,  Colonel 
Alexander,  of  John-  E.  Smith's,  and  General  Lightburn,  of 
Morgan  L.  Smith's  divisions,  were  to  hold  their  hill  as  the  key 
point ;  General  Corse,  with  as  much  of  his  brigade  of  Ewing's 
division  as  could  operate  along  the  narrow  ridge,  was  to  attack 
from  the  right  centre  ;  General  Lightburn  was  to  dispatch 
a  regiment  from  his  position  to  co-operate  with  General 
Corse ;  and  General  Morgan  L.  Smith  was  to  move  along  the 
east  base  of  Missionary  Ridge,  connecting  with  General  Corse, 
and  Colonel  Loomis,  of  Ewing's  division,  in  like  manner,  to 
move  along  the  west  base,  supported  by  Matthias'  and  Baum's 
brigades,  of  John  E.  Smith's  division,  in  reserve. 

The  sun  had  already  risen  before  General  Corse  had  com 
pleted  his  preparations,  and  his  bugle  sounded  the  "  forward." 
The  Fortieth  Illinois,  supported  by  the  Forty-sixth  Ohio, 
on  the  right  centre,  with  the  Twentieth  Ohio,  Colonel  Jones, 
moved  down  the  face  of  the  hill,  and  up  that  held  by  the 
enemy.  The  line  advanced  to  within  about  eighty  yards  of 
the  intrenched  position,  where  General  Corse  found  a  second 
ary  crest,  which  he  gained  and  held.  To  this  point  he  called 


142  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

his  reserves,  and  asked  for  reinforcements,  which  were  sent, 
but  the  space  was  narrow,  and  it  was  not  well  to  crowd  the 
men,  as  the  enemy's  artillery  and  musketry  fire  swept  the  ap 
proach.  As  soon  as  General  Corse  had  made  his  preparations 
he  assaulted,  and  a  close,  severe  contest  ensued,  lasting  more 
than  an  hour,  giving  and  losing  ground,  but  never  the  posi 
tion  first  obtained,  from  which  the  enemy  in  vain  attempted 
to  drive  him.  General  Morgan  L.  Smith  steadily  gained 
ground  on  the  left  spur  of  Missionary  Ridge,  and  Colonel 
Loomis  got  abreast  of  the  tunnel  and  the  railroad  embank 
ment  on  his  side,  drawing  the  enemy's  fire,  and  to  that  extent 
relieving  the  assaulting  party  011  the  hill-crest.  Captain  Cal- 
ander  had  four  of  his  guns  on  General  Ewing's  hill,  and  Cap 
tain  Wood  his  battery  of  Napoleon  guns  on  General  Lightburn's ; 
and  two  guns  of  Dillon's  battery  were  with  Colonel  Alexander's 
brigade.  The  day  was  bright  and  clear.  The  columns  of  the 
enemy  were  streaming  towards  Sherman,  and  the  enemy's  artil 
lery  poured  its  concentric  fire  upon  him  from  every  hill  and 
spur  that  gave  a  view  of  any  part  of  his  position.  All  Sherman's 
batteries  directed  their  fire  as  carefully  as  possible  to  clear  the 
hill  to  the  front  without  endangering  our  own  men.  The  fight 
raged  furiously  about  ten  A.  M.,  when  General  Corse  received 
a  severe  wound,  and  was  carried  off  the  field,  and  the  com 
mand  of  the  brigade,  and  of  the  assault  at  that  key-point, 
devolved  on  Colonel  Wolcott,  of  the  Forty-sixth  Ohio,  who 
continued  the  contest,  pressing  forward  at  all  points.  Colonel 
Loomis  had  made  good  progress  to  the  right ;  and  at  about 
two  P.  M.  General  John  E.  Smith,  judging  the  battle  to  be 
severe  on  the  hill,  and  being  required  to  support  General 
Ewing,  ordered  Colonel  Baum's  and  General  Matthias'  bri 
gades  across  the  fields  to  the  disputed  summit.  They  moved 
up  under  a  heavy  fire  of  cannon  and  musketry,  and  joined 
Colonel  Wolcott,  but  the  crest  was  so  narrow  that  they  neces 
sarily  occupied  the  west  face  of  the  hill.  The  enemy  at  the 
time  being  massed  in  great  strength  in  the  tunnel  gorge, 
moved  a  large  force,  under  cover  of  the  ground  and  the  thick 
bushes,  and  suddenly  appeared  on  the  right  and  rear  of  this 


MARCH  TO  CHATTANOOGA.  143 

command.  The  two  reserve  brigades  of  John  E.  Smith's 
division,  being  thus  surprised,  and  exposed  as  they  were  in  the 
open  ground,  fell  back  in  some  disorder  to  the  lower  end  of  the 
field,  and  reformed.  This  movement,  seen  from  Chattanooga, 
five  miles  distant,  gave  rise  to  the  report  that  Sherman  was 
repulsed  on  the  left.  The  enemy  made  a  show  of  pursuit,  but 
were  caught  in  flank  by  the  well-directed  fire  of  the  brigade 
on  the  wooded  crest,  and  hastily  sought  cover  behind  the  hill. 
About  three  p.  M.,  a  white  line  of  musketry  fire  in  front  of 
Orchard  Knoll,  extending  further  right  and  left  and  front,  and 
a  faint  echo  of  sound,  satisfied  Sherman  that  General  Thomas 
was  moving  on  the  centre.  The  attack  on  the  left  had  drawn 
vast  masses  of  the  enemy  to  that  flank,  so  that  the  result  on 
the  centre  was  comparatively  assured. 

The  advancing  line  of  musketry  fire  from  Orchard  Knoll 
disappeared  behind  a  spur  of  the  hill,  and  could  no  longer  be 
seen,  and  it  was  not  until  night  closed  that  Sherman  knew  that 
Thomas  had  swept  across  Missionary  Ridge,  and  broken  the 
enemy's  centre. 

The  victory  was  won,  and  pursuit  was  the  next  step.  Sher 
man  ordered  General  Morgan  L.  Smith  to  feel  the  tunnel, 
which  was  found  vacant,  save  by  the  commingled  dead  and 
wounded  of  both  armies. 

The  reserve  of  General  Jefferson  C.  Davis  was  ordered  to 
march  at  once,  by  the  pontoon  bridge  across  the  Chickamauga 
at  its  mouth,  and  push  forward  for  the  depot.  General  Howard 
had  reported  to  Sherman,  in  the  early  part  of  the  day,  with  the 
remainder  of  his  corps,  the  Eleventh,  and  had  been  posted  to 
connect  the  left  with  Chickamauga  Creek.  He  was  ordered  to 
repair  an  old  broken  bridge  about  two  miles  up  the  Chick 
amauga,  and  to  follow  General  Davis  at  four  A.  M.  The 
Fifteenth  Army  Corps  was  to  march  at  daylight.  But  General 
Howard  found  the  repairs  too  difficult,  and  all  were  compelled  to 
cross  the  Chickamauga  on  the  new  pontoon  bridge.  By  eleven 
A.  M.,  Jefferson  C.  Davis'  division  appeared  at  the  depot,  just 
in  time  to  see  it  in  flames.  He  entered  with  one  bri 
gade,  and  found  the  enemy  occupying  two  hills  partially  in- 


.  144  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

trenched  just  beyond  the  depot.  These  he  soon  drove 
away.  Corn-meal  and  corn,  in  huge  burning  piles,  broken 
wagons,  abandoned  caissons,  two  thirty-two  pounder  rifled 
guns  with  carriages  burned,  pieces  of  pontoons,  balks, 
chesses,  etc.,  destined  for  the  invasion  of  Kentucky,  and  all 
manner  of  things,  were  found  burning  and  broken.  A  good 
supply  of  forage  for  the  horses,  and  meal,  beans,  and  the  like, 
for  the  men,  were  also  discovered  in  good  condition. 

Pausing  but  a  short  while,  Sherman  pressed  forward,  the  road 
lined  with  broken  wagons  and  abandoned  caissons,  till  night. 
Just  as  the  head  of  his  column  emerged  from  a  dense,  miry 
swamp,  it  encountered  the  rear-guard  of  the  retreating  army. 
The  fight  was  sharp,  but  the  night  closed  in  so  dark  that  our 
troops  could  not  move.  Here  Sherman  was  overtaken  by 
General  Grant. 

At  daylight  the  march  was  resumed,  and  at  Greysville,  where 
a  good  bridge  spanned  the  Chickamauga,  the  Fourteenth  Corps 
of  General  Palmer  was  met  on  the  south  bank.  From  him 
Sherman  learned  that  General  Hooker  was  on  a  road  still 
further  south.  His  guns  could  be  heard  near  Einggold.  As 
the  roads  were  filled  with  all  the  troops  they  could  accom 
modate,  Sherman  then  turned  to  the  east  to  fulfil  another 
part  of  the  general  plan,  by  breaking  up  all  communications 
between  Bragg  and  Longstreet. 

General  Howard  was  ordered  to  move  to  Parker's  Gap,  and 
thence  send  a  competent  force  to  Red  Clay,  or  the  Council 
Ground,  and  there  destroy  a  large  section  of  the  railway 
which  connects  Dalton  and  Cleveland.  This  work  was  most 
successfully  and  completely  performed  that  day.  The  di 
vision  of  General  Jefferson  C.  Davis  was  moved  up  close  to 
Einggold,  to  assist  General  Hooker,  if  needed,  and  the  Fif 
teenth  Corps  held  at  Greysville,  to  take  advantage  of  circum 
stances.  About  noon  a  message  came  from  General  Hooker,  say 
ing  that  he  had  had  a  hard  fight  at  the  mountain  pass  just  be 
yond  Einggold,  and  wanted  Sherman  to  come  forward  and  turn 
the  position.  Howard,  by  passing  through  Parker's  Gap  to 
wards  Eed  Clay,  had  already  done  so.  Sherman  therefore  rode 


MARCH  TO  CHATTANOOGA.  145 

forward  to  Ringgold,  to  find  that  the  enemy  had  fallen  back 
to  Tunnel  Hill,  abandoned  the  valley  of  Chickamauga  and  the 
State  of  Tennessee,  and  was  descending  the  southern  slopes, 
whose  waters  flow  to  the  Atlantic  and  the  Gulf. 

At  Ringgold  Sherman  again  met  General  Grant,  and  re 
ceived  orders,  after  breaking  up  the  railroad  between  that 
point  and  the  State  line,  to  move  slowly  back  to  Chattanooga. 

On  the  following  day,  the  Fifteenth  Corps  effectually  de 
stroyed  the  railroad  from  a  point  half-way  between  Greysville 
and  Ringgold,  back  to  the  State  line ;  and  General  Grant, 
coming  to  Greysville,  consented  that,  instead  of  returning  to 
Chattanooga,  Sherman  might  send  back  his  artillery,  wagons, 
and  impediments,  and  make  a  circuit  to  the  north  as  far  as 
the  Hiawassee  River. 

Accordingly,  on  the  morning  of  November  29th,  General 
Howard  moved  from  Parker's  Gap  to  Cleveland,  General 
Davis  by  way  of  McDaniel's  Gap,  and  General  Blair,  with  two 
divisions  of  the  Fifteenth  Army  Corps,  by  way  of  Julian's 
Gap ;  all  meeting  at  Cleveland  that  night.  Here  another 
effectual  break  was  made  in  the  Cleveland  and  Dalton  road. 
On  the  30th,  the  army  moved  to  Charleston,  General  Howard 
approaching  so  rapidly  that  the  enemy  evacuated  in  haste,  leav 
ing  the  bridge  but  partially  damaged,  and  five  car-loads  of 
flour  and  provisions  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Hiawassee. 

The  losses  in  Sherman's  own  corps  during  this  brief  cam 
paign  were  as  follows  :  Osterhaus'  first  division,  87  killed,  344 
wounded,  and  66  missing ;  M.  L.  Smith's  second  division,  10 
killed,  90  wounded,  and  2  missing;  John  E.  Smith's  third 
division,  89  killed,  288  wounded,  and  122  missing ;  Ewmg's 
fourth  division,  72  killed,  535  wounded,  and  21  missing ;  total, 
258  killed,  1,257  wounded,  and  211  missing.  The  loss  in 
Jefferson  C.  Davis'  division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  was  small. 
Bushbeck's  brigade  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  lost  37  killed,  145 
wounded,  81  missing;  total,  263.  Among  the  killed  were 
Colonels  Putnam  of  the  Ninety-third  Illinois,  O'Meara  of  the 
Ninetieth  Illinois,  Torrence  of  the  Thirtieth  Iowa,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Taft  of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  and  Major  Buslmell  of 

10 


146  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

the  Thirteenth  Illinois  Volunteers  ;  while  in  the  list  of  wounded 
appeared  the  names  of  Brigadier-Generals  Giles  A.  Smith, 
J.  M.  Corse,  and  Matthias ;  Colonel  Baum,  Fifty-sixth  Illinois ; 
Colonel  Wangeline,  Twelfth  Missouri  Volunteers  ;  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Patridge,  Thirteenth  Illinois  Volunteers ;  Major  P.  J. 
Welch,  Fifty-sixth  Illinois  Volunteers ;  and  Major  M.  Allen, 
Tenth  To wa  Volunteers.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Archer,  Seven 
teenth  Iowa,  was  reported  missing. 

The  army  which  eight  days  before  had  lain  besieged,  and 
barely  subsisting  behind  the  Missionary  range,  had  shaken  off 
its  enemy,  broken  his  strength  and  his  spirit,  pushed  his 
shattered  forces  out  of  reach,  and  was  returning  to  its  camps 
holding  the  keys  of  the  whole  central  region,  and  of  the  gates 
of  Georgia. 


THE  RELIEF  OF  KNOXVILLE.  147 


CHAPTEE  XII. 

THE   RELIEF  OF  KNOXVILLE. — BEOKGANIZINGL 

IT  was  General  Grant's  desire  to  continue  the  pursuit,  but 
Burnsicle  was  closely  beleaguered  at  Knoxville  and  Long- 
street  was  steadily  pushing  his  approaches.  The  commander- 
in-chief  had  instructed  Burnside  to  hold  on  to  the  last.  "  I 
can  hardly  conceive,"  he  wrote,  "  the  necessity  of  retreating 
from  East  Tennessee.  If  I  did  it  at  all,  it  would  be  after 
losing  most  of  the  army,  and  then  necessity  would  suggest  the 
route.  I  will  not  attempt  to  lay  out  a  line  of  retreat." 

On  the  3d  of  December,  according  to  General  Burnside's 
report,  the  supplies  would  be  exhausted.  Elliott's  division  of 
cavalry  had  already  started  for  Knoxville,  and  Granger  had 
been  ordered  thither  with  the  Fourth  Corps.  Finding  that  the 
latter  moved  slowly  and  without  energy,  on  the  28th  of  Novem 
ber,  General  Grant  decided  to  send  Sherman  with  his  com 
mand,  and  accordingly  gave  him  orders  to  take  Granger's 
troops  and  his  own,  and  go  with  all  possible  dispatch  to  the 
relief  of  the  besieged  garrison. 

A  large  part  of  Sherman's  command  had  marched  from 
Memphis,  had  gone  into  battle  immediately  on  arriving  at 
Chattanooga,  and  had  had  no  rest  since.  In  the  late  campaign 
officers  and  men  had  carried  no  luggage  or  provisions.  The 
week  before,  they  had  left  their  camps,  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Tennessee,  with  only  two  days'  rations,  without  a  change  of 
clothing,  stripped  for  the  fight,  each  officer  and  man,  from  the 
commanding  general  down,  having  but  a  single  blanket  or 
overcoat.  They  had  now  no  provisions,  save  what  had  been 
gathered  by  the  road,  and  were  ill-supplied  for  such  a  march. 


148  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Moreover,  the  weather  was  intensely  cold.  But  twelve  thou 
sand  of  their  fellow-soldiers  were  beleaguered  in  a  mountain 
town  eighty-four  miles  distant :  they  needed  relief,  and  must 
have  it  in  three  days.  This  was  enough.  Without  a  murmur, 
without  waiting  for  any  thing,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  di 
rected  its  course  upon  Knoxville. 

On  the  night  of  November  28th,  General  Howard  repaired 
and  planked  the  railroad  bridge,  and  at  dawn  the  army 
passed  the  Hiawassee,  and  during  the  day  marched  to  Athens, 
a  distance  of  fifteen  miles.  Granger,  who  was  then  near  the 
mouth  of  the  Hiawassee,  was  at  first  ordered  to  join  the  main 
column  at  Kingston  ;  but  on  reaching  Athens,  Sherman  sent 
him  directions  to  meet  him  at  Philadelphia.  The  small  force 
of  cavalry  which  was,  at  the  time  of  the  receipt  of  General 
Grant's  orders,  scouting  near  Benton  and  Columbus,  overtook 
the  column  at  Athens  during  the  night. 

On  the  2d  of  December,  the  army  moved  rapidly  north, 
towards  Loudoii,  twenty-six  miles  distant.  About  11  A.  M., 
the  cavalry  passed  to  the  head  of  the  column,  and  was  ordered 
to  push  to  London,  and,  if  possible,  save  the  pontoon  bridge 
across  the  Tennessee,  held  by  a  brigade  of  the  enemy,  com 
manded  by  General  Vaughn.  The  cavalry  moved  with  such 
rapidity  as  to  capture  every  picket ;  but  Vaughn  had  artillery 
in  position,  covered  by  earthworks,  and  displayed  a  force  too 
large  to  be  dislodged  by  a  cavalry  dash,  and  darkness  closed 
in  before  General  Howard's  infantry  arrived  on  the  ground. 
The  enemy  evacuated  the  place  in  the  night,  destroying  the 
pontoons,  running  three  locomotives  and  forty-eight  cars  into 
the  Tennessee,  and  abandoning  a  large  quantity  of  provisions, 
four  guns,  and  other  material,  which  General  Howard  took  at 
daylight.  But  the  bridge  being  gone,  Sherman  was  forced 
to  turn  east,  and  trust  to  the  bridge  at  Knoxville. 

It  was  now  all-important  that  General  Burnside  should 
have  notice  of  Sherman's  approach,  and  but  one  more  day  of 
the  time  remained.  Accordingly,  at  Philadelphia,  during  the 
night  of  December  2d,  Sherman  sent  an  aid-de-camp  for 
ward  to  Colonel  Long,  commanding  the  brigade  of  cavalry, 


THE  RELIEF  OF  KNOXVILLE.  149 

ordering  him  to  select  the  best  material  of  his  command,  to 
start  at  once,  ford  the  Little  Tennessee,  and  push  into  Knox- 
ville  at  whatever  cost  of  life  and  horseflesh.  The  distance  to 
be  travelled  was  about  forty  miles,  and  the  roads  villanous. 
Before  day  the  cavalry  marched.  At  daylight  the  Fifteenth 
Corps  was  turned  from  Philadelphia  to  the  Little  Tennessee,  at 
Morgantown,  where  the  maps  represented  the  river  as  very 
shallow  ;  but  it  was  found  impossible  to  ford  it,  as  the  water 
was,  in  some  places,  five  feet  deep,  and  freezing  cold,  and  the 
stream  was  two  hundred  and  forty  yards  wide.  A  bridge  was 
indispensable.  Brigadier-General  James  H.  Wilson,  who  ac 
companied  Sherman,  undertook  to  superintend  the  work,  and 
with  only  such  tools  as  axes,  picks,  and  spades,  working  partly 
with  crib-work  and  partly  with  trestles  made  of  the  houses  of  the 
late  town  of  Morgantown,  by  dark  of  December  4th  the  bridge 
was  completed,  and  by  daylight  of  the  5th  the  Fifteenth  Corps, 
General  Blair,  was  over,  and  General  Granger's  corps  and  Gen 
eral  Davis'  division  were  ready  to  pass  ;  but  the  diagonal 
bracings  were  imperfect,  for  want  of  proper  spikes,  and  the 
bridge  broke,  causing  delay. 

General  Blair  had  been  ordered  to  march  out  on  the  Marys- 
ville  road  five  miles,  there  to  await  notice  that  General  Gran 
ger  was  on  a  parallel  road  abreast  of  him.  At  the  fork  of  the 
road  a  messenger  rode  up  to  General  Sherman,  bringing  a  few 
words  from  General  Burnside,  dated  December  4th,  stating 
that  Colonel  Long  had  arrived  at  Knoxville  with  his  cavalry, 
and  all  was  well  there  ;  that  Longstreet  still  lay  before  the 
place,  but  there  were  symptoms  of  a  speedy  departure. 

As  soon  as  the  bridge  was  mended,  all  the  troops  moved 
forward.  General  Howard  had  marched  from  Loudon,  had 
found  a  good  ford  for  his  wagons  and  horses  at  Davis,  seven 
miles  from  Morgantown,  and  had  made  a  bridge  of  the  wagons 
left  by  Vaughn  at  Loudon.  He  marched  by  Unitia  and  Louis 
ville.  On  the  night  of  the  5th,  all  the  heads  of  column  com 
municated  at  Marysville,  where  an  officer  of  General  Burn- 
side's  staff  arrived  with  the  news  that  Longstreet  had,  the 
night  before,  retreated  on  the  Kutledge,  Bodgersville,  and 


150  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Bristol  roads,  towards  Virginia ;  and  that  General  Burn- 
side's  cavalry  was  on  his  heels ;  and  with  word  that 
the  general  desired  to  see  General  Sherman  in  person  as  soon 
as  he  could  come  to  KnoxyiUe.  Ordering  all  the  troops  to 
halt  and  rest,  except  the  two  divisions  of  General  Granger, 
which  were  directed  to  move  forward  to  Little  Biver  and 
report  to  General  Burnside,  on  the  morning  of  December  6th 
Sherman  rode  from  Marysville  into  Kiioxville,  and  there  met 
General  Burnside. 

The  siege  had  been  already  raised.  Longstreet  had 
hurled  three  brigades  against  the  works,  and  met  with  a  bloody 
repulse.  The  intelligence  of  Bragg's  defeat,  and  the  arrival 
of  Colonel  Long's  cavalry,  as  the  forerunners  of  the  army 
known  to  be  marching  for  the  relief  of  the  besieged  garrison, 
had  shown  Longstreet  the  necessity  of  prompt  movement,  and 
he  had  taken  the  only  line  of  retreat  that  continued  practi 
cable.  General  Burnside  now  asked  for  nothing  but  General 
Granger's  command,  and  suggested  to  Sherman,  in  view  of  the 
large  force  he  had  brought  from  Chattanooga,  that  he  should 
return  with  due  expedition  to  the  Hne  of  the  Hiawassee,  lest 
Bragg,  re-enforced,  might  take  advantage  of  his  absence  to 
assume  the  offensive. 

In  the  following  communication  General  Burnside  took  oc 
casion  to  express  his  thanks  for  the  timely  relief  : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO, 
Kiioxville,  December  7,  1863. 

"  Major- General  W.  T.  Sherman,  Commanding,  etc. : 

"  GENERAL — I  desire  to  express  to  you  and  your  command  my 
most  hearty  thanks  and  gratitude  for  your  promptness  in 
coming  to  our  relief  during  the  siege  of  Knoxville  ;  and  I  am 
satisfied  your  approach  served  to  raise  the  siege. 

"  The  emergency  having  passed,  I  do  not  deem  for  the  pres 
ent  any  other  portion  of  your  command  but  the  corps  of 
General  Granger  necessary  for  operations  in  this  section ; 
and  inasmuch  as  General  Grant  has  weakened  the  force  imme 
diately  with  him  in  order  to  relieve  us,  thereby  rendering  the 


THE  RELIEF  OF  KNOXVILLE.  151 

position  of  General  Thomas  less  secure,  I  deem  it  advisable 
that  all  the  troops  now  here,  save  those  commanded  by  Gen 
eral  Granger,  should  return  at  once  to  within  supporting 
distance  of  the  forces  in  front  of  Bragg' s  army. 

"  In  behalf  of  my  command,  I  desire  again  to  thank  you  and 
your  command  for  the  kindness  you  have  done  us. 

"  I  am,  general,  very  respectfuly,  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  E.  BUKNSIDE, 

Major-General  commanding." 

Having  seen  the  forces  of  General  Burnside  move  out  of 
Knoxville  in  pursuit  of  Longstreet,  and  General  Granger's 
move  in,  Sherman  put  his  own  command  in  motion  to  return. 

General  Howard  was  ordered  to  move,  by  way  of  Davis' 
Ford  and  Sweetwater,  to  Athens,  with  a  guard  formed  at 
Charleston,  to  hold  and  repair  the  bridge  which  the  enemy 
had  retaken  after  the  passage  of  the  army  up  the  river.  Gen 
eral  Jefferson  C.  Davis  moved  to  Columbus  on  the  Hiawassee 
by  way  of  Madisonville,  and  the  two  divisions  of  the  Fifteenth 
Corps  moved  to  Telire  Plains,  in  order  to  cover  a  movement  of 
cavalry  across  the  mountain  into  Georgia  to  overtake  a  wagon 
train  of  the  enemy's  which  had  escaped  by  way  of  Murphy. 
Subsequently,  on  a  report  from  General  Howard  that  the  enemy 
still  held  Charleston,  Sherman  directed  General  Ewing's  di 
vision  on  Athens,  and  went  in  person  to  Telire  with  General 
Morgan  L.  Smith's  division.  By  the  9th,  all  the  troops  were 
in  position,  holding  the  rich  country  between  the  Little  Ten 
nessee  and  the  Hiawassee.  The  cavalry  under  Colonel  Long 
passed  the  mountains  at  Telire,  and  proceeded  about  seventeen 
miles  beyond  Murphy,  when,  deeming  his  further  pursuit  of 
the  wagon  train  useless,  he  returned  on  the  12th  to  Telire. 
Sherman  then  ordered  him  and  the  division  of  General 
Morgan  L.  Smith  to  move  to  Charleston,  to  which  point  he 
had  previously  ordered  the  corps  of  General  Howard. 

On  the  14th  of  December,  all  of  the  command  lay  en 
camped  along  the  Hiawassee.  Having  communicated  to  Gen 
eral  Grant  the  actual  state  of  affairs,  Sherman  received  orders 


152  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

to  leave  on  the  line  of  the  Hiawassee  all  the  cavalry  and  proceed 
to  Chattanooga  with  the  balance  of  his  command.  Leaving 
at  Charleston  the  brigade  of  cavalry  commanded  by  Colonel 
Long,  re-enforced  by  the  Fifth  Ohio  cavalry,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Heath,  which  was  the  only  cavalry  properly  belonging 
to  the  Fifteenth  Army  Corps,  with  the  remainder  Sherman 
moved  by  easy  marches  by  way  of  Cleveland  and  Tymus 
Depot  into  Chattanooga.  There  he  received  orders  from 
General  Grant  to  transfer  back  to  the  appropriate  commands 
the  Eleventh  Corps  of  General  Howard  and  the  division  of  the 
Fourteenth  Corps,  commanded  by  General  Jefferson  C.  Davis, 
and  to  conduct  the  Fifteenth  Army  Corps  to  its  new  field  of 
operations  in  Northern  Alabama. 

In  closing  his  report  of  the  memorable  campaign  thus  closed, 
Sherman  wrote  to  General  Grant : — 

"  It  will  thus  appear  that  we  have  been  constantly  in  motion 
since  our  departure  from  the  Big  Black,  until  the  present  mo 
ment. 

"  In  reviewing  the  facts,  I  must  do  justice  to  my  command 
for  the  patience,  cheerfulness,  and  courage  which  officers  and 
men  have  displayed  throughout,  in  battle,  on  the  march,  and 
in  camp.  For  long  periods,  without  regular  rations  or  sup 
plies  of  any  kind,  they  have  marched  through  mud  and  over 
rocks,  sometimes  barefooted,  without  a  murmur,  without  a 
moment's  rest.  After  a  march  of  over  four  hundred  miles, 
without  stop  for  three  successive  nights,  we  crossed  the  Ten 
nessee,  fought  our  part  of  the  battle  of  Chattanooga,  pursued 
the  enemy  out  of  Tennessee,  and  then  turned  more  than  one 
hundred  miles  north,  and  compelled  Longstreet  to  raise  the 
siege  of  Knoxville,  which  gave  so  much  anxiety  to  the  whole 
country. 

"  It  is  hard  to  realize  the  importance  of  these  events  without 
recalling  the  memory  of  the  general  feeling  which  pervaded  all 
minds  at  Chattanooga  prior  to  our  arrival.  I  cannot  speak  of 
the  Fifteenth  Army  Corps  without  a  seeming  vanity,  but  as  I 
am  no  longer  its  commander,  I  assert  that  there  is  no  better 


C.  B.  Richards  on  ,  Pubiisl 


Ul 


THE  RELIEF  OF  KNOXVILLE.  155 

But  if  any  one  comes  out  into  the  public  streets  and  creates 
disorder,  lie  or  she  should  be  punished,  restrained,  or  ban 
ished,  either  to  the  rear  or  front,  as  the  officer  in  command 
adjudges.  If  the  people,  or  any  of  them,  keep  up  a  corres 
pondence  with  parties  in  hostility,  they  are  spies,  and  can  be 
punished  with  death,  or  minor  punishment. 

"  These  are  well-established  principles  of  war,  and  the  peo 
ple  of  the  South,  having  appealed  to  war,  are  barred  from 
appealing  to  our  Constitution,  which  they  have  practically  and 
publicly  defied.  They  have  appealed  to  war,  and  must  abide 
its  rules  and  laws. 

"  The  United  States,  as  a  belligerent  party  claiming  right 
in  the  soil  as  the  ultimate  sovereign,  have  a  right  to 
change  the  population;  and  it  may  be,  and  is,  both  politic 
and  just,  we  should  do  so  in  certain  districts.  When  the 
inhabitants  persist  too  long  in  hostility,  it  may  be  both 
politic  and  right  we  should  banish  them  and  appropriate  their 
lands  to  a  more  loyal  and  useful  population.  No  man  will 
deny  that  the  United  States  would  be  benefited  by  dispossess 
ing  a  single  prejudiced,  hard-headed,  and  disloyal  planter,  and 
substituting  in  his  place  a  dozen  or  more  patient,  industrious, 
good  families,  even  if  they  be  of  foreign  birth.  I  think  it  does 
good  to  present  this  view  of  the  case  to  many  Southern  gentle 
men,  who  grew  rich  and  wealthy,  not  by  virtue  alone  of  their 
industry  and  skill,  but  by  reason  of  the  protection  and  impetus 
to  prosperity  given  by  our  hitherto  moderate  and  magnani 
mous  Government.  It  is  all  idle  nonsense  for  these  Southern 
planters  to  say. that  they  made  the  South,  that  they  own  it, 
and  that  they  can  do  as  they  please, — even  to  break  up  our 
Government  and  to  shut  up  the  natural  avenues  of  trade, 
intercourse,  and  commerce 

"  "Whilst  I  assert  for  our  Government  the  highest  military 
prerogatives,  I  am  willing  to  bear  in  patience  that  political 
nonsense  of  slave-rights,  State-rights,  freedom  of  conscience, 
freedom  of  press,  and  such  other  trash,  as  have  deluded  the 
Southern  people  into  war,  anarchy,  bloodshed,  and  the  foulest 
crimes  that  have  disgraced  any  time  or  any  people. 


156  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

"  I  would  advise  the  commanding  officers  at  Huntsville,  and 
such  other  towns  as  are  occupied  by  our  troops,  to  assemble 
the  inhabitants  and  explain  to  them  these  plain,  self-evident 
'propositions,  and  tell  them  that  it  is  for  them  now  to  say 
whether  they  and  their  children  shall  inherit  the  beautiful 
land  which  by  the  accident  of  nature  has  fallen  to  their  share. 
The  Government  of  the  United  States  has  in  North  Alabama 
any  and  all  rights  which  they  choose  to  enforce  in  war, — to 
take  their  lives,  their  homes,  their  lands,  their  every  thing ; 
because  they  cannot  deny  that  war  does  exist  there  ;  and  war 
is  simply  power,  unrestrained  by  Constitution  or  compact.  If 
they  want  eternal  war,  well  and  good  :  we  will  accept  the  issue 
and  dispossess  them  and  put  our  friends  in  possession.  I 
know  thousands  and  millions  of  good  people  who,  at  simple 
notice,  would  come  to  North  Alabama  and  accept  the  elegant 
houses  and  plantations  now  there.  If  the  people  of  Huntsville 
think  differently,  let  them  persist  in  war  three  years  longer,  and 
then  they  will  not  be  consulted.  Three  years  ago,  by  a  little 
reflection  and  patience,  they  could  have  had  a  hundred  years 
of  peace  and  prosperity,  but  they  preferred  war.  Very  well. 
Last  year  they  could  have  saved  their  slaves,  but  now  it  is  too 
late  :  all  the  powers  of  earth  cannot  restore  to  them  their 
slaves,  any  more  than  their  dead  grandfathers.  Next  year 
their  lands  will  be  taken, — for  in  war  we  can  take  them,  and 
rightfully  too, — and  in  another  year  they  may  beg  in  vain  for 
their  lives.  A  people  who  will  persevere  in  war  beyond  a  cer 
tain  limit  ought  to  know  the  consequences.  Many,  many  peo 
ple,  with  less  pertinacity  than  the  South,  have  been  wiped  out 
of  national  existence." 

On  the  26th,  in  a  hasty  reply  to  a  letter  from  a  citizen,  on 
the  same  subject,  with  special  reference  to  the  treatment  of 
slavery,  the  cultivation  of  abandoned  plantations,  and  the  pro 
posed  calling  of  a  convention  of  the  people  of  Tennessee,  he 
wrote  : 

"  Slavery  is  already  dead  in  Tennessee. 

"  The  moment  a  negro  cannot  be  bought  and  sold,  or  when 


THE  RELIEF  AT   KNOXVILLE.  157 

he  can  run  off  without  danger  of  recapture,  the  question  is 
settled.  Conventions  cannot  revive  slavery.  It  should  be 
treated  as  a  minor  question. 

"  If  a  Convention  is  called  in  Tennessee  it  should  be  without 
regard  to  slavery,  or  any  other  single  question.  When  assem 
bled,  the  members  would  naturally  discuss  any  and  all  ques 
tions,  and  no  doubt  would  waste  more  sound  on  the  history  of 
Greece  and  Home  than  on  the  commonplace  business  be 
fore  it." 

Under  date  of  the  27th  he  addressed  a  full  letter  of  instruc 
tions  to  Brigadier-General  R.  P.  Buckland,  who  was  to  be  left 
in  command  of  the  district  of  Memphis.  In  the  course  of  it 
he  said  : 

"  You  know  how  much  stress  I  have  put  on  honesty  in  the 
character  of  a  United  States  officer. 

"  Merchants  naturally  make  gains.  It  is  their  calling,  but 
an  officer  has  a  salary,  and  nothing  else,  and  if  you  see  by  an 
officer's  style  of  living,  or  any  external  symptoms,  that  he  is 
spending  more  than  his  pay,  or  if  you  observe  him  interested 
in  the  personal  affairs  of  business  men,  stop  it,  and  send  him 
to  some  other  duty.  Don't  let  officers  settle  down  into  com 
fortable  houses,  but  make  camps,  and  collect  in  them  all  this 
floating  mass,  and  send  them  to  their  regiments 

"  You  can  confer  in  the  most  friendly  spirit  with  the  people 
here  and  in  the  country.  Assure  them  that  if  they  act  in  good 
faith  to  the  United  States,  we  will  fully  reciprocate.  They 
must,  however  ACT, — good  faith  of  itself  is  of  no  value  in  war. 

"  As  an  army  we  will  take  care  of  all  large  hostile  bodies, 
but  cannot  undertake  to  do  the  work  of  local  police. 

"  We  have  heretofore  done  too  much  of  this,  and  you  can,  in 
your  own  way,  gradually  do  less  and  less  of  it,  till  finally  the 
city  and  county  authorities  can  take  it  all  off  our  hands. 

"  Memphis  as  a  military  depot  must  be  held  with  the  tenacity 
of  life  !  The  fort  must  be  impregnable,  the  river  secure,  and 
the  levee,  and  incidentally  the  town,  or  so  much  of  it  as  gives 
storage  and  offices  ;  but  if  these  are  at  all  in  danger,  move 
them  to  the  cover  of  the  fort. 


158  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

"  Encourage  the  militia  in  all  manner  of  ways.  I  know  the 
poorer  classes,  the  working  men,  are  Union,  and  I  would  not 
mind  the  croaking  of  the  richer  classes.  Their  power  is  pass 
ing  from  their  hands,  and  they  talk  of  the  vulgarity  of  the  new 
regime  ;  but  such  arguments  will  be  lost  on  you.  Power  and 
success  will  soon  replace  this  class  of  grumblers,  and  they  will 
gradually  disappear  as  a  political  power." 


THE  MERIDIAN  RAID.  159 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE  MERIDIAN  RAID. — A   NEW   COMMAND. 

McPHERSON's  seventeenth  corps  was  still  at  Vicksburg ; 
part  of  Hmibut's  sixteenth  corps,  with  Smith's  and  Grier- 
son's  divisions  of  cavalry,  at  Memphis.  Lieutenant-General 
Polk,  who  commanded  the  Confederate  forces  in  Mississippi, 
was  at  Meridian  with  French's  division,  and  had  Loring's  di 
vision  at  Canton;  Forrest  was,  with  twenty-five  hundred  ir 
regular  cavalry,  in  the  northern  part  of  the  State  ;  Cash's  and 
Whitfield's  brigades  of  cavalry  patrolling  from  Yazoo  City, 
along  the  Big  Black  to  Port  Gibson ;  and  Wirt  Adams'  bri 
gade  doing  similar  duty  in  the  rear  .of  Port  Hudson  and 
Baton  Rouge. 

To  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  assigned  by  General 
Grant  the  duty  of  keeping  open  the  Mississippi  River  and 
maintaining  intact  our  control  of  the  east  bank. 

Sherman  decided  to  do  this  by  occupying  prominent  points 
in  the  interior  with  small  corps  of  observation,  threatening  a 
considerable  radius ;  and  to  operate  against  any  strong  force 
of  the  enemy  seeking  to  take  a  position  on  the  river,  by  a 
movable  column  menacing  its  rear.  To  destroy  the  enemy's 
means  of  approaching  the  river  with  artillery  and  trains,  he 
determined  to  organize  a  large  column  of  infantry  and  move 
with  it  to  Meridian,  effectually  breaking  up  the  Southern 
Mississippi  railway  ;  while  a  cavalry  force  should  move  from 
Memphis  to  meet  him,  and  perform  the  same  work  with 
respect  to  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  railway. 

Brigadier-General  William  Sovy  Smith,  chief  of  cavalry  on 
General  Grant's  staff,  was  placed  in  command  of  all  the  cavalry 


160  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

of  the  department,  and  instructed  to  move  with  it  from  Mem 
phis  on  or  before  the  1st  of  February,  by  way  of  Pontotoc, 
Okalona,  and  Columbus,  to  Meridian,  a  distance  of  two  hun 
dred  and  fifty  miles,  so  as  to  reach  that  place  by  the  10th. 
General  Smith  was  specially  instructed  to  disregard  all  small 
detachments  of  the  enemy  and  all  minor  operations,  and 
striking  rapidly  and  effectually  any  large  body  of  the  enemy, 
to  be  at  his  destination  precisely  at  the  appointed  time. 
Simultaneously  the  Eleventh  Illinois  Volunteers  and  a  colored 
regiment,  under  Colonel  Coates,  of  the  former  regiment,  with 
five  tin-clad  gunboats  under  Lieutenant-Commander  Owen, 
were  sent  up  the  Yazoo  to  ascend  that  stream  and  its  tributa 
ries  as  far  as  possible,  so  as  to  create  a  diversion  and  protect 
the  plantations  on  the  river  ;  and  Brigadier-General  Hawkins 
was  directed  to  patrol  the  country  in  the  rear  of  Yicksburg 
towards  the  Big  Black,  and  to  collect  some  fifty  skiffs,  by 
means  of  which  detachments  of  two  or  three  hundred  men 
might  be  moved  at  pleasure  through  the  labyrinth  of  bayous 
between  the  Yazoo  and  the  Mississippi,  for  the  purpose  of 
suppressing  the  depredations  of  the  horde  of  guerillas  then 
infesting  that  region. 

Having  made  all  these  arrangements,  Sherman  himself, 
with  two  divisions  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps  under  Huiibut, 
two  divisions  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps  under  McPherson, 
and  a  brigade  of  cavalry  under  Colonel  E.  E.  Winslow, 
Fourth  Iowa  Cavalry,  marched  from  Yicksburg  on  the  3d 
of  February.  The  expedition  moved  out  in  two  columns, 
Hurlbut's  corps  by  Messenger's,  McPherson's  along  the  rail 
way.  The  former  met  the  enemy  at  Joe  Davis'  plantation, 
the  latter  at  Champion  Hills,  on  the  5th,  and  for  eighteen 
miles  kept  up  a  continual  skirmish,  without  delaying  the 
march  of  the  troops,  and  entered  Jackson  the  same  night ; 
thus  entirely  disconcerting  the  enemy's  plan,  which  was  at 
that  moment  in  process  of  execution,  of  concentrating  at  that 
place  Loring's  and  French's  divisions,  and  Lee's  division  of 
cavalry.  On  the  6th,  both  columns  being  united,  and  Mc 
Pherson  taking  the  lead,  crossed  the  Pearl  River  on  a  pontoon 


THE  MERIDAN   RAID. 

bridge  captured  from  the  enemy  the  day  before  ;  on  the- 
7th  marched  into  Brandon ;  on  the  8th  reached  Live  Creek, 
five  miles  west  of  Morton  ;  and  on  the  9th  entered  Mor 
ton,  where  McPherson's  corps  halted  to  destroy  the  railways 
for  five  miles  around,  and  Hurlbut  took  the  advance.  From 
this  point  the  troops  moved  by  easy  marches,  with  no  greater 
opposition  than  the  annoyance  of  foraging  parties  and  strag 
glers  by  the  enemy's  cavalry  hovering  on  the  flanks,  through 
Hillsboro'  and  Decatur  to  the  Tallahatchie  Kiver,  twenty-fiv"e 
miles  west  of  Meridian,  where  the  road  was  found  obstructed 
by  felled  trees.  Leaving  the  trains  under  sufficient  guard, 
Sherman  pushed  on  over  these  obstructions  for  the  Ocktib- 
beha  Kiver,  where  he  found  the  bridge  burning  ;  but  in  two 
hours  the  troops  had  built  a  new  one,  and  at  three  and  a  half 
o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  entered  Meridian, 
with  slight  opposition.  French's  and  Loring's  divisions,  of 
the  Confederate  troops,  with  General  Polk  in  person,  had  evac 
uated  the  place  during  the  morning  and  the  preceding  night, 
Lee's  cavalry  covering  their  retreat ;  and  all  the  locomotives 
and  cars,  except  one  train  found  burning,  had  been  removed 
towards  Mobile  and  Selma.  It  was  evidently  impossible  to 
overtake  the  enemy  before  they  should  cross  the  Tombigbee. 
The  army  therefore  rested  on  the  15th,  and  on  the  16th  com 
menced  the  destruction  of  the  railways  centring  in  Meridian. 
The  depots,  storehouses,  arsenals,  offices,  hospitals,  hotels 
and  cantonments  in  the  town  were  burned,  and  during  the 
next  five  days,  with  axes,  sledges,  crowbars,  clambars  and  fire, 
Hurlburt's  corps  destroyed  011  the  north  and  east  sixty  miles 
of  ties  and  iron,  one  locomotive,  and  eight  bridges ;  and  Mc 
Pherson's  corps,  on  the  south  and  west,  fifty-five  miles  of  rail 
way,  fifty-three  bridges,  6,075  feet  of  trestle-work,  nineteen 
locomotives,  twenty-eight  steam-cars,  and  three  steam  saw 
mills.  Thus  was  completed  the  destruction  of  the  railways 
for  one  hundred  miles  from  Jackson  to  Meridian,  and  for 
twenty  miles  around  the  latter  place,  in  so  effectual  a  manner 
that  they  could  not  be  used  against  us  in  the  approaching 
campaigns. 

11 


162  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

The  cavalry,  under  General  W.  Sovy  Smith,  had  not  arrived. 
As  was  afterwards  learned,  that  officer  had  not  left  Memphis 
until  the  llth  of  February  ;  and  had  proceeded  no  further 
than  West  Point,  from  which  place  he  turned  back  on  the 
22d,  and  rapidly  retraced  his  steps  to  Memphis. 

Ascertaining  that  the  enemy's  infantry  had  crossed  the 
Tombigbee  on  the  17th  of  February,  and  hearing  nothing 
of  Smith,  on  the  20th  General  Sherman  ordered  McPherson  to 
move  slowly  back  on  the  main  road,  while  he  himself,  with  Hurl- 
but's  corps  and  the  cavalry,  marched  north,  to  feel  for  Smith. 
Sherman  moved  through  Marion  and  Muckalusha-Old-Town 
to  Union,  whence  he  dispatched  Colonel  Winslow  with  three 
regiments  of  cavalry  to  Philadelphia  and  Louisville,  fifty  miles 
distant,  towards  Columbus,  on  the  road  by  which  Smith  was 
expected  to  come ;  while  the  main  body  moved  to  Hillsboro', 
where,  on  the  23d,  it  was  joined  by  McPherson's  corps.  On 
the  24th  the  army  continued  the  march  on  two  roads,  and  on 
the  25th  and  26th  crossed  the  Pearl  Kiver  at  Ratchcliffe  Ferry 
and  Edwards'  Station,  and  bivouacked  near  Canton,  leaving  a 
division  at  the  crossing  to  look  for  the  cavalry.  From  Louis 
ville,  Colonel  Winslow  sent  out  two  scouts  to  seek  for  Smith, 
and,  swinging  round  through  Kosciusko  as  ordered,  rejoined 
the  army  at  Canton,  without  news  of  the  missing  cavalry.  The 
return  march  was  unmolested. 

About  one  thousand  white  refugees,  four  hundred  prisoners, 
five  thousand  negroes,  three  thousand  animals,  and  a  large 
number  of  wagons,  were  brought  in  by  the  troops  on  their 
return.  Our  total  loss  was  in  killed,  twenty-one ;  wounded, 
sixty-eight ;  missing,  eighty-one ;  total,  one  hundred  and 
seventy.  During  the  entire  expedition,  the  army  subsisted 
chiefly  upon  the  stores  belonging  to  the  enemy,  and  such  as 
were  found  in  the  country.  In  spite  of  the  failure  of  the 
cavalry,  the  isolation  of  Mississippi,  which  was  the  main  object 
of  the  expedition,  was  accomplished,  and  after  marching  from 
three  hundred  and  sixty  to  four  hundred  and  fifty-three  miles, 
and  driving  the  enemy  out  of  the  State,  within  four  weeks  the 
army  returned  in  better  health  and  condition  than  when  it 


THE  MERIDIAN  RAID.  163 

started,  confident  in  itself,  and  schooled  for  the  trying  cam 
paigns  before  it. 

On  the  28th  of  February,  leaving  the  army  at  Canton, 
Sherman  went  to  Yicksburg  ;  thence  sent  back  orders  to  Hurl- 
but  to. come  in  on  the  3d  of  March,  and  at  once  proceeded  to 
New  Orleans,  to  confer  with  General  Banks  and  Admiral 
Porter,  in  regard  to  the  details  of  the  combined  movement  up 
the  Ked  Eiver. 

General  Banks  had  asked  General  Sherman  for  a  force  of 
ten  thousand  men/  to  leave  Vicksburg  on  the  7th  of  March, 
and  remain  with  him  thirty  days,  and  Sherman  had  promised 
to  comply  with  this  request.  His  idea  was  for  a  heavy 
column,  supported  by  the  iron-clad  gunboats,  to  move  up  the 
Red  Kiver  during  high-water  to  Alexandria,  and  thence,  if  the 
gunboats  could  pass  the  rapids  as  far  as  Shreveport,  to  fortify 
and  hold  in  force  one  or  the  other  of  those  places  ;  and  thus  to 
perform  for  the  west  bank  of  the  river  the  same  service,  in  pre 
venting  any  large  body  of  the  enemy  from  reaching  the  Mis 
sissippi,  that  the  destruction  of  the  railroads  and  the  occupa 
tion  of  the  line  of  the  Big  Black  was  expected  to  accomplish 
on  the  east  bank.  General  Banks  now  informed  him  that  he 
would  in  person  march  on  the  5th  or  7th  from  Franklin, 
Louisiana,  up  the  Bayou  Teche,  with  a  picked  force  of 
seventeen  thousand  men,  and  would  reach  Alexandria  by  the 
17th  of  March,  and  requested  that  the  troops  from  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  and  Admiral  Porter's  fleet  should  meet  him 
there  at  that  time.  Simultaneously,  Steele  was  to  move  from 
Little  Rock  on  Shreveport  or  Natchitoches,  with  ten  thousand 
men. 

Sherman  at  once  returned  to  Vicksburg,  and  on  the  6th  of 
March  gave  the  necessary  instructions  to  Brigadier-General 
A.  J.  Smith,  who  had  been  previously  directed  to  organize 
and  command  the  expedition,  which  was  to  consist  of  seven, 
thousand  five  hundred  men  of  Hurlbut's  sixteenth  corps,  and 
twenty-five  hundred  men  of  McPherson's  seventeenth  corps. 
General  Smith  was  to  report  to  General  Banks,  and  obey  his 
orders.  He  was  to  move  up  the  river  on  transports,  while  the 


164  SHERMAN   AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

troops  from  the  Department  of  the  Gulf  marched  by  land. 
The  duration  of  his  absence  was  not  to  extend  beyond  thirty 
days.  At  the  end  of  that  time  he  was  to  return  to  Yicksburg, 
gather  up  all  the  detachments,  equipage,  and  transportation  of 
the  Sixteenth  Corps,  and  conduct  the  troops  under  his  com 
mand  belonging  to  that  corps  to  Memphis,  where  he  was  told  he 
would  probably  find  orders  to  join  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
at  Huntsville  or  Bridgeport. 

We  need  not  follow  the  steps  of  this  expedition  in  detail. 
General  Smith  landed  at  Simmesport,  on  the  west  bank  of  the 
Atchafalaya,  on  the  13th  of  March,  took  Fort  De  Kussy  by 
assault  on  the  14th,  and  reached  Alexandria  on  the  16th.  The 
advance-guard  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Gulf  arrived 
the  same  day,  and  the  main  body  of  that  army  several  days 
later.  The  river  was  very  high.  The  head  of  the  column  left 
Alexandria  on  the  27th.  The  army  marched  from  Grand 
Ecore,  where  it  had  halted,  on  the  6th  of  April ; — the  main  body 
by  land ;  one  division  under  General  T.  Kilby  Smith  on  trans 
ports  accompanying  Admiral  Porter,  who  started  on  the  same 
day,  aiming  to  reach  Springfield  Landing  on  the  10th,  where 
General  Banks  undertook  to  be  at  that  time.  On  the  8th,  Gen 
eral  Banks  was  met  near  Mansfield,  and  his  attenuated  column 
beaten  in  detail,  by  an  inferior  but  concentrated  force  of  the 
enemy,  under  General  E.  Kirby  Smith.  The  army  retreated  in 
considerable  disorder  to  Pleasant  Hill,  thirty-five  miles  distant, 
and  there  on  the  9th  again  encountered  the  enemy,  checked 
his  pursuit,  and  routed  him.  The  next  day  General  Banks  con 
tinued  the  retreat  to  Grand  Ecore.  Admiral  Porter  and  Gen 
eral  Smith  reached  Springfield  Landing  at  the  appointed  time, 
heard  of  the  disaster,  and  returned,  with  difficulty,  to  Grand 
Ecore.  Here  the  army  waited  nearly  three  weeks,  when  hav 
ing  been  re-enforced  by  all  the  available  troops  in  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  Gulf,  General  Banks  continued  the  retreat  to 
Alexandria.  The  river  had  fallen.  The  gunboats  and  trans 
ports  could  not  pass  the  rapids.  By  means  of  a  dam,  con 
structed  at  the  suggestion  and  under  the  supervision  of 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Joseph  Bailey,  Fourth  Wisconsin  Cavalry, 


THE  MERIDIAN  RAID.  165 

the  water  in  the  river  was  raised  sufficiently  to  allow  tliQ  boats 
to  descend,  and  on  the  14th  of  May  the  army  marched  on 
Simmesport.  On  the  21st  it  reached  Morganzia  Bend,  on  the 
west  bank  of  the  Mississippi.  General  Smith  at  once  em 
barked  his  command  and  returned  to  Yicksburg,  after  an 
absence  of  just  two  months  and  a  half,  instead  of  the  thirty 
days  originally  agreed  upon. 

In  the  mean  while,  nearly  ten  thousand  veteran  volunteers 
of  the  Sixteenth  and  Seventeenth  Corps,  and  the  local  garri 
sons,  had  been  furloughed  for  thirty  days,  on  condition  of  re- 
enlisting,  and  had  returned  with  the  ranks  of  their  regiments 
swelled  by  recruits.  Early  in  March,  Yeatch's  division  of  the 
Sixteenth  Corps  had  been  ordered  to  report  to  General  Dodge 
at  Huntsville. 

On  the  4th  of  March,  at  Nashville,  Major-General  Grant  re 
ceived  telegraphic  orders  to  report  in  person  at  Washington. 
Congress  had  passed  an  act  authorizing  the  appointment  of  a 
lieutenant-general  to  command  the  armies  of  the  United  States, 
and  the  president  had  nominated  General  Grant  for  the  ap 
pointment.  Before  starting  on  his  journey,  Grant  seized  his 
pen,  and  in  the  very  moment  of  his  greatest  elevation,  filled 
with  generosity  towards  those  others,  to  whose  exertions  he 
modestly  chose  to  ascribe  his  own  deserved  reward,  hastily 
wrote  these  touching  lines  : — 

"DEAR  SHERMAN  —  The  bill  reviving  the  grade  of  lieuten 
ant-general  in  the  army  has  become  a  law,  and  my  name  has 
been  sent  to  the  Senate  for  the  place.  I  now  receive  orders 
to  report  to  Washington  immediately  in  person,  which  indicates 
a  confirmation,  or  a  likelihood  of  confirmation. 

"  I  start  in  the  morning  to  comply  with  the  order. 

"  Whilst  I  have  been  eminently  successful  in  this  war,  in  at 
least  gaming  the  confidence  of  the  public,  no  one  feels  more 
than  I  how  much  of  this  success  is  due  to  the  energy,  skill, 
and  the  harmonious  putting  forth  of  that  energy  and  skill,  of 
those  whom  "it  has  been  my  good  fortune  to  have  occupying 
subordinate  positions  under  me. 


166  SHERMAN   AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

"  There  are  many  officers  to  whom  these  remarks  are  appli 
cable  to  a  greater  or  less  degree,  proportionate  to  their  ability 
as  soldiers ;  but  what  I  want  is  to  express  my  thanks  to  you 
and  McPherson,  as  the  men  to  whom,  above  all  others,  I  feel 
indebted  for  whatever  I  have  had  of  success. 

"  How  far  your  advice  and  assistance  have  been  of  help  to 
me,  you  know.  How  far  your  execution  of  whatever  has  been 
given  you  to  do  entitles  you  to  the  reward  I  am  receiving,  you 
cannot  know  as  well  as  I. 

"  I  feel  all  the  gratitude  this  letter  would  express,  giving  it 
the  most  flattering  construction. 

"  The  word  you  I  use  in  the  plural,  intending  it  for  McPher 
son  also.     I  should  write  to  him,  and  will  some  day,  but  start 
ing  in  the  morning,  I  do  not  know  that  I  will  find  time  just  now. 
"  Your  friend, 

"U.  S.  GRANT, 

"  Major-General.'* 

Sherman  received  this  letter  near  Memphis,  on  the  10th  of 
March,  and  immediately  replied  : — 

"  DEAR  GENERAL  : — I  have  your  more  than  kind  and  charac 
teristic  letter  of  the  4th  inst.  I  will  send  a  copy  to  General 
McPherson  at  once. 

"  You  do  yourself  injustice  and  us  too  much  honor  in  assign 
ing  to  us  too  large  a  share  of  the  merits  which  have  led  to 
your  high  advancement.  I  know  you  apjprove  the  friendship 
I  have  ever  professed  to  you,  and  will  permit  me  to  continue, 
as  heretofore,  to  manifest  it  on  all  jproper  occasions. 

"You  are  now  "Washington's  legitimate  successor,  and  oc 
cupy  a  position  of  almost  dangerous  elevation  ;  but  if  you  can 
continue,  as  heretofore,  to  be  yourself,  simple,  honest,  and  un 
pretending,  you  will  enjoy  through  life  the  respect  and  love  of 
friends  and  the  homage  of  millions  of  human  beings,  that  will 
award  you  a  large  share  in  securing  to  them  and  their  descend 
ants  a  government  of  law  and  stability. 

"  I  repeat,  you  do  General  McPherson  and  myself  too  much 
honor.  At  Belmont  you  manifested  your  traits — neither  of  us 


THE  MERIDIAN   RAID.  167 

.being  near.  At  Donelson,  also,  you  illustrated  your  whole 
character.  I  was  not  near,  and  General  McPherson  in  too  sub 
ordinate  a  capacity  to  influence  you. 

"Until  you  had  won  Donelson,  I  confess  I  was  almost 
cowed  by  the  terrible  array  of  anarchical  elements  that  pre 
sented  themselves  at  every  point ;  but  that  admitted  a  ray  of 
light  I  have  followed  since. 

"I  believe  you  are  as  brave,  patriotic,  and  just,  as  the 
great  prototype,  Washington — as  unselfish,  kind-hearted,  and 
honest  as  a  man  should  be — but  the  chief  characteristic  is  the 
simple  faith  in  success  you  have  always  manifested,  which  I 
can  liken  to  nothing  else  than  the  faith  a  Christian  has  in  the 
Saviour. 

"  This  faith  gave  you  victory  at  Shiloh  and  Yicksburg.  Also, 
when  you  have  completed  your  best  preparations,  you  go  into 
battle  without  hesitation,  as  at  Chattanooga — no  doubts — no 
reserves ;  and  I  tell  you,  it  was  this  that  made  us  act  with 
confidence.  I  knew,  wherever  I  was,  that  you  thought  of  me, 
and  if  I  got  in  a  tight  place,  you  would  help  me  out,  if  alive. 

"  My  only  point  of  doubts  was,  in  your  knowledge  of  grand 
strategy,  and  of  books  of  science  and  history ;  but,  I  confess, 
your  common  sense  seems  to  have  supplied  all  these. 

"  Now  as  to  the  future.  Don't  stay  in  Washington.  Come 
West :  take  to  yourself  the  whole  Mississippi  Valley.  Let  us 
make  it  dead-sure — and  I  tell  you,  the  Atlantic  slopes  and 
Pacific  shores  will  follow  its  destiny,  as  sure  as  the  limbs  of  a 
tree  live  or  die  with  the  main  trunk.  We  have  done  much,  but 
still  much  remains.  Time,  and  time's  influences,  are  with  us. 
We  could  almost  afford  to  sit  still,  and  let  these  influences  work. 

"  Here  lies  the  seat  of  the  coming  empire  ;  and  from  the 
West,  when  our  task  is  done,  we  will  make  short  work  of 
Charleston  and  Richmond,  and  the  impoverished  coast  of  the 
Atlantic. 

"  Your  sincere  friend." 

On  the  12th  of  March,  1864,  the  President  relieved  Major- 
General  Halleck  from  duty  as  general-in-chief,  and  assigned 


168  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Lieutenant-General  Grant  to  the  command  of  the  armies  of 
the  United  States,  with  headquarters  in  the  field,  and  also  at 
Washington,  where  General  Halleck  was  to  remain  as  chief-of- 
staff.  By  the  same  order,  Sherman  was  assigned  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  and  Major- 
General  McPherson  to  the  command  of  the  Department  and 
Army  of  the  Tennessee. 

Sherman  received  this  order  at  Memphis,  on  the  14th,  while 
on  his  way  to  Huntsville,  to  prepare  for  the  gre&t  campaign  in 
Georgia.  In  accordance  with  the  request  of  General  Grant, 
accompanying  the  order,  he  immediately  proceeded  to  Nash 
ville,  where  he  arrived  on  the  17th,  and  accompanied  the 
lieutenant-general  as  far  on  his  way  to  Washington  as  Cin 
cinnati.  During  the  journey,  they  had  a  full  and  free  con 
ference  as  to  the  plan  of  operations  in  the  approaching  cam 
paign,  and  a  complete  understanding  of  the  work  to  be  done  by 
each.  In  a  parlor  of  the  Burnet  House,  at  Cincinnati,  bend 
ing  over  their  maps,  the  two  generals,  who  had  so  long  been 
inseparable,  planned  together  that  colossal  structure  whereof 
the  great  campaigns  of  Richmond  and  Atlanta  were  but  two 
of  the  parts,  and,  grasping  one  another  firmly  by  the  hand, 
separated,  one  to  the  east,  the  other  to  the  west,  each  to  strike 
at  the  same  instant  his  half  of  the  ponderous  death-blow. 


THE  ARMY  OF  THE  CENTRE.  171 

the  State  of  New  York,  was  born  there  on  the  29th  of  Sep 
tember,  1831.  "When  about  twelve  years  of  age  his  father 
took  him  to  reside  at  Bristol,  Illinois,  whence,  in  1845,  they 
removed  to  Freeport,  in  the  same  State.  In  June,  1849, 
young  Schofield  entered  the  Military  Academy  at  West  Point, 
and  graduated  four  years  later,  standing  seventh  in  the  order 
of  general  merit  in  the  same  class  with  Generals  McPherson, 
Sheridan,  Sill,  Ten-ill,  E.  O.  Tyler,  and  the  rebel  General 
Hood.  He  was  appointed  a  brevet  second-lieutenant,  and  at 
tached  to  the  Second  Regiment  of  Artillery,  011  the  1st  of  July, 
1853,  and  in  regular  course  of  promotion  advanced  to  the 
grades  of  second-lieutenant  in  the  First  Regiment  of  Artillery 
on  the  30th  of  August  in  the  same  year  ;  first-lieutenant  in  the 
same  regiment  on  the  1st  of  March,  1855  ;  and  captain  on  the 
14th  of  May,  1861.  After  serving  for  two  years  with  his 
company  in  South  Carolina  and  Florida,  in  the  fall  of  1855, 
Lieutenant  Schofield  was  ordered  to  West  Point,  as  Assistant 
Professor  of  Natural  and  Experimental  Philosophy  ;  which 
position  he  held  until  June,  1860,  when  he  obtained  leave  of 
absence  for  twelve  months  to  accept  the  Chair  of  Physics 
in  Washington  University,  at  St.  Louis,  Missouri,  intending 
to  quit  the  army  at  the  end  of  the  leave.  This  design  he 
abandoned  immediately  upon  the  publication  of  the  Presi 
dent's  proclamation  of  the  loth  of  April,  1861,  calling  for 
seventy-five  thousand  volunteers,  and  waiving  the  remainder 
of  his  leave,  reported  himself  for  orders  and  was  assigned  to 
duty  as  mustering  officer  at  St.  Louis.  Shortly  afterwards, 
by  permission  of  the  War  Department,  Lieutenant  Schofield 
accepted  the  position  of  major  of  the  First  Regiment  of 
Missouri  Volunteers,  offered  him  by  the  governor  of  the 
State,  and  in  that  capacity  participated  with  his  regiment  in 
the  bold  capture  and  dispersion  of  the  nest  of  secessionists  at 
Camp  Jackson  on  the  10th  of  May,  planned  and  executed 
by  Captain,  afterwards  Brigadier-General  Nathaniel  Lyon. 
Major  Schofield  soon  afterwards  became  General  Lyon's 
principal  staff-officer,  and  served  with  that  gallant  commander 
throughout  the  campaign  which  ended  in  his  death.  In  the 


172  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

fall,  the  First  Missouri  Volunteers  was  converted  into  a  heavy 
artillery  regiment,  and  Major  Schofield  charged  with  its 
equipment.  At  Fredericktown,  Missouri,  he  participated  with 
Battery  A,  the  first  one  mounted,  in  the  defeat  of  Jeff. 
Thompson,  by  Plummer  and  Carlin.  On  the  20th  of  No 
vember,  1861,  Major  Schofield  was  appointed  by  the  President 
a  brigadier-general  of  volunteers  —  and  at  the  same  time 
received  from  the  governor  of  Missouri  a  corresponding 
commission  in  the  Missouri  Militia,  with  orders  to  organize, 
equip,  and  command  a  force  of  ten  thousand  militia,  to  be 
called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States,  within  the  limits 
of  Missouri,  during  the  war.  With  this  force  General  Schofield 
was  enabled  to  relieve  the  main  armies  for  active  service  in 
more  important  fields.  In  the  spring  of  1862,  he  was  desig 
nated  by  Major-General  Halleck,  commanding  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  West,  as  commander  of  the  district  of  Missouri, 
and  in  the  fall  organized  and  took  personal  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Frontier,  serving  in  the  southwestern  portion  of 
the  State.  He  relinquished  the  former  command  in  September, 
to  give  his  undivided  attention  to  the  suppression  of  the 
terrible  guerrilla  warfare  which  then  raged  in  Missouri.  On 
the  29th  of  November,  1862,  the  President  appointed  him  a 
major-general  of  volunteers,  but  his  straightforward,  decided, 
and  just  administration  of  affairs  as  commander  of  the  district 
of  Missouri  having  greatly  dissatisfied  the  local  politicians, 
they  made  a  combined  and  determined  effort  to  defeat  his 
nomination,  and  so  far  succeeded  that  the  Senate  failed  to  act 
upon  it,  and  his  commission  consequently  expired  on  the  3d 
of  March,  1863,  by  constitutional  limitation.  Immediately 
relieved,  at  his  own  request,  from  duty  in  Missouri,  Brigadier- 
General  Schofield  was  now  ordered  to  report  to  Major-Gen- 
eral  Kosecrans,  commanding  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
at  Murfreesboro',  Tennessee,  by  whom  he  was  assigned  to 
the  command  of  Thomas'  old  division  of  the  Fourteenth 
Army  Corps.  A  month  later,  President  Lincoln  reappointed 
him  a  major-general  of  volunteers,  and  sent  him  back  to 
St.  Louis,  to  relieve  Curtis,  in  command  of  the  Department 


THE  ARMY  OF  THE  CENTRE.  173 

of  Missouri.  In  May,  1863,  he  assumed  command,  and  realiz 
ing  the  paramount  importance  of  the  operations  before  Vicks- 
burg,  suspended  all  active  operations  in  his  own  department 
and  lent  himself  heartily  to  a  co-operation  with  the  plans  of 
General  Grant,  then  merely  the  commander  of  an  adjacent  de 
partment,  by  furnishing  him  with  Major-General  F.  J.  Her- 
ron's  fine  division  of  the  Army  of  the  Frontier,  and  all  other 
troops  not  necessarily  required  for  a  strictly  defensive  attitude 
in  Missouri.  After  the  capture  of  Yicksburg,  Schofield  was 
re-enforced  by  General  Grant  with  Steele's  division,  lately  of 
Sherman's  corps.  Sending  a  division  of  cavalry  under  Briga 
dier-General  J.  W.  Davidson  to  join  Steele  at  Helena,  he 
ordered  the  latter  forthwith  to  move  on  Little  Hock,  the  key 
to  the  military  possession  of  the  line  of  the  Arkansas  River 
and  the  control  of  the  State,  while  he  sent  another  column 
from  Kansas,  under  Brigadier-General  Blunt,  to  occupy  Fort 
Smith  and  open  communication  with  Little  Rock.  Both 
movements  having  proved  successful,  Missouri  being  thus 
secured  from  the  ravages  of  a  border  war,  and  his  army 
holding  securely  the  line  of  the  Arkansas,  while  menacing 
offensively  the  forces  of  the  enemy  between  that  river  and  the 
Red,  General  Schofield  was  engaged  in  concerting  with  Major- 
General  Banks,  commanding  the  Gulf  department,  the  Details 
of  a  joint  occupation  of  Shreveport  and  the  line  of  the  Red 
River,  when,  in  January,  1864,  the  President  appointed  Major- 
General  Rosecrans  to  relieve  him  from  command.  There 
were  then  three  principal  political  parties  in  Missouri,  which, 
under  different  names  or  various  pretences,  had  existed  ever 
since  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  The  entire  control  of  affairs 
in  Missouri  necessarily  rested  with  the  military  commander  of 
the  department.  As  it  was  impossible  to  please  all  parties, 
so,  in  looking  only  upon  his  duty  and  his  orders  from  a  stand 
point  different  from  that  of  either,  he  generally  ended  by 
pleasing  none.  Fremont,  Hunter,  and  Curtis  had  been  suc 
cessively  relieved  from  command ;  Schofield  himself  had  been 
degraded  for  a  time  ;  and  now  he  was  again  to  give  way  to  the 
demands  of  the  dissatisfied  politicians.  Perceiving  at  last 


174  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

that  the  hostility  of  these  gentlemen  was  indeed  directed 
against  himself,  and  not  against  his  subordinates,  President 
Lincoln,  although  he  indorsed  and  supported  Schofield's  entire 
policy  and  acts,  yielded  to  the  demands  of  the  politicians  for 
the  purpose  of  demonstrating  their  motives,  and  gave  them  a 
new  commander  of  their  own  choice.  In  a  few  weeks,  the 
howls  against  Rosecrans  were  as  loud  as  those  previously 
raised  against  any  of  his  predecessors.  At  the  request  of 
General  Grant,  Schofield  was  now  assigned  to  the  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  which  he  assumed  on  the  9th  of 
February. 

George  H.  Thomas,  born  in  Southampton  County,  Vir 
ginia,  on  the  31st  of  July,  1816,  of  wealthy  and  respectable 
parents,  entered  West  Point  in  June,  1836,  and  graduated 
twelfth  in  a  class  of  forty-five  members ;  on  the  first  of 
July,  1840,  was  appointed  a  second-lieutenant  in  the  Third 
Eegiment  of  Artillery,  attained  by  regular  promotions  the 
grades  of  first-lieutenant,  on  the  17th  of  May,  1843,  captain 
in  the  month  of  December,  1853,  and  on  the  12th  of  May,  1855, 
was  selected  as  major  of  the  newly  raised  Second  Eegiment  of 
Cavalry.  On  the  25th  of  April,  1861,  by  regular  promotion, 
consequent  upon  the  resignation  of  the  disloyal  officers,  he  be 
came  lieutenant-colonel  and  on  the  5th  of  May  colonel  of 
the  same  regiment,  then  and  since  known  as  the  Fifth  Cavalry. 
During  this  time,  he  served  eighteen  months  in  Florida,  was 
breve tted  first-lieutenant,  on  the  6th  of  November,  1841,  for 
gallantry  in  the  war  against  the  Seminoles  ;  served  some  time 
with  his  company  at  New  Orleans  Barracks,  Fort  Moultrie,  in 
Charleston  Harbor,  and  Fort  McHenry,  near  Baltimore  ;  in 
July,  1845,  .was  sent  to  Corpus .  Christi,  Texas,  to  report  to 
General  Taylor;  took  part  in  the  defence  of  Fort  Brown 
against. a  short  siege  by  the  Mexicans,  and  in  the  battle  of  Ke- 
saca  de  la  Palma ;  was  brevetted  captain  for  gallant  conduct 
at  the  battle  of  Monterey,  September  23,  1846 ;  commanded 
Company  E,  Third  Artillery,  during  the  following  winter  ;  was 
brevetted  major  for  highly  distinguished  service  with  his  bat 
tery  in  the  decisive  action  at  Buena  Yista ;  recrossed  the  Bio 


THE  ARMY  OF  THE  CENTRE.  175 

Grande  at  the  conclusion  of  the  war  and  was  placed  in  charge 
of  the  commissary  depot  at  Brazos  Santiago  ;  served  in  Flor 
ida,  in  command  of  Company  B,  of  his  regiment,  in  1849  and 
1850 ;  served  at  Fort  Independence,  Boston  Harbor,  during 
the  first  three  months  of  1851 ;  was  stationed  at  West  Point 
as  instructor  of  artillery  and  cavalry  from  that  time  until  the 
spring  of  1854,  when  he  was  ordered  to  California  with  a  bat 
talion  of  his  regiment  and  stationed  at  Fort  Yuma,  until  July, 
1853  ;  served  with  ihe  Second  Cavalry,  into  which  lie  had  now 
been  promoted,  until  early  in  1856,  when  it  went  to  Texas, 
where  he  commanded  it  for  three  years  ;  and  in  April,  1861,  was 
ordered  to  Carlisle  Barracks,  Pennsylvania,  to  remount  his 
regiment,  which  had  been  betrayed  and  robbed  of  its  outfit 
and  equipment  by  Twiggs,  in  his  infamous  surrender  of 
the  entire  department  under  his  command,  after  he  had 
received  orders  relieving  him,  and  with  indecent  haste  to 
anticipate  the  hourly  expected  arrival  of  his  successor.  In 
May,  1861,  Colonel  Thomas  took  command  of  a  brigade  in 
the  Department  of  Pennsylvania,  under  Major-General  Patter 
son,  afterwards  the  Department  of  the  Shenandoah,  under 
Major-General  Banks,  and  continued  to  hold  that  position 
until  the  end  of  August.  On  the  17th  of  August  he  was  ap 
pointed  a  brigadier-general  of  volunteers,  and  shortly  after 
wards  ordered  to  Kentucky  to  report  to  Brigadier-General 
Anderson,  who  gave  him  the  command  of  Camp  Dick  Kobin- 
son  with  about  six  thousand  new  troops.  On  the  26th  of 
October,  a  brigade  sent  out  by  him  under  Brigadier- General 
Schoepf  defeated  the  enemy  under  Zollicoffer,  in  the  battle  of 
Wildcat.  On  the  18th  of  January,  after  a  march  of  nineteen 
days,  over  nearly  impassable  roads,  with  part  of  the  first 
division  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  to  which  General  Buell  as 
signed  him,  he  met  the  fierce  attack  of  Zollicoffer,  near  Mill 
Spring,  Kentucky,  repulsed  it,  attacked  in  his  turn,  broke  the 
enemy  and  pursued  the  disordered  remnants  to  the  Cumberland 
Kiver,  which  they  crossed  during  the  night,  abandoning  all 
their  artillery  and  baggage.  In  March,  Thomas  with  his  divi 
sion,  now  forming  the  reserve  of  Buell' s  army,  occupied  Nash- 


176  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

ville,  and  in  April  joiiied  the  rest  of  that  army  after  the  battle 
of  Shiloh,  and  moved  with  it  and  Grant's  army  on  Corinth. 
On  the  25th  of  April,  1862,  he  was  promoted  to  be  a  major- 
general  of  volunteers,  and  on  the  1st  of  May  his  own  division 
was  transferred  to  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and  he  was  as 
signed  by  General  Halleck  to  command  the  five  divisions,  in 
cluding  Sherman's,  constituting  the  right  wing  of  the  forces 
before  Corinth.  After  the  evacuation  of  that  place  by  Beau- 
regard,  Thomas  returned  to  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  and  was 
placed  on  duty  as  second  in  command  of  that  army,  during 
Bragg's  invasion  and  the  remarkable  series  of  movements  by 
which  Buell  manoeuvred  it  out  of  Tennessee,  through  Ken 
tucky,  and  back  to  Louisville.  On  the  1st  of  October  he  was 
assigned  to  the  command  of  the  right  wing  of  that  army,  and 
in  that  capacity  took  part  in  Buell's  nominal  pursuit  of  Bragg. 
On  the  5th  of  November,  1862,  he  was  assigned  by  General 
Kosecrans,  who  had  just  relieved  Buell,  to  the  command  of  a 
corps  comprising  his  own  third  division,  now  under  Rousseau, 
and  Negley's  division.  At  Stone  River,  on  the  31st  of  Decem 
ber,  1863,  when  Bragg  impetuously  hurled  his  entire  army 
against  Rosecrans'  right  and  routed  it,  Thomas,  with  Rous 
seau's  division  unbroken,  stood  firm,  held  his  ground,  and 
aided  in  the  selection  of  the  new  line,  whose  strength  enabled 
Rosecrans  to  turn  back  the  enemy's  second  attack  on  the  fol 
lowing  day.  On  the  20th  of  September,  1863,  at  the  battle  of 
Chickamauga,  when  Me  Cook  and  Crittenden  on  either  flank 
yielded  to  the  fury  of  the  enemy's  assault,  and  streamed  back 
in  such  utter  rout  to  Chattanooga  that  even  Rosecrans  gave 
up  the  day  as  lost,  and  hastened  thither  in  person  to  prepare  a 
new  line  of  defence,  Thomas  with  his  corps,  somewhat  later 
augmented  by  Granger's  division,  stood  like  a  lion  at  bay, 
and  resting  his  flanks  upon  the  sides  of  the  mountain  gap, 
resisted  and  severely  punished  every  attempt  of  Bragg,  either 
to  force  his  position  in  front  or  to  turn  his  flanks.  Falling 
back  in  the  night  three  miles  to  a  better  position,  he  again 
formed  line  of  battle  and  waited  all  the  day  of  the  21st 
for  Bragg's  expected  attack,  which  never  came.  Having 


THE  AKMY  OF  THE  CENTRE.  177 

alone  saved  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  from  destruc 
tion,  Thomas  was  very  justly  selected  as  the  successor  of 
General  Kosecrans,  when  on  the  19th  of  October  it  was 
determined  to  relieve  the  latter.  On  the  27th  of  the  same 
month  he  was  made  a  brigadier-general  in  the  regular  army. 
Faithful  over  all  things  and  free  from  all  petty  desires, 
when  Sherman,  his  junior  in  years,  in  experience,  in  commis 
sion,  and  at  no  remote  period  his  subordinate,  was  ele 
vated  to  the  command  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  Thomas  yielded  a  ready  acquiescence  in  the  selection, 
and  a  thorough,  efficient,  and  essential  co-operation  in  all  the 
plans  of  his  new  superior.  It  is  characteristic  of  Thomas, 
that  in  the  twenty-five  years  that  have  elapsed  since  his 
graduation  he  has  had  but  two  short  leaves  of  absence,  one  in 

1848,  and  one  in  1860,  and  has  never  been  on  favored  duty  of 
any  kind.     In  his  most  marked  traits,  Thomas  is  the  antithesis 
of  Sherman,  his  habitual  repose  of  mind  and  temper  being, 
perhaps,  only  less  strongly  marked  than  Sherman's  electric 
restlessness. 

James  Birdseye  McPherson  was  born  in  Sandusky  County, 
Ohio,  on  the  14th  of  November,  1828,  entered  the  Military 
Academy  towards  the  close  of  his  twenty-first  year,  in  June, 

1849,  graduated  at  the  head  of  the  same  class  with  Schofield, 
and  on  the  1st  of  July,  1853,  was  appointed  a  brevet  second- 
lieutenant,  and  assigned  to  the  corps  of  engineers.     By  regu 
lar  promotion,  he  attained  the  grades  of  second-lieutenant,  on 
the  1st  of  December,  1854,  first-lieutenant,  December  13,  1858, 
and  captain,  August  6,  1861.     Upon   the   expiration  of  his 
graduating  furlough,  he  was  stationed  at  West  Point  as  as 
sistant  instructor  of  practical  engineering,  and  remained  there 
until  September,   1854,  when   he  was   detailed   as   assistant 
engineer  of  the  harbor  defences  of  New  York.     From  January 
to  July,  1857,  he  was  in  charge  of  the  construction  of  Fort 
Delaware,  in  the  Delaware  Kiver.      In  December,  1857,  he 
took  charge  of  the  erection  of  the  fortifications  on  Alcatras 
Island,  in  the  Bay  of  San  Francisco,  California.     In  August, 
1861,  he  was  detailed  to  superintend  the  construction  of  the 

12 


178  SHEEMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

fortifications  of  Boston  Harbor.  On  the  12th  of  November, 
of  the  same  year,  Captain  McPherson  was,  at  the  request  of 
Major-General  Halleck,  appointed  an  additional  aid-de-camp, 
with  the  rank  of  lieutenant-colonel,  and,  on  reporting  to  him 
at  St.  Louis,  was  assigned  to  engineer  duty  on  his  staff. 
Lieutenant-Colonel  McPherson  served  as  chief  engineer  on 
General  Grant's  staff,  at  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  and  at 
Shiloh,  and  was  brevetted  major  in  the  regular  army  for  the 
two  former  and  lieutenant-colonel  for  the  latter.  On  the  1st 
of  May  he  was  promoted  to  be  additional  aid-de-camp,  with 
the  rank  of  colonel,  and  served  on  General  Halleck' s  staff  as 
chief  engineer  of  the  army  before  Corinth.  He  was  soon 
afterwards  promoted  to  be  brigadier-general  of  volunteers, 
from  May  15th,  1862.  After  serving  under  Grant  as  gen 
eral  superintendent  of  the  military  railways  in  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  Tennessee  and  upon  the  staff  of  that  general  in  the 
battle  of  luka,  he  saw  his  first  service  in  command  of  troops 
early  in  October,  when,  with  a  division,  he  fought  his  way 
through  the  rebel  General  Price's  lines,  then  investing  Corinth, 
marched  in  to  the  relief  of  the  garrison,  and  the  next  day 
joined  in  the  attack  and  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  In  recognition 
.of  his  continued  meritorious  services,  he  was,  upon  General 
Grant's  request,  promoted  to  be  a  major-general  of  volun 
teers  on  the  8th  of  October,  1862.  In  December,  1862, 
he  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Seventeenth  Army 
Corps.  He  was  appointed  a  brigadier-general  in  the  regu 
lar  army,  to  date  from  the  capture  of  Yicksburg.  His 
share  in  the  campaign  which  resulted  in  the  conquest  of 
the  Mississippi  River,  in  the  battles  of  Port  Gibson,  Ray 
mond,  Jackson,  and  Champion's  Hill,  and  in  the  siege  of 
Yicksburg,  we  have  already  noticed,  as  well  as  his  subsequent 
assignment  to  the  command  of  the  district  of  Yicksburg,  and 
the  control  of  operations  on  that  part  of  the  river,  and  his 
part  in  Sherman's  Meridian  raid.  He  was  tall  in  person,  being 
over  six  feet  in  height,  well  proportioned  and  erect ;  easy  and 
agreeable  in  his  manners  ;  frank  in  conversation  ;  accessible  to 
all ;  gallant  and  dashing  in  action ;  regardless  of  danger ; 


THE  ARMY  OF  THE  CENTRE.  179 

strictly  honorable  in  all  his  dealings  with  men  and  with  the 
Government. 

Schofield,  young  but  matured,  well  poised,  thoroughly  scien 
tific  by  education,  thoroughly  practical  by  contact  with  men, 
habituated  to  command ;  McPherson,  in  the  full  flower  of  his 
life,  bold  and  enthusiastic,  just  emerging  from  a  complete 
mastery  of  the  science  of  defensive  war  into  the  wider  field  of 
the  offensive,  trained  to  command  under  the  eye,  and  by  the 
example  of  Grant  and  Sherman ;  Thomas,  the  ripe  growth  of 
years  and  experience,  of  balanced  and  crystallized  mind, 
strong  and  patient,  steadfast  and  prudent,  a  true  soldier,  no 
genius,  but  a  master  of  his  profession,  exhaustive  in  prepara 
tion,  deliberate  in  action,  ponderous  and  irresistible  in  execu 
tion  :  such  were  the  men  upon  whom,  under  the  leadership  of 
Sherman,  the  destiny  of  the  campaign  was  to  rest. 

On  the  25th  of  March,  Sherman  set  out  to  inspect  his  com 
mand,  and  prepare  it  for  action.  He  visited  Athens,  Decatur, 
Huntsville,  and  Larkin's  Ferry,  Alabama;  and  Chattanooga, 
London,  and  Knoxville,  Tennessee.  Meeting  General  McPher 
son  at  Huntsville,  General  Thomas  at  Chattanooga,  and  General 
Schofield  at  Knoxville,  he  arranged  with  them  in  general  terms 
the  lines  of  communication  to  be  guarded,  and  the  strength 
of  the  columns  and  garrisons,  and  fixed  the  first  of  May  as  the 
date  when  every  thing  throughout  the  entire  command  was  to 
be  ready  for  a  general  movement.  Leaving  the  department 
commanders  to  complete  the  details  of  organization  and  pre 
paration,  Sherman  returned  to  his  headquarters  at  Nashville, 
to  look  after  the  vital  question  of  supplies.  Two  parallel 
lines  of  railway  from  the  Tennessee  River  on  the  east,  and  a 
third  line  from  the  Ohio  at  Louisville,  bring  supplies  to  Nash 
ville.  Thence  by  the  Nashville  and  Decatur  Railroad  they 
are  carried  south  to  Decatur,  and  by  the  Nashville  and  Chat 
tanooga  Railroad  southeast  to  Chattanooga,  passing  through 
Huntsville,  Stevenson,  and  Bridgeport.  The  Memphis  and 
Charleston  Railroad  forms  the  base  of  a  triangle,  one  hundred 
and  twenty-one  miles  from  Decatur  to  Chattanooga;  from 
near  Decatur  to  Bridgeport  it  lies  north  of  the  Tennessee. 


180  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS 

Thus  in  case  of  accident  or  destruction  to  either  of  the  direct 
lines,  there  was  generally  communication  by  the  circuitous 
route,  and  during  the  season  of  navigation  the  Tennessee 
River  added  a  third.  The  railways  were  in  fine  condition,  in 
spite  of  the  repeated  injuries  inflicted  upon  them  by  the 
enemy's  cavalry  in  their  frequent  raids,  but  the  people  in  East 
Tennessee  were  so  impoverished  that  the  Union  commanders 
had  hitherto  felt  obliged  to  issue  rations  to  them  from  the 
military  stores.  Sherman  at  once  found  that  the  army  and 
the  people  could  not  both  be  fed  by  the  railways.  The  army 
must  be  supplied,  must  remain,  and  must  move  forward ;  the 
people  could  bring  supplies  by  private  means  or  could  mi 
grate  to  other  parts  of  the  country.  Sherman's  first  duty  was 
the  success  of  his  army.  He  accordingly  issued  orders  stop 
ping  the  issue  of  stores  to  the  citizens,  and  made  strenuous  ex 
ertions  to  increase  the  carrying  capacity  of  the  railways.  "  At 
first,"  he  says,  in  his  official  report  of  the  campaign,  "  my  orders 
operated  very  hardly,  but  the  prolific  soil  soon  afforded  early 
vegetables,  and  ox-wagons  hauled  meat  and  bread  from  Ken 
tucky,  so  that  no  actual  suffering  resulted,  and  I  trust  that 
those  who  clamored  at  the  cruelty  and  hardships  of  the  day 
have  already  seen  in  the  result  a  perfect  justification  of  my 
course."  By  the  1st  of  May  the  storehouses  at  Chattanooga 
contained  provisions  for  thirty  days,  the  ammunition-trains 
were  fully  supplied,  the  re-enlisted  veterans  had  come  forward, 
and  all  was  ready. 

On  the  10th  of  April,  Sherman  received  his  final  instruc 
tions  from  the  lieutenant-general.  From  them  he  learned 
that  Grant  would  march  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from 
Culpepper  on  the  5th  of  May,  against  Lee.  Sherman  was  to 
move  against  Johnston  at  the  same  time,  with  Atlanta  as  his 
immediate  objective.  He  immediately  replied,  giving  the 
details  of  his  plans,  and  concluding : 

"  Should  Johnston  fall  behind  Chattahoochee,  I  would  feign 
to  the  right  but  pass  to  the  left,  and  act  on  Atlanta  or  its 
eastern  communications,  according  to  developed  facts.  This 
is  about  as  far  ahead  as  I  feel  disposed  to  look ;  but  I  would 


THE  ARMY  OF   THE  CENTRE.  181 

ever  bear  in  mind  that  Johnston  is  at  all  times  to  be  kept  so 
busy  that  he  cannot  in  any  event  send  any  part  of  his  com 
mand  against  you  or  Banks.  If  Banks  can  at  the  same  time 
carry  Mobile  and  open  up  the  Alabama  River,  he  will  in  a 
measure  solve  a  most  difficult  part  of  my  problem — provisions. 
But  in  that  I  must  venture.  Georgia  has  a  million  of  inhab 
itants.  If  they  can  live,  we  should  not  starve.  If  the  enemy 
interrupt  my  communications,  I  will  be  absolved  from  all 
obligations  to  subsist  on  my  own  resources,  but  feel  perfectly 
justified  in  taking  whatever  and  wherever  I  can  find.  I  will 
inspire  my  command,  if  successful,  with  my  feelings,  and  that 
beef  and  salt  are  all  that  are  absolutely  necessary  to  life  ;  and 
parched  corn  fed  General  Jackson's  army  once,  on  that  very 
ground." 

On  the  27th  of  April,  Sherman  issued  orders  to  all  the  troops 
that  were  to  form  part  of  the  moving  columns  to  concentrate 
towards  Chattanooga,  and  on  the  28th  removed  his  headquar 
ters  thither. 

On  the  morning  of  the  6th  of  May  the  Army  of  the  Tennes 
see  was  near  Gordon's  Mill,  on  the  Chickamauga  Creek,  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  at  and  near  Einggold  on  the  rail 
way,  and  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  near  Eed  Clay  on  the  Geor 
gia  line,  directly  north  of  Dalton.  It  had  been  Sherman's 
desire  and  intention  to  move  with  one  hundred  thousand  men 
and  two  hundred  and  fifty  guns ;  fifty  thousand  men  in  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  thirty-five  thousand  in  that  of  the 
Tennessee,  and  fifteen  thousand  in  that  of  the  Ohio.  His 
actual  force  was  ninety-eight  thousand  seven  hundred  and 
ninety-seven  men,  and  two  hundred  and  fifty-four  guns,  dis 
tributed  as  follows : — 

Army  of  the  Cumberland. — Infantry,  54,568;  artillery,  2,377; 
cavalry,  3,828  :  total,  60,773  ;  guns,  130. 

Army  of  the  Tennessee. — Infantry,  22,437 ;  artillery,  1,404 ; 
cavalry,  624 :  total,  24,465 ;  guns,  96. 

Army  of  the  Ohio. — Infantry,  11,183  ;  artillery,  679  ;  cavalry, 
1,697 :  total,  13,559 ;  guns,  28. 

A.  J.  Smith's  and  Mower's  divisions,  which  were  to  have 


182  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

joined  the  Army  of  Tennessee  early  in  April,  were  still  de 
tained  on  the  Mississippi,  in  consequence  of  the  unexpected 
length  and  disastrous  end  of  the  Ked  River  expedition. 

The  Confederate  army  under  Johnston,  now  numbering, 
according  to  his  official  report,  forty  thousand  nine  hundred 
infantry,  in  the  three  corps  of  Hardee,  Hood,  and  Polk,  and 
four  thousand  cavalry,  under  Wheeler,  was  grouped  around 
Dalton,  on  the  line  of  the  Chattanooga  and  Atlanta  Eailway, 
Johnston's  plan  was  to  take  the  initiative,  with  his  own  force 
increased  from  other  sources  as  largely  as  practicable ;  but 
while  Mr.  Davis  and  General  Bragg,  then  stationed  in  Rich 
mond,  as  general-in-chief  of  the  Confederate  armies,  were 
engaged  in  discussing  details,  and  objecting  to  General  John 
ston's  suggestions,  Sherman  advanced. 


BEYOND  THE  MOUNTAINS.  183 


CHAPTER  XV. 

BEYOND   THE   MOUNTAINS. 

THE  two  hostile  armies  were  separated  by  an  inaccessible 
spur  of  the  Alleghanies,  called  Rocky  Face  Ridge,  cloven  by 
Buzzard's  Roost  Gap,  through  which  run  the  railway  and 
Mill  Creek.  This  narrow  pass  was  strongly  fortified,  was 
flooded  by  the  waters  of  the  creek,  artificially  raised  by  means 
of  a  dam,  and  was  swept  by  strong  batteries  on  the  projecting 
spurs  and  on  a  ridge  at  the  southern  extremity.  To  assault 
the  enemy  in  this  almost  unapproachable  position,  formed  no 
part  of  Sherman's  plan.  He  decided  to  turn  the  enemy's  left. 
McPherson  was  ordered  to  move  rapidly  by  Ship's  Gap,  Vil- 
lanow,  and  Snake's  Creek  Gap,  on  the  railway  at  Resaca, 
eighteen  miles  below  Dalton,  or  a  point  nearer  than  that 
place,  make  a  bold  attack,  and  after  breaking  the  railway 
well,  to  retire  to  a  strong  defensive  position  near  Snake  Creek 
Gap,  ready  to  fall  on  the  enemy's  flank  when  he  retreated, 
as  it  was  thought  he  would  do. 

On  the  7th  of  May,  with  slight  opposition,  Thomas  occu 
pied  Tunnel  Hill,  directly  in  front  of  Buzzard's  Roost  Gap. 
On  the  9th,  Schofield  moved  down  close  to  Dalton,  from 
his  camps  at  Red  Clay,  and  Thomas  renewed  his  demon 
stration  against  Buzzard's  Roost  and  Rocky  Face  Ridge 
with  such  vigor,  that  Newton's  division  of  Howard's  fourth 
corps  earned  the  ridge,  but  turning  south,  found  the  crest  too 
narrow  and  too  well  protected  by  rock  epaulements  to  enable 
it  to  reach  the  gorge.  Geary's  division  of  Hooker's  twentieth 
corps,  made  a  bold  push  for  the  summit,  but  the  narrow  road 
was  strongly  held  by  the  enemy,  and  could  not  be  carried. 


184  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Meanwhile  McPherson  had  reached  Snake  Creek  Gap  on 
the  8th,  completely  surprising  a  brigade  of  Confederate  cav 
alry  which  was  coming  to  watch  and  hold  it.  The  next  day 
he  approached  within  a  mile  of  Kesaca,  but  finding  that  place 
very  strongly  fortified,  and  no  road  leading  across  to  it,  with 
out  exposing  his  left  flank  to  an  attack  from  the  north,  he 
retired  to  Snake  Creek  Gap  and  there  took  up  a  strong  posi 
tion. 

Leaving  Howard's  Fourth  Corps  and  a  small  force  of  cavalry, 
to  occupy  the  enemy's  attention  in  front,  on  the  10th,  Sherman 
ordered  General  Thomas  to  send  Hooker's  twentieth  corps 
over  to  McPherson,  and  to  follow  with  Palmer's  fourteenth 
corps,  and  Schofield  was  directed  to  march  by  the  same  route. 
On  the  12th,  the  whole  army,  except  Howard's  corps,  moved 
through  Snake's  Creek  Gap  on  Eesaca ; — McPherson,  in  ad 
vance,  by  the  direct  road,  preceded  by  Kilpatrick's  division  of 
cavalry ;  Thomas  to  the  left,  and  Schofield  to  the  right. 

General  Kilpatrick,  with  his  division,  led,  and  drove  Wheel 
er's  division  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  from  a  cross-road  to  within 
two  miles  of  Eesaca,  but  received  a  wound  which  disabled 
him,  and  gave  the  command  of  his  brigade  to  Colonel  Murray, 
who,,  according  to  his  orders,  wheeled  out  of  the  road,  leaving 
General  McPherson  to  pass.  General  McPherson  struck  the 
enemy's  infantry  pickets  near  Eesaca,  and  drove  them  within 
their  fortified  lines,  and  occupied  a  ridge  of  bald  hills,  his 
light  on  the  Oostanaula,  about  two  miles  below  the  railway 
bridge,  and  his  left  abreast  the  town.  General  Thomas  came 
up  on  his  left,  facing  Camp  Creek.  General  Schofield  broke 
his  way  through  the  dense  forest  to  General  Thomas'  left. 
Johnston  had  left  Dalton  on  the  night  of  the  12th  and  morn 
ing  of  the  13th,  and  General  Howard  entered  it  and  pressed 
his  rear.  Eocky  Face  Mountain  and  the  southern  extremity 
of  Snake  Creek  Gap  had  effectually  concealed  the  flank 
movement  of  the  Union  army,  and  nothing  saved  Johnston's 
army  at  Eesaca  but  the  impracticable  nature  of  the  country, 
which  made  the  passage  of  troops  across  the  valley  almost 
impossible.  This  enabled  him  to  reach  Eesaca  from  Dal- 


OPERATIONS  AROUND RESACA 

Preared  l.v  Bi-vt.  Bri    C.pni  (>   M  IV-. 


/I 


BEYOND  THE  MOUNTAINS.  135 

ton  along  the  comparatively  good  roads  constructed  before 
hand,  by  his  own  foresight.  On  the  14th  of  May,  the  whole 
rebel  army  was  met  in  a  strong  position  behind  Camp 
Creek,  occupying  the  forts  at  Eesaca,  the  right  on  some 
high  hills  to  the  north  of  the  town.  Sherman  at  once  ordered 
a  pontoon  bridge  to  be  laid  across  the  Oostanaula  at  Lay's 
Ferry,  in  the  direction  of  Calhoun ;  Sweeney's  division  of  the 
Sixteenth  Corps,  to  cross  and  threaten  Calhoun,  and  Garrard's 
cavalry  division  to  move  from  its  position  at  Yillanow  towards 
Eome,  cross  the  Oostanaula,  and  break  the  railway  below 
Calhoun  and  above  Kingston,  if  possible,  while  the  main  army 
pressed  against  Eesaca  at  all  points.  General  McPherson  got 
across  Camp  Creek  near  its  mouth,  and  made  a  lodgment 
close  up  to  the  enemy's  works,  driving  Folk's  corps  from  the 
hills  that  commanded  the  railroad  and  trestle  bridges  ;  and 
General  Thomas  pressing  close  along  Camp  Creek  Yalley, 
threw  Hooker's  corps  across  the  head  of  the  creek  to  the  main 
Dalton  road,  and  down  it  close  to  Eesaca. 

General  Schofield  came  up  on  his  left,  and  a  heavy 
battle  ensued  during  the  afternoon  and  evening  of  the  15th, 
during  which  General  Hooker  drove  the  enemy  from  several 
strong  hills,  capturing  a  four-gun  battery  and  many  prisoners. 
That  night  Johnston  escaped,  retreating  south  across  the 
Oostanaula,  and  the  next  morning  Sherman  entered  the  town 
in  time  to  save  the  road  bridge,  but  not  the  railway  bridge, 
which  had  been  burned. 

The  whole  army  started  in  pursuit,  General  Thomas  directly 
on  the  heels  of  Hardee,  who  was  bringing  up  the  Confederate 
rear,  General  McPherson  by  Lay's  Ferry,  and  General  Scho 
field  by  blind  roads  to  the  left.  In  Eesaca  another  four-gun 
battery  and  a  considerable  quantity  of  stores  were  found. 

During  the  16th  the  whole  of  Sherman's  army  crossed  the 
Oostanaula,  and  on  the  17th  moved  south  by  as  many  different 
roads  as  practicable.  General  Thomas  had  sent  Jefferson 
C.  Davis'  division  along  the  west  bank  of  the  Oostanaula,  to 
Eome.  Near  Adairsville,  the  rear  of  the  rebel  army  was  again 
encountered,  and  about  sunset  of  that  day  General  Newton's 


186  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

division,  in  the  advance,  had  a  sharp  encounter  with  his  rear 
guard,  but  the  next  morning  he  was  gone,  and  the  Union  troops 
pushed  on  through  Kingston,  to  a  point  four  miles  beyond, 
where  they  found  the  enemy  again  formed  on  ground  compar 
atively  open,  and  well  adapted  for  a  great  battle.  General 
Schofield  approached  Cassville  from  the  north,  to  which  point 
General  Thomas  had  also  directed  General  Hooker's  corps, 
and  General  McPherson's  army  had  been  drawn  from  Wood 
land  to  Kingston  in.  order  to  be  in  close  support.  On  the  19th 
the  enemy  was  in  force  about  Cassville,  strongly  intrenched, 
but  as  our  troops  converged  on  him  again  he  retreated,  in  the 
night-time,  across  the  Etowah  River,  burning  the  road  and 
railway  bridges  near  Cartersville,  but  leaving  us  in  possession 
of  the  valuable  country  about  the  Etowah  River. 

That  morning  Johnston  had  ordered  Folk's  and  Hood's 
corps  to  advance  and  attack  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  General 
Palmer's,  which  had  followed  them  from  Adairsville,  but 
Hood,  who  led  the  advance,  being  deceived  by  a  report  that 
the  union  troops  had  turned  his  right,  delayed  until  the  op 
portunity  was  lost.  On  the  night  of  the  19th,  the  Confed 
erate  army  held  a  commanding  situation  on  a  ridge  before 
Cassville,  but  acting  upon  the  earnest  representations  of  Lieu 
tenant-Generals  Polk  and  Hardee,  that  their  positions  were 
untenable,  Johnston  crossed  the  Etowah  on  the  following 
morning. 

Holding  General  Thomas's  army  about  Cassville,  General 
McPherson's  about  Kingston,  and  General  Schofield  at  Cass- 
ville's  depot,  and  towards  the  Etowah  bridge,  Sherman  gave 
his  army  a  few  days'  rest,  and  time  to  bring  forward  supplies 
for  the  next  stage  of  the  campaign.  In  the  mean  time  General 
Jefferson  C.  Davis,  with  his  division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps, 
had  got  possession  of  Rome,  with  its  forts,  eight  or  ten  guns 
of  heavy  calibre,  and  its  valuable  mills  and  foundries.  Two 
good  bridges  were  also  secured  across  the  Etowah  River  near 
Kingston.  Satisfied  that  the  enemy  would  hold  him  in  check 
at  the  Allatoona  Pass,  Sherman  resolved,  without  even  at 
tempting  it  in  front,  to  turn  it  by  a  circuit  to  the  right,  and 


BEYOND  THE  MOUNTAINS.  187 

having  loaded  the  wagons  with  forage  and  subsistence  for 
twenty  days'  absence  from  the  railway,  left  a  garrison  at  Rome 
and  Kingston,  on  the  23d  put  the  army  in  motion  for  Dallas. 

General  McPherson  crossed  the  Etowah  at  the  mouth  of 
Conasene  Creek,  near  Kingston,  and  moved  for  his  position  to 
the  south  of  Dallas  by  way  of  Yan  Wert.  Davis'  division 
of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  moved  directly  from  Rome  for  Dallas 
by  Wan  "Wert.  General  Thomas  took  the  road  by  Euharlee 
and  Burnt  Hickory,  while  General  Schofield  moved  by  other 
roads  more  to  the  east,  aiming  to  come  up  on  Thomas'  left. 
The  head  of  Thomas'  column  skirmished  with  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  under  Jackson,  about  Burnt  Hickory,  and  captured  a 
courier  with  a  letter  of  General  Johnston,  showing  that  he  had 
detected  the  move,  and  was  preparing  to  take  a  stand  near 
Dallas.  The  country  was  very  rugged,  mountainous,  and 
densely  wooded,  with  few  and  obscure  roads. 

On  the  25th  May,  General  Thomas  was  moving  from  Burnt 
Hickory  for  Dallas,  his  troops  on  three  roads,  Hooker's  corps 
having  the  advance.  When  he  approached  the  Pumpkin  Vine 
Creek,  on  the  main  Dallas  road,  he  found  Jackson's  division 
of  the  enemy's  cavalry  at  the  bridge  to  his  left.  Rapidly 
pushing  across  the  creek,  he  saved  the  bridge,  though  on 
fire,  and  following  eastward  about  two  miles,  encountered 
and  drove  the  infantry  some  distance,  until  he  met  Hood's 
corps  in  line  of  battle,  and  his  leading  division,  General 
Geary's,  had  a  severe  encounter.  Williams'  and  Ward's  (late 
Butterfield's)  divisions  of  Hooker's  corps,  were  on  other  roads, 
and  it  was  nearly  four  o'clock  p.  M.  before  General  Hooker 
got  his  whole  corps  well  in  hand,  when  he  deployed,  and, 
by  Sherman's  order,  made  a  bold  push  to  secure  possession 
of  New  Hope  Church,  where  three  roads  from  Ackworth,  Ma 
rietta,  and  Dallas  meet.  Here  a  hard  battle  with  Stewart's 
division  of  Hood's  corps  was  fought,  lasting  two  hours,  but 
the  enemy  being  covered  by  hastily  constructed  earthworks, 
and  a  stormy  dark  night  having  set  in,  General  Hooker  was 
unable  to  drive  him  from  these  roads.  The  next  morning 
General  McPherson  was  moved  up  to  Dallas,  General.  Thomas 


188  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

deployed  against  New  Hope  Church,  and  General  Schofield 
directed  towards  the  left,  so  as  to  strike  and  turn  the  enemy's 
right.  General  Garrard's  cavalry  operated  with  General  Mc- 
Pherson,  and  General  Stoneman's  with  General  Schofield. 
General  McCook  looked  to  the  rear.  Owing  to  the  difficult 
nature  of  the  ground  and  dense  forests,  it  took  several  days 
to  deploy  close  to  the  enemy,  when  Sherman  resolved  gradu 
ally  to  work  towards  our  left,  and  as  soon  as  all  things  should 
be  ready  to  push  for  the  railway  east  of  Allatooiia.  In  making 
the  development  before  the  enemy  about  New  Hope,  many 
severe  encounters  occurred  between  parts  of  the  army.  On 
the  28th,  General  McPherson  was  on  the  point  of  closing 
to  his  left  on  General  Thomas,  in  front  of  New  Hope  Church, 
to  enable  the  rest  of  the  army  to  extend  still  more  to  the  left, 
and  to  envelop  the  enemy's  right,  when  suddenly  the  enemy 
made  a  bold  and  daring  assault  on  him  at  Dallas.  Fortu 
nately  our  men  had  erected  good  breastworks,  and  gave  the 
enemy  a  terrible  and  bloody  repulse.  After  a  few  days'  delay, 
for  effect,  Sherman  renewed  his  orders  to  General  McPherson, 
to  move  to  the  left  about  five  miles,  and  occupy  General 
Thomas'  position  in  front  of  New  Hope  Church,  and  directed 
Generals  Thomas  and  Schofield  to  move  a  corresponding  dis 
tance  to  their  left.  This  was  effected  without  resistance  on 
the  1st  of  June,  and  by  pushing  the  left  well  around,  all  the 
roads  leading  back  to  Allatoona  and  Ackworth  were  occupied, 
after  which  Sherman  sent  General  Stoneman's  cavalry  rapidly 
into  Allatoona,  at  the  east  end  of  the  Pass,  and  General*  Gar 
rard's  cavalry  around  by  the  rear  to  the  west  end  of  the  Pass. 
This  was  accomplished,  Allatoona  Pass  was  turned,  and  Sher 
man's  real  object  gained. 

Ordering  the  railway  bridge  across  the  Etowah  to  be  at 
once  rebuilt,  Sherman  continued  working  by  the  left,  and  by 
the  4th  of  June  had  resolved  to  leave  Johnston  in  his  in 
trenched  position  at  New  Hope  Church,  and  move  to  the  rail 
way  about  Ackworth,  when  the  latter  abandoned  his  intrench- 
ments,  and  fell  back  to  Lost  Mountain.  The  Union  army 
then  moved  to  Ackworth  and  reached  the  railway  on  the  6th. 


BEYOND   THE   MOUNTAINS.  189 

On  the  7th  the  Confederate  right  was  extended  beyond  the 
railway,  and  across  the  Ackworth  and  Marietta  road.  On  ex 
amining  the  Allatoona  Pass,  Sherman  found  it  admirably 
adapted  for  use  as  a  secondary  base,  and  gave  the  necessary 
orders  for  its  defence  and  garrison.  As  soon  as  the  railway 
bridge  was  finished  across  the  Etowah,  stores  came  forward  to 
camp  by  rail.  At  Ackworth,  General  Blair  came  up  on  the  8th 
of  June  with  two  divisions  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps,  that  had 
been  on  furlough,  and  one  brigade  of  cavalry,  Colonel  Long's, 
of  General  Garrard's  division,  which  had  been  awaiting  horses 
at  Columbia.  This  accession  of  force  nearly  compensated  for 
the  losses  in  battle,  and  the  detachments  left  at  Resaca,  Rome, 
Kingston,  and  Allatoona. 


190  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

ACEOSS   THE   CHATTAHOOCHEE. 

ON  the  9th  of  June,  his  communication  in  the  rear  being 
secure  and  supplies  ample,  Sherman  moved  forward  to  Big 
Shanty. 

Kenesaw  Mountain  lay  before  him,  with  a  high  range  of 
hills,  covered  with  chestnut-trees,  trending  off  to  the  north 
east,  terminating  in  another  peak,  called  Brushy  Mountain. 
To  the  right  was  a  smaller  hill,  called  Pine  Mountain,  and 
beyond  it,  in  the  distance,  Lost  Mountain.  All  these,  though 
links  in  a  continuous  chain,  present  a  sharp,  conical  appear 
ance,  prominent  in  the  vast  landscape  that  presents  itself  from 
any  of  the  hills  that  abound  in  that  region.  Pine  Mountain 
forms  the  apex,  and  Kenesaw  and  Lost  Mountains  the  base 
of  a  triangle,  perfectly  covering  the  town  of  Marietta  and  the 
railway,  back  to  the  Chattahoochee.  On  each  of  these  peaks 
the  enemy  had  his  signal-stations.  Hardee's  corps  held  the 
left  of  the  enemy's  line,  resting  on  Lost  Mountain,  Polk's  the 
centre,  and  Hood's  the  right,  across  the  Marietta  and  Ackworth 
road.  The  enemy's  line  was  fully  two  miles  long — more  than 
he  had  force  to  hold.  General  McPherson  was  ordered  to 
move  towards  Marietta,  his  right  on  the  railroad ;  General 
Thomas  on  Kenesaw  and  Pine  Mountains,  and  General 
Schofield  off  towards  Lost  Mountain  :  General  Garrard's  cav 
alry  on  the  left,  General  Stoneman's  on  the  right ;  and  General 
McCook  looking  to  the  rear  and  communications.  The  depot 
was  at  Big  Shanty. 

By  the  llth  of  June  Sherman's  lines  were  close  up,  and  he 
made  dispositions  to  break  the  enemy's  line  between  Kenesaw 


ACROSS   THE   CHATTAHOOCHEE.  191 

and  Pine  Mountains.  General  Hooker  was  on  its  right  and 
front,  General  Howard  on  its  left  and  front,  and  General 
Palmer  between  it  and  the  railroad.  During  a  sharp  can 
nonading  from  General  Howard's  right  and  General  Hooker's 
left,  Lieutenant-General  Polk,  of  the  Confederate  army,  was 
killed  on  the  14th,  and  Major-General  Lovell  succeeded  to  the 
command  of  his  corps.  On  the  morning  of  the  15th  Pine 
Mountain  was  found  abandoned  by  the  enemy.  Generals 
Thomas  and  Schofield  advanced,  and  found  him  again  strongly 
intrenched  along  the  line  of  rugged  hills  connecting  Kenesaw 
and  Lost  Mountains.  At  the  same  time  General  McPherson 
advanced  his  line,,  gaining  substantial  advantage  on  the  left. 
Pushing  the  operations  on  the  centre  as  vigorously  as  the 
nature  of  the  ground  would  permit,  Sherman  had  again  or 
dered  an  assault  on  the  centre,  when,  on  the  17th,  the  enemy 
abandoned  Lost  Mountain,  and  the  long  line  of  breastworks 
connecting  it  with  Kenesaw.  Our  troops  continued  to  press 
at  all  points,  skirmishing  in  dense  forests  of  timber,  and  across 
most  difficult  ravines,  until,  on  the  19th,  they  found  him  again 
strongly  posted  and  intrenched,  his  right  wing,  composed  of 
Hood's  corps,  thrown  back  to  cover  Marietta,  resting  on  the 
Marietta  and  Canton  road ;  the  centre  on  Kenesaw  Mountain, 
held  by  Loring's  corps ;  and  the  left,  Hardee's  corps,  across 
the  Lost  Mountain  and  Marietta  road,  behind  Nose's  Creek, 
and  covering  the  railroad  back  to  the  Chattahoochee. 

From  Kenesaw  the  enemy  could  look  down  upon  the  Union 
camps,  and  observe  every  movement,  and  his  batteries  thun 
dered  away,  but  did  little  harm,  on  account  of  the  extreme 
height,  the  shot  and  shell  passing  harmlessly  over  the  heads  of 
the  men.  During  the  operations  about  Kenesaw  the  rain  fell 
almost  continuously  for  three  weeks,  rendering  the  narrow 
wooded  roads  mere  mud  gulleys,  so  that  a  general  movement 
would  have  been  impossible  ;  but  the  men  daily  worked  closer 
to  their  intrenched  foe,  and  kept  up  an  incessant  picket  firing 
to  annoy  him. 

General   McPherson   was   watching  the  enemy  on  Kene 
saw  and  working  his   left  forward;   General  Thomas  swing- 


192  SHERMAN   AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

ing,  as  it  were,  on  a  grand  left  wheel,  his  left  on  Kene- 
saw  connecting  with  General  McPherson ;  and  General  Scho- 
field  all  the  time  working  to  the  south  and  east,  along  the  old 
Sandtown  road.  On  the  21st,  Hood's  corps  was  moved  to  the 
left  of  the  Confederate  lines,  and  his  former  position  on  the 
right  filled  by  Wheeler's  cavalry.  On  the  22d,  General 
Hooker  had  advanced  his  line,  with  General  Schofield  on  his 
right,  when  Hindman's  and  Stevenson's  divisions  of  Hood's 
corps  suddenly  sallied  forth,  attacked  Williams'  division  of 
Hooker's  corps  and  a  brigade  of  Hascall's  division  of  General 
Schofield's  army,  and  drove  in  their  skirmish  lines,  but  on  reach 
ing  the  line  of  battle  received  a  terrible  repulse  and  fell  back, 
leaving  dead,  wounded,  and  many  prisoners  in  our  hands. 
Upon  studying  the  ground,  Sherman  now  considered  that  he 
had  no  alternative  but  to  assault  the  enemy's  lines  or  turn  his 
position.  Either  course  had  its  difficulties  and  dangers  ;  and 
he  perceived  that  the  enemy,  as  well  as  his  own  officers,  had 
settled  down  into  a  conviction  that  he  would  not  assault  forti 
fied  lines.  All  expected  him  to  "  outflank."  An  army,  to  be 
efficient,  must  not  settle  down  to  one  single  mode  of  offence,  but 
must  be  prepared  to  execute  any  plan  which  promises  success. 
Desiring,  therefore,  for  the  moral  effect,  to  make  a  successful 
assault  against  the  enemy  behind  breastworks,  Sherman  re 
solved  to  attempt  it  on  the  left  centre ;  reflecting  that  if  he 
could  thrust  a  strong  head  of  column  through  at  that  point, 
by  pushing  it  boldly  and  rapidly  two  and  a  half  miles,  it 
would  reach  the  railway  below  Marietta,  cut  off  the  enemy's 
right  and  centre  from  its  line  of  retreat,  and  then,  by  turning 
on  either  fragment,  that  fraction  could  be  overwhelmed  and 
destroyed.  On  the  24th  of  June,  he  ordered  that  an  assault 
should  be  made  at  two  points  south  of  Kenesaw  on  the  27th, 
one  near  Little  Kenesaw  by  McPherson,  and  the  other  about 
a  mile  further  south  by  Thomas.  On  the  27th  of  June,  the 
two  assaults  were  made  exactly  at  the  time  and  in  the  man 
ner  prescribed  in  Sherman's  orders,  and  both  failed,  costing 
us  many  valuable  lives,  among  them  those  of  Generals  Harker 
and  McCook — Colonel  Rice,  and  others  badly  wounded ;  our 


ACROSS   THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE.  193 

aggregate  loss  being  nearly  three  thousand,  while  we  inflicted 
comparatively  little  loss  to  the  enemy,  behind  his  well-formed 
breastworks.  The  losses  in  Hardee's  and  Loring's  corps,  by 
which  the  brunt  of  the  assault  was  sustained,  are  reported  by 
General  Johnston  at  about  five  hundred  and  forty.  In  his 
official  report,  Sherman  says  :  "  Failure  as  it  was,  and  for 
which  I  assume  the  entire  responsibility,  I  yet  claim  it  pro 
duced  good  fruits,  as  it  demonstrated  to  General  Johnston 
that  I  would  assault,  and  that  boldly ;  and  we  also  gained  and 
held  ground  so  close  to  the  enemy's  parapets  that  he  could 
not  show  a  head  above  them." 

On  the  1st  of  July,  Sherman  ordered  General  McPherson  to 
be  relieved  by  General  Garrard's  cavalry  in  front  of  Kenesaw, 
and  rapidly  to  throw  his  whole  army  by  the  right  to  threaten 
Nickajack  Creek  and  Turner's  Ferry  across  the  Chattahoochee  ; 
and  he  also  pushed  Stoneman's  cavalry  to  the  river  below 
Turner's.  General  McPherson  commenced  his  movement  on 
the  night  of  July  2d,  and,  at  the  same  moment,  Johnston,  finding 
his  left  turned,  and  in  danger  of  being  cut  off  from  Atlanta, 
abandoned  his  strong  position  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  and  fell 
back  to  Smyrna  Church,  five  miles  from  Marietta.  The  next 
morning  General  Thomas'  whole  line  was  moved  forward  to 
the  railway,  and  turned  south  in  pursuit  towards  the  Chatta 
hoochee.  General  Logan's  corps,  of  General  McPherson's 
army,  was  ordered  back  into  Marietta  by  the  main  road,  and 
General  McPherson  and  General  Schofield  were  instructed  to 
cross  Nickajack  and  attack  the  enemy  in  flank  and  rear,  and, 
if  possible,  to  catch  him  in  the  confusion  of  crossing  the 
Chattahoochee  ;  but  Johnston  had  covered  his  movement  too 
well,  by  a  strong  tete-du-pont  at  the  Chattahoochee  and  an  ad 
vanced  intrenched  line  across  the  road  at  Smyrna  Church,  to 
admit  of  this. 

Leaving  a  garrison  in  Marietta,  and  ordering  General  Logan 
to  join  his  own  army  near  the  mouth  of  Nickajack,  Sherman 
overtook  General  Thomas  at  Smyrna.  On  the  4th  of  July, 
Thomas  pushed  a  strong  skirmish  line  down  the  main  road, 
capturing  the  entire  line  of  the  enemy's  pits,  and  made  strong 

13 


194:  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

demonstrations  along  Nickajack  Creek  and  about  Turner's 
Ferry.  This  had  the  desired  effect,  and  during  the  night 
Johnston  feh1  back  to  the  Chattahoochee,  covering  the  cross 
ings  from  Turner's  Ferry  to  the  railway  bridge,  and  sending 
Wheeler's  and  Jackson's  cavalry  to  the  left  bank  to  observe 
the  river  for  twenty  miles  above  and  below.  The  next  morn 
ing,  Sherman  advanced  to  the  Chattahoochee,  General  Thomas' 
left  flank  resting  on  it  near  Price's  Ferry,  General  McPherson's 
right  at  the  mouth  of  the  Nickajack,  and  General  Schofield  in 
reserve.  Heavy  skirmishing  along  the  whole  front,  during  the 
5th,  demonstrated  the  strength  of  the  enemy's  position,  which 
could  alone  be  turned  by  crossing  the  main  Chattahoochee 
River,  a  rapid  and  deep  stream,  only  passable  at  that  stage 
of  water  by  means  of  bridges,  except  at  one  or  two  very 
difficult  fords. 

Conceiving  that  this  would  be  more  easy  of  execution  be 
fore  the  enemy  had  made  more  thorough  preparation  or  re 
gained  full  confidence,  Sherman  ordered  General  Schofield  to 
cross  from  his  position  on  the  Sandtown  Toad  to  Smyrna 
camp  ground,  and  next  to  the  Chattahoochee,  near  the  mouth 
of  Soap's  Creek,  and  effect  a  lodgment  on  the  east  bank. 
This  was  most  successfully  and  skilfully  accomplished  on  the 
7th  of  July,  General  Schofield  capturing  a  gun,  completely 
surprising  the  guard,  laying  a  good  pontoon  bridge  and  a 
trestle  bridge,  and  effecting  a  strong  lodgment  on  high  and 
commanding  ground,  with  good  roads  leading  to  the  east.  At 
the  same  time,  General  Garrard,  with  his  cavalry  division, 
moved  rapidly  on  Eoswell,  and  destroyed  the  cloth  factories 
which  had  supplied  the  rebel  armies.  General  Garrard  was 
then  ordered  to  secure  the  shallow  ford  at  Roswell,  and  hold 
it  until  he  could  be  relieved  by  infantry  ;  and,  as  Sherman  con 
templated  transferring  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  from  the 
extreme  right  to  the  left,  he  ordered  General  Thomas  to  send 
a  division  of  his  infantry  that  was  nearest  to  Roswell  to  hold 
the  ford  until  General  McPhe^son  could  send  a  corps  from  the 
neighborhood  of  Nickajack.  General  Newton's  division  was 
sent,  and  held  the  ford  until  the  arrival  of  General  Dodge's 


THE  ATLANTA  CAMPAIGN 

furnished  .b 

Brevet  Bri^.G 

Clue'f   Ens^inee 


'or    Sht'/'t/uiti  suit/  /i is  Gaanpazqng 


ACROSS  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE.  195 

corps,  which  was  soon  followed  by  the  remainder  of  General 
McPherson's  army.  General  Howard  had  also  built  a  bridge 
at  Powers'  Ferry,  two  miles  below  General  Schofield,  and  had 
crossed  over  and  taken  position  on  his  right.  Thus,  during  the 
9th,  we  had  secured  three  good  and  safe  points  of  passage  over 
the  Chattahoochee  above  the  enemy,  with  good  roads  leading 
to  Atlanta.  Learning  these  facts,  Johnston  crossed  the  river  on 
the  night  of  the  9th,  and  burned  the  bridges  in  his  rear  ;  and 
thus,  on  the  morning  of  the  10th,  Sherman's  army  held  undis 
puted  possession  of  the  right  bank  of  the  Chattahoochee ;  one 
of  the  chief  objects  of  his  campaign  was  gained ;  and  Atlanta 
lay  before  him,  only  eight  miles  distant.  It  was  too  impor 
tant  a  place  in  the  hands  of  an  enemy  to  be  left  undisturbed 
with  its  magazines,  stores,  arsenals,  workshops,  foundries,  and 
converging  railways.  But  the  men  had  worked  hard  and 
needed  rest. 

In  anticipation  of  this  contingency,  Sherman  had  collected 
a  well-appointed  force  of  cavalry,  about  two  thousand  strong, 
at  Decatur,  Alabama,  with  orders,  on  receiving  notice  by 
telegraph,  to  push  rapidly  south,  cross  the  Coosa  at  the 
railroad  bridge  or  the  Ten  Islands,  and  thence  by  the  most 
direct  route  to  Opelika,  for  the  purpose  of  breaking  up  the  only 
finished  railway  connecting  the  channels  of  trade  and  travel 
between  Georgia,  Alabama,  and  Mississippi,  running  from 
Montgomery  to  Opelika,  and  thereby  to  cut  off  Johnston's 
army  from  an  important  source  of  supply  and  re-enforcement. 
Major-General  Lovell  H.  Rousseau,  commanding  the  district 
of  Tennessee,  had  asked  and  received  permission  to  command 
the  expedition.  As  soon  as  Johnston  was  well  across  the 
Chattahoochee,  and  Sherman  had  begun  to  manoeuvre  on  At 
lanta,  the  requisite  notice  was  given.  General  Rousseau  started 
punctually  on  the  10th  of  July,  fulfilled  his  orders  and  instruc 
tions  to  the  very  letter,  passed  through  Talladega,  reached  the 
railway  on  the  16th,  about  twenty-five  miles  west  of  Opelika, 
and  effectually  broke  it  up  to  that  place,  as  well  as  three  miles 
of  the  branch  towards  Columbus,  and  two  miles  towards 
West  Point.  He  then  turned  north,  and,  on  the  22d,  joined 


196  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

Sherman  at  Marietta,  haying  sustained  a  loss  of  about  thirty 
men. 

The  interval  to  the  16th  of  July,  was  employed  in  collecting 
stores  at  Allatoona,  Marietta,  and  Vining's  Station,  strengthen 
ing  the  railway  guards  and  garrisons,  and  in  improving  the 
pier  bridges  and  roads  leading  across  the  river.  Generals 
Stoneman's  and  McCook's  cavalry  had  scouted  well  down 
the  river  to  draw  attention  in  that  direction,  and  all  things 
being  ready  for  a  general  advance,  on  the  17th,  Sherman 
ordered  it  to  commence.  General  Thomas  was  to  cross  at 
Powers'  and  Price's  ferry  bridges,  and  march  by  Buckhead ; 
Schofield,  who,  as  has  been  seen,  was  already  across  at 
the  mouth  of  Soap's  Creek,  to  march  by  Cross  Keys ;  and 
General  McPherson  to  direct  his  course  from  Eoswell  di 
rectly  against  the  Augusta  road  at  some  point  east  of  Deca- 
tur,  near  Stone  Mountain.  General  Garrard's  cavalry  acted 
with  General  McPherson,  and  Generals  Stoneman  and  Mc- 
Cook  watched  the  river  and  roads  below  the  railway.  On  the 
17th  the  whole  army  advanced  from  their  camps,  and  formed 
a  general  line  along  the  old  Peach-tree  road. 

The  same  day,  Jefferson  Davis  relieved  General  Johnston 
from  the  command  of  the  Confederate  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
and  designated  Lieutenant-General  J.  B.  Hood  as  his  succes 
sor.  The  telegram  from  General  Samuel  Cooper,  adjutant- 
general  of  the  Confederate  army,  communicating  this  order 
assigned  as  a  reason  for  it  that  Johnston  had  failed  to  arrest 
the  advance  of  the  Union  army  to  the  vicinity  of  Atlanta,  and 
expressed  no  confidence  that  he  could  defeat  it.  From  the 
moment  that  stiffly  bending  to  the  pressure  of  public  opinion, 
unmistakably  uttered  through  the  lips  of  the  rebel  Congress, 
Jefferson  Davis  had,  against  his  will,  restored  General  John 
ston  to  command  in  the  west,  that  wrong-headed  man,  ever 
warped  by  his  private  griefs  to  the  injury  of  his  own  cause, 
had  sullenly  refrained  from  giving  to  his  subordinate  any  as 
sistance  whatever,  had  spent  the  time  for  action  in  cavilling  at 
details,  had  withheld  the  troops  needed  to  render  either  offence 
or  defence  successful,  and  had  left  Johnston  in  entire  igno- 


ACROSS    THE   CHATTAHOOCHEE.  197 

ranee  as  to  the  approval  or  condemnation  of  his  plans  until 
their  consummation  afforded  the  hungrily  watched  chance  for 
his  disgrace.  With  an  army  less  than  half  the  size  of  Sher 
man's,  a  victory  by  Johnston  on  the  banks  of  the  Tennessee, 
by  no  means  probable  would  even  if  possible,  have  proved  in 
decisive  ;  while  defeat,  which  he  ought  to  have  regarded  as 
certain,  would  have  been  his  utter  destruction.  Falling  back 
successively  to  the  strong  mountain  positions  at  Kesaca,  Alla- 
toona,  Ackworth,  and  Kenesaw,  and  in  turn  interposing  be 
tween  himself  and  the  Union  army  three  large  rivers,  the 
Oostanaula,  Etowah,  and  Chattahoochee,  Johnston  had  forced 
Sherman  to  consume  seventy-two  days  in  passing  over  the 
hundred  miles  that  measured  the  distance  between  Einggold 
and  Atlanta,  and  there,  behind  secure  fortifications,  with  an 
army  larger  than  at  the  start,  was  preparing  to  attack  the 
Union  army,  largely  reduced  by  losses,  by  detachments,  and 
by  expiration  of  enlistments,  in  a  position  south  of  all  the 
barriers  it  had  passed,  where  a  defeat  would  be  so  far  decisive 
for  Sherman  as  to  cost  him  ah1  the  fruits  already  gained  and 
months  of  delay,  but  indecisive  for  the  Confederates,  who  could 
retire  behind  their  works,  too  strong  for  assault  and  too  exten 
sive  for  investment.  At  this  crisis  of  the  campaign,  Johnston, 
prudent,  wary,  and  exhaustive  in  his  plans,  brave  and  skilful 
in  their  execution,  was  displaced  by  a  successor,  brave  indeed 
but  also  rash,  capable  of  fighting,  but  incompetent  to  direct. 
The  Confederate  tactics  changed  at  once  and  the  battle  which 
Johnston,  at  the  very  moment  he  was  relieved,  was  about  to 
deliver  upon  the  decisive  point  with  thorough  preparation  was 
delivered  by  Hood,  upon  the  first  point  that  presented  itself, 
with  rash  impetuosity. 

The  Confederate  army,  numbering  forty-one  thousand  infan 
try  and  artillery  and  ten  thousand  cavalry,  was  now  strongly 
posted,  about  four  miles  in  front  of  Atlanta,  on  the  hills 
which  form  the  south  bank  of  the  broad  channel  known  as 
Peach-tree  Creek,  holding  the  line  of  that  stream  and  the 
Chattahoochee  for  some  distance  below  the  mouth  of  the 
creek. 


198  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

On  the  18th,  continuing  on  a  general  right  wheel,  General 
McPherson  reached  the  Augusta  railway,  at  a  point  seven 
miles  east  of  Decatur,  and  with  General  Garrard's  cavalry  and 
General  Morgan  L.  Smith's  division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps, 
broke  up  a  section  of  about  four  miles.  General  Schofield 
reached  the  town  of  Decatur  the  same  day. 

On  the  19th,  General  McPherson  turned  along  the  railway 
into  Decatur.  General  Schofield  followed  a  road  towards  At 
lanta,  leading  by  Colonel  Howard's  house  and  the  distillery, 
and  General  Thomas  crossed  Peach-tree  Creek  in  force  by  nu 
merous  bridges  in  the  face  of  the  enemy's  intrenched  lines.  All 
found  the  enemy  in  more  or  less  force  and  skirmished  heavily. 

On  the  20th,  all  the  armies  had  closed  in,  converging  towards 
Atlanta,  but  as  a  gap  existed  between  Generals  Schofield 
and  Thomas,  two  divisions  of  General  Howard's  corps  of 
General  Thomas'  army  were  moved  to  the  left  to  connect  with 
General  Schofield,  leaving  Newton's  division  of  the  same  corps 
on  the  Buckhead  road.  During  the  afternoon  of  the  20th, 
about  4  P.  M.,  the  enemy  sallied  from  his  works  in  force,  and 
fell  in  line  of  battle  against  Sherman's  right  centre,  composed 
of  Newton's  division  of  Howard's  corps,  on  the  main  Buck- 
head  road,  of  Hooker's  corps,  next  towards  the  south,  and 
Johnson's  division  of  Palmer's  corps.  The  blow  was  sudden 
and  somewhat  unexpected,  but  General  Newton  had  hastily 
covered  his  front  by  a  line  of  rail-piles,  which  enabled  him  to 
meet  and  repulse  the  attack  on  him.  General  Hooker's  corps, 
although  uncovered,  and  compelled  to  fight  on  comparatively 
open  ground,  after  a  very  severe  battle,  drove  the  enemy  back 
to  his  intrenchments.  The  action  in  front  of  Johnston's  divi 
sion  was  comparatively  light,  as  the  position  was  well  intrench 
ed.  Sherman's  entire  loss  was  about  fifteen  hundred  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing, — chiefly  in  Hooker's  corps,  by  reason  of 
its  exposed  condition. 

On  the  morning  of  the  22d,  to  his  surprise,  Sherman  discov 
ered  that  the  Confederate  army  had,  during  the  succeeding 
night,  abandoned  the  line  of  Peach-tree  Creek,  where  he 
should  have  interposed  an  obstinate  resistance,  and  fallen  back 


ACROSS    THE    CHATTAHOOCHEE.  199 

to  a  strong  line  of  redoubts,  forming  the  immediate  defences 
of  Atlanta,  and  covering  all  the  approaches  to  that  town. 
These  works  had  been  long  since  prepared,  and  the  enemy 
was  now  engaged  in  connecting  the  redoubts  with  curtains 
strengthened  by  rifle-trenches,  abattis,  and  chevaux-de-frise. 
The  whole  of  Sherman's  army  crossed  Peach-tree  Creek  and 
closed  in  upon  Atlanta, — McPherson  on  the  left,  Schofield  next, 
and  Thomas  on  the  right. 

General  McPherson,  who  had  advanced  from  Decatur,  con 
tinued  to  follow  substantially  the  Augusta  railway,  with  the 
Fifteenth  Corps,  General  Logan,  and  Seventeenth,  General 
Blair,  on  its  left,  and  the  Sixteenth,  General  Dodge,  on  its 
right ;  but  as  the  general  advance  of  all  the  armies  contracted 
the  circle,  the  Sixteenth  Corps  was  thrown  out  of  line  by  the 
Fifteenth  connecting  on  the  right  with  General  Schofield  near 
the  Howard  •  House.  General  McPherson,  the  night  before, 
had  gained  a  high  hill  to  the  south  and  east  of  the  railway, 
where  the  Seventeenth  Corps  had,  after  a  severe  fight,  driven 
the  enemy,  and  it  gave  him  a  most  commanding  position 
within  view  of  the  very  heart  of  the  city.  He  had  thrown  out 
working  parties  to  it,  and  was  making  preparations  to  occupy 
it  in  strength  with  batteries.  The  Sixteenth  Corps,  General 
Dodge,  was  ordered  from  right  to  left  to  occupy  this  position 
and  make  it  a  strong  general  left  flank.  General  Dodge  was 
moving  by  a  diagonal  path  or  wagon-track  leading  from  the 
Decatur  road  in  the  direction  of  General  Blair's  left  flank. 

About  noon  Hood  attacked  boldly.  At  the  first  indications 
of  a  movement,  on  his  flank,  General  McPherson  parted  from 
General  Sherman,  with  whom  he  was  engaged  in  discussing  the 
state  of  affairs  and  the  plans  for  the  future,  and  with  his  staff 
rode  off  to  direct  matters  on  the  field.  In  a  few  moments,  the 
sounds  of  musketry  to  McPherson's  left  and  rear,  growing  in 
volume  and  presently  accompanied  by  artillery,  indicated  to 
Sherman  Hood's  purpose  of  throwing  a  superior  force  against 
his  left,  while  his  front  would  be  checked  by  the  fortifications 
of  Atlanta  ;  and  orders  were  accordingly  at  once  dispatched 
to  the  centre  and  right  to  press  forward  and  give  full  employ- 


200  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

ment  to  all  the  enemy  in  his  lines,  and  for  General  Schofield 
to  hold  as  large  a  force  in  reserve  as  possible,  awaiting  devel 
opments.  About  half-past  twelve  o'clock,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
William  T.  Clark,  assistant-adjutant-general,  rode  up  and 
communicated  to  General  Sherman  the  appalling  intelligence 
that  General  McPherson  was  either  dead  or  a  prisoner,  that 
he  had  ridden  to  General  Dodge's  column,  which  was  then 
moving  as  heretofore  described,  and  had  sent  off  nearly  all  his 
staff:'  and  orderlies  on  various  errands,  and  himself  had  passed 
into  a  narrow  path  or  road  that  led  to  the  left  and  rear  of 
General  Giles  A.  Smith's  division,  which  was  General  Blair's 
extreme  left ;  that  a  few  minutes  after  he  had  entered  the 
woods  a  sharp  volley  was  heard  in  that  direction,  and  his  horse 
had  come  out  riderless  and  wounded  in  two  places.  There 
was  no  time  to  yield  to  the  grief  caused  by  this  terrible  calam 
ity.  Not  an  instant  was  to  be  lost.  Sherman  instantly  dis 
patched  a  staff-officer  to  General  Logan  to  tell  him  what  had 
happened  and  that  he  must  assume  command  of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee,  and  hold  stubbornly  the  ground  already  chosen, 
more  especially  the  hill  gained  by  General  Leggett  the  night 
before. 

Already  the  whole  line  was  engaged  in  battle.  Hardee's 
corps  had  sallied  from  Atlanta,  and,  by  a  wide  circuit  to  the 
east,  had  struck  General  Blair's  left  flank,  enveloped  it,  and 
had  swung  round  to  the  right  until  it  struck  General  Dodge  in 
motion.  General  Blair's  line  was  substantially  along  the  aban 
doned  line  of  rebel  trench,  but  it  was  fashioned  to  fight  out 
wards.  A  space  of  wooded  ground  of  near  half  a  mile  inter 
vened  between  the  head  of  General  Dodge's  column  and 
General  Blair's  line,  through  which  the  enemy  had  poured. 
The  last  order  known  to  have  been  given  by  General  McPher 
son  was  to  hurry  Colonel  Wangelin's  brigade  of  the  Fifteenth 
Corps  across  from  the  railway  to  occupy  this  gap.  Oppor 
tunely,  it  came  on  the  double-quick  and  checked  the  enemy. 
While  Hardee  assailed  our  left  flank,  Lieutenant-General  A. 
P.  Stewart,  who  had  been  placed  in  command  of  Polk's  corps, 


ACROSS  THE   CHATTAHOOCHEE.  201 

on  the  7th,  was  intended  to  move  directly  out  from  his  main 
works  and  fall  upon  McPherson  in  front,  but  fortunately  both 
attacks  were  not  made  simultaneously.  The  enemy  swept 
across  the  hill  which  our  men  were  fortifying,  captured  the 
pioneer  company,  its  tools,  and  almost  the  entire  working 
party,  and  bore  down  on  our  left  until  he  encountered  General 
Giles  A.  Smith's  division  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps,  who  being 
somewhat  in  air,  was  forced  to  fig-lit  first  from  one  side  of  the 
old  rifle  parapet  and  then  from  the  other,  gradually  withdraw 
ing,  regiment  by  regiment,  so  as  to  form  a  flank  to  General 
Leggett's  division,  which  held  the  important  position  on  the 
apex  of  the  hill.  General  Dodge  received  and  held  in  check 
the  attack  of  Hardee's  corps,  and  punished  him  severely,  cap 
turing  many  prisoners.  General  Giles  A.  Smith  had  gradually 
given  up  the  extremity  of  his  line,  and  formed  a  new  one,  con 
nected  on  the  right  with  General  Leggett,  and  the  left  refused, 
facing  southeast.  On  this  ground  and  in  this  order  the  men 
fought  well  and  desperately  for  nearly  four  hours,  checking  and 
repulsing  all  the  enemy's  attacks.  The  execution  on  the  ene 
my's  ranks  at  the  angle  was  terrible,  and  great  credit  is  as 
cribed  by  Sherman  to  Generals  Leggett  and  Giles  A.  Smith 
and  their  men  for  their  hard  and  stubborn  fighting.  The 
enemy  made  no  further  progress  on  that  flank,  and  by  four 
p.  M.  had  almost  given  up  the  attempt.  In  the  mean  time, 
Garrard's  cavalry  division  having  been  sent  off  to  Covington, 
Wheeler,  with  his  Confederate  cavalry,  had  reached  Decatur 
and  attempted  to  capture  the  wagon  trains,  but  Colonel 
Sprague  covered  them  with  great  skill  and  success,  sending 
them  to  the  rear  of  Generals  Schofield  and  Thomas,  and  not 
drawing  back  from  Decatur  till  every  wagon  was  safe  except 
three,  which  were  abandoned  by  the  teamsters.  On  our  ex 
treme  left  the  enemy  had  taken  Murray's  regular  battery  of 
six  guns,  with  its  horses,  as  it  was  moving  along  unsupported 
and  unapprehensive  of  danger  in  a  narrow  wooded  road  in 
the  unguarded  space  between  the  head  of  General  Dodge's 
column  and  the  line  of  battle  on  the  ridge  above,  but  most  of 


202  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

the  men  escaped  to  the  bushes.  Hardee  also  captured  two 
other  guns  on  the  extreme  left  flank,  that  were  left  on  the 
ground  as  General  Giles  A.  Smith  drew  off  his  men.  About 
four  p.  M.  there  was  a  lull,  during  which  the  enemy  advanced 
on  the  railway  and  the  main  Decatur  road,  and  suddenly 
assailed  a  regiment  which,  with  a  section  of  guns,  had  been 
thrown  forward  as  a  picket,  moved  rapidly  forward,  and  broke 
through  our  lines  at  that  point.  The  force  on  this  part  of  the 
line  had  been  materially  weakened  by  the  withdrawal  of  Colonel 
Martin's  brigade,  sent  by  General  Logan's  orders  to  the  extreme 
left,  and  Lightburn's  brigade  fell  back  in  some  disorder  about 
four  hundred  yards,  to  a  position  held  by  it  the  night  before, 
leaving  the  enemy  for  a  time  in  possession  of  two  batteries, 
including  a  valuable  20-pounder  Parrott  battery  of  four  guns, 
and  separating  the  two  divisions  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps, 
which  were  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  railway.  Being  in  per 
son  close  by  the  spot,  and  appreciating  the  vast  importance 
of  the  connection  at  that  point,  Sherman  ordered  several  bat- 
,  teries  of  Schofield's  army  to  be  moved  to  a  position  command 
ing  the  interval  by  a  left-flank  fire,  and  ordered  an  incessant 
fire  of  shells  on  the  enemy  within  sight,  and  in  the  woods 
beyond  to  prevent  his  re-enforcing.  Orders  were  also  sent  to 
General  Logan  to  cause  the  Fifteenth  Corps  to  regain  its  lost 
ground  at  any  cost,  and  to  General  Woods,  supported  by 
General  Schofield,  to  use  his  division  and  sweep  the  parapet 
down  from  where  he  held  it  until  he  saved  the  batteries  and 
recovered  the  lost  ground.  With  soldierly  instinct,  Logan  had 
anticipated  these  orders,  and  was  already  in  motion.  The 
whole  was  executed  in  superb  style,  our  men  and  the  enemy 
at  times  fighting  across  the  narrow  parapet ;  but  at  last  the 
enemy  gave  way,  and  the  Fifteenth  Corps  regained  its  position 
and  all  the  guns  except  the  two  advanced  ones,  which  were 
out  of  view,  and  had  been  removed  by  the  enemy  within  his' 
main  work.  With  this  terminated  the  battle  of  the  22d, 
which  cost  us  3,722  officers  and  men  in  killed,  wounded,  and 
prisoners. 


ACROSS  THE  CHATTAHOOCHEE.  203 

But  among  the  dead  was  one  whose  loss  no  numbers  can 
fitly  represent.  The  accomplished,  the  brave,  the  noble  Mc- 
Pherson  had  fallen ! 

The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  had  lost  its  commander,  every 
man  in  its  ranks  a  friend,  America  a  great  soldier,  and 
humanity  a  bright  ornament. 


204  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 


CHAPTEE    XVII. 

ATLANTA  WON. 

ON  the  23d,  General  Garrard,  with  his  division  of  cavalry, 
returned  from  the  expedition  sent  to  Covington  to  break  up 
the  Augusta  railway,  and  reported  that,  with  the  loss  of  only 
two  men,  he  had  succeeded  in  accomplishing  that  object,  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  render  the  road  useless  to  the  enemy 
during  the  pending  operations,  having  effectually  destroyed 
the  large  bridges  across  the  Ulcofauhachee  and  Yellow  rivers, 
which  are  branches  of  the  Ocmulgee. 

The  Macon  railway,  running  at  first  almost  due  south,  was 
now  the  only  line  by  which  the  Confederate  army  in  Atlanta 
could  receive  the  supplies  requisite  to  maintain  the  defence  of 
the  place.  The  problem  before  Sherman  was  to  reach  that 
road.  Schofield  and  Thomas  had  closed  well  up,  holding  the 
enemy  behind  his  inner  intrenchments,  and  Logan,  with  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  temporarily  under  his  command,  was 
ordered  to  prepare  to  vacate  the  position  on  the  left  of  the 
line  and  move  by  the  right  to  the  opposite  flank,  below  Proc 
tor's  Creek,  while  General  Schofield  should  extend  up  to  and 
cover  the  Augusta  road.  General  Kousseau,  who  had  arrived 
from  his  expedition  to  Opelika,  bringing  about  two  thousand 
good  cavalry,  of  course  fatigued  with  its  long  and  rapid  march, 
was  ordered  to  relieve  General  Stoneman  in  the  duty  of  guard 
ing  the  river  near  Sandtown,  below  the  mouth  of  Utoy  Creek. 
Stoneman  was  then  transferred  to  the  extreme  left  of  the  line, 
and  placed  in  command  of  his  own  division  and  Garrard's, 
numbering  in  all  about  five  thousand  effective  troopers.  The 
new  cavalry  brought  by  General  Housseau,  and  which  was 


iVlllf 


THE  ATLANTA  CAMPAIGN 


-SIEGE  OF   ATLANTA 
A'/ff/reircf //(>/•     Mt<-rtt/ti/i  (i/ts/ ///.V  Cti 


ork.v 


ATLANTA  WON.  205 

commanded  by  Colonel  Harrison,  of  the  Eighth  Indiana 
Cavalry,  was  added  to  the  command  of  Brigadier-General 
Edward  M.  McCook,  making  with  it  a  division  of  about  four 
thousand. 

The  plan  now  was  that  while  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
should  move  by  the  right  on  East  Point  to  seize  the  Macon 
railway,  Stoneman  and  McCook,  with  their  well-appointed 
columns,  were  to  march  in  concert,  the  former  by  the  left 
around  Atlanta  to  McDonough,  and  the  latter  by  the  right  on 
Fayetteville,  and,  on  the  night  of  July  28th,  to  meet  on  the 
Macon  railway,  near  Lovejoy's,  and  destroy  the  road  in  the 
most  effectual  manner.  At  the  moment  almost  of  starting, 
General  Stoneman  addressed  a  note  to  General  Sherman, 
asking  permission,  after  fulfilling  his  orders  and  breaking  the 
railway,  to  proceed  with  his  command  proper  to  Macon  and 
Andersonville,  and  release  our  prisoners  of  war  confined  at  those 
points,  thirty  thousand  in  number,  suffering  the  extremities  of 
starvation,  and  rotting  by  hundreds  from  the  loathsome  dis 
eases  that  follow  in  its  train.  "  There  was  something  captiva 
ting  in  the  idea,"  says  Sherman,  and  deeming  the  execution 
within  the  bounds  of  probable  success,  he  consented  that  after 
the  defeat  of  Wheeler's  cavalry  and  breaking  the  road,  Gen 
eral  Stoneman  might  make  the  attempt  with  his  cavalry 
proper,  sending  that  of  General  Garrard  back  to  the  army. 
Both  cavalry  expeditions  started  at  the  time  appointed. 

General  McCook,  in  the  execution  of  his  part  of  the  move 
ment,  went  down  the  west  bank  of  the  Chattahoochee  to  near 
Bivertown,  where  he  laid  a  pontoon  bridge  with  which  he  was 
provided,  crossed  his  command,  and  moved  rapidly  on  Pal 
metto  station,  on  the  West  Point  railway,  where  he  tore  up  a 
section  of  track,  leaving  a  regiment  to  create  a  diversion  to 
wards  Campbelltown,  which  was  successfully  accomplished. 
McCook  then  rapidly  moved  to  Fayetteville,  where  he  found 
a  large  number  of  wagons  belonging  to  the  rebel  army  in 
Atlanta,  killed  eight  hundred  mules,  and  captured  two  hundred 
and  fifty  prisoners.  He  then  pushed  for  the  Macon  railway, 
reached  it  at  Lovejoy's  station  at  the  time  appointed,  burned 


206  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

the  depot,  tore  up  a  section  of  the  road,  and  continued  to  work 
until  forced  to  leave  off  to  defend  himself  against  an  accumula 
ting  force  of  the  enemy.  He  could  hear  nothing  of  General 
Stoneman,  and,  finding  his  progress  east  too  strongly  opposed, 
moved  south  and  west,  and  reached  Newman  on  the  West 
Point  road,  where  he  encountered  an  infantry  force  coming 
from  Mississippi  to  Atlanta,  and  which  had  been  stopped  by 
the  break  he  had  made  at  Palmetto.  This  force,  with  the 
pursuing  cavalry,  hemmed  him  in  and  forced  him  to  fight. 
He  was  compelled  to  drop  his  prisoners  and  captures  and  cut 
his  way  out,  losing  some  five  hundred  officers  and  men  ;  among 
them  Colonel  Harrison,  Eighth  Indiana  Cavalry,  a  valuable 
officer,  who  was  taken  prisoner  while  fighting  his  men-  as 
skirmishers  on  foot.  McCook  succeeded,  however,  in  cutting 
his  way  out,  reached  the  Chattahoochee,  crossed  the  river,  and 
got  to  Marietta  without  further  loss. 

Sherman  says  in  his  official  report : — 

"  General  McCook  is  entitled  to  much  credit  for  thus  saving 
his  command,  which  was  endangered  by  the  failure  of  General 
Stoneman  to  reach  Lovejoy's.  But  on  the  whole,  the  cavalry 
raid  is  not  deemed  a  success,  for  the  real  purpose  was  to 
break  the  enemy's  communications,  which,  though  done,  was 
on  so  limited  a  scale  that  I  knew  the  damage  would  soon  be 
repaired." 

Pursuant  to  the  general  plan,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
drew  out  of  its  lines  on  the  left,  near  the  Decatur  road,  during 
the  night  of  July  26th,  and  on  the  27th  moved  behind  the  rest 
of  the  army  to  Proctor's  Creek,  the  extreme  right  beyond  it,  to 
prolong  the  line  due  south,  facing  east.  On  the  same  day,  by 
appointment  of  the  President,  Major-General  Oliver  O. 
Howard  assumed  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
relieving  General  Logan,  who  had  exercised  the  command 
with  great  ability  since  the  death  of  McPherson  on  the  22d, 
and  who  now  returned  to  the  immediate  charge  of  his  own 
Fifteenth  Corps.  Dodge  got  into  line  on  the  evening  of  the 
27th,  and  Blair  came  into  position  on  the  right  early  on  the 
morning  of  the  28th,  his  right  reaching  an  old  meeting-house, 


ATLANTA  WON.  207 

called  Ezra  Church,  on  the  Bell's  Ferry  road.  Here  Logan's 
fifteenth  corps  joined  on  and  formed  the  extreme  right  flank 
of  the  army  before  Atlanta,  along  a  wooded  and  commanding 
ridge.  About  ten  A.  M.,  all  the  army  was  in  position,  and 
the  men  were  busy  in  throwing  up  their  accustomed  piles  of 
rails  and  logs,  which,  after  awhile,  assumed  the  form  of  a  para 
pet.  In  order  to  be  prepared  to  defeat  the  enemy  if  he  should 
repeat  his  game  of  the  22d,  Sherman  had,  the  night  before, 
ordered  Jefferson  C.  Davis'  division,  of  Palmer's  fourteenth 
corps,  which,  by  the  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
had  been  left  in  reserve,  to  move  down  to  Turner's  Ferry,  and 
thence  towards  White  Hall  or  East  Point,  aiming  to  reach  the 
flank  of  Howard's  new  line.  The  object  of  this  movement  was 
that  in  case  of  an  attack  this  division  might  in  turn  catch  tlu> 
attacking  force  in  flank  or  rear  at  an  unexpected  moment. 
Brigadier-General  Morgan,  who  commanded  the  division  dur 
ing  the  temporary  illness  of  General  Davis,  marched  early  for 
Turner's  Ferry,  but  many  of  the  roads  laid  down  on  the  maps 
did  not  exist  at  all ;  and  from  this  cause,  and  the  intricate 
nature  of  the  wooded  ground,  great  delay  was  experienced. 
About  noon,  Hardee  and  Lee  sallied  forth  from  Atlanta  by  the 
Bell's  Ferry  road,  and  formed  their  masses  in  the  open  fields 
behind  a  swell  of  ground,  and  after  some  heavy  artillery  firing, 
advanced  in  parallel  lines  against  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  expect 
ing  to  catch  it  in  air.  The  advance  was  magnificent ;  but  Sher 
man  had  prepared  for  this  very  contingency  ;  our  troops  were 
expecting  this  attack,  and  met  it  with  a  galling  and  coolly  de 
livered  fire  of  musketry  that  swept  the  ranks  of  the  enemy  and 
drove  him  back  in  confusion.  But  they  were  rallied  again  and 
again,  as  often  as  six  times  at  some  points,  and  a  few  of  the 
rebel  officers  and  men  reached  our  lines  of  rail  piles  only  to 
be  hauled  over  as  prisoners.  About  four  p.  M.,  the  enemy 
disappeared,  leaving  his  dead  and  wounded  in  our  hands. 
General  Logan  on  this  occasion  was  again  conspicuous,  his 
corps  being  chiefly  engaged.  Our  entire  loss  was  less  than 
six  hundred.  Had  Davis'  division  not  been  delayed  by  causes 
beyond  control,  what  was  simply  a  complete  repulse  of  the 


208  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

enemy  would  have  been  a  disastrous  rout.  Instructed  by  the 
terrible  lessons  of  the  22d  and  28th  of  July,  Hood  abandoned 
his  rash  offensive  and  assumed  a  strict  defensive  attitude, 
merely  meeting  Sherman's  successive  extensions  of  his  right 
flank  by  continuing  his  own  line  of  works  to  the  south. 

Finding  that  the  right  flank  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
did  not  reach  to  East  Point,  Sherman  was  forced  to  trans 
fer  Schofield  to  that  flank  also,  and  afterwards  Palmer's 
fourteenth  corps  of  Thomas'  army.  Schofield  moved  from 
the  left  on  the  1st  of  August,  and  Palmer's  corps  followed  at 
once,  taking  a  line  below  Utoy  Creek,  which  Schofield  pro 
longed  to  a  point  near  East  Point. 

About  the  1st  of  August,  General  'Hooker,  deeming  himself 
aggrieved  by  the  promotion  of  General  Howard,  who  had 
served  under  him  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  had  but 
recently  come  to  the  West  as  his  subordinate,  to  the  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  was,  at  his  own  request,  relieved 
from  command  of  the  Twentieth  Corps  and  ordered  to  report 
to  the  adjutant-general  at  Washington.  Major-General  Henry 
W.  Slocum,  then  at  Yicksburg,  was  sent  for  to  assume  the 
command,  which,  until  his  arrival,  devolved  upon  Brigadier- 
General  A.  S.  Williams.  Brigadier-General  Jefferson  C.  Davis 
was  promoted  to  the  command  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  in 
lieu  of  General  Palmer,  relieved  at  his  own  request ;  and 
Major-General  D.  S.  Stanley  succeeded  to  the  command  of 
the  Fourth  Corps,  vacated  by  General  Howard. 

From  the  2d  to  the  5th,  Sherman  continued  to  extend  to  the 
right,  demonstrating  strongly  on  the  left  and  along  the  whole 
line.  Reilley's  brigade  of  Cox's  division  of  Schofield's  army,  on 
the  5th,  tried  to  break  through  the  enemy's  line  about  a  mile 
below  Utoy  Creek,  but  failed  to  carry  the  position,  losing  about 
four  hundred  men,  who  were  caught  by  the  entanglements  and 
abattis  ;  but  the  next  day  this  position  was  turned  by  General 
Hascall,  and  General  Schofield  advanced  his  whole  line  close 
up  to  and  facing  the  enemy  below  Utoy  Creek.  Still  he  did 
not  gain  the  desired  foothold  on  either  the  West  Point  or 
Macon  railway.  The  enemy's  line  at  that  time  was  nearly 


fletonsiye   atiii  udr-., 
/ 

'iisk/as  of'  hi*-  ritfht 

.')    ':.!V-;   SOlltK, 

•>'  tL<    Tennessee 


:•  ..a. MI-.'.' I    iiiovo-.i    n"G.ir.i 
liner's  corps  follow;]  -^ 


ji.il.':nt-<r--:-uernl  at  \\ ;itsliin 
.'.; . •,       r-ti  ..it  Yick^ljiir^, 
i,  * •  i».u-j.     't.oiiJ    !ri;:   rifiiYa 
A;  &.  \vniui:i:^.     R.r^  i:Iio 

•;    »i     (1    t.. }    tin':    C(...n_iDi'?5Ki    « 

1   .Pahncr,  n;iieve( 


Macon 


•io\e  lino  c!o- 

;.-  HhJ]  Le  d;d 
r  u.;.-  West  'P:»lnt  or 
luii  tJine  v'as  nenrlT 


210  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

railway,  and  thoroughly  destroy  it ;  to  avoid,  as  far  as  possible, 
the  enemy's  infantry,  but  to  attack  any  cavalry  he  could  find. 
Sherman  expected  that  this  cavalry  expedition  would  save  the 
necessity  of  moving  the  main  arrdy  across,  and  that  in  case  of 
success  it  would  leave  him  in  a  better  position  to  take  full 
advantage  of  the  result. 

Kilpatrick  got  off  at  the  time  appointed,  broke  the  West 
Point  road,  and  afterwards  reached  the  Macon  road  at  Jones- 
boro',  where  he  whipped  Boss'  cavalry,  and  got  possession  of 
the  railway,  which  he  held  for  five  hours,  damaging  it  con 
siderably  ;  but  a  brigade  of  the  enemy's  infantry,  which  had 
been  dispatched  below  Jonesboro'  in  cars,  was  run  back  and 
disembarked,  and,  with  Jackson's  rebel  cavalry,  made  it  im 
possible  for  him  to  continue  his  work.  He  drew  off  to  the 
east,  made  a  circuit,  and  struck  the  railway  about  Love- 
joy's  Station,  but  was  again  threatened  by  the  enemy,  who 
moved  on  shorter  lines ;  when  he  charged  through  their  cavalry, 
taking  many  prisoners,  of  whom  he  brought  in  seventy,  and 
captured  a  four-gun  battery,  of  which  he  brought  in  one  gun 
and  destroyed  the  others.  Eeturning  by  a  circuit  north  and 
east,  Kilpatrick  reached  Decatur  on  the  22d.  He  estimated 
the  damage  done  to  the  railway  as  sufficient  to  interrupt  its 
use  for  ten  days  ;  but,  upon  learning  all  the  details  of  the  ex 
pedition,  Sherman  became  satisfied  that  it  had  not  accom 
plished  the  chief  object  in  view,  and  accordingly  at  once 
renewed  his  original  orders  for  the  movement  of  the  whole 
army. 

This  involved  the  necessity  of  raising  the  siege  of  Atlanta, 
taking  the  field  with  the  main  force,  and  using  it  against 
the  communications  of  Atlanta,  instead  of  against  its  in- 
trenchments.  The  army  commanders  were  immediately  noti 
fied  to  send  their  surplus  wagons,  encumbrances,  and  sick 
back  to  the  intrenched  position  at  the  bridge  over  the  Chat- 
tahoochee,  and  that  the  movement  would  begin  during  the 
night  of  the  25th.  Accordingly,  all  things  being  ready,  the 
Fourth  Corps,  General  Stanley,  drew  out  of  its  lines  on  the 
extreme  left,  and  marched  to  a  position  below  Proctor's 


ATLANTA  WON.  211 

Creek;  while  the  Twentieth  Corps,  General  Williams,  moved 
back  to  the  river.  Both  movements  were  effected  without  loss. 
On  the  night  of  the  26th  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  broke 
camp,  and  moved  rapidly  by  a  circuit  towards  Sandtown  and 
across  Camp  Creek,  a  small  stream  about  a  mile  below  Proc 
tor's  Creek ;  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  moved  below  Utoy 
Creek,  while  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  remained  in  position  to  mask 
the  movement,  which  was  attended  with  the  loss  of  but  a  single 
man  in  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  wounded  by  a  shell.  On 
the  27th,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  moved  to  the  West  Point 
railway,  above  Fairburn  ;  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  Eed 
Oak,  and  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  closed  in  near  Diggs'  and 
Minis'.  The  three  columns  were  thus  massed  on  the  line  of 
the  "West  Point  railway  from  Diggs',  two  miles  below  East 
Point,  to  within  an  equal  distance  of  Fairburn.  The  28th  was 
consumed  in  destroying  the  road.  For  twelve  and  a  half  miles 
the  ties  were  burned,  and  the  iron  rails  heated  and  twisted 
with  the  utmost  ingenuity  of  old  hands  at  the  work.  Several 
cuts  were  filled  up  with  the  trunks  of  trees,  logs,  rock,  and 
earth,  intermingled  with  loaded  shells,  prepared  as  torpedoes, 
to  explode  in  case  of  an  attempt  to  clear  them  out.  Having 
personally  inspected  this  work,  and  being  satisfied  with  its 
execution,  Sherman  ordered  the  whole  army  to  face  eastward 
and  move  the  next  day  by  several  roads ;  General  Howard,  on 
the  right,  towards  Jonesboro',  General  Thomas  in  the  centre 
to  Couch's,  on  the  Decatur  and  Fayetteville  road,  and  General 
Schofield  on  the  left,  by  Morrow's  Mills.  The  railway  from 
Atlanta  to  Macon  follows  substantially  the  ridge  which  divides 
the  waters  of  the  Flint  and  Ocmulgee  Eivers,  and  from  East 
Point  to  Jonesboro'  makes  a  wide  bend  to  the  east.  The 
position  now  selected  by  Sherman,  parallel  to  the  railway, 
facing  eastwardly,  was  therefore  a  very  important  one,  and  he 
was  anxious  to  seize  it  as  a  necessary  preliminary  to  his 
ulterior  movements. 

The  several  columns  moved  punctually  on  the  morning  of 
the  29th.  General  Thomas,  who  encountered  little  opposition 
or  difficulty,  save  what  resulted  from  the  narrow  roads,  reached 


212  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

his  position  at  Couch's  early  in  the  afternoon.  General  Scho- 
field,  being  closer  to  the  enemy,  who  still  clung  to  East  Point, 
moved  cautiously  on  a  small  circle  around  that  point,  and 
came  into  position  towards  Eough  and  Eeady ;  and  General 
Howard,  having  the  outer  circle,  and  consequently  a  greater 
distance  to  move,  encountered  cavalry,  which  he  drove  rapidly 
to  the  crossing  of  Shoal  Creek.  Here  a  short  delay  occurred, 
and  some  cannonading  and  skirmishing,  but  Howard  soon 
drove  the  enemy,  passed  the  Kenfrew  House,  on  the  Decatur 
road,  which  was  the  point  indicated  for  him  in  the  orders 
of  the  day,  and  wisely  pushed  his  march  towards  Jonesboro', 
saved  the  bridge  across  Flint  Eiver,  and  halted  only  when 
the  darkness  compelled  him,  within  half  a  mile  of  Jonesboro'. 
Here  he  rested  for  the  night,  and  on  the  next  morning,  find 
ing  himself  in  the  presence  of  a  heavy  force  of  the  enemy,  he 
deployed  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  and  disposed  the  Sixteenth  and 
Seventeenth  on  its  left  and  right  flanks.  The  men  covered 
their  front  with  the  usual  parapet,  and  were  soon  prepared  to 
act  offensively  or  defensively  as  the  case  called  for. 

As  soon  as  Sherman,  who  made  his  headquarters  with 
Thomas  at  Couch's,  learned  that  General  Howard  had  passed 
Kenfrew's,  he  directed  General  Thomas  to  send  to  that  place 
a  division  of'  General  Jefferson  C.  Davis'  fourteenth  corps, 
to  move  General  Stanley's  fourth  corps,  in  connection  with 
General  Schofield,  towards  Eough  and  Eeady,  and  then  to 
send  forward  due  east  a  strong  detachment  of  General  Davis' 
corps  to  feel  for  the  railway.  General  Schofield  was  also 
ordered  to  move  boldly  forward  and  strike  the  railroad  near 
Eough  and  Eeady.  These  movements  were  progressing  during 
the  31st,  when  Stephen  D.  Lee's  and  Hardee's  corps  of  the 
enemy  carne  out  of  the  works  at  Jonesboro',  and  attacked 
General  Howard  in  the  position  just  described.  After  a  con 
test  of  over  two  hours,  the  attack  was  repulsed,  with  great  loss 
to  the  enemy,  who  withdrew,  leaving  his  dead  and  many 
wounded  on  the  ground. 

In  the  mean  while,  Sherman  was  aiming  to  get  his  left  and 
centre  between  Stewart's  corps  remaining  in  Atlanta  and  the 


ATLANTA  WON.  213 

corps  of  Hardee  and  Lee  engaged  in  Howard's  front.  Gen 
eral  Schofield  had  reached  the  railway,  a  mile  below  Rough 
and  Ready,  and  was  working  up  the  road,  breaking  it  as  he 
went ;  General  Stanley,  of  General  Thomas'  army,  had  also 
struck  the  road  below  General  Schofield,  and  was  destroying 
it,  working  south ;  and  Baird's  division  of  Davis'  corps  had 
struck  it  still  lower  down,  within  four  miles  of  Jonesboro'. 

The  Confederate  forces  being  thus  divided,  orders  were  at 
once  given  for  all  the  army  to  turn  on  the  fraction  at  Jones 
boro  ;  General  Howard  to  keep  the  enemy  busy,  while  General 
Thomas  should  move  down  from  the  north,  with  General 
Schofield  on  his  left.  The  troops  were  also  ordered  as  they 
moved  down  to  continue  the  thorough  destruction  of  the  rail 
way,  as  it  was  impossible  to  say  how  soon  our  hold  of  it  might 
be  relinquished,  from  the  necessity  of  giving  attention  in  other 
quarters.  General  Garrard's  cavalry  was  directed  to  watch 
the  roads  to  the  north,  and  General  Kilpatrick  was  sent 
south,  to  the  west  bank  of  the  Flint,  with  instructions  to 
attack  or  threaten  the  railway  below  Jonesboro'.  On  the  1st 
of  September  Davis'  corps,  having  a  shorter  distance  to  travel, 
was  deployed,  facing  south,  his  right  in  connection  with 
General  Howard,  and  his  left  on  the  railway ;  while  General 
Stanley  and  General  Schofield  were  coming  down  the  Rough - 
and-Ready  road,  and  along  the  railway,  breaking  it  as  they 
came.  When  General  Davis  joined  to  General  Howard,  Blair's 
corps,  on  General  Howard's  left,  was  thrown  in  reserve,  and 
was  immediately  sent  well  to  the  right  below  Jonesboro',  to  act 
on  that  flank  in  conjunction  with  General  Kilp  a  trick's.  About 
5  P.  M.,  General  Davis  assaulted  the  enemy's  lines  across  open 
fields,  carrying  them  very  handsomely,  and  taking  as  prisoners 
the  greater  part  of  Gowan's  brigade,  including  its  com 
mander,  with  two  four-gun  batteries.  Repeated  orders  were 
sent  to  Generals  Stanley  and  Schofield  to  hasten  their  move 
ments,  but  owing  to  the  difficult  nature  of  the  country  and  the 
absence  of  roads,  they  did  not  get  well  into  position  for  attack 
before  night  rendered  further  operations  impossible.  About 
2  o'clock  that  night,  the  sounds  of  heavy  explosions  were  heard 


214  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

in  the  direction  of  Atlanta,  distant  about  twenty  miles,  with  a 
succession  of  minor  explosions,  and  what  seemed  like  the 
rapid  firing  of  cannon  and  musketry.  These  sounds  con 
tinued  for  about  an  hour,  and  again  about  4  A.  M.  occurred 
another  series  of  similar  discharges,  apparently  nearer,  which 
could  be  accounted  for  on  no  other  hypothesis  than  of  a 
night  attack  on  Atlanta  by  General  Slocum,  or  the  blow 
ing  up  of  the  enemy's  magazines.  At  daybreak  it  was  dis 
covered  that  Hardee  and  Lee  had  abandoned  their  lines  at 
Jonesboro',  and  Sherman  ordered  a  general  pursuit  south  ; 
General  Thomas  following  to  the  left  of  the  railway,  General 
Howard  on  its  right,  and  General  Schofield  diverging  two 
miles  to  the  east.  Near  Lovejoy's  Station  the  enemy  was 
again  overtaken  in  a  strong  intrenched  position,  with  his 
flanks  well  protected,  behind  a  branch  of  Walnut  Creek  to  the 
right,  and  a  confluent  of  the  Flint  River  to  his  left.  Pushing 
close  up  and  reconnoitring  the  ground,  Sherman  found  he 
had  evidently  halted  to  cover  his  communication  with  the 
McDonough  and  Fayetteville  road,  and  presently  rumors 
began  to  arrive,  through  prisoners  captured,  that  Atlanta  had 
been  abandoned  during  the  night  of  September  1st,  that  Hood 
had  blown  up  his  ammunition  trains,  which  accounted  for  the 
unexplained  sounds  so  plainly  heard ;  that  Stewart's  corps  was 
then  retreating  towards  McDonough,  and  that  the  militia  had 
gone  off  towards  Covington.  It  was  then  too  late  to  interpose 
and  prevent  their  escape,  and  Sherman  being  satisfied  with 
the  substantial  success  already  gained,  ordered  the  work  of 
destroying  the  railway  to  cease,  and  the  troops  to  be  held  in 
hand,  ready  for  any  movement  that  further  information  from 
Atlanta  might  warrant. 

On  the  same  night,  a  courier  arrived  from  General  Slocum, 
reporting  the  fact  that  the  enemy  had  evacuated  Atlanta, 
blown  up  seven  trains  of  cars,  and  retreated  on  the  Mc 
Donough  road,  and  that  he  himself  with  the  Twentieth  Corps 
had  entered  and  taken  possession  on  the  morning  of  2d  of 
September. 

Atlanta  being  won,  the  object  of  the  movement  against 


ATLANTA  WON.  215 

the  railway  being  therefore  already  concluded,  and  any  pur 
suit  of  the  enemy  with  a  view  to  his  capture  being  futile  in 
such  a  country,  Sherman  gave  orders,  on  the  4th,  for  the  army 
to  move  back  slowly  to  Atlanta.  On  the  5th,  the  army 
marched  to  the  vicinity  of  Jonesboro',  five  miles,  where  it  re 
mained  a  day.  On  the  7th,  it  moved  to  Rough  and  Eeady, 
seven  miles,  and  the  next  day  to  the  camps  selected.  The 
A_nny  of  the  Cumberland  wras  then  grouped  round  about  At 
lanta,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  about  East  Point,  and  the 
Army  of  the  Ohio  at  Decatur,  all  in  clean  and  healthy  camps, 
at  last  enabled  to  enjoy  a  brief  period  of  rest,  so  much  needed 
for  reorganization  and  recuperation. 

To  return  to  the  erratic  movements  of  Wheeler,  whom,  in 
the  presence  of  the  campaigns  of  two  large  armies,  we  have 
almost  forgotten.  He  succeeded  in  breaking  the  railway  about 
Calhoun,  made  his  appearance  at  Dalton,  where  Colonel  Lei- 
bold  held  him  in  check  until  General  Steedman  arrived  from 
Chattanooga  and  drove  him  off,  then  passed  up  into  East 
Tennessee,  and  remained  a  short  while  at  Athens ;  but  on  the 
first  show  of  pursuit  he  moved  beyond  the  Little  Tennessee, 
and  crossing  the  Holston,  near  Strawberry  Plains,  reached 
the  Clinch  near  Clinton,  passed  over  towards  Sequatchee 
and  McMinnville,  and  thence  to  Murfreesboro',  Lebanon,  and 
Franklin.  From  Franklin  he  was  pursued  towards  Florence, 
and  out  of  Tennessee,  by  Generals  Eousseau,  Steedman,  and 
Granger.  He  did  great  injury  to  many  citizens,  and  destroyed 
the  railway  nearly  as  fast  as  the  construction  parties  were 
able  to  repair  it ;  but,  except  by  being  absent  from  Hood's 
army  at  the  critical  moment,  had  no  influence  whatever  upon 
the  campaign. 

Thus  ended,  four  months  after  its  inception,  one  of  the  great 
est  campaigns  of  the  war ;  a  campaign  which  doubly  secured 
the  possession  of  the  mountain  regions  of  the  centre,  and  laid 
the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  slopes  at  the  mercy  of  the  Union  com 
mander.  Divided  in  twain  by  the  conquest  of  the  Mississippi, 
the  domain  of  the  rebellion  was  quartered  by  the  capture  of 
Atlanta.  A  vital  spot  had  been  reached;  the  granary  of 


216  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Georgia  was  lost ;  and  there  was  suddenly  presented  to  the 
Confederate  authorities  the  alternative,  to  concentrate  their 
two  remaining  armies  or  to  perish. 

Two  dangers  had  menaced  the  success  of  Sherman's  cam 
paign.  The  first  was  the  question  of  supplies.  This  was  in 
great  part  solved  by  the  energetic  and  successful  management 
of  the  superintendent  of  military  railways,  Colonel  W. 
W.  Wright.  "  No  matter  when  or  where  a  break  has  been 
made,"  says  Sherman,  "  the  repair  train  seemed  on  the  spot, 
and  the  damage  was  generally  repaired  before  I  knew  of  the 
break.  Bridges  have  been  built  with  surprising  rapidity,  and 
the  locomotive  whistle  was  heard  in  our  advanced  camps 
almost  before  the  echoes  of  the  skirmish  fire  had  ceased. 
Some  of  these  bridges,  those  of  the  Oostanaula,  Etowah,  and 
Chattahoochee,  are  fine,  substantial  structures,  and  were  built 
in  inconceivably  short  time,  almost  out  of  the  materials  im 
provised  on  the  spot."  But  the  solution  was  mainly  due  to  the 
forethought  exercised  by  Sherman  himself  in  successively 
establishing  secondary  depots,  strongly  garrisoned,  as  at  Chat 
tanooga,  Kesaca,  Home,  and  Allatoona,  and  by  great  exer 
tions  accumulating  at  each  stores  sufficient  to  render  the  army 
independent  of  the  rear  during  any  temporary  interruption 
of  the  communications.  The  second  danger  ever  present  con 
sisted  in  the  rapid  diminution  of  the  army,  not  only  by  the 
heavy  casualties  incidental  to  offensive  warfare,  but  also  by 
the  expiration  of  the  terms  of  service  of  a  large  number  of  the 
regiments.  This  was  prevented  from  becoming  fatal,  by  the 
bravery  of  the  army  in  attacking;  by  the  skill  of  its  com 
mander,  in  turning  obstacles  too  great  to  be  surmounted  by 
direct  approach ;  by  the  patriotism  of  the  veterans,  in  re- 
enlisting;  by  the  noble  exertions  of  the  governors  of  the 
Western  States,  in  encouraging  and  expediting  re-enlistments, 
and  pushing  the  veterans  to  the  front ;  and  by  the  folly  of 
Hood,  in  attacking  the  Union  troops  in  strong  positions,  pro 
tected  by  earthworks,  instead  of  attempting  to  take  them  at  a 
disadvantage,  as  in  crossing  Peach-tree  Creek.  On  tke  12th 
of  August,  President  Lincoln  conferred  upon  General  Sher- 


ATLANTA  WON.  217 

man  a  commission  as  major-general  in  the  regular  army,  as  a 
reward  for  his  services  in  this  campaign. 

Stoneman  marched  from  Decatur  on  the  day  appointed,  with 
the  whole  effective  strength  of  his  division,  numbering  about 
two  thousand  in  all,  organized  in  three  brigades,  commanded 
by  Colonels  Adams,  Biddle,  and  Capron.  The  first  brigade 
consisted  of  the  First  and  Second  regiments  of  Kentucky  cav 
alry  ;  the  Second,  of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Indiana  ;  the  third 
brigade,  of  the  Fourteenth  Illinois,  Eighth  Michigan,  and  a 
squadron  of  Ohio  cavalry  under  Captain  McLoughlin. 

Stoneman  moved  out  along  the  line  of  the  Georgia  Central 
railway  to  Covington,  and  thence  turned  South  and  pushed  by 
way  of  Monticello,  Hillsboro',  and  Clinton,  for  Macon.  A 
battalion  of  the  Fourteenth  Illinois  cavalry  of  Capron's  brigade 
succeeded  in  entering  Gordon,  destroying  eleven  locomotives 
and  several  trains  of  cars  laden  with  munitions  of  war.  The 
bridge  over  the  Oconee  was  also  destroyed  by  General  Stone- 
man's  orders,  by  another  detachment  from  his  command. 

On  arriving  within  fifteen  miles  of  Macon  on  the  evening 
of  the  30th  of  July,  General  Stoneman  ascertained  from  reli 
able  sources  that,  in  anticipation  of  such  an  attempt,  the 
probability  of  which  had  been  freely  discussed  in  the  Northern 
newspapers,  the  Confederate  authorities  had  taken  the  pre 
caution  to  remove  all  the  Union  prisoners  previously  confined 
in  the  military  prisons  at  Macon  and  Millen,  in  the  direction 
of  Florence,  South  Carolina  ;  and  that  this  movement  had  only 
been  completed  on  the  preceding  day.  The  prime  object  of 
the  expedition  being  thus,  unfortunately,  frustrated,  Stoneman 
reluctantly  determined  to  return  to  the  main  body.  But  in 
the  mean  while  the  enemy  had  concentrated  in  heavy  force, 
and  was  now  moving  upon  his  line  of  retreat. 

On  the  morning  of  Sunday,  the  31st  of  July,  finding  what 
seemed  to  be  a  heavy  force  of  the  enemy  in  his  front,  Stone 
man  deployed  a  strong  line  of  skirmishers,  which  soon  de 
veloped  the  fact  that,  taking  advantage  of  the  unfavorable 
nature  of  the  country  for  the  operations  of  cavalry,  Allen's 
brigade  of  Confederate  infantry  had  passed  around  his  flank 


218  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

and  taken  up  a  strong  position  directly  across  the  line  of  his 
homeward  march,  while  Armstrong's  brigade  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  in  connection  with  Allen's  infantry,  was  dangerously 
menacing  his  left  flank.  With  the  Oconee  in  his  rear  and  a 
formidable  enemy  in  his  front,  Stoneman  had  evidently  no  re 
source  but  to  destroy  that  enemy  or  be  himself  destroyed. 

Dismounting  the  troopers  of  one  brigade,  he  caused  them 
repeatedly  to  charge  the  enemy  on  'foot,  but  they  were  as  often 
repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  Eallying  the  broken  columns  by  his 
personal  exertions  and  with  the  assistance  of  the  gallant  Major 
Keogh  and  other  officers  of  his  staff,  Stoneman  placed  himself 
at  the  head  of  his  men,  and  again  charged,  but  without  more 
favorable  result.  At  the  critical  moment,  Armstrong's  brigade 
assailed  his  left  flank.  The  Union  cavalry  gave  way  before 
the  combined  opposition,  and  were  with  difficulty  reformed. 
By  this  time  the  enemy  had  completely  surrounded  them. 

Perceiving  this,  and  deeming  all  further  resistance  useless, 
Stoneman  gave  permission  to  such  of  his  officers  and  men  as 
wished  to  try  the  apparently  desperate  chance  of  cutting  their 
way  through  the  opposing  lines,  to  make  the  attempt,  and  then, 
causing  hostilities  to  cease  on  his  part,  sent  in  a  flag  of  truce, 
and  unconditionally  surrendered  the  remainder  of  his  force. 

Among  those  who  cut  their  way  through  the  enemy's  lines, 
and  thus  escaped  and  rejoined  the  main  army,  was  the  bulk  of 
Colonel  Adams'  brigade  and  a  number  of  Colonel  Caproii's  men. 
The  entire  number  captured  was  less  than  fifteen  hundred. 

The  failure  to  unite  with  McCook,  which  was  the  prime 
cause  of  this  disaster,  undoubtedly  occurred  in  consequence 
of  false,  but  apparently  reliable,  information  concerning  the 
roads  and  the  crossings  of  the  Ocmulgee  Paver,  whereby  Gen 
eral  Stoneman  was  led  to  believe  he  could  prolong  his  east 
erly  march  to  Covington  without  sacrificing  the  combination. 
Yet  in  all  concerted  operations,  the  co-operative  movements 
are  of  the  first  importance  ;  all  others,  no  matter  how  great 
their  intrinsic  value,  must  be  deemed  secondary.  Great  suc 
cess  alone  can  excuse,  while  not  even  success  can  justify,  any 
departure  from  the  primary  features  of  the  plan. 


TAKING  BREATH.  219 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

TAKING      BREATH. 

FROM  Lovejoy's  Station,  Hardee  and  Lee  retreated  to 
the  line  of  the  West  Point  railway  at  Palmetto  Station, 
twenty-five  miles  southwest  from  Atlanta,  and  situated  at 
about  the  same  distance  from  the  Chattahoochee  as  that 
city  is.  Here  Hood  joined  them  with  Stewart's  corps,  took 
up  a  position  confronting  Sherman,  threw  a  pontoon  bridge 
across  the  Chattahoochee,  and  sent  a  cavalry  detachment  be 
yond  the  river,  twenty-five  miles  westward  to  Carrollton,  and 
another  in  a  northerly  direction  to  Powder  Springs,  about  ten 
miles  south  of  Lost  Mountain,  and  an  equal  distance  west  of 
the  Chattanooga  railway.  He  also  occupied  Jonesboro'  in 
some  force.  Lieutenant-General  Stephen  D.  Lee  succeeded 
Hardee  in  the  command  of  his  corps,  the  latter  officer  being 
relieved  by  orders  from  Richmond,  and  sent  to  Charleston  to 
replace  Beauregard.  Lieutenant-General  B.  F.  Cheatham  had 
command  of  Hood's  old  corps,  and  Lieutenant-General  A.  P. 
Stewart  still  retained  his  assignment  to  Polk's  old  corps. 
The  cavalry  was  largely  reinforced  and  united  in  one  corps, 
under  the  command  of  Major-General  James  Wheeler.  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  was  summoned  from  Charleston,  and  placed ' 
at  the  head  of  ah1  the  Confederate  armies  operating  in  the 
central  region. 

During  the  month  of  September,  Sherman's  army  remained 
grouped  about  Atlanta.  The  terms  of  enlistment  of  many  of 
his  regiments  had  expired,  a  large  number  went  home  on  fur 
lough,  and  others,  previously  furloughed  on  condition  of  re- 
enlisting,  returned  to  the  field  with  their  ranks  swelled  by 


220  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

additions  of  stragglers,  convalescents,  and  recruits.  Many 
changes  were  thus  rendered  necessary  in  the  composition  of 
the  different  commands.  The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was 
consolidated  into  two  corps,  the  Fifteenth  and  Seventeenth, 
respectively  commanded  by  Major-General  P.  J.  Osterhaus 
and  Brigadier-General  Thomas  E.  G.  Ransom ;  the  former 
comprising  the  four  divisions  of  Brigadier-Generals  Charles 
R.  Woods,  William  B.  Hazen,  John  E.  Smith,  and  John  M. 
Corse ;  the  latter  those  of  Major-General  Joseph  A.  Mower, 
and  Brigadier-Generals  Miles  D.  Leggett  and  Giles  A.  Smith, 
with  the  First  Alabama  Cavalry,  and  the  First  Missouri  engi 
neer  regiment,  having  in  charge  a  large  pontoon-bridge  train. 
This  organization  was  effected  by  transferring  all  the  troops  of 
the  Seventeenth  Corps  remaining  on  the  Mississippi  to  the  Six 
teenth  Corps,  breaking  up  the  detachment  of  the  latter  corps 
in  the  field,  and  transferring  Ransom's  division,  now  com 
manded  by  Brigadier-General  Giles  A.  Smith,  and  Corse's  di 
vision  to  the  Seventeenth  Corps.  Major- Generals  Logan  and 
Blair  were  temporarily  absent,  engaged  in  the  important  politi 
cal  canvass  then  in  progress.  Major-General  Schofield  re 
turned  to  the  headquarters  of  the  Department  of  the  Ohio,  at 
Knoxville,  to  give  his  personal  attention  to  affairs  in  that 
quarter,  leaving  Brigadier-General  Jacob  D.  Cox  in  command 
of  the  Twenty-third  Corps.  The  cavalry  was  reorganized  so 
as  to  consist  of  two  divisions  under  Brigadier-Generals  Ken- 
ner  Garrard  and  Judson  Kilpatrick. 

As  stated  in  the  last  chapter,  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
under  Major-General  Thomas,  held  Atlanta  ;  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  commanded  by  Major-General  Howard,  was  at 
East  Point ;  and  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  occupied  Decatur. 
Garrard' s  cavalry  division  was  also  at  Decatur,  and  Kilpat=- 
rick's  at  Sandtown  watching  for  any  westward  movement  of 
the  enemy.  To  render  the  communications  more  secure,  with 
a  view  to  the  present  wants  of  the  army  and  possible  future 
operations,  Sherman  sent  Newton's  division  of  Stanley's  fourth 
corps,  and  Morgan's  division  of  Jefferson  C.  Davis'  fourteenth 
corps,  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  to  Chattanooga,  and 


TAKING  BREATH.  221 

Corse's  division  of  Osterhaus'  fifteenth  corps,  of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee,  to  Eome,  to  garrison  those  places. 

The  topography  of  the  country  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of 
Atlanta  was  carefully  studied,  and  a  new  line  of  works  con 
structed  for  the  defence  of  the  place,  capable  of  being 
maintained  by  a  much  smaller  garrison  than  was  contem 
plated  by  the  Confederate  authorities  when  laying  out  the 
old  line. 

Sherman  now  determined  to  make  Atlanta  exclusively  a 
military  post.  On  the  4th  of  September,  he  issued  the  follow 
ing  orders  : — 

"  The  city  of  Atlanta  belonging  exclusively  for  warlike  pur 
poses,  it  will  at  once  be  vacated  by  all  except  the  armies  of 
the  United  States  and  such  civilian  employes  as  may  be  re 
tained  by  the  proper  departments  of  the  Government 

At  a  proper  time  full  arrangements  will  be  made  for  a  supply  to 
the  troops  of  all  the  articles  they  may  need  over  and  above 
clothing,  provisions,  &c.,  furnished  by  Government,  and  on  no 
pretence  whatever  will  traders,  manufacturers,  or  sutlers  be 
allowed  to  settle  in  the  limits  of  fortified  places ;  and  if  they 
manage  to  come  in  spite  of  this  notice  the  quartermaster  will 
seize  their  stores,  apply  them  to  the  use  of  the  troops,  and  de 
liver  the  parties,  or  other  unauthorized  citizens  who  thus  place 
their  individual  interest  above  that  of  the  United  States,  over 
to  the  hands  of  some  provost-marshal,  to  be  put  to  labor  on 
forts  or  conscripted  into  one  of  the  regiments  or  battery  al 
ready  in  service.  The  same  military  principles  will  apply  to 
all  military  posts  south  of  Atlanta." 

This  order  fell  upon  the  ears  of  the  inhabitants  of  Atlanta 
like  a  thunderbolt.  Though  they  had  lent  all  the  moral  and 
physical  assistance  in  their  power  to  the  cause  of  the  rebellion, 
they  had  begun  to  dream  of  the  advent  of  the  Federal  troops 
as  the  commencement  of  an  era  of  quiet.  They  had  never 
imagined  that  the  war  would  reach  Atlanta.  Now  that  it  had 
come,  and 'kept  its  rough,  hot  hand  upon  them  for  so  many 


222  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

days,  they  were  beginning  to  look  forward  to  a  long  period 
when  they  might  enjoy  at  once  the  advantage  of  the  protec 
tion  of  a  just  and  powerful  government,  and  the  luxury  of  con 
sidering  the  means  whereby  that  protection  was  enforced 
against  their  chosen  friends  as  a  grievance.  On  the  llth  of 
September  the  town  authorities  addressed  the  following  petition 
to  General  Sherman,  praying  the  revocation  of  his  orders  : — 

"  SIK — The  undersigned,  mayor,  and  two  members  of  council 
for  the  city  of  Atlanta,  for  the  time  being  the  only  legal  organ 
of  the  people  of  the  said  city,  to  express  their  wants  and 
wishes,  ask  leave  most  earnestly,  but  respectfully,  to  petition 
you  to  reconsider  the  order  requiring  them  to  leave  Atlanta. 

"  At  first  view,  it  struck  us  that  the  measure  would  involve 
extraordinary  hardship  and  loss,  but  since  we  have  seen  the 
practical  execution  of  it,  so  far  as  it  has  progressed,  and  the 
individual  condition  of  many  of  the  people,  and  heard  their 
statements  as  to  the  inconveniences,  loss,  and  suffering  attend 
ing  it,  we  are  satisfied  that  it  will  involve,  in  the  aggregate, 
consequences  appalling  and  heartrending. 

"  Many  poor  women  are  in  an  advanced  state  of  pregnancy ; 
others  now  having  young  children,  and  whose  husbands  are 
either  in  the  army,  prisoners,  or  dead.  Some  say :  I  have 
such  a  one  sick  at  home  ;  who  will  wait  on  them  when  I  am 
gone  ?  Others  say  :  What  are  we  to  do  ?  we  have  no  houses 
to  go  to,  and  no  means  to  buy,  build,  or  to  rent  any — no 
parents,  friends,  or  relatives  to  go  to.  Another  says :  I  will 
try  and  take  this  or  that  article  of  property,  but  such  and  such 
things  I  must  leave  behind,  though  I  need  them  much.  We 
reply  to  them  :  General  Sherman  will  carry  your  property  to 
Bough  and  Beady,  and  General  Hood  will  take  it  from  there 
on.  And  they  will  reply  to  that :  But  I  want  to  leave  the 
railway  at  such  a  point,  and  cannot  get  conveyance  from 
there  on. 

"  We  only  refer  to  a  few  facts  to  try  to  illustrate  in  part  how 
this  measure  will  operate  in  practice.  As  you  advanced,  the 
people  north  of  us  fell  back,  and  before  your  arrival  here  a 


TAKING  BREATH.  223 

large  portion  of  the  people  had  retired  south,  so  that  the 
country  south  of  this  is  already  crowded,  and  without  houses 
to  accommodate  the  people,  and  we  are  informed  that  many 
are  now  starving  in  churches  and  other  out-buildings.  This 
being  so,  how  is  it  possible  for  the  people  still  here  (mostly 
women  and  children)  to  find  any  shelter  ?  and  how  can  they 
live  through  the  winter  in  the  woods — no  shelter  nor  subsist 
ence — in  the  midst  of  strangers  who  know  them  not,  and  with 
out  the  power  to  assist  them,  if  they  were  willing  to  do  so  ? 

"  This  is  but  a  feeble  picture  of  the  consequences  of  this 
measure.  You  know  the  woe,  the  horror,  and  the  suffering  can 
not  be  described  by  words.  Imagination  can  only  conceive 
of  it,  and  we  ask  you  to  take  these  things  into  consideration. 

"We  know  your  mind  and  time  are  constantly  occupied 
with  the  duties  of  your  command,  which  almost  deters  us  from 
asking  your  attention  to  this  matter ;  but  thought  it  might  be 
that  you  had  not  considered  the  subject  in  all  its  awful  conse 
quences,  and  that  on  more  reflection  you,  we  hope,  would  not 
make  this  people  an  exception  to  all  mankind,  for  we  know  of 
no  such  instance  ever  having  occurred ;  surely  none  such  in 
the  United  States ;  and  what  has  this  helpless  people  done 
that  they  should  be  driven  from  their  homes,  to  wander  as 
strangers,  outcasts,,  and  exiles,  and  to  subsist  on  charity  ? 

"  We  do  not  know,  as  yet,  the  number  of  people  still  here. 
Of  those  who  are  here,  we  are  satisfied  a  respectable  number, 
if  allowed  to  remain  at  home,  could  subsist  for  several  months 
without  assistance,  and  a  respectable  number  for  a  much 
longer  time,  and  who  might  not  need  assistance  at  any  time. 

"In  conclusion,  we  must  earnestly  and  solemnly  petition 
you  to  reconsider  this  order,  or  modify  it,  and  suffer  this  un 
fortunate  people  to  remain  at  home  and  enjoy  what  little 
means  they  have. 

"  Kespectfully  submitted, 

"  JAMES  M.  CALHOUN,  Mayor. 
"E.  E.  KAWSON,  Councilman. 
"L.  C.  WELLS,  Councilman." 


224  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

To  this  General  Sherman  replied,  in  full  and  clear  terms,  on 
the  following  day : 

"  GENTLEMEN  :  I  have  your  letter  of  the  llth,  in  the  nature 
of  a  petition  to  revoke  my  orders  removing  all  the  inhabitants 
from  Atlanta.  I  have  read  it  carefully,  and  give  full  credit  to 
your  statements  of  the  distress  that  will  be  occasioned  by  it, 
and  yet  shall  not  revoke  my  order,  simply  because  my  orders 
are  not  designed  to  meet  the  humanities  of  the  case,  but  to 
prepare  for  the  future  struggles  in  which  millions,  yea  hun 
dreds  of  millions  of  good  people  outside  of  Atlanta  have  a  deep 
interest.  We  must  have  peace,  not  only  at  Atlanta,  but  in  all 
America.  To  secure  this  we  must  stop  the  war  that  now 
desolates  our  once  happy  and  favored  country.  To  stop  the  war, 
we  must  defeat  the  rebel  armies  that  are  arrayed  against  the 
laws  and  Constitution,  which  all  must  respect  and  obey.  To 
defeat  these  armies,  we  must  prepare  the  way  to  reach  them  in 
their  recesses,  provided  with  the  arms  and  instruments  which 
enable  us  to  accomplish  our  purpose. 

"  Now,  I  know  the  vindictive  nature  of  our  enemy,  and  that 
we  may  have  many  years  of  military  operations  from  this 
quarter,  and  therefore  deem  it  wise  and  prudent  to  prepare  in 
time.  The  use  of  Atlanta  for  warlike  purposes  is  inconsistent 
with  its  character  as  a  home  for  families.  There  will  be  no 
manufactures,  commerce,  or  agriculture  here  for  the  mainten 
ance  of  families,  and  sooner  or  later  want  will  compel  the  in 
habitants  to  go.  Why  not  go  noiv,  when  all  the  arrangements 
are  completed  for  the  transfer,  instead  of  waiting  until  the 
plunging  shot  of  contending  armies  will  renew  the  scenes  of 
the  past  month  ?  Of  course  I  do  not  apprehend  any  such 
thing  at  this  moment,  but  you  do  not  suppose  this  army  will 
be  here  till  the  war  is  over.  I  cannot  discuss  this  subject 
with  you  fairly,  because  I  cannot  impart  to  you  what  I  pro 
pose  to  do,  but  I  assert  that  my  military  plans  make  it  neces 
sary  for  the  inhabitants  to  go  away,  and  I  can  only  renew  my 
offer  of  services  to  make  their  exodus  in  any  direction  as  easy 


TAKING  BREATH.  225 

and  comfortable  as  possible.  You  cannot  qualify  war  in 
harsher  terms  than  I  will. 

"  War  is  cruelty,  and  you  cannot  refine  it ;  and  those  who 
brought  war  on  our  country  deserve  all  the  curses  and  male 
dictions  a  people  can  pour  out.  I  know  I  had  no  hand  in 
making  this  war,  and  I  know  I  will  make  more  sacrifices  to 
day  than  any  of  you  to  secure  peace.  But  you  cannot  have 
peace  and  a  division  of  our  country.  If  the  United  States 
submit  to  a  division  now,  it  will  not  stop,  but  will  go  on  till  we 
reap  the  fate  of  Mexico,  which  is  eternal  war.  The  United 
States  does  and  must  assert  its  authority  wherever  it  has 
power  ;  if  it  relaxes  one  bit  to  pressure,  it  is  gone,  and  I  know 
that  such  is  not  the  national  feeling.  This  feeling  assumes 
various  shapes,  but  always  comes  back  to  that  of  Union.  Once 
admit  the  Union,  once  more  acknowledge  the  authority  of  the 
National  Government,  and  instead  of  devoting  your  houses, 
and  streets,  and  roads  to  the  dread  uses  of  war,  I  and  this 
army  become  at  once  your  protectors  and  supporters,  shield 
ing  you  from  danger,  let  it  come  from  what  quarter  it  may.  I 
know  that  a  few  individuals  cannot  resist  a  torrent  of  error 
and  passion  such  as  has  swept  the  South  into  rebellion  ;  but 
you  can  point  out,  so  that  we  may  know  those  who  desire  a 
government  and  those  who  insist  on  war  and  its  desolation. 

"  You  might  as  well  appeal  against  the  thunder-storm  as 
against  these  terrible  hardships  of  war.  They  are  inevitable, 
and  the  only  way  the  people  of  Atlanta  can  hope  once  more  to 
live  in  peace  and  quiet  at  home,  is  to  stop  this  war,  which 
can  alone  be  done  by  admitting  that  it  began  in  error  and  is 
perpetuated  in  pride.  !  We  don't  want  your  negroes  or  your 
horses,  or  your  houses  or  your  land,  or  any  thing  you  have  ; 
but  we  do  want,  and  will  have,  a  just  obedience  to  the  laws  of 
the  United  States.  That  we  will  have,  and  if  it  involves  the 
destruction  of  your  improvements,  we  cannot  help  it. x 

"  You  have  heretofore  read  public  sentiment  in  your  news 
papers,  that  live  by  falsehood  and  excitement,  and  the 
quicker  you  seek  for  truth  in  other  quarters  the  better  for 
you.  I  repeat,  then,  that  by  the  original  compact  of  govern- 

15 


226  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS 

ment,  the  United  States  had  certain  rights  in  Georgia  which 
have  never  been  relinquished,  and  never  will  be ;  that  the 
South  began  the  war  by  seizing  forts,  arsenals,  mints,  custom 
houses,  etc.,  etc.,  long  before  Mr.  Lincoln  was  installed,  and 
before  the  South  had  one  jot  or  tittle  of  provocation.  I  my 
self  have  seen,  in  Missouri,  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  and  Missis 
sippi,  hundreds  and  thousands  of  women  and  children  fleeing 
from  your  armies  and  desperadoes,  hungry,  and  with  bleeding 
feet.  In  Memphis,  Yicksburg,  and  Mississippi,  we  fed  thous 
ands  upon  thousands  of  the  families  of  rebel  soldiers  left  on 
our  hands,  and  whom  we  could  not  see  starve.  Now,  that  war 
comes  home  to  you,  you  feel  very  differently — you  deprecate  its 
horrors,  but  did  not  feel  them  when  you  sent  car-loads  of 
soldiers  and  ammunition,  and  moulded  shells  and  shot  to  carry 
war  into  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  and  desolate  the  homes  of 
hundreds  and  thousands  of  good  people,  who  only  asked  to 
live  in  peace  at  their  old  homes,  and  under  the  government  of 
their  inheritance.  But  these  comparisons  are  idle.  I  want 
peace,  and  believe  it  can  only  be  reached  through  Union  and 
war,  and  I  will  ever  conduct  war  purely  with  a  view  to  perfect 
and  early  success. 

"  But,  my  dear  sirs,  when  that  peace  does  como,  you  may 
call  upon  me  for  any  thing.  Then  will  I  share  with  you  the 
last  cracker,  and  watch  with  you  to  shield  your  home  and 
families  against  danger  from  every  quarter.  Now,  you  must 
go,  and  take  with  you  the  old  and  feeble  ;  feed  and  nurse 
them,  and  build  for  them  in  more  quiet  places  proper  habita 
tions  to  shield  them  against  the  weather,  until  the  mad  pas 
sions  of  men  cool  down,  and  allow  the  Union  and  peace  once 
more  to  settle  on  your  old  homes  at  Atlanta." 

As  soon  as  his  arrangements  were  completed,  General  Sher 
man  wrote  to  General  Hood,  by  a  flag  of  truce,  notifying  him 
of  his  orders,  and  proposing  a  cessation  of  hostilities  for -ten 
days,  from  the  12th  of  September,  in  the  country  included 
within  a  radius  of  two  miles  around  Eough  and  Keady  Sta 
tion,  to  enable  him  to  complete  the  removal  of  those  families 


TAKING  BREATH.  227 

electing  to  go  to  the  south.  Hood  immediately  replied  on  the 
9th,  acceding  to  the  proposed  truce,  but  protesting  against 
Sherman's  order.  He  concluded : — 

"  Permit  me  to  say,  the  unprecedented  measure  you  propose 
transcends  in  studied  and  iniquitous  cruelty  all  acts  ever  be 
fore  brought  to  my  attention  in  this  dark  history  of  the  war. 
In  the  name  of  God  and  humanity,  I  protest,  believing  you 
are  expelling  from  homes  and  firesides  wives  and  children  of 
a  brave  people." 

To  this  Sherman  answered  on  the  same  date  : — 

"GENERAL: — I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt 
of  your  letter  of  this  date,  at  the  hands  of  Messrs.  Ball  and 
Crew,  consenting  to  the  arrangement  I  had  proposed  to  facili 
tate  the  removal  south  of  the  people  of  Atlanta  who  prefer  to 
go  in  that  direction.  I  inclose  you  a  copy  of  my  orders,  which 
will,  I  am  satisfied,  accomplish  my  purpose  perfectly. 

"  You  style  the  measures  proposed  '  unprecedented,'  and 
appeal  to  '  the  dark  history  of  war  for  a  parallel  as  an  act 
of  studied  and  ingenious  cruelty.'  It  is  not  unprece 
dented,  for  General  Johnston  himself  very  wisely  and  prop 
erly  removed  the  families  all  the  way  from  Dalton  down, 
and  I  see  no  reason  why  Atlanta1  should  be  excepted.  Nor 
is  it  necessary  to  appeal  to  *  the  dark  history  of  war,'  when 
recent  and  modern  examples  are  so  handy.  You  yourself 
burned  dwelling-houses  along  your  parapet ;  and  I  have  seen, 
to-day,  fifty  houses  that  you  have  rendered  uninhabitable 
because  they  stood  in  the  way  of  your  forts  and  men.  You 
defended  Atlanta  on  a  line  so  close  to  the  town  that  every 
cannon-shot,  and  many  musket-shots  from  our  line  of  invest 
ment,  that  overshot  their  mark,  went  into  the  habitations  of 
women  and  children.  General  Hardee  did  the  same  thing  at 
Jonesboro',  and  General  Johnston  did  the  same  last  summer 
at  Jackson,  Mississippi. 

"  I  have  not  accused  you  of  heartless  cruelty,  but  merely  in- 


228  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

stance  these  cases  of  very  recent  occurrence,  and  could  go  on 
and  enumerate  hundreds  of  others,  and  challenge  any  fair  man 
to  judge  which  of  us  has  the  heart  of  pity  for  the  families  of 
'  brave  people.'  I  say  it  is  kindness  to  these  families  of  At 
lanta  to  remove  them  at  once  from  scenes  that  women  and 
children  should  not  be  exposed  to;  and  the  'brave  people* 
should  scorn  to  commit  their  wives  and  children  to  the  rude 
barbarians  who  thus,  as  you  say,  violate  the  rules  of  war  as  il 
lustrated  in  the  pages  of  its  '  dark  history.' 

"  In  the  name  of  common  sense,  I  ask  you  not  to  '  appeal  to 
a  just  God '  in  such  a  sacrilegious  manner — you  who,  in  the 
midst  of  peace  and  prosperity,  have  plunged  a  nation  into  war, 
dark  and  cruel  war  ;  who  dared  and  badgered  us  into  battle  ; 
insulted  our  flag ;  seized  our  arsenals  and  forts  that  were  left 
in  the  honorable  custody  of  a  peaceful  ordnance  sergeant ; 
seized  and  made  prisoners  even  the  very  first  garrisons  sent 
to  protect  your  people  against  negroes  and  Indians,  long 
before  any  other  act  was  committed  by  the,  to  you,  '  hateful 
Lincoln  government ;'  tried  to  force  Missouri  and  Kentucky 
into  rebellion,  in  spite  of  themselves ;  falsified  the  vote  of 
Louisiana ;  turned  loose  your  privateers  to  plunder  unarmed 
ships  ;  expelled  Union  families  by  the  thousands,  burned  their 
houses,  and  declared  by  acts  of  your  Congress  the  confiscation 
of  ah1  debts  due  Northern  men  for  goods  had  and  received. 
Talk  thus  to  the  Marines,  but  not  to  me,  who  have  seen  these 
things,  and  who  will  this  day  make  as  much  sacrifice  for  the 
peace  and  honor  of  the  South  as  the  best-born  Southerner 
among  you.  If  we  must  be  enemies,  let  us  be  men,  and  fight 
it  out  as  we  propose  to-day,  and  not  deal  in  such  hypocritical 
appeals  to  God  and  humanity. 

"  God  will  judge  us  in  due  time,  and  he  will  pronounce 
whether  it  will  be  humane  to  fight  with  a  town  full  of  women 
and  the  families  of  '  a  brave  people '  at  our  back,  or  to  remove 
them  in  time  to  places  of  safety  among  their  own  friends  and 
people." 

During  the  truce,  four  hundred  and  forty-six  families  were 


TAKING  BREATH.  229 

moved  south,  comprising  seven  hundred  and  five  adults,  eight 
hundred  and  sixty  children,  and  seventy-nine  servants,  with 
an  average  of  sixteen  hundred  and  fifty-one  pounds  of  furni 
ture  and  household  goods  of  all  kinds  to  each  family. 

On  the  8th,  General  Hood  wrote  to  General  Sherman  pro 
posing  an  exchange  of  prisoners  captured  by  both  armies  since 
the  commencement  of  the  campaign  just  closed.  Sherman 
replied  on  the  same  day,  agreeing  to  this  proposition,  on  the 
basis  of  the  old  cartel,  made  by  Generals  Dix  and  Hill  in  1862, 
but  stating  that  he  feared  most  of  the  prisoners  in  his  hands 
were  already  beyond  Chattanooga  on  their  way  north,  and  in 
custody  of  the  commissary-general  of  prisoners.  The  next 
day  he  again  wrote  : — 

"  GENEEAL — As  I  engaged  yesterday,  I  consent  to  an  actual 
exchange  of  prisoners,  man  for  man,  and  equal  for  equal, 
differences  or  balance  to  be  made  up  according  to  the  cartel 
of  1862.  I  have  appointed  one  of  my  inspector-generals, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  "W.  "Warner,  to  carry  out  this  exchange, 
and  will  empower  him  to  call  for  the  prisoners,  and  all  such 
guards  as  he  may  need  to  affect  the  actual  transfers.  "We  have 
here  twenty-eight  officers  and  seven  hundred  and  eighty-two 
enlisted  men;  and  en  route  for  Chattanooga,  ninety-three 
officers  and  nine  hundred  and  seven  men,  making  one  thou 
sand  eight  hundred  and  ten  on  hand  that  I  will  exchange  for  a 
like  number  of  my  own  men,  captured  by  you  in  this  campaign, 
who  belong  to  regiments  with  me,  and  who  can  resume  their 
places  at  once,  as  I  take  it  for  granted  you  will  do  the  same 
with  yours.  In  other  words,  for  these  men  I  am  not  willing 
to  take  equivalents  belonging  to  other  armies  than  my  own, 
or  who  belong  to  regiments  whose  times  are  out  and  who  have 
been  discharged. 

"  By  your  laws  all  men  eligible  for  service  are  ipso  facto 
soldiers,  and  a  very  good  one  it  is  ;  and,  if  needed  for  civil 
duty,  they  are  simply  detailed  soldiers.  "We  found  in  Atlanta 
about  a  thousand  of  these  fellows,  and  I  am  satisfied  they  are 
fit  subjects  of  exchange  ;  and  if  you  will  release  an  equal  num- 


230  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

ber  of  our  poor  fellows  at  Anderson  I  will  gather  these  together 
and  send  them  as  prisoners.  They  seem  to  have  been  detailed 
for  railroad  and  shop  duty,  and  I  do  not  ask  for  them  an  equal 
number  of  my  trained  soldiers,  but  will  take  men  belonging 
to  any  part  of  the  United  States  army  subject  to  your 
control. 

"  We  hold  a  good  many  of  your  men  styled  '  deserters,' 
who  are  really  stragglers,  and  would  be  a  good  offset  to  such 
of  our  stragglers  and  foragers  as  your  cavalry  pick  up  of  our 
men  ;  but  I  am  constrained  to  give  these  men,  though  sorely 
against  the  grain,  the  benefit  of  their  character,  pretended  or 
real. 

"  As  soon  as  Colonel  Warner  agrees  upon  a  few  points  with 
the  officer  you  name,  I  will  send  the  prisoners  to  the  place 
appointed,  and  recall  those  not  beyond  Chattanooga  ;  and  you 
may  count  on  about  two  thousand  in  the  aggregate,  and  get 
ready  to  give  me  a  like  number. 

"  I  am  willing  to  appoint  Eough  and  Keady  or  Jonesboro' 
as  the  place  of  exchange,  as  also  for  the  place  of  delivering 
the  citizens,  male  and  female,  of  Atlanta,  who  start  to  go 
south. 

To  this  Hood  answered  on  the  llth  : — 

"  SIR — I  had  the  honor,  on  the  9th  instant,  to  propose  to 
you  an  exchange  of  prisoners — officers  and  men  captured  by 
both  armies  since  the  commencement  of  the  present  cam 
paign. 

"  On  the  same  day  you  answered  my  communication,  stating 
that  you  accepted  my  offer  ( to  exchange  prisoners  of  war  in 
hand  at  this  moment.'  There  being  no  condition  attached  to 
the  acceptance,  on  your  part,  of  my  offer  to  exchange  prisoners, 
I  regarded  it  as  obligatory  to  the  extent  of  the  number  of 
prisoners  represented  by  you  to  be  within  your  jurisdiction. 

At  the  meeting  on  the  llth  instant  between  our  respective 
staff  officers,  Major  J.  B.  Eustis  and  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Warner,  intended  to  arrange  such  preliminaries  as  the  time 


TAKING    BREATH.  231 

and  place  of  delivery,  etc.,  a  communication  was  received  from 
you  rendering,  I  regret  to  inform  you,  an  exchange  of  prisoners 
impossible. 

"  Your  refusal  to  receive,  in  exchange,  your  soldiers  belong 
ing  to  '  regiments  whose  times  are  out,  and  who  have  been  dis 
charged,'  discloses  a  fixed  purpose  on  the  part  of  your  Govern 
ment  to  doom  to  hopeless  captivity  those  prisoners  whose 
term  of  service  have  expired,  or  will  soon  expire. 

"  The  new  principle  which  you  seek  to  interpolate  on  the 
cartel  of  our  respective  governments,  as  well  as  upon  the  laws 
and  customs  of  war,  will  not  be  sanctioned  by  me.  AIL  captives 
taken  in  war,  who  owe  no  obligations  to  the  captors,  must 
stand  upon  the  same  equal  footing.  The  duration  of  these 
terms  of  service  can  certainly  impose  no  duties  or  obligations 
on  the  captors.  The  volunteer  of  a  day,  and  the  conscript  for 
the  war,  who  may  be  captured  in  war,  are  equally  subject  to 
all  the  burdens,  and  equally  entitled  to  all  the  rights  secured 
by  the  laws  of  nations.  This  principle  is  distinctly  conceded 
in  the  cartel  entered  into  by  our  respective  governments,  and 
is  sanctioned  by  honor,  justice,  and  the  public  law  of  all 
civilized  nations. 

"  My  offer  to  exchange  the  prisoners  captured  during  the 
campaign  precludes  an  intention  on  my  part  in  the  delivery  to 
discriminate  between  your  prisoners,  as  all  would  have  been 
delivered  ;  and  even  had  it  been  intended,  this  discrimination 
between  your  men,  whose  term  of  service  had  and  had  not 
expired,  would  have  been  impossible,  and  could  not  have  been 
effected,  as  I  had  no  reliable  means  of  ascertaining  what  por 
tion  of  your  men  were  entitled  to  their  discharge. 

"  Your  avowal  that  this  class  of  your  soldiers  will  not  be 
exchanged,  but  will  be  rewarded  by  the  sufferings  and  priva 
tions  incident  to  military  imprisonment  because  their  boldness 
and  courage  subjected  them  to  capture,  although  their  terms 
of  service  had  nearly  expired,  is  deeply  regretted  by  me,  as  I 
have  the  earnest  desire  of  my  Government  to  release  from  pro 
longed  confinement  the  large  number  of  prisoners  held  by 
both  parties. 


232  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

"  Permit  me  to  hope  that  this  declared  policy  of  your  Gov 
ernment  will  be  reconsidered,  as  it  is  unjustly  oppressive  to 
those  whom  the  hazards  of  military  service  have  rendered 
prisoners,  and  is  violative  of  the  well-understood  obligations 
of  a  Government  towards  those  who  are  enlisted  in  its 
service. 

"  As  was  proper,  I  notified  my  Government  of  my  offer  to 
you  to  effect  an  exchange  of  prisoners  captured  during  this 
campaign ;  and  not  only  was  my  action  approved,  but  my 
Government  placed  at  my  entire  disposal  for  immediate  ex 
change,  man  for  man,  all  the  prisoners  at  Andersonville. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  renew  my  offer  to  exchange  prisoners 
as  proposed  in  my  first  communication,  and  remain  your 
obedient  servant, 

"J.  B.  HOOD, 

"  General." 

By  gathering  up  all  the  Confederate  prisoners  at  Chatta 
nooga  and  Atlanta,  and  all  small  squads  in  various  quarters, 
Sherman  succeeded  in  collecting  about  two  thousand  of  them, 
and,  notwithstanding  the  difficulties  raised  in  the  foregoing 
correspondence,  a  special  exchange  of  these  for  an  equal  num 
ber  of  Union  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy  was  presently 
agreed  upon  and  carried  into  effect. 

It  was  found  necessary  to  confine  the  operations  of  the  long 
lines  of  military  railways  connecting  Atlanta  with  the  Ohio 
Kiver  to  the  transportation  of  troops  and  materials  of  war. 
Sherman  gave  the  most  stringent  orders  on  this  subject  to  all 
his  subordinates  having  charge  of  the  matter.  They  were  not 
to  allow  a  person  or  thing  not  needed  and  intended  for  the 
army  to  come  to  the  front,  nor  a  person  or  thing  not  sent  from 
the  army  to  go  to  the  rear,  without  passes  from  himself  or  one 
of  the  three  army  commanders.  Such  passes  were  very  spar 
ingly  given,  and  only  in  clearly  exceptional  cases.  Every  ton 
of  freight,  animate  or  inanimate,  not  strictly  necessary  for  the 
immediate  purposes  of  his  army,  diverted  just  so  much  power 
and  occupied  just  so  much  space  absolutely  needed  for  those 


TAKING  BREATH.  233 

purposes.  The  railways  had  not  sufficient  capacity  to  serve 
both  the  army  and  the  citizens,  and  the  army  alone  was  now  to 
be  considered. 

We  may  now  glance  briefly  at  Sherman's  correspondence 
during  this  interval  and  the  preceding  campaign. 

With  regard  to  the  treatment  of  guerrillas  he  wrote  to  Gen 
eral  Burbridge  in  June  : — 

"  Even  on  the  Southern  State-rights  theory,  Kentucky  has 
not  seceded.  Her  people,  by  their  vote  and  by  their  action, 
have  adhered  to  their  allegiance  to  the  National  Government 
and  the  South  would  now  coerce  her  out  of  our  Union  and  into 
theirs, — the  very  dogma  of  coercion  upon  which  so  much  stress 
was  laid  at  the  outset  of  the  war,  and  which  carried  into  rebel 
lion  the  people  of  the  Middle  or  Border  Slave  States.  But 
politics  aside,  these  acts  of  the  so-called  partisans  or  guerril 
las  are  nothing  but  simple  murder,  horse-stealing,  arson,  and 
other  well-defined  crimes  which  do  not  sound  as  well  under 
their  true  names  as  the  more  agreeable  ones  of  warlike  mean 
ing.  Now,  before  starting  on  this  campaign,  I  foresaw,  as  you 
remember,  that  this  very  case  would  arise,  and  I  asked  Gov 
ernor  Bramlette  to  at  once  organize  in  each  county  a  small 
trustworthy  band,  under  the  sheriff,  if  possible,  and  at  once  ar 
rest  every  man  in  the  community  who  was  dangerous  to  it,  and 
also  every  fellow  hanging  about  the  towns,  villages,  and  cross 
roads  who  had  no  honest  calling,  the  material  out  of  which 
guerrillas  are  made  up ;  but  this  sweeping  exercise  of  power 
doubtless  seemed  to  the  governor  rather  arbitrary.  The  fact 
is,  in  our  country  personal  liberty  has  been  so  well  secured,  that 
public  Safety  is  lost  sight  of  in  our  laws  and  constitutions  ;  and 
the  fact  is  we  are  thrown  back  a  hundred  years  in  civiliza 
tion,  law,  and  every  thing  else,  and  will  go  right  straight  to 
anarchy  and  the  devil,  if  somebody  don't  arrest  our  downward 
progress.  We,  the  military,  must  do  it,  and  we  have  right  and 
law  on  our  side.  All  governments  and  communities  have  a 
right  to  guard  against  real  or  even  supposed  danger.  The 
whole  people  of  Kentucky  must  not  be  kept  in  a  state  of  sus- 


234  SHERMAN   AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

pense  and  real  danger,  lest  a  few  innocent  men  should  be 
wrongfully  accused. 

"  1st.  You  may  order  all  your  post  and  district  commanders, 
that  guerrillas  are  not  soldiers,  but  wild  beasts,  unknown  to 
the  usage  of  war.  To  be  recognized  as  soldiers,  they  must  be 
enlisted,  enrolled,  officered,  uniformed,  armed,  and  equipped 
by  some  recognized  belligerent  power,  and  must,  if  detached 
from  a  main  army,  be  of  sufficient  strength,  with  written  orders 
from  some  army  commander,  to  do  some  military  thing.  Of 
course,  we  have  recognized  the  Confederate  Government  as  a 
belligerent  power,  but  deny  their  right  to  our  lands,  territories, 
rivers,  coasts,  and  nationality,  admitting  the  right  to  rebel 
and  move  to  some  other  country,  where  laws  and  customs  are 
more  in  accordance  with  their  own  ideas  and  prejudices. 

"  2cL  The  civil  power  being  sufficient  to  protect  life  and  prop 
erty,  '  ex  necessitate  rei,  and  to  prevent  anarchy,  '  which  nature 
abhors,'  the  military  steps  in,  and  is  rightful,  constitutional, 
and  lawful.  Under  this  law,  everybody  can  be  made  to  '  stay 
at  home,  and  mind  his  or  her  own  business,'  and  if  they  won't 
do  that,  can  be  sent  away  where  they  won't  keep  their  honest 
neighbors  in  fear  of  danger,  robbery,  and  insult. 

"  3d.  Your  military  commanders,  provost-marshals,  and  other 
agents,  may  arrest  all  males  and  females  who  have  encouraged 
or  harbored  guerrillas  and  robbers,  and  you  may  cause  them  to 
be  collected  in  Louisville  ;  and  when  you  have  enough,  say 
three  hundred  or  four  hundred,  I  will  cause  them  to  be  sent 
down  the  Mississippi,  through  their  guerrilla  gauntlet,  and  by 
a  sailing  ship  send  them  to  a  land  where  they  may  take  their 
negroes  and  make  a  colony,  with  laws  and  a  future  of  their 
own.  If  they  won't  live  in  peace  in  such  a  garden  as  Ken 
tucky,  why  'we  will  kindly  send  them  to  another,  if  not  a  better 
land,  and  surely  this  would  be  a  kindness  and  a  God's  blessing 
to  Kentucky.  I  wish  you  to  be  careful  that  no  personalities 
are  mixed  up  in  this ;  nor  does  a  full  and  generous  love  of 
country,  '  of  the  South,'  of  their  State  or  country,  form  a 
cause  of  banishment,  but  that  devilish  spirit  which  will  not 
be  satisfied,  and  that  makes  war  the  pretext  for  murder. 


TAKING  BREATH.  235 

arson,  theft  in  all  its  grades,  and  all  the  crimes  of  human 
nature. 

"  My  own  preference  was  and  is  '  that  the  civil  authorities  of 
Kentucky  would  and  could  do  this  in  that  State  ;  but  if  they 
will  not,  or  cannot,  then  we  must,  for  it  must  be  done.  There 
must  be  an  'end  to  strife,'  and  the  honest,  industrious  people 
of  Kentucky,  and  the  whole  world,  will  be  benefited  and  re 
joiced  at  the  conclusion,  however  arrived  at.  I  use  no  con 
cealment  in  saying  that  I  do  not  object  to  men  or  women 
having  what  they  call  '  Southern  feelings,'  if  confined  to  love 
of  country,  and  of  peace,  honor,  and  security,  and  even  of 
little  family  pride ;  but  these  become  l  crimes '  when  enlarged 
to  mean  love  of  murder,  of  war,  desolation,  famine,  and  ah1  the 
horrible  attendants  of  anarchy.'- ' 

A  few  days  later,  on  the  5th  of  July,  Sherman's  representa 
tions  to  the  "War  Department,  to  the  like  effect,  induced  Presi 
dent  Lincoln  to  order  the  declaration  of  martial  law  and  the 
suspension  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  throughout  Kentucky. 

"With  regard  to  the  use  of  torpedoes,  concerning  which  he 
apprehended  trouble,  he  wrote  in  advance  to  General  Steed- 
man,  left  in  command  at  Chattanooga  : — 

"  As  the  question  may  arise,  and  you  have  a  right  to  tie 
support  of  any  authority,  I  now  decide  that  the  use  of  the 
torpedo  is  justifiable  in  war,  in  advance  of  an  army,  so  as  to 
make  his  advance  up  a  river  or  over  a  road  more  dangerous 
and  difficult.  But  after  the  adversary  has  gained  the  coun 
try  by  fair  warlike  means,  then  the  case  entirely  changes. 

"  The  use  of  torpedoes  in  blowing  up  our  cars  and  the  road 
after  they  are  in  our  possession,  is  simply  malicious.  It  can 
not  alter  the  great  problem,  but  simply  makes  trouble.  Now 
if  torpedoes  are  found  in  the  possession  of  an  enemy  to  our 
rear,  you  may  cause  them  to  be  put  on  the  ground,  and  tested 
by  wagon  loads  of  prisoners,  or  if  need  be,  by  citizens  im 
plicated  in  their  use.  In  like  manner,  if  a  torpedo  is  sus 
pected  on  any  part  of  the  road,  order  the  point  to  be  tested 


236  SHERMAN   AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

by  a  car-load  of  prisoners,  or  citizens  implicated,  drawn  by  a 
long  rope.  Of  course  an  enemy  cannot  complain  of  his  own 
traps." 

At  this  time  Sherman  considered  the  expediency  of  enlisting 
negroes  in  the  army  as  an  open  question,  which  he  was,  indeed, 
willing  and  desirous  to  have  decided  by  a  fair  test,  but  still  an 
open  one ;  while  their  adaptation  to  service  as  teamsters  and 
laborers  he  regarded  as  demonstrated  by  experience,  and  the 
necessity  for  their  use  in  some  capacity  as  obvious.  Northern 
Georgia  having  been  almost  denuded  of  its  able-bodied  colored 
population  by  their  removal  by  their  former  masters  to  the 
southern  portion  of  the  State,  and  the  number  still  available 
not  being  more  than  sufficient  to  fill  up  the  ranks  of  the  ex 
isting  colored  regiments  already  belonging  to  his  army,  he 
opposed  the  practice,  just  then  begun,  of  sending  commis 
sioners  to  his  command  to  recruit  for  men  to  fill  the  quotas  of 
the  Northern  States.  Under  date  of  July  30,  he  wrote  to  Mr. 
John  A.  Spooner,  agent  for  the  State  of  Massachusetts,  then 
at  Nashville  : — 

"On  applying  to  General  Webster,  at  Nashville,  he  will 
grant  you  a  pass  through  our  lines  to  those  States  ;  and,  as  I 
have  had  considerable  experience  in  those  States,  I  would  sug 
gest  recruiting  depots  to  be  established  at  Macon  and  Colum 
bus,  Mississippi-;  Selma,  Montgomery,  and  Mobile,  Alabama  ; 
and  Columbus,  Milledgeville,  and  Savannah,  Georgia. 

"  I  do  not  see  that  the  law  restricts  you  to  black  recruits, 
but  you  are  at  liberty  to  collect  white  recruits  also.  It  is 
waste  of  time  and  money  to  open  rendezvous  in  northwest 
Georgia,  for  I  assure  you  I  have  not  seen  an  able-bodied  man, 
black  or  white,  there,  fit  for  a  soldier,  who  was  not  in  this 
army  or  the  one  opposed  to  it. 

"  You  speak  of  the  impression  going  abroad  that  I  am  op 
posed  to  the  organization  of  colored  regiments.  My  opinions 
are  usually  very  positive,  and  there  is  no  reason  why  you 
should  not  know  them.  Though  entertaining  profound  rever- 


TAKING  BREATH.  237 

ence  for  our  Congress,  I  do  doubt  their  wisdom  in  the  passage 
of  this  law  : 

"  1.  Because  civilian  agents  about  an  army  are  a  nuisance. 

"  2.  The  duty  of  citizens  to  fight  for  their  country  is  too 
sacred  a  one  to  be  peddled  off  by  buying  up  the  refuse  of 
other  States. 

"  3.  It  is  unjust  to  the  brave  soldiers  and  volunteers  who  are 
fighting  as  those  who  compose  this  army  do,  to  place  them  on 
a  par  with  the  class  of  recruits  you  are  after. 

"  4.  The  negro  is  in  a  transition  state,  and  is  not  the  equal 
of  the  white  man. 

"  5.  He  is  liberated  from  his  bondage  by  act  of  war,  and  the 
armies  in  the  field  are  entitled  to  all  his  assistance  in  labor 
and  fighting,  in  addition  to  the  proper  quotas  of  the  States. 

"  6.  This  bidding  and  bartering  for  recruits,  white  and  black, 
has  delayed  the  re-enforcement  of  the  armies  at  the  times 
when  such  re-enforcements  would  have  enabled  us  to  make 
our  successes  permanent. 

"  7.  The  law  is  an  experiment  which,  pending  war,  is  unwise 
and  unsafe,  and  has  delayed  the  universal  draft,  which  I  firmly 
believe  will  become  necessary  to  overcome  the  wide-spread 
resistance  offered  us  ;  and  I  also  believe  the  universal  draft 
will  be  wise  and  beneficial,  for,  under  the  providence  of  God, 
it  will  separate  the  sheep  from  the  goats,  and  demonstrate 
what  citizens  will  fight  for  their  country,  and  what  will  only 
talk. 

"  No  one  will  infer  from  this  that  I  am  not  a  friend  of  the 
negro  as  well  as  the  white  race.  I  contend  that  the  treason 
and  rebellion  of  the  master  freed  the  slave,  and  the  armies  I 
have  commanded  have  conducted  to  safe  points  more  negroes 
than  those  of  any  general  officer  in  the  army ;  but  I  prefer 
negroes  for  pioneers,  teamsters,  cooks,  and  servants ;  others 
gradually  to  experiment  in  the  art  of  the  soldier,  beginning 
with  the  duties  of  local  garrisons,  such  as  we  had  at  Memphis, 
Vicksburg,  Natchez,  Nashville,  and  Chattanooga  ;  but  I  would 
not  draw  on  the  poor  race  for  too  large  a  proportion  of  its 
active,  athletic  young  men,  for  some  must  remain  to  seek  new 


238  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS 

homes,  and  provide  for  the  old  and  young,  the  feeble  and 
helpless. 

"  These  are  some  of  my  peculiar  notions,  but  I  assure  you 
they  are  shared  by  a  large  proportion  of  our  fighting  men." 

In  further  explanation  of  these  views,  he  subsequently  wrote 
to  Adjutant-General  Thomas,  then  in  special  charge  of  the 
duty  of  raising  colored  troops  in  the  West  and  Southwest : — 

"  My  preference  is  to  make  this  radical  change  with  natural 
slowness.  If  negroes  are  taken  as  soldiers  by  undue  influence 
or  force,  and  compelled  to  leave  their  women  in  the  uncertainty 
of  their  new  condition,  they  cannot  be  relied  on  ;  but  if  they 
can  put  their  families  in  some  safe  place,  and  then  earn  money 
as  soldiers  or  laborers,  the  transition  will  be  more  easy  and 
the  effect  more  permanent.  What  my  order  contemplated  was 
the  eagerness  of  recruiting  captains  and  lieutenants  to  make 
up  their  quota,  in  order  to  be  commissioned.  They  would  use 
a  species  of  force  or  undue  influence,  and  break  up  our  gangs 
of  laborers,  as  necessary  as  soldiers.  We  find  gangs  of  negro 
laborers,  well  organized,  on  the  Mississippi,  at  Nashville,  and 
along  the  railroads,  most  useful,  and  I  have  used  them  with 
great  success  as  pioneer  companies  attached  to  divisions  ;  and 
I  think  it  would  be  well  if  a  law  would  sanction  such  an  organ 
ization,  say  of  one  hundred  to  each  division  of  four  thousand 
men.  The  first  step  in  the  liberation  of  the  negro  from 
bondage  will  be  to  get  him  and  family  to  a  place  of  safety ; 
then  to  afford  him  the  means  of  providing  for  his  family,  for 
their  instincts  are  very  strong  ;  then  gradually  use  a  propor 
tion,  greater  and  greater  each  year,  as  sailors  and  soldiers. 
There  will  be  no  great  difficulty  in  our  absorbing  the  four 
millions  of  slaves  in  this  great  industrious  country  of  ours  ; 
and,  being  lost  to  their  masters,  the  cause  of  the  war  is  gone, 
for  this  great  money  interest  then  ceases  to  be  an  element  in 
'  our  politics  and  civil  economy.  If  you  divert  too  large  a  pro 
portion  of  the  able-bodied  men  into  the  ranks,  you  will  leave 
too  large  a  class  of  black  paupers  on  our  hands. 


TAKING  BREATH.  239 

"  The  great  mass  of  our  soldiery  must  be  of  the  white  race, 
and  the  black  troops  should  for  some  years  be  used  with  cau 
tion,  and  with  due  regard  to  the  prejudice  of  the  races.  As 
was  to  be  expected,  in  some  instances  they  have  done  well,  in 
others,  badly  ;  but,  on  the  whole,  the  experiment  is  worthy  a 
fair  trial,  and  all  I  ask  is,  that  it  be  not  forced  beyond  the  laws 
of  natural  development." 

On  the  29th  of  August  he  issued  the  following  compre 
hensive  order  on  the  subject  of  trade  within  the  limits  of  his 
command,  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  the  provisions  of 
the  act  of  Congress,  approved  July  2,  1864,  and  the  regula 
tions  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  made  in  pursuance 
thereof  : — 

"  I.  All  trade  is  prohibited  near  armies  in  the  field,  or  moving 
columns  of  troops,  save  that  necessary  to  supply  the  wants  of 
the  troops  themselves.  Quartermasters  and  commissaries  will 
take  such  supplies  as  are  needed  in  the  countries  passed 
through,  giving  receipts,  and  taking  the  articles  up  on  their 
returns.  When  cotton  is  found,  and  transportation  to  the  rear 
is  easy  and  does  not  interfere  with  the  supplies  of  the  army 
dependent  on  the  route,  the  quartermaster  will  ship  the  cotton 
to  the  quartermaster  at  Nashville  or  Memphis,  who  will  de 
liver  it  to  the  agent  of  the  Treasury  Department.  It  will  be 
treated  as  captured  property  of  an  enemy,  and  invoiced  ac 
cordingly.  No  claim  of  private  interest  in  it  will  be  enter 
tained  by  the  military  authorities. 

"  II.  In  departments  and  military  districts,  embracing  a 
country  within  our  military  control,  the  commanders  of  such 
departments  and  districts  may  permit  a  trade  in  articles  not 
contraband  of  war  or  damaging  to  the  operations  of  the  army 
at  the  front,  through  the  properly  appointed  agents  and  sub- 
agents  of  the  Treasury  Department,  to  an  extent  proportionate 
to  the  necessities  of  the  peaceful  and  worthy  inhabitants  of  the 
localities  described  ;  but  as  trade  and  the  benefits  of  civil  gov 
ernment  are  conditions  not  only  of  the  fidelity  of  the  people, 
but  also  of  an  ability  to  maintain  peace  and  order  in  their  dis- 


240  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

trict,  county,  or  locality,  commanding  officers  will  give  notic'e 
that  all  trade  will  cease  where  guerrillas  are  tolerated  and 
encouraged  ;  and  moreover,  that  in  such  districts  and  localities, 
the  army  or  detachments  sent  to  maintain  the  peace  must  be 
maintained  by  the  district  or  locality  that  tolerates  or  en 
courages  such  guerrillas. 

"  III.  Ah1  military  officers  will  assist  the  agents  of  the  Treas 
ury  Department  in  securing  the  possession  of  all  abandoned 
property  and  estates  subject  to  confiscation  under  the  law. 

"  IV.  The  use  of  weapons  for  hunting  purposes  is  too  dan 
gerous  to  be  allowed  at  this  time,  and  therefore  the  introduc 
tion  of  all  arms  and  powder,  percussion-caps,  bullets,  shot, 
lead,  or  any  thing  used  in  connection  with  firearms,  is  pro 
hibited  absolutely,  save  by  the  proper  agents  of  the  United 
States  ;  and  when  the  inhabitants  require  and  can  be  trusted 
with  such  things  for  self-defence,  or  for  aiding  in  maintaining 
the  peace  and  safety  of  their  families  and  property,  command 
ing  officers  may  issue  the  same  out  of  the  public  stores  in 
limited  quantities. 

"  V.  Medicines  and  clothing,  as  well  as  salt,  meats,  and  pro 
visions,  being  quasi  -contraband  of  war,  according  to  the  con 
dition  of  the  district  or  locality,  when  offered  for  sale,  will  be 
regulated  by  local  commanders,  in  connection  with  the  agents 
of  the  Treasury  Department. 

"  YI.  In  articles  non-contraband,  such  as  the  clothing  needed 
for  women  and  children,  groceries  and  imported  articles,  the 
trade  should  be  left  to  the  Treasury  agents,  as  matters  too  un 
important  to  be  noticed  by  military  men. 

"  VII.  When  military  officers  can  indicate  a  preference  to 
the  class  of  men  allowed  to  trade,  they  will  always  give  the 
preference  to  men  who  have  served  the  Government  as  soldiers, 
and  are  wounded  or  incapacitated  from  further  service  by  such 
wounds  or  sickness.  Men  who  manifest  loyalty  by  oaths,  and 
nothing  more,  are  entitled  to  live,  but  not  to  ask  favors  of  a 
Government  that  demands  acts  and  personal  sacrifices." 


HOOD'S   INVASION. 


CHAPTEE    XIX. 

HOOD'S   INVASION. 

THE  condition  of  affairs  in  the  several  theatres  of  war  in  the 
month  of  September,  1864,  may  be  summed  up  in  a  few  words. 

Grant  held  Lee  firmly  at  Petersburg,  with  a  large  force  under 
Sheridan  stopping  the  debouches  from  the  Valley  of  the  Shen- 
andoah,  and  showed  an  evident  purpose  of  persisting  in  his 
operations  until  a  decisive  result  should  be  reached.  In  North 
and  South  Carolina  matters  were  passive.  Sherman,  as  we 
have  seen,  was  at  Atlanta  and  Hood  southwest  of  that  place, 
both  watching  each  other  ;  each  preparing  to  take  the  initia 
tive.  Along  the  Mississippi  and  west  of  that  river  no  opera 
tions  of  importance  were  in  progress.  Mobile  was  constantly 
threatened,  more  to  compel  the  Confederates  to  keep  a  garri 
son  there  than  with  any  intention  of  resorting  to  decisive 
measures.  For  practical  purposes,  all  the  troops  of  the  enemy 
west  of  the  Mississippi  might  be  considered  out  of  the  war, 
since,  unless  by  some  unlikely  accident,  they  were  powerless 
to  influence  the  decisive  campaigns  about  to  commence. 

In  point  of  fact,  the  issue  of  the  war  was  now  concentrated 
upon  the  result  of  the  approaching  campaigns  of  the  two  main 
armies  on  either  side.  It  was  obvious  that  the  Union  armies 
would,  if  allowed  to  complete  all  their  preparations  and  select 
their  time  and  direction,  continue  the  offensive.  Should  Sher 
man  move  to  the  southeast,  while  Hood  maintained  his  pres 
ent  position,  it  would  be  in  the  power  of  the  former,  should  he 
be  able  to  reach  the  sea-coast  in  safety,  to  place  himself  in  com 
munication  with  Grant,  and  thus  wrest  from  the  Confederates 
their  great  advantage  of  interior  lines.  Under  these  circum 
stances,  it  was  evidently  Hood's  true  policy  to  abandon  all  at 
tempts  to  hold  the  line  of  the  Chattahoochee  or  the  country  west 

16 


242  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

of  it,  and  placing  his  army  east  of  Atlanta,  to  be  prepared  to  resist 
an  advance  of  Sherman  down  the  Atlantic  slope,  or  to  operate 
upon  his  flanks  in  case  he  should  essay  a  movement  towards 
the  Gulf.  At  the  same  time  the  Confederate  cavalry  should 
have  been  constantly  engaged  in  destroying  the  railways  lead 
ing  to  the  north,  thus  interrupting  Sherman's  communications, 
and  retarding,  if  not  entirely  preventing,  the  accumulation  of 
the  ammunition  and  other  stores  requisite  to  enable  him  to 
push  the  invasion.  Had  Hood's  army  been  held  between  Lee 
and  Sherman,  the  Confederates  could,  at  some  favorable 
moment,  have  concentrated  the  bulk  of  both  their  main 
armies,  augmented  by  numerous  garrisons  and  detachments, 
upon  either  theatre  of  war,  according  to  circumstances,  and 
placing  one  army  on  the  strict  defensive,  suddenly  assume  the 
bold  offensive  with  the  other,  with  greater  chances  of  success 
than  were  presented  by  any  other  course. 

But  Jefferson  Davis  saw  only  a  foe  to  be  destroyed  and  but 
one  speedy  means  of  destroying  him.  To  have  followed  the 
course  we  have  indicated,  might  have  appeared  to  the  public 
and  the  press  of  the  Confederacy  as  an  indorsement  of  Johns 
ton's  mode  of  warfare.  Such  a  thing  could  not  be  tolerated 
for  an  instant.  Hurrying  from  Richmond  to  the  West,  Davis 
visited  his  army,  conversed  with  his  generals,  and  gave  his 
orders  for  their  future  government.  To  the  army  he  promised 
that  their  feet  should  again  press  the  soil  of  Tennessee.  To 
the  citizens  he  avowed  that  within  thirty  days  the  barbarous 
invader  would  be  driven  from  their  territory.  The  retreat  of 
Sherman  from  Atlanta,  he  said,  should  be  like  Napoleon's 
from  Moscow. 

About  the  20th  of  September,  Forrest,  with  his  cavalry, 
crossed  the  Tennessee  near  "Waterloo,  Alabama,  destroyed  a 
portion  of  the  railway  between  Decatur  and  Athens,  'and  on  the 
23d  appeared  before  the  latter  place,  and  drove  the  garrison, 
consisting  of  six  hundred  men  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Sixth, 
One  Hundred  and  Tenth,  and  One  Hundred  and  Eleventh 
regiments  of  colored  troops,  and  Third  Tennessee  Cavalry, 
the  whole  under  command  of  Colonel  Campbell,  of  the  One 


HOOD'S   INVASION.  243 

Hundred  and  Tenth,  into  the  fort  constructed  for  the  defence 
of  the  place.  On  the  24th,  Forrest  having  completely  invested 
the  fort,  succeeded  in  persuading  Colonel  Campbell,  in  a  per 
sonal  interview  which  that  officer  granted  him,  after  refusing 
to  comply  with  his  summons  to  surrender,  that  it  was  useless 
to  resist  the  odds  against  the  garrison ;  and  Colonel  Campbell 
accordingly  capitulated.  Half  an  hour  afterwards  the  Nine 
teenth  Michigan  and  One  Hundred  and  Second  Ohio  regiments 
arrived,  but  Forrest  being  now  at  liberty  to  use  his  entire 
force  against  them,  they  were  soon  compelled  to  yield,  after  a 
hard  fight.  Forrest  then  moved  on,  destroying  the  railway 
as  he  went,  until  the  27th,  when  he  arrived  before  Pulaski, 
where  he  was  confronted  and  successfully  resisted  by  a  garri 
son  hastily  collected  by  Major-General  Lovell  H.  Rousseau. 
Finding  his  progress  barred  in  this  direction,  on  the  29th 
Forrest  swung  round  to  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  rail 
way  and  began  to  break  it  up  between  Tullahoma  and  Decherd ; 
but  General  Rousseau,  divining  this  plan,  moved  so  rapidly 
by  rail  through  Nashville  to  Tullahoma  that  he  reached  that 
place  before  the  main  body  of  Forrest's  command  could  come 
up,  and  Major-General  Steedman  with  five  thousand  men  from 
Chattanooga,  having  crossed  the  Tennessee  on  the  same  day 
to  check  his  movements,  Forrest  fell  back  through  Fayetteville 
during  the  night.  The  next  day  the  railway  was  again  in 
running  order.  Forrest  then  divided  his  command  into  two 
columns,  one  under  Buford  being  four  thousand  strong,  and 
the  other,  commanded  by  himself  in  person,  numbering  three 
thousand.  Buford  appeared  before  Huntsville  on  the  evening 
of  the  30th,  demanded  the  surrender  of  the  garrison  that  night 
and  again  on  the  following  morning,  and  being  on  both  occa 
sions  refused,  moved  on  Athens  and  attacked  that  place  on  the 
afternoon  of  October  1st  and  the  morning  of  the  2d,  but  was 
gallantly  repulsed  by  the  Seventy-third  Indiana,  under  Lieuten 
ant-Colonel  Slade,  which  Brigadier-General  R.  S.  Granger  had 
just  sent  to  reoccupy  the  place.  Buford  then  abandoned  his 
portion  of  the  expedition  and  recrossed  the  Tennessee  on  the 
3d  at  Brown's  Ferry.  Forrest,  with  his  own  column,  appeared 


244  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

before  Columbia  on  the  1st  of  October,  but  did  not  attack, 
and  on  the  morning  of  the  3d  he  too  turned  his  face  to  the 
south,  passed  through  Lawrenceburg  on  the  night  of  the  4th, 
and  on  the  6th,  though  closely  pressed,  succeeded  in  effecting 
his  escape  across  the  Tennessee  at  Bainbridge.  Meanwhile, 
dangers  had  been  thickening  in  his  path,  for  Newton's  division 
of  Stanley's  fourth  corps,  now  under  Brigadier-General  Wag 
ner,  left  Atlanta  on  the  26th  and  replaced  Steedman  at  Chatta 
nooga  two  days  later ;  Morgan's  second  division  of  Jefferson 
C.  Davis'  fourteenth  corps  started  north  on  the  29th,  reached 
Stevenson  early  on  the  1st  of  October  and  Huntsville  the  same 
night,  Athens  on  the  night  of  the  2d,  Rogersville  on  the  4th, 
and  came  up  and  skirmished  with  Forrest's  rear-guard  at 
Shoal  Creek  bridge  ;  Rousseau,  with  four  thousand  cavalry 
and  mounted  infantry,  followed  Forrest  from  Columbia,  at 
Pulaski  was  joined  by  Major-General  C.  C.  Washburne  with 
three  thousand  cavalry  from  Memphis,  and  together  they 
reached  Waynesboro'  on  the  6th.  Moreover,  on  the  28th  of 
September,  as  soon  as  he  became  convinced  of  the  enemy's 
designs,  Sherman  had  dispatched  Major-General  Thomas  to 
Nashville  to  take  personal  command  of  the  rear,  and  on  the 
3d,  Thomas  had  reached  that  place  and  put  in  motion  this 
combination,  which  but  for  unforeseen  causes,  such  as  the  rise 
of  Elk  River  in  front  of  Morgan,  must,  in  all  probability,  have 
resulted  in  Forrest's  destruction. 

On  the  1st  of  October,  Hood  began  his  fatal  march  to  the 
north.  Sending  his  cavalry  in  advance  to  move  rapidly 
against  Sherman's  communications  beyond  Marietta,  he 
crossed  the  Chattahooch.ee  with  his  three  corps  of  infantry, 
and  pushed  north  by  way  of  Dallas. 

Leaving  Slocum  with  his  Twentieth  Corps  to  hold  Atlanta 
and  the  railway  bridge  over  the  Chattahoochee,  on  the  4th  of 
October,  in  accordance  with  his  previous  intentions  and  ar 
rangements,  Sherman  marched  with  the  remainder  of  his 
army  to  Smyrna  Camp  Ground,  and  on  the  following  day  to  a 
strong  position  at  Kenesaw  Mountain.  The  enemy's  cavalry 
and  French's  division  of  Stewart's  corps  had  struck  the  rail- 


HOOD'S  INVASION.  245 

way  at  Big  Shanty,  effectually  destroyed  it  and  the  telegraph 
for  a  distance  of  twenty  miles,  and  was  now  moving  on  Alla- 
toona  Pass,  where  were  stored  a  million  of  rations,  guarded 
by  the  Ninety-third  Illinois  regiment,  under  Lieutenant-Col 
onel  Tqurtellotte,  behind  the  redoubts  previously  constructed. 
The  telegraph  wires  being  broken  by  the  enemy,  and  the  in 
termediate  country  occupied  by  his  troops,  Sherman  sent  a 
message  by  signals  to  Brigadier-General  Corse,  who,  as  we 
have  seen,  was  at  Rome  with  his  division  of  the  Fifteenth 
Corps,  directing  that  officer  to  re-enforce  the  threatened  post 
without  delay.  Corse  started  immediately  by  railway  with 
the  Fourth  Minnesota  and  Seventh  Illinois,  and  reached 
Allatoona  at  one  o'clock,  A.  M.,  on  the  5th  of  October ;  but, 
owing  to  an  accident  to  the  train,  it  was  so  late  in  return 
ing  that  no  more  troops  had  arrived  when,  an  hour  after 
Corse's  arrival,  French  with  his  division  appeared  before 
the  place  and  opened  a  brisk  skirmish  fire.  By  daylight, 
the  works  at  Allatoona,  manned  by  one  thousand  nine  hun 
dred  and  forty-four  men,  were  completely  invested  by  French's 
entire  division  of  the  Confederate  army.  At  half-past  eight, 
on  the  5th,  after  a  sharp  cannonade  of  two  hours'  duration, 
General  French  sent  a  note  to  General  Corse,  under  a  flag 
of  truce,  intimating  that  he  would  give  the  garrison  just 
five  minutes  to  surrender,  in  order  to  spare  the  unnecessary 
effusion  of  human  blood.  Corse  instantly  replied  that  he 
should  not  surrender,  and  that  he  was  prepared  for  this  un 
necessary  effusion  of  blood  as  soon  as  his  assailant  chose  to 
begin  it.  The  enemy  immediately  assaulted  with  great  fury ; 
and  again  and  again,  during  the  day,  his  columns  surged 
madly  up  against  the  parapets,  only  to  be  as  often  hurled 
back  with  great  slaughter  by  the  intrepid  little  garrison,  stand 
ing  as  grim  and  immovable  as  the  rock  itself ;  until  at  night 
the  shattered  remnants  of  the  enemy  were  at  length  driven 
from  every  position,  and  the  possession  of  Allatoona  was 
secure.  At  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  Sherman  in  person 
reached  Kenesaw  Mountain,  eighteen  miles  distant,  and 


246  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

thence  saw  and  faintly  heard,  but  only  too  fully  comprehended, 
what  was  transpiring  at  his  depot.  The  distance  was  too 
great  to  offer  any  hope  of  being  able  to  render  direct  assist 
ance  before  the  struggle  should  be  decided,  but  Sherman  at 
once  sent  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  under  Cox,  out  on  the 
Burnt  Hickory  road,  towards  Dallas,  to  move  against  the 
flank  and  rear  of  the  forces  threatening  Allatoona.  From 
mountain  to  mountain  the  little  signal  flags,  spelling  their 
message  in  quiet  defiance  of  hostile  force,  waved  from  Sher 
man  to  Corse  the  words  few  and  simple,  but  of  thrilling  im 
port,  which  announced  to  him  the  presence  of  the  commander- 
in-chief  on  the  overlooking  height  of  Kenesaw,  the  movement  of 
troops  for  his  relief,  and  exhorted  him  to  hold  out  to  the  last. 
Quickly  the  flags  moved  again  with  Corse's  brave  reply,  which 
would  show  his  commander,  even  if  there  had  been  misgiv 
ings  on  the  subject,  that  here  was  a  captain  who  would  fight 
to  the  death  for  Allatoona  and  the  safety  of  the  army,  resting 
at  that  moment  upon  the  unaided  strength  of  his  single  arm, 
But  there  were  no  such  doubts.  No  sooner  did  the  flags  speak 
Corse's  name,  than  Sherman  exclaimed,  "  If  Corse  is  there  he 
will  hold  out.  I  know  the  man !"  In  this  stubborn  defence 
against  apparently  overwhelming  odds,  the  garrison,  number 
ing  less  than  two  thousand,  lost  seven  hundred  and  seven 
officers  and  men  killed  and  wounded ;  among  the  latter, 
Brigadier-General  Corse  himself,  who,  though  struck  in  the 
face  by  a  bullet  about  noon,  declined  to  leave  the  field,  and 
by  his  own  energy  and  spirit  imbued  his  command  with  the 
strength  that  gave  them  the  victory.  Colonel  Kichard  Eowell, 
Seventh  Illinois,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Tourtellotte,  Ninety- 
third  Illinois,  both  of  whom  behaved  with  remarkable  gal 
lantry,  were  also  wounded.  The  garrison  captured  eight  hun 
dred  muskets,  three  stands  of  colors,  and  four  hundred  and 
eleven  prisoners,  and  after  the  enemy  retired,  buried  two  hun 
dred  and  thirty-one  of  their  men,  who  were  killed  outright. 
The  arrival  of  the  Fourth  and  Fourteenth  Corps  at  Pine 
Mountain,  and  the  movement  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  on 


HOOD'S   INVASION.  247 

Dallas,  hastened  French's  withdrawal  towards  the  latter  place, 
after  his  severe  defeat. 

Kood  now  moved  rapidly  to  the  northwest,  aiming  to  reach 
the  railway  at  Resaca.  On  the  6th  and  7th,  holding  his  army 
about  Kenesaw,  Big  Shanty,  and  Kenesaw  Mountain,  Sher 
man  sent  his  cavalry  towards  Burnt  Hickory  and  Dallas,  and 
discovered  this  movement  of  the  enemy.  Accordingly,  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  10th,  he  put  the  troops  in  motion  through 
Allatoona  Pass,  on  Kingston.  By  a  forced  march  of  thirty-eight 
miles,  the  three  armies  reached  Kingston  on  the  llth.  On  the 
12th,  the  march  was  continued  to  Eome,  a  brigade  of  Hazen's 
division  of  Osterhaus'  fifteenth  corps  being  sent  in  advance, 
by  railway,  from  Allatoona,  to  occupy  the  place,  in  anticipa- 
1  tion  of  Hood's  movement  against  it.  Sherman  pushed  Gar- 
rard's  division  of  cavalry  and  the  Twenty-third  Corps  across 
the  Oostanaula,  to  menace  the  enemy's  flanks,  and  Garrard 
succeeded  in  driving  a  brigade  of  the  enemy  through  the  narrow 
entrance  of  the  valley  of  the  Chattooga,  capturing  two  guns, 
while,  at  the  same  time,  Corse  crossed  the  Etowah  with  his 
division,  and  the  brigade  of  Hazen's  division  that  had  come 
forward  b'y  rail,  and  made  a  reconnoissance  with  a  view  to 
develop  the  force  of  the  enemy  guarding  their  pontoon  bridge, 
sixteen  miles  below.  Having  thus  ascertained  that  Hood's 
movement  upon  Home  had  been  merely  a  feint,  and  that  he 
had  in  fact  crossed  the  Coosa  with  his  entire  army,  and  was 
hastening  with  all  speed  towards  Kesaca  and  Dalton,  Sherman 
put  his  command,  except  Corse's  division,  left  to  hold  Eome, 
in  motion,  on  the  13th,  towards  the  former  place,  and  ordered 
Howard  to  send  forward  Belknap's  division  of  Ransom's 
seventeenth  corps  by  railway  to  the  relief  of  the  garrison,  ar 
riving  about  midnight.  From  Kingston,  Sherman  had  sent 
two  regiments  of  Howard's  army,  under  Colonel  Weaver,  to 
occupy  Eesaca,  and  had  afterwards  caused  them  to  be  re-en 
forced  by  Baum's  brigade  of  John  E.  Smith's  division  of  the 
Fifteenth  Corps.  Hood  appeared  before  the  small  garrison 
with  his  entire  army,  but  General  Baum  showed  so  bold  and 
extended  a  front  that,  probably  retaining  a  vivid  recollection 


248  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

of  Allatoona,  and  knowing  the  contagious  effect  of  such  an 
example  both  upon  besieged  and  besiegers,  Hood  contented 
himself  with  an  attack  by  a  skirmish  line,  and  a  summons  to 
surrender,  coupled  with  a  threat  that  no  prisoners  would  be 
taken  in  case  he  were  compelled  to  carry  the  placeby  assault. 
During  the  parley,  portions  of  Hood's  army  were  engaged  in 
effectually  destroying  the  railway  for  twenty  miles  to  the 
northward,  and  in  capturing  the  small  and  unresisting  gar 
risons  at  Tilton  and  Dalton.  On  the  evening  of  the  14th, 
Sherman,  with  the  main  body  of  the  army,  arrived  in  Eesaca, 
and  on  the  15th,  directing  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  to  move 
to  Snake  Creek  Gap,  and  hold  the  enemy  there,  he  caused 
Stanley,  with  the  Fourth  and  Fourteenth  Corps,  to  move  by 
Tilton,  across  the  mountains  towards  Yillanow,  in  order  to 
strike  Hood  in  flank  or  force  him  to  fight.  But  Hood  evi 
dently  considered  it  his  policy,  at  this  time,  to  avoid  a  battle, 
for  his  lines  gave  way  about  noon  before  the  advance  of  How 
ard's  skirmishers,  and,  followed  by  Howard,  he  escaped 
through  Snake  Creek  Gap  before  Stanley  had  time  to  reach 
the  other  end  of  the  Pass,  and  rapidly  retreated,  in  a  south 
westerly  direction,  down  the  valley  of  the  Coosa,  to  the 
vicinity  of  Gadsden,  and  occupied  the  narrow  gorge  formed  by 
the  Lookout  Mountains  abutting  against  the  river.  On  the 
16th,  Sherman  moved  towards  Lafayette  with  the  view  of  cut 
ting  off  Hood's  retreat,  and  found  him  intrenched  at  Ship's 
Gap  ;  but  "Woods'  division  of  Osterhaus'  fifteenth  corps,  hav 
ing  the  advance,  rapidly  carried  the  advanced  posts,  capturing 
two  companies  of  a  South  Carolina  regiment,  and  driving  the 
remainder  back  on  the  main  body  at  Lafayette.  That  night 
the  armies  went  into  camp  at  Taylor's  Eidge,  where  Ship's 
Gap  divides  it. 

On  the  17th,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  moved  to  Lafayette, 
while  the  other  corps  remained  in  camp  at  the  Kidge. 

On  the  18th,  Howard  crossed  the  Chattooga  at  Tryon's 
Factory,  and  encamped  near  Summerville.  Stanley  moved  in 
the  same  direction,  through  Mattock's  Gap,  in  Taylor's  Eidge, 
crossed  the  river  at  Penn's  Ford,  and  halted  four  miles  be- 


HOOD'S  INVASION.  249 

yond  it.  On  the  19th,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  reached 
Alpine,  and  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  after  a  short  march, 
encamped  at  Summerville,  and,  on  the  20th,  both  these  com 
mands  marched  into  Gaylesville  ;  while  Cox,  with  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps  and  Garrard's  division  of  cavalry,  having  moved 
by  Yillanow,  Dirt  Town,  and  Gover's  Gap,  arrived  on  the  same 
day. 

In  the -mean  while,  Thomas  had  disposed  of  his  small  forces 
so  as  to  oppose  the  greatest  resistance  in  his  power  to  Hood's 
movement  on  Bridgeport  and  Chattanooga,  both  of  which 
places  were  seriously  menaced  by  the  direction  of  his  advance. 
Leaving  Decatur,  Huntsville,  Stevenson,  and  the  rest  of 
Northern  Alabama  to  the  care  of  their  ordinary  garrisons, 
Thomas  caused  Eousseau  to  recall  his  mounted  troops  from 
the  pursuit  of  Forrest  and  concentrate  at  Athens ;  Croxton's 
brigade  of  cavalry  to  observe  and  protect  the  crossings  of  the 
Tennessee  Eiver  from  Decatur  to  Eastport ;  Morgan's  division 
of  Jefferson  C.  Davis'  fourteenth  corps  to  move  by  rail  to 
Chattanooga,  where,  it  will  be  remembered,  Wagner  already 
was  with  Newton's  division  of  Stanley's  fourth  corps,  and 
Steedman  to  follow  Morgan  to  Bridgeport.  On  the  14th, 
Morgan  reached  his  designated  position,  and  Steedman's 
destination  was  also  changed  to  Chattanooga. 

The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  now  posted  near  Little 
River,  with  orders  to  support  the  cavalry  engaged  in  watching 
Hood ;  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  was  at  Cedar  Bluff,  with  orders 
to  lay  a  pontoon  bridge  across  the  Coosa,  and  feel  towards 
Centre  and  Blue  Mountains  ;  and  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
was  held  in  reserve  at  Gaylesville.  In  this  position,  in  the 
heart  of  the  rich  valley  of  the  Chattooga,  in  a  country 
abounding  with  food,  Sherman  determined,  while  living  upon 
the  country,  to  pause  in  his  pursuit  of  his  erratic  enemy,  and 
giving  him  sufficient  rope  wherewith  to  entangle  himself,  to 
watch  his  movements.  Communications  were  established 
with  Eome,  and  a  large  force  put  to  work,  under  Colonel  W. 
W.  Wright,  chief  engineer  of  the  United  States  military  rail 
ways  in  this  division,  in  repairing  the  damages  inflicted  by 


250  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Hood  upon  the  railway.  (Slocum  at  Atlanta  was  ordered  to 
send  out  strong  foraging  parties,  collect  all  the  corn  and  fod 
der  possible,  and  put  his  trains  in  condition  for  service.  As 
early  as  the  21st,  telegraphic  communication  was  restored  be 
tween  Chattanooga  and  Atlanta,  and  by  the  28th,  although 
thirty-four  miles  of  rails  and  ties  had  been  destroyed,  and 
several  important  bridges  carried  away  by  floods,  trains  be 
gan  running  through  on  the  railway. 

Hood  had  turned  westward  from  Gadsden  towards  Decatur, 
and  taken  up  a  position  threatening  the  Chattanooga  and 
Atlanta  railway,  and  at  the  same  time  menacing  Tennes 
see.  His  movements  and  strategy  had  conclusively  de 
monstrated  that  he  had  an  army  at  all  times  capable  of 
endangering  Sherman's  communications,  but  unable  to  meet 
and  cope  with  him  in  battle.  To  follow  Hood  indefinitely 
towards  the  west  and  north  would,  without  much  prospect 
of  overtaking  and  overwhelming  his  army,  be  for  Sherman 
equivalent  to  being  decoyed  out  of  Georgia.  To  remain 
on  the  defensive,  on  the  other  hand,  would  be  to  lose  the 
main  effectiveness  of  the  great  Army  of  the  Centre.  Sher 
man  had  previously  proposed  to  General  Grant,  in  the  early 
stages  of  the  pursuit,  to  break  up  the  railway  from  Chatta 
nooga  to  Atlanta,  and  strike  out  for  Milledgeville,  Millen,  and 
Savannah.  "  Until  we  can  repopulate  Georgia,"  he  wrote,  "  it 
is  useless  to  occupy  it ;  but  the  utter  destruction  of  its  roads, 
houses,  and  people  will  cripple  their  military  resources.  By 
attempting  to  hold  the  roads  we  will  lose  a  thousand  men 
monthly,  and  will  gain  no  result.  I  can  make  the  march,  and 
make  Georgia  howl"  And  again  :  " Hood  may  turn  into  Ten 
nessee  and  Kentucky,  but  I  believe  he  will  be  forced  to  follow 
me.  Instead  of  being  on  the  defensive  I  would  be  on  the 
offensive.  Instead  of  guessing  'at  what  he  means,  he  would 
have  to  guess  at  my  plans.  The  difference,  in  war  is  full 
twenty-five  per  cent.  I  can  make  Savannah,  Charleston, 
or  the  mouth  of  the  Chattahoochee.  I  prefer  to  march 
through  Georgia,  smashing  things,  to  the  sea."  He  now  pro 
posed  to  the  lieutenant-general  to  modify  these  plans,  so  far 


HOOD'S   INVASION.  251 

as  to  give  him  the  choice  of  either  of  the  three  alternatives 
just  named. 

"  I  must  have  alternatives,"  he  said  ;  "else  being  confined  to 
one  route  the  enemy  might  so  oppose  that  delay  and  want 
would  trouble  me  ;  but  having  alternatives,  I  can  take  so 
eccentric  a  course  that  no  general  can  guess  at  my  objective. 
Therefore,  when  you  hear  I  am  off,  have  lookouts  at  Morris 
Island,  S.  C. ;  Ossabaw  Sound,  Georgia ;  Pensacola  and 
Mobile  bays.  I  will  turn  up  somewhere,  and  believe  me  I  can 
take  Macon,  Milledgeville,  Augusta,  and  Savannah,  Georgia, 
and  wind  up  with  closing  the  neck  back  of  Charleston,  so  that 
they  will  starve  out.  This  movement  is  not  purely  military 
or  strategic,  but  it  will  illustrate  the  vulnerability  of  the 
South." 

General  Grant  promptly  authorized  the  proposed  move 
ment,  indicating,  however,  his  preference  for  Savannah  as  the 
objective,  and  fixing  Dalton  as  the  northern  limit  for  the  de 
struction  of  the  railway.  Preparations  were  instantly  under 
taken  and  pressed  forward  for  the  consummation  of  these 
plans. 

On  the  26th  of  October,  Sherman  detached  the  Fourth  Corps 
under  Major-General  Stanley,  and  ordered  him  to  proceed  to 
Chattanooga  and  report  to  General  Thomas  at  Nashville.  On 
the  30th  of  October,  he  also  detached  the  Twenty-third  Corps, 
Major-General  Schofield,  with  the  same  destination,  and  dele 
gated  to  Major-General  Thomas  full  power  over  the  troops, 
except  the  four  corps  with  which  he  himself  designed  to  move 
into  Georgia.  This  gave  Thomas  the  two  divisions  of  the 
Sixteenth  Corps,  under  A.  J.  Smith,  then  in  Missouri  but 
on  the  way  to  Tennessee,  the  Fourth  and  Twenty-third 
corps,  as  just  mentioned,  and  all  the  garrisons  in  Tennes 
see,  as  well  as  all  the  cavalry  of  the  Military  Division,  except 
the  division  under  Brigadier-General  Kilpatrick,  which  was 
ordered  to  rendezvous  at  Marietta.  Brevet  Major-General 
Wilson  had  arrived  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  assume 
command  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Centre,  and  he 
was  sent  back  to  Nashville  with  all  dismounted  detachments, 


252  SHERMAN   AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

and  orders  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  collect  the  cavalry  serving 
in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  to  mount,  organize,  and  equip 
them,  and  report  to  Major-General  Thomas  for  duty.  These 
forces,  Sherman  considered,  would  enable  General  Thomas  to 
defend  the  railway  from  Chattanooga  back,  including  Nash 
ville  and  Decatur,  and  give  him  an  army  with  which  he  could 
successfully  cope  with  Hood,  should  the  latter  cross  the  Ten 
nessee  northward.  The  entire  plan  of  the  campaign  was 
communicated  to  General  Thomas,  and  he  was  instructed 
that,  as  an  essential  portion  of  it,  he  was  expected  to  defend 
the  line  of  the  Tennessee  Kiver,  to  hold  Tennessee,  in  any 
event,  and  to  pursue  the  enemy  should  Hood  follow  Sherman. 

On  the  26th,  the  enemy  appeared  in  some  force  before 
Decatur,  but  after  skirmishing  for  three  days  withdrew.  On 
the  31st,  in  spite  of  all  the  efforts  to  the  contrary  of  Croxton's 
brigade  of  cavalry,  which,  as  has  been  seen,  was  engaged  in 
guarding  the  river,  the  enemy  succeeded  in  effecting  a  lodgment 
on  the  north  bank  of  the  Tennessee,  about  three  miles  above 
Florence.  On  the  28th  November,  Forrest,  coining  from  Cor 
inth  with  seventeen  regiments  of  cavalry  and  nine  pieces  of 
artillery,  having  captured  a  gunboat  and  two  transports,  and 
burned  a  third  at  Fort  Heiman,  seventy-five  miles  from  Padu- 
cah,  planted  batteries  above  and  below  Jolmsonville,  and  after 
cannonading  that  place  for  three  days,  during  which  our  troops 
burned  their  transports  and  stores,  withdrew  and  crossed  the 
Tennessee  just  above  the  town. 

The  same  day  Schofield,  with  the  Twenty-third  Corps, 
reached  Nashville  and  was  hurried  on  to  Johnsonville ;  and 
arriving  there  the  night  after  Forrest's  withdrawal,  was  sent 
on  to  join  the  Fourth  Corps  at  Pulaski,  leaving  a  garrison 
at  Johnsonville.  General  Schofield  was  charged  with  the 
immediate  direction  of  the  operations  of  these  two  corps,  with 
instructions  to  watch  Hood's  movements,  and  delay  them 
as  much  as  possible,  without  risking  a  general  engagement, 
so  as  to  allow  time  for  A.  J.  Smith  to  arrive  from  Missouri 
and  for  Wilson  to  remount  his  cavalry.  Thomas'  effective 
force,  at  this  moment,  numbered  twenty-two  thousand  infantry 


HOOD'S   INVASION.  •  253 

and  seven  thousand  seven  hundred  cavalry,  exclusive  of  the 
numerous  detachments  garrisoning  Murfreesboro',  Stevenson, 
Bridgeport,  Huntsville,  Decatur,- and  Chattanooga,  and  dis 
tributed  along  the  railways  to  guard  them.  With  these  he 
had  to  oppose  Beauregard,  with  Hood's  three  corps  and 
Forrest's,  Wheeler's,  and  Eoddy's  cavalry,  now  grouped  about 
Florence,  threatening  the  invasion  of  Middle  Tennessee. 

Meanwhile,  Sherman,  having  completed  his  preparations, 
received  his  final  instructions,  and  explained  his  plans  in  detail, 
under  strict  confidence,  to  his  corps  commanders  and  heads  of 
staff  departments,  had  changed  front  to  the  rear  and  was  once 
more  marching  towards  the  south. 

During  the  campaign  just  closed,  the  army  and  the  country 
were  called  upoA  to  lament  the  death  of  the  gallant  commander 
of  the  Seventeenth  Corps,  Brigadier-General  Thomas  Edward 
Greenfield  Hansom.  He  had  been  suffering  at  the  outset  from 
the  fatal  dysentery  which  caused  his  death,  but  esteeming  it  as 
merely  a  temporary  malady,  and  unwilling  to  quit  his  post  at 
such  a  time,  he  had  remained  in  command,  continuing  to  exert 
himself  day  and  night  to  the  utmost  of  his  power,  until,  on  the 
20th,  on  arriving  at  Gaylesville,  the  aggravated  nature  of 
his  symptoms  compelled  him  to  yield  his  inclinations  and 
go  to  the  rear.  On  the  29th  of  October,  his  end  being 
evidently  nigh  at  hand,  he  was  taken  from  the  stretcher  on 
which  he  was  being  carried  to  Eome,  and  borne  into  a  house 
by  the  roadside,  where  shortly  afterwards  he  breathed  his 
last. 

Born  in  Norwich,  Vermont,  on  the  29th  of  November,  1834, 
and  graduating  at  Norwich  University  in  his  seventeenth  year, 
he  removed  to  Lasalle  County,  Illinois,  in  1851,  and  entered 
upon  the  practice  of  his  profession  as  civil  engineer.  In  1854, 
he  embarked  in  the  real  estate  business,  at  Peru,  Illinois,  in 
connection  with  an  uncle,  Mr.  Gilson,  and  in  December,  1855, 
joined  the  house  of  Galloway  and  Company,  at  Chicago,  who 
were  largely  engaged  in  land  operations.  When  the  rebellion 
broke  out  he  was  living  in  Fayette  County,  Illinois,  acting  as 
an  agent  of  the  Illinois  Central  Eailway  Company.  Imme- 


254  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

diately  after  the  issue  of  the  President's  proclamation  of  April 
16,  1861,  calling  for  seventy-five  thousand  three  months' 
militia,  Ransom  raised  a  company,  which  was  presently  at 
tached  to  the  Eleventh  Regiment  of  Illinois  Volunteers,  where 
of,  by  a  vote  of  the  company  officers,  he  was  elected  major,  and 
duly  commissioned  accordingly  by  the  governor  of  the  State. 
On  the  reorganization  of  the  regiment  for  the  three  years' 
service  at  the  end  of  July,  1861,  Ransom  was  made  its  lieuten 
ant-colonel.  On  the  19th  of  August  he  was  severely  wounded 
in  the  shoulder,  in  a  charge  at  Charleston,  Missouri.  He 
took  part  in  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry,  and  led  his  regiment 
in  the  assault  on  Fort  Donelson,  where  he  was  again  severely 
wounded,  and  narrowly  escaped  death,  his  clothing  being 
pierced  by  six  bullet-holes,  and  his  horse  being  shot  under 
him.  Though  suffering  from  prolonged  sickness,  consequent 
upon  his  wound  and  continued  exposure,  he  insisted  on  re 
maining  with  his  command,  and  being  soon  promoted  to  the 
position  vacated  by  the  appointment  of  Colonel  W.  H.  L. 
"Wallace  as  a  brigadier-general,  led  the  regiment  through  the 
battle  of  Shiloh,  though  again  wounded  in  the  head  in  the 
early  part  of  the  engagement.  In  January,  1863,  he  was 
appointed  a  brigadier-general,  dating  from  the  29th  of  No 
vember  previous,  and  as  such  commanded  a  brigade  of 
Logan's  division  of  McPherson's  seventeenth  corps  during  the 
siege  of  Vicksburg.  Early  in  August  his  brigade  was  sent  to 
occupy  Natchez,  and  was  soon  afterwards  transferred  to  the 
Thirteenth  Corps,  under  Major-General  Ord,  when  that  corps 
was  assigned  to  the  Department  of  the  Gulf,  and  he  was  placed 
in  command  of  a  division.  He  took  part  in  the  brief  occupation 
of  the  Texas  coast  by  General  Banks  in  the  winter  of  1863, 
and  in  the  ill-fated  Red  River  expedition,  being  so  severely 
wounded  in  the  knee  at  the  battle  of  Sabine  Cross-roads,  on 
the  8th  of  April,  1864,  that  the  surgeons  were  divided  in 
opinion  on  the  question  of  amputation.  General  Ransom 
himself  decided  the  dispute  in  favor  of  retaining  the  leg,  and 
recovered,  though  suffering  with  a  stiff  knee,  in  time  to  join 


HOOD'S  INVASION.  255 

Sherman  and  take  command  of  a  division  of  Blair's  seven 
teenth  corps,  just  before  the  capture  of  Atlanta. 

By  his  talents,  his  patience,  his  courage,  his  aptness  for 
command,  he  had  rapidly  mounted  almost  to  the  highest 
rewards  of  his  profession,  when  death  closed  a  career  of  honor 
apparently  without  other  limit.  Young,  enthusiastic,  and  un 
tiring,  brave  and  skilful,  in  Eansom's  death  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee  lost  a  jewel  second  only  in  lustre  to  that  which 
fell  from  its  diadem  in  the  death  of  McPherson. 


256  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 


CHAPTEE  XX. 

THE  COLOES  POINT  TO  THE  SOUTH. 

SHEKMAN  moved  the  Fifteenth  and  Seventeenth  Corps  by 
slow  and  easy  marches  on  the  south  of  the  Coosa  back  to 
the  neighborhood  of  Smyrna  camp-ground,  and  the  Four 
teenth  Corps  to  Kingston,  whither  he  repaired  in  person  on 
the  2d  of  November.  From  that  point  he  directed  all  sur 
plus  artillery,  all  baggage  not  needed  for  the  contemplated 
march,  all  the  sick  and  wounded,  refugees  and  other  encum 
brances  to  be  sent  back  to  Chattanooga,  and  the  three  corps 
above-mentioned,  as  well  as  Kilpatrick's  cavalry,  and  the 
Twentieth  Corps,  then  at  Atlanta,  to  be  put  in  the  most  efficient 
condition  possible  for  the  long  and  difficult  march  before  them. 
This  operation  consumed  the  time  until  the  llth  of  Novem 
ber,  when,  every  thing  being  ready,  General  Corse,  who  still 
remained  at  Rome,  was  directed  to  destroy  the  bridges 
there,  as  well  as  all  foundries,  mills,  shops,  warehouses,  and 
other  property  that  could  be  useful  to  the  enemy,  and  to 
move  to  Kingston.  At  the  same  time  the  railway  in  and 
about  Atlanta,  and  between  the  Etowah  and  the  Chatta- 
hoochee,  was  ordered  to  be  utterly  destroyed.  )  General 
Steedman  was  also  instructed  to  gather  up  the  garrisons  from 
Kingston  northward,  and  to  draw  back  to  .Chattanooga,  tak 
ing  with  him  all  public  property  and  all  railway  stock,  and 
to  take  up  the  rails  from  Resaca  back,  preserving  them,  that 
they  might  be  replaced  whenever  future  interests  should  de 
mand  it.  The  railway  between  the  Etowah  and  the  Oostanaula 
was  left  untouched,  in  view  of  General  Grant's  instructions, 
and  because  Sherman  thought  it  more  than  probable  that 


THE  COLORS  POINT  TO  THE  SOUTH.  257 

General  Thomas  would  find  it  necessary  to  reoccupy  the 
country  as  far  forward  as  the  line  of  the  Etowah,  which,  by 
reason  of  its  rivers  and  other  natural  features,  possesses  an 
enduring  military  importance,  since  from  it  all  parts  of  Georgia 
and  Alabama  can  be  reached  by  armies  marching  down  the 
valleys  of  the  Coosa  and  Chattahoochee. 

On  the  llth  of  November,  Sherman  sent  his  last  dispatch 
to  General  Halleck,  at  Washington,  and,  on  the  12th,  his  army 
stood  detached  and  cut  off  from  all  communication  with  the 
rear. 

For  the  purpose  of  the  great  march,  it  had  been  divided  into 
two  wings  :  the  right,  commanded  by  Major-General  Oliver  O. 
Howard,  comprising  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  under  Major-Gen- 
eral  P.  J.  Osterhaus,  and  the  Seventeenth  Corps,  under  Major- 
General  Frank  P.  Blair,  Jr.,  who  had  now  rejoined  the  army ;  the 
left,  under  Major-General  Henry  W.  Slocum,  consisting  of  the 
Fourteenth  Corps  of  brevet  Major-General  Jefferson  C.  Davis, 
and  the  Twentieth  Corps,  to  which  Brigadier-General  A.  S. 
Williams  was  assigned.  The  aggregate  force  of  infantry  was 
sixty  thousand ;  the  cavalry  division,  under  'Brigadier-General 
Judson  Kilpatrick,  numbered  fifty-five  hundred  men ;  and 
there  was  one  field-gun  to  every  thousand  men. 

The  Fifteenth  Corps  consisted  of  the  divisions  of  Brigadier- 
Generals  Charles  E.  Woods,  William  B.  Hazen,  John  E. 
Smith,  and  John  M.  Corse.  Hazen's  second  division,  though 
greatly  changed  in  all  its  parts  by  time  and  hard  service,  was 
substantially  the  same  division  which  Sherman  organized  at 
Paducah  and  commanded  at  Shiloh,  and  whose  history  we 
have  followed  in  these  pages,  successively  under  the  leadership 
of  David  Stuart,  Morgan  L.  Smith,  and  Blair. 

The  Seventeenth  Corps  comprised  three  divisions,  under 
Major-General  John  A.  Mower  and  Brigadier-Generals  Miles 
D.  Leggett  and  Giles  A.  Smith,  besides  the  detachments  above 
mentioned. 

The  Fourteenth  Corps  was  composed  of  three  divisions,  led 
by  Brigadier-Generals  William  P.  Carlin,  James  D.  Morgan, 
and  Absalom  Baird. 

17 


258  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

The  Twentieth  Corps,  which  it  will  be  remembered  was 
formed  by  consolidating  the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Corps  from 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  included  the  divisions  of  Brigadier- 
Generals  Norman  J.  Jackson,  John  W.  Geary,  and  "William  T. 
Ward. 

Kilpatrick's  division  of  cavalry  consisted  of  two  brigades, 
commanded  by  Colonels  Eli  H.  Murray,  Third  Kentucky 
Cavalry,  and  Smith  D.  Atkins,  Ninety-second  Illinois  Mounted 
Infantry. 

This  whole  force  moved  rapidly,  and  on  the  14th  of  Novem 
ber  was  once  more  grouped  about  Atlanta. 

Here  let  us  pause  to  glance  at  such  of  the  more  prominent 
actors  in  the  approaching  scenes,  as  we  have  not  already 
sketched. 

Oliver  O.  Howard  was  born  in  Leeds,  in  Kennebec  County, 
Maine,  on  the  8th  of  November,  1830,  the  eldest  of  three  chil 
dren  of  parents  in  independent  but  moderate  circumstances. 
He  worked  on  his  father's  farm  until  his  tenth  year,  when  his 
father  died,  leaving  him  to  the  care  of  his  uncle,  the  Honor 
able  John  Otis,  of  Jlallowell.  He  enjoyed  the  advantages  of  a 
good  common-school  education  until,  at  the  age  of  sixteen,  he 
entered  Bowdoin  College,  at  Brunswick,  Maine.  Upon  finish 
ing  the  collegiate  course,  after  some  hesitation  he  decided  to 
avail  himself  of  the  opportunity  just  then  offered  of  comple 
ting  his  education  at  the  United  States  Military  Academy  at 
West  Point.  He  accordingly  entered  that  institution  in  1850, 
and  graduated  in  1854,  ranking  fourth  in  the  order  of  general 
standing  of  his  class.  He  was  appointed  brevet  second  lieu 
tenant  in  the  Ordnance  Department,  and  two  years  later 
served  in  a  campaign  against  the  Indians  in  Florida,  as  chief 
ordnance  officer  of  the  department.  The  1st  of  July,  1855,  by 
regular  promotion,  he  became  second  lieutenant  and  on  the  1st 
July,  1857,  first  lieutenant  of  ordnance,  and  held  the  latter 
rank  at  the  opening  of  the  war,  when  he  was  stationed  at  West 
Point  as  assistant  professor  of  mathematics.  At  an  early  date 
his  services  were  offered  to  the  governor  of  Maine,  who,  on 
the  28th  of  May,  1861,  commissioned  him  as  colonel  of  the 


THE  COLORS  POINT  TO  THE  SOUTH.  259 

Third  Maine  Volunteers,  the  first  three  years'  regiment  that 
left  the  State. 

At  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  he  commanded  a  brigade  as  senior 
colonel,  and  on  the  3d  of  September,  1861,  was  commissioned 
brigadier-general  of  volunteers,  and  was  soon  afterwards  as 
signed  to  the  command  of  a  brigade  of  Sumner's  division  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which,  in  March,  1862,  became  a 
part  of  Sumner's  second  army  corps,  Brigadier-General  Israel 
B.  Richardson  succeeding  to  the  command  of  the  division. 
General  Howard  was  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on  the 
Peninsula  until  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  where  he  lost  his  right 
arm  while  leading  his  brigade  in  a  charge  against  the  enemy. 
Two  bullets  entered  the  arm,  one  near  the  wrist  and  the  ofther 
at  the  elbow  ;  but  he  did  not  leave  the  field  until,  on  being 
wounded  the  second  time,  his  strength  gave  out,  and  he  was 
obliged  to  go  to  the  rear,  and  submit  to  an  amputation.  After 
an  absence  of  two  months,  he  returned  to  the  army  in  season 
to  be  with  his  corps  at  the  second  battle  of  Bull  Run,  and  on 
the  retreat  from  Centreville  he  commanded  the  rear-guard. 
At  the  battle  of  Antietam,  when  General  Sedgwick  was 
wounded,  and  compelled  to  quit  the  field,  General  Howard 
succeeded  him  in  command  of  his  division  of  Sumner's  corps. 

At  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg  this  division  formed  the 
right  of  the  line,  and  lost  heavily. 

On  the  29th  November,  1862,  he  was  appointed  major-gen 
eral  of  volunteers,  and  on  the  1st  April,  1863,  took  command 
of  the  Eleventh  Army  Corps,  relieving  General  Sigel.  He  led 
his  corps  at  Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg.  He  took  a  gal 
lant  part  in  the  capture  of  Lookout  Mountain  and  the  battle 
of  Mission  Ridge,  and  accompanied  Sherman  in  his  march  to 
the  relief  of  Burnside  at  Knoxville.  His  services  in  the  At 
lanta  campaign,  in  command  of  the  Fourth  Army  Corps,  and, 
after  McPherson's  death,  at  the  head  of  the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee,  have  already  been  fully  illustrated  in  these  pages. 

Thoroughly  educated,  an  accomplished  scholar,  a  true  gen 
tleman,  and  a  brave  soldier,  General  Howard  is  eminently  cal 
culated  to  inspire  the  confidence  of  his  superiors,  the  respect 


260  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

and  obedience  of  his  followers,  the  affection  and  esteem  of  all 
with  whom  he  may  be  associated.  Quiet  and  unassuming  in 
his  deportment ;  a  fervent  and  devoted  Christian,  not  only  in 
his  belief  but  in  his  daily  lif e ;  conscientious  to  a  degree  in  the 
performance  of  the  smallest  duty ;  careless  of  exposing  his 
person  in  battle,  to  an  extent  that  would  be  attributable  to 
rashness  or  fatalism  if  it  were  not  known  to  spring  from  re 
ligion  ;  strictly  honorable  in  all  things ;  warm  in  his  sympa- 
pathies  and  cordial  in  his  friendships,  Howard  presents  a  rare 
combination  of  qualities,  no  less  grand  than  simple,  equally  to 
be  imitated  for  their  virtue  and  loved  for  their  humanity. 

Judson  Kilpatrick  was  born  in  New  Jersey,  in  1838.  In 
June*  1856,  as  a  reward  for  his  political  services  in  the  support 
of  the  re-election  of  the  member  of  Congress  from  the  district 
wherein  he  resided,  he  was  selected  by  that  gentleman  to  rep 
resent  the  district  at  West  Point.  In  April,  1861 ,  he  gradu 
ated  fifteenth  in  his  class,  and  was  immediately  appointed  a 
second-lieutenant  in  the  First  Regiment  of  Artillery,  but  soon 
afterwards  received  permission  from  the  War  Department  to 
accept  a  captaincy  in  the  Fifth  Eegiment  of  New  York  Vol 
unteers,  generally  known  as  Duryea's  Zouaves,  and  served 
with  that  regiment  in  the  skirmish  or  battle,  in  June,  at  Big 
Bethel,  where  he  was  slightly  wounded. 

In  the  fall,  Kilpatrick  succeeded  in  obtaining  a  commission 
as  lieutenant-colonel  of  the  Second  Kegiment  of  New  York  Cav 
alry,  or  "  Harris  Light  Cavalry,"  commanded  by  Colonel  J. 
Mansfield  Davies.  Participating  in  command  of  that  regiment, 
and  afterwards  at  the  head  of  a  brigade  of  Gregg's  division,  in 
nearly  all  the  principal  operations  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  under  Generals  McClellan,  Burnside,  and 
Hooker,  in  May,  1863,  he  was  promoted  to  be  a  brigadier- 
general  for  gallant  and  distinguished  services  in  the  battle  of 
Brandy  Station,  and  was  soon  afterwards,  on  the  appointment 
of  General  Meade  to  relieve  Hooker,  placed  in  command  of 
Stahl's  division,  which,  with  the  divisions  of  Buford  and 
Gregg,  now  constituted  Pleasonton's  cavalry  corps.  This 
command  he  continued  to  hold  until,  on  the  failure  of  the  ill- 


THE  COLORS  POINT  TO  THE  SOUTH.  261 

considered  raid  for  the  relief  of  the  Union  prisoners  at  Rich 
mond,  wherein  he  and  the  brave  young  Dahlgren  were  jointly 
engaged,  he  was  relieved  and  ordered  to  report  to  General 
Sherman,  who  readily  discovered  in  Kilpatrick  those  sterling 
qualities  which,  though  marred  and  partially  concealed  by  an 
extravagant  craving  for  admiration  and  a  ceaseless  straining 
after  dramatic  effect,  nevertheless  constituted  him,  when  his 
judgment  was  properly  strengthened  and  developed  by  contact 
with  a  master  mind,  and  his  love  of  daily  popularity  strongly 
restrained  by  a  master  will,  a  valuable  and  deserving  cavalry 
commander. 

Frank  P.  Blair,  Jr.,  the  son  of  Francis  P.  Blair,  Sr.,  of 
Montgomery  County,  Maryland,  was  born  in  Lexington,  Ken 
tucky,  on  the  19th  of  February,  1821.  After  completing  his 
education  at  Princeton  College,  he  applied  himseK  to  the  study 
of  the  law  in  his  native  town,  and  after  being  admitted  to  the 
bar,  removed  to  St.  Louis,  and  commenced  practice  in  1843. 
He  served  in  Mexico,  during  the  wrar  with  that  country  in 
1846-47,  as  a  lieutenant  of  volunteers,  and  returned  to  St. 
Louis  after  the  peace,  resumed  the  practice  of  his  profession, 
and  entered  into  politics  with  the  activity  characteristic  of  his 
family,  supporting  Mr.  Van  B.uren  for  the  Presidency  in  1848, 
on  the  Buffalo  platform.  Becoming  from'  that  time  identified 
with  the  free-soil  party,  opposed  to  the  extension  of  slavery 
into  the  territories,  he  was  elected  to  the  Legislature  of  Mis 
souri  in  1852,  as  a  delegate  from  St.  Louis,  and  re-elected  in 
1854.  At  the  expiration  of  his  second  term,  in  1856,  as  the 
candidate  of  the  Republican  party,  he  was  chosen  representa 
tive  in  Congress  from  the  St.  Louis  district,  and  has  been  suc 
cessively  re-elected  as  such  in  the  years  1858,  1860,  and  1862. 

From  the  spring  of  1861  until  he  left  his  seat  in  Congress, 
he  was  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  in  the 
House  of  Representatives. 

On  the  breaking  out  of  the  rebellion,  he  raised  the  First 
Infantry  Regiment  of  Missouri  Volunteers,  and  on  the  7th  of 
August,  having  in  the  mean  time  attended  the  special  session 
of  Congress  in  his  civil  capacity,  and  immediately  afterwards 


262  SHERMAN  AND   HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

returned  to  Missouri  and  raised  a  brigade,  he  was  appointed 
by  the  President  a  brigadier-general  of  volunteers.  On  the 
29th  of  November,  1862,  he  was  promoted  to  be  a  major- 
general. 

General  Blair's  military  record  while  in  command  of  a  bri 
gade  at  Chickasaw  Bayou  and  Arkansas  Post ;  of  Sherman's 
old  division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  in  the  siege  of  Vicksburg  and 
the  capture  of  Jackson ;  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  in  its  marches 
from  luka  to  Chattanooga,  and  thence  to  Knoxville,  and  the 
battle  of  Missionary  Eidge  ;  and  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps 
in  the  Atlanta  campaign,  we  have  already  followed,  step  by 
step. 

"When  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  went  into  winter-quarters 
at  Huntsville,  in  1863,  General  Blair,  at  the  personal  request 
of  President  Lincoln,  returned  to  Washington,  and  resumed 
his  place  in  Congress.  At  the  reopening  of  active  operations 
he  hastened  back  to  the  army,  and  was  assigned  the  command 
of  the  Seventeenth  Army  Corps,  in  place  of  General  McPher- 
son,  who  had  succeeded  General  Sherman  at  the  head  of  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee. 

Peter  Joseph  Osterhaus  was  a  native  of  Prussia,  and  held  a 
commission  in  the  Prussian  army,  but  afterwards  emigrated 
to  the  United  States',  and  took  up  his  residence  at  St.  Louis, 
in  Missouri.  During  the  winter  of  1860,  in  anticipation  of 
the  war,  he  organized  and  commanded  a  company  of  militia, 
and  subsequently  took  part  with  it  in  the  capture  of  the  seces 
sion  camp  near  the  city  by  General  Lyon,  in  May,  1861.  His 
company  being  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United  States, 
on  the  17th  of  July,  1861,  he  took  part,  under  General  Lyon, 
in  the  battle  of  Booneville  ;  on  the  2d  of  August  fought  at 
Dug  Springs,  in  Southwestern  Missouri,  and  on  the  10th  of  the 
same  month  was  engaged  in  the  battle  of  Wilson's  Creek, 
during  which  Lyon  was  killed.  He  was  then  promoted  to  be 
colonel  of  the  Twelfth  Missouri  Volunteers,  and  at  the  head 
of  that  regiment  took  part  in  the  brief  campaign  under  Fre 
mont.  At  the  battle  of  Pea  Eidge,  on  the  7th  and  8th  of 
March,  1862,  Colonel  Osterhaus  commanded  with  ability  the 


delcl.     1;    . 

art  m   th  • 

A    k;UlSfcS    10 


THE  COLORS  POINT  TO  THE   SOUTH.  263 

first  brigade  of  General  Sigel's  division,  and  was  wounded  and 
compelled  to  leave  the  field.  He,  however,  soon  rejoined  his 
regiment  and  took  part  in  the  arduous  march  of  General 
Curtis'  troops  through  Arkansas  to  Helena,  where  the  forces 
arrived  in  July,  1862.  On  the  9th  of  June,  1862,  he  was  pro 
moted  to  be  a  brigadier-general  of  volunteers,  and  in  that 
capacity  took  part,  as  we  have  already  seen,  in  command 
of  a  brigade,  in  Sherman's  attempt  on  Vicksburg,  in  December, 
1862,  at  the  head  of  a  division  of  the  Thirteenth  Army  Corps, 
in  the  capture  of  Arkansas  Post,  the  siege  of  Vicksburg,  where 
he  was  again  wounded,  and  subsequently  in  Sherman's  cap 
ture  of  the  town  of  Jackson.  From  that  time,  as  the  com 
mander  of  the  first  division  of  the  Fifteenth  Army  Corps,  his 
history  has  been  fully  traced  in  these  pages.  It  may  be  said 
of  General  Osterhaus,  that  no  officer  of  foreign  birth  and  edu 
cation  so  successfully  exercised,  during  the  late  war,  com 
mands  of  equal  extent  and  responsibility. 

Henry  Wadsworth  Slocum  was  born  in  Syracuse,  in  Onon- 
daga  County,  in  the  State  of  New  York.  Entering  the  Mili 
tary  Academy  at  "West  Point  as  a  cadet  in  June,  1848,  he 
graduated  four  years  later,  seventh  in  the  general  standing 
of  his  class,  and  on  the  1st  of  July,  1852,  was  commissioned 
a  brevet  second-lieutenant  and  attached  to  the  First  Regi- 
ment  of  Artillery.  In  the  following  year  he  attained,  by 
regular  promotion,  to  a  full  second-lieutenancy  in  the  same 
regiment,  and  in  March,  1855,  became  a  first-lieutenant.  On 
the  31st  of  October,  1856,  he  resigned  his  commission  in  the 
army,  settled  in  his  native  place,  and  embarked  in  the  prac 
tice  of  the  laAv  as  a  profession,  at  the  same  time  taking  an 
active  part  in  political  affairs.  His  resignation  was  accepted 
in  the  height  of  the  excitement  attending  the  contest  of  1856 
between  Buchanan  and  Breckinridge  and  Fremont  and  Day 
ton,  as  opposing  candidates  for  the  Presidency  and  Yice- 
Presidency  of  the  United  States.  Slocum  became  a  warm 
supporter  of  the  principles  and  nominees  of  the  Republican 
party,  then  just  organized,  and  continued  from  that  time  to 
act  with  it. 


266  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

make  about  fifteen  miles  per  day,  unless  otherwise  fixed  in 
orders. 

"  III.  The  army  will  forage  liberally  on  the  country  during 
the  inarch.  To  this  end,  each  brigade  commander  will  organ 
ize  a  good  and  sufficient  foraging  party,  under  the  command 
of  one  or  more  discreet  officers,  who  will  gather  near  the  route 
travelled  corn  or  forage  of  any  kind,  meat  of  any  kind,  vege 
tables,  corn-meat,  or  whatever  is  needed  by  the  command ; 
aiming  at  all  times  to  keep  in  the  wagon  trains  at  least  ten 
days'  provisions  for  the  command  and  three  days'  forage. 
Soldiers  must  not  enter  the  dwellings  of  the  inhabitants,  or 
commit  any  trespass :  during  the  halt  or  at  camp  they  may 
be  permitted  to  gather  turnips,  potatoes,  and  other  vegetables, 
and  drive  in  stock  in  front  of  their  camps.  To  regular  for 
aging  parties  must  be  intrusted  the  gathering  of  provisions 
and  forage  at  any  distance  from  the  road  travelled. 

"  Y.  To  army  commanders  is  intrusted  the  power  to  destroy 
mills,  houses,  cotton-gins,  etc.,  and  for  them  this  general  prin 
ciple  is  laid  down  :  In  districts  and  neighborhoods  where  the 
army  is  unmolested,  no  destruction  of  such  property  should 
be  permitted ;  but  should  guerrillas  or  bushwhackers  molest 
our  march,  or  should  the  inhabitants  burn  bridges,  obstruct 
roads,  or  otherwise  manifest  local  hostility,  then  army  corps 
commanders  should  order  and  enforce  a  devastation  more  or 
less  relentless  according  to  the  measure  of  such  hostility. 

"  VI.  As  for  horses,  mules,  wagons,  etc.,  belonging  to  the 
inhabitants,  the  cavalry  and  artillery  may  appropriate  freely 
and  without  limit,  discriminating,  however,  between  the  rich, 
who  are  usually  hostile,  and  the  poor  or  industrious,  usually 
neutral  or  friendly.  Foraging  parties  may  also  take  mules  or 
horses  to  replace  the  jaded  animals  of  their  trains,  or  to  serve 
as  pack-mules  for  the  regiments  or  brigades.  In  all  foraging, 
of  whatever  kind,  the  parties  engaged  will  refrain  from  abusive 
or  threatening  language,  and  may,  when  the  officer  in  com 
mand  thinks  proper,  give  written  certificates  of  the  facts,  but 
no  receipts ;  and  they  will  endeavor  to  leave  with  each  family 
a  reasonable  portion  for  their  maintenance. 


THE  COLORS  POINT  TO  THE  SOUTH.  267 

"  VII.  Negroes  who  are  able-bodied,  and  can  be  of  service 
to  the  several  columns,  may  be  taken  along ;  but  each  army 
commander  will  bear  in  mind  that  the  question  of  supplies  is 
a  very  Important  one,  and  that  his  first  duty  is  to  see  to  those 
who  bear  arms. 

"  VIII.  The  organization  at  once  of  a  good  pioneer  battal 
ion  for  each  corps,  composed,  if  possible,  of  negroes,  should 
be  attended  to.  This  battalion  should  follow  the  advance 
guard,  should  repair  roads,  and  double  them  if  possible,  so 
that  the  columns  will  not  be  delayed  after  reaching  bad  places.' 
Also,  army  commanders  should  study  the  habit  of  giving  the 
artillery  and  wagons  the  road,  and  marching  their  troops  on 
one  side  ;  and  also  instruct  their  troops  to  assist  wagons  at 
steep  hills  or  bad  crossings  of  streams. 

"  IX.  Captain  O.  M.  Poe,  chief  engineer,  will  assign  to  each 
wing  of  the  army  a  pontoon-train,  fully  equipped  and  organ 
ized,  and  the  commanders  thereof  will  see  to  its  being  properly 
protected  at  all  times." 

Captain  Poe  had  thoroughly  destroyed  Atlanta,  save  its 
mere  dwelling-houses  and  churches  ;  General  Corse  had  done 
the  same  with  regard  to  Rome ;  and  the  right  wing,  with 
General  Kilpatrick's  cavalry,  was  put  in  motion  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Jonesboro'  and  McDonough,  with  orders  to  make  a 
strong  feint  on  Macon,  to  cross  the  Ocrnulgee  about  Planters' 
Mills,  and  rendezvous  in  the  neighborhood  of  Gordon  in  seven 
days,  exclusive  of  the  day  of  march.  On  the  same  day,  Gen 
eral  Slocum  was  to  move  with  Williams'  twentieth  corps 
by  Decatur  and  Stone  Mountain,  with  orders  to  tear  up  the 
railroad  from  Social  Circle  to  Madison,  to  burn  the  large  and 
important  railway  bridge  across  the  Oconee,  east  of  Madison, 
and  turn  south  and  reach  Milledgeville  on  the  seventh  day,  ex 
clusive  of  the  day  of  march.  Sherman  in  person  left  Atlanta 
on  the  16th,  in  company  with  Jefferson  C.  Davis'  fourteenth 
corps,  marching  by  Lithoiiia,  Covington,  and  Shady  Dale, 
directly  on  Milledgeville.  All  the  troops  were  provided  with 
good  wagon-trains,  loaded  with  ammunition,  and  supplies 


053  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

approximating  forty  days'  bread,  sugar,  and  coffee,  a  double  al 
lowance  of  salt  for  the  same  period,  and  beef-cattle  equal  to 
forty  days'  supplies.  The  wagons  were  also  supplied  with 
about  three  days'  forage  in  grain.  All  the  commanders  were 
instructed,  by  a  judicious  system  of  foraging,  to  maintain  this 
order  of  things  as  long  as  possible,  living  chiefly,  if  not  solely, 
upon  the  country,  which  was  known  to  abound  in  corn,  sweet 
potatoes,  and  meats.  The  first  object  was,  of  course,  to  place 
the  army  in  the  very  heart  of  Georgia,  interposing  between 
Macon  and  Augusta,  and  obliging  the  enemy  to  divide  his 
forces,  in  order  to  defend  not  only  those  points,  but  also 
Millen,  Savannah,  and  Charleston. 

Howard,  with  the  right  wing,  marched  from  Whitehall  on 
the  15th  of  November,  dividing  his  army  into  two  columns. 
The  right-hand  column,  consisting  of  Osterhaus'  fifteenth 
corps,  General  Howard's  headquarters  train,  and  the  cattle- 
herds,  marched  by  Eough  and  Ready,  turning  to  the  left 
towards  McDonough  when  about  five  miles  from  Jonesboro'. 
The  left-hand  column,  comprising  Blair's  seventeenth  corps, 
the  bridge  train,  and  First  Missouri  Engineer  Eegiment, 
Kilpatrick's  supply  train  and  the  First  Alabama  Cavalry 
leading  the  advance,  marched  on  McDoilough  by  the  direct 
road.  Kilpatrick,  who  accompanied  the  right  wing  during 
this  stage  of  the  campaign,  met  the  enemy's  cavalry  skirmishers 
near  East  Point,  and  drove  them  before  him  to  the  crossing  of 
Flint  Eiver ;  and  Osterhaus  also  met  them  near  Eough  and 
Eeady,  and  again  near  Stockbridge. 

On  the  16th,  Howard  marched  to  the  vicinity  of  McDonough 
by  three  routes.  At  the  crossing  of  the  Cotton  Eiver,  Oster 
haus  once  more  met  the  enemy's  cavalry,  who  retreated 
rapidly,  setting  fire  to  the  bridge.  Some  mounted  infantry  in 
advance  drove  them  off  in  time  to  put  out  the  fire,  and  save 
every  thing  but  the  planking,  and  the  bridge  was  immediately 
repaired,  having  detained  the  column  but  forty  minutes.  Kil 
patrick  crossed  the  Flint  Eiver  at  the  bridge  near  Jonesboro', 
at  7  A.  M.  Finding  the  enemy  had  left  that  place,  he  followed 
them  to  Lovejoy's,  where  they  occupied  a  strong  position, 


THE  COLORS  POINT  TO  THE  SOUTH.  269 

having  two  brigades  of  cavalry  and  two  pieces  of  artillery, 
and  holding  the  old  rebel  works.  Dismounting  Murray's 
brigade,  Kilpatrick  charged  the  works,  and  carried  them, 
driving*  back  the  enemy,  whose  artillery  was  subsequently 
overtaken  by  Atkins'  brigade,  charged,  and  captured.  Kil 
patrick  drove  the  enemy  beyond  Bear  Station,  capturing  over 
fifty  prisoners,  and  then  moved  to  the  left,  and  encamped  on 
the  Griffin  and  McDonough  road. 

On  the  17th  the  right  wing  moved  to  Jackson  and  its 
vicinity  in  three  columns,  Osterhaus  encamping  near  Indian 
Springs,  Blair  at  Hendrick's  Mill,  and  Kilpatrick  at  Towaligo 
Creek.  Some  cavalry  of  the  enemy  crossed  the  creek,  burning 
the  bridges. 

The  nearest  division  was  pushed  to  Hatting's  or  Planters' 
Factory,  on  the  Ocmulgee  River,  early  next  morning,  and 
a  part  of  it  crossed  over  by  the  ferry.  The  bridge-train 
arrived  at  about  10  A.  M.,  was  laid,  and  the  troops  commenced 
crossing  at  1  p.  M.  During  that  day  and  night,  Blair's  seven 
teenth  corps,  John  E.  Smith's  division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps, 
and  all  the  cavalry  had  crossed.  The  hill  on  the  east  side 
was  steep,  and  the  heavy  rain  during  the  night  rendered  the 
the  ascent  extremely  difficult. 

On  the  morning  of  the  19th,  regiments  were  detailed  in 
each  division  to  assist  the  trains  in  getting  up  the  hill.  Oster 
haus,  with  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  following  the  cavalry,  took 
country  roads  to  Hillsborough.  Blair,  with  the  Seventeenth 
Corps,  moved  in  the  vicinity  of  Hillsborough,  by  way  of 
Monticello.  The  roads  now  becoming  very  heavy,  the  pro 
gress  was  slow.  The  two  bridges  at  the  point  of  crossing 
were  rilled  with  troops  and  trains  all  day,  yet  the  crossing 
was  not  completed  by  the  rear-guard  until  the  following 
morning. 

On  the  20th,  the  right  wing  moved  on  Gordon  in  two 
columns,  Kilpatrick,  with  his  cavalry,  taking  the  Clinton 
road  and  the  river  road  towards  Macon,  Osterhaus  moving 
towards  Clinton,  and  Blair  by  way  of  Blountsville.  The  head 
of  the  right  column  encamped  at  Clinton,  and  the  left  near 


270  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Fortville.  Kilpatrick  waited  at  Clinton  until  the  arrival  of  the 
head  of  the  infantry  column  at  12  M.,  when  he  moved  out 
towards  Macon,  on  the  left-hand  road  met  the  enemy's 
cavalry  about  four  miles  from  Macon,  drove  them  in,  and 
charged  their  works,  defended  by  infantry  and  artillery.  The 
head  of  his  column  got  inside  the  works,  but  could  not  hold 
them.  He  succeeded  in  reaching  the  railway,  and  destroyed 
about  one  mile  of  the  track.  The  road  was  struck  in  two  or 
three  other  places  by  the  cavalry,  and  a  train  of  cars  burned. 
It  rained  hard  during  the  entire  night. 

On  the  21st,  the  cavalry  took  up  an  advance  position  cover 
ing  all  the  roads  debouching  from  Macon.  Blair  continued  his 
march  direct  on  Gordon,  reaching  that  place  with  his  leading 
division.  Osterhaus'  column  was  subdivided ;  two  divisions, 
with  small  trains,  taking  the  road  towards  Irwinton,  and  the 
rest,  with  headquarters,  bridge-train,  and  cattle,  the  direct 
Gordon  road.  The  centre  and  left  column  met  at  a  point  six 
miles  from  Gordon,  called  Pitt's  Mill,  where  the  centre  took  a 
parallel  road  into  Gordon.  The  division  of  General  Giles  A. 
Smith  reached  Gordon  the  same  day. 

On  the  22d  the  troops  and  trains  were  closed  up  towards 
Gordon,  excepting  Woods'  division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps, 
which  was  directed  to  take  up  a  strong  position  on  the  Irwin 
ton  road,  and  demonstrate  towards  Macon.  The  demonstra 
tion  was  made  by  General  Walcott's  brigade,  in  conjunction 
with  the  cavalry  on  the  different  roads.  The  rebel  cavalry,  in 
force,  made  a  charge  early  in  the  morning,  capturing  one  of 
our  cavalry  picket-posts.  After  a  sharp  engagement  the  enemy 
were  driven  from  the  field  in  confusion,  "Walcott's  infantry  de 
ployed  as  skirmishers  taking  part  in  the  repulse.  In  the  after 
noon,  Walcott  had  taken  up  a  position  two  miles  in  advance 
of  his  division,  towards  Macon,  having  two  pieces  of  artillery, 
and  had  thrown  up  rail  barricades,  when  he  was  attacked  by 
a  large  body  of  infantry,  accompanied  by  a  battery  of  four 
guns.  The  assault  was  made  with  great  vigor,  but  was  met 
and  completely  repulsed.  The  action  continued  for  some  three 
hours.  Walcott  was  assisted  by  a  regiment  of  cavalry  on 


THE  COLORS  POINT  TO  THE  SOUTH.  271 

either  flank.  General  "Woods  was  present  during  the  action, 
and  General  Osterhaus  part  of  the  time.  In  this  affair,  Gen 
eral  Walcott  was  wounded.  On  arriving  at  Gordon,  General 
Howard  directed  General  Blair  to  send  forward  the  First  Ala 
bama  Cavalry  and  Giles  A.  Smith's  division  eight  or  ten  miles 
towards  the  Oconee  bridge,  with  instructions  to  move  forward 
at  once,  and,  if  possible,  to  secure  that  bridge  and  plank  it 
over  for  infantry  to  cross.  Corse's  fourth  division  of  the  Fif 
teenth  Corps,  with  the  bridge-train,  having  found  the  roads 
almost  impassable,  did  not  reach  the  vicinity  of  Clinton  until 
night. 

On  the  morning  of  the  23d,  the  right  wing  was  in  and  near 
Gordon,  Woods'  and  Corse's  divisions  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps 
occupying  that  place,  Hazen's  division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps 
marching  on  Irwinton,  and  Blair  moving  along  the  Macon  and 
Savannah  railway,  engaged  in  destroying  it. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  the  left  wing  under  Slocum  and  follow 
its  movements  down  to  the  same  period. 

Williams'  twentieth  corps  marched  out  of  Atlanta  on  the 
morning  of  the  15th  of  November,  on  the  Decatur  road,  and 
encamped  that  night  near  the  Augusta  railway,  south  of  Stone 
Mountain.  On  the  16th  it  marched  to  Hock  Bridge,  on  the  17th 
to  Cornish  Creek,  and  on  the  18th  to  within  three  miles  of  Madi 
son.  There  Geary's  division  was  detached  and  sent,  without 
wagons  or  baggage,  to  destroy  the  Georgia  Central  railway 
bridge  over  the  Oconee  ;  while  Jackson's  and  Ward's  divisions, 
with  the  trains,  taking  the  Milledgeville  road,  moved  the  same 
day  to  a  point  four  miles  beyond  Madison,  on  the  20th  to  Eaton- 
ton,  and  on  the  21st  to  Little  Eiver,  a  branch  of  the  Oconee. 
There  Geary  rejoined  the  corps,  which  on  the  22d  crossed 
Little  River  on  a  pontoon  bridge  and  moved  forward  to  the 
suburbs  of  Milledgeville,  Jackson's  and  Geary's  divisions  en 
camping  on  the  east  and  Ward's  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Oconee, 
near  the  bridge  on  the  Augusta  road ;  while  the  Third  Wis 
consin  and  One  Hundred  and  Seventh  New  York  regiments, 
under  Colonel  Hawley,  were  placed  in  the  town  as  a  garrison. 

Jefferson  C.  Davis'  fourteenth  army  corps  moved  from  At- 


272  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

lanta  on  the  morning  of  the  16th  of  November,  by  Decatur,  on 
Covington,  and  by  night  had  marched  fifteen  miles.  On  the 
17th  this  corps  marched  to  the  west  bank  of  the  Yellow  River  ; 
crossed  that  stream  on  the  18th,  on  two  pontoon  bridges,  and 
passing  through  Covington  took  the  road  leading  to  Milledge- 
ville,  by  way  of  Shady  Dale,  and  encamped  on  the  west  side 
of  the  Ulcofauhatch.ee  River;  on  the  19th  crossed  and  marched 
to  Shady  Dale,  on  the  20th  reached  Eatonton  Factories ;  on 
the  21st  deflected  to  the  right,  in  order  to  avoid  coming  in  con 
tact  with  the  Twentieth  Corps  on  the  main  Milledgeville  road, 
and  moved  with  difficulty,  owing  to  a  heavy  rain,  to  cross 
Murder  Creek  ;  reached  Cedar  Creek  on  the  next  day  ;  and  on 
the  23d  went  into  camp  in  the  vicinity  of  Milledgeville. 

During  the  movement  of  both  wings  the  railway  had  been 
effectually  destroyed  wherever  the  line  of  march  touched  or 
approached  it.  The  Georgia  Central  line  was  broken  up  from 
Lithonia  to  Yellow  River,  a  distance  of  fifteen  miles,  for  seven 
teen  miles  between  Social  Circle  and  Madison,  and  at  several 
points  between  the  last-named  town  and  the  Oconee  ;  the 
Atlanta  and  Macon  line  at  various  places  above  Lovejoy's, 
and  the  road  from  Macon  to  the  east  between  that  city  and 
Gordon. 

Sherman  himself  had  thus  far  accompanied  the  Fourteenth 
Corps.  He  now  ordered  Howard  to  move  eastward  from  Gor 
don,  destroying  the  railway  line  leading  to  Millen  as  far  as 
Tennille  Station,  and  Slocum  to  march  by  two  roads  on  San 
der  sville,  four  miles  north  of  Tennille ;  while  Kilpatrick  should 
move  from  Gordon  to  Milledgeville,  thence  rapidly  towards  the 
east,  break  up  the  railway  between  Millen  and  Augusta,  and 
then  turn  upon  Millen  and  rescue  the  Union  prisoners  there 
confined  under  torture. 


^,w  by 
Brvt  .Brii-  .Gen  .  (  )  .  M   l>oe 


•x"/"  Em/rtn'trt  fur    Shrrnmn  n/i<l  Hi  A-  (JI//I/JH, 

>^7~- 


Ruthprfordtoiio 


THE  COLORS  POINT  TO  THE  SOUTH.  273 


CHAPTEE   XXI. 

THE     LOST     ARMY. 

DURING  this  march  the  commander-in-chief  made  his  head 
quarters  with  the  Twentieth  Corps. 

On  the  24th  of  November,  the  right  wing  marched  from 
Gordon  in  two  columns,  Osterhaus'  fifteenth  corps  by  way 
of  Irwinton  to  Ball's  Ferry,  and  Blair's  seventeenth  corps 
along  the  railway,  with  instructions  to  cross  the  Oconee  at 
Jackson's  Ferry,  two  and  a  half  miles  north  of  the  railway 
bridge.  General  Giles  A.  Smith,  who  had  preceded  his  column 
with  the  First  Alabama  Cavalry,  drove  quite  a  force  of  the 
enemy  from  two  stockades  and  across  the  bridge,  and  found 
that  Jackson's  Ferry  was  an  old  abandoned  route  through  the 
swamp,  completely  impracticable.  General  Howard  therefore 
directed  Blair's  corps  to  move  to  Ball's  Ferry,  where  the  two 
heads  of  column  arrived  about  the  same  time  on  the  25th  inst. 
A  detachment  of  the  First  Alabama  had  the  day  before  recon 
noitred  the  ferry,  finding  a  small  force  of  the  enemy,  made  a 
raft,  crossed  the  river,  and  drove  the  enemy  back,  but  were, 
subsequently,  themselves  forced  to  recross  the  river  with  some 
loss.  On  arriving  at  the  river  the  enemy  was  found  in 
trenched  behind  barricades,  with  an  extended  line  of  skirmish 
ers.  Osterhaus  and  Blair  confronted  them  with  a  line  which 
extended  beyond  the  enemy's  flanks  both  up  and  down  the 
river ;  the  former  placed  artillery  in  position  and  made  a 
demonstration  on  the  front,  along  the  road,  while  the  latter 
sent  a  detachment  some  two  miles  up  the  river  to  cross  in 
boats,  but  the  current  being  too  swift  for  rowing,  the  boats 
were  finally  swung  over,  after  the  fashion  of  a  flying  ferry. 

18 


274  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Alter  working  through  the  bayous  and  swamps  till  near  morn 
ing,  the  detachment  reached  the  road  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy's 
position ;  but  the  enemy  had  retreated.  The  Oconee  at  this 
place  is  narrow,  but  the  current  is  very  swift,  and  there  are 
some  two  miles  of  swampy  ground  on  the  right  bank.  The 
immediate  approach  to  the  ferry  on  the  left  bank  is,  however, 
very  good.  The  bridges  were  laid  so  that  the  troops  com 
menced  crossing  in  two  columns  about  noon,  and  by  night 
Corse's  and  Woods'  divisions  reach  Irwin's  Cross-roads,  about 
ten  miles  east  of  the  ferry,  and  the  remainder  of  the  Fifteenth 
Corps  crossed  on  the  26th,  during  which  day  the  Seventeenth 
Corps  took  up  a  position  near  the  fork  of  the  road  leading  to 
Station  No.  14,  and  General  Blair  detached  a  division  to  de 
stroy  the  railway  from  the  Oconee  to  a  point  north  of  Irwin's 
Cross-roads,  and  General  Osterhaus  caused  the  destruction 
to  be  continued  thence  as  far  east  as  Station  No.  13. 

Slocum  marched  from  Milledgeville  on  the  24th,  the 
Fourteenth  Corps  taking  the  right,  by  Black  Spring,  Fair 
Play,  and  Long's  Bridge,  and  the  Twentieth  Corps  the  more 
direct  road  by  Hebron  ;  and  both  corps  entered  Sandersville 
by  parallel  roads,  almost  simultaneously,  on  the  morning  of 
the  26th.  The  advanced  guard  of  Wheeler's  cavalry  was  en 
countered  near  the  town,  and  skirmished  with,  but  offered  no 
serious  opposition. 

The  two  wings  being  now  abreast  of  each  other,  General 
Slocum  was  ordered  to  tear  up  and  destroy  the  Georgia  Cen 
tral  Railroad,  from  Tennille  Station,  No.  13,  to  Station  No.  10, 
near  the  crossing  of  Ogeechee ;  one  of  his  corps  substantially 
following  the  railway,  the  other  the  more  circuitous  route  to 
the  left  by  Louisville,  in  support  of  Kilpatrick's  cavalry. 

Sherman  himself  now  changed  his  headquarters  to  the 
right  wing,  and  accompanied  Blair's  seventeenth  corps  on 
the  south  of  the  railway,  till  abreast  of  Barton  Station,  or  No. 
9| ;  General  Howard,  in  person,  with  the  Fifteenth  Corps, 
keeping  further  to  the  right,  and  about  one  day's  march 
ahead,  ready  to  turn  against  the  flank  of  any  enemy  who 
should  oppose  his  progress. 


THE  LOST  ARMY.  275 

On  the  27th,  Osterhaus'  corps  was  divided  into  two  col 
umns.  The  left,  consisting  of  Woods'  and  Corse's  divisions, 
marched  from  Irwin's  Cross-roads,  by  the  Louisville  road,  to 
its  intersection  with  the  road  leading  from  Sandersville  to 
Johnson,  and  thence  to  the  latter  place.  The  right,  consisting 
of  Hazen's  and  John  E.  Smith's  divisions,  was  to  follow  the 
next  morning,  by  plantation  roads,  to  Johnson. 

On  the  28th  the  right  column  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  en 
camped  at  Wrightsville,  the  left  column  at  Riddle ville.  Blair 
marched  with  the  Seventeenth  Corps  from  Irwin's,  on  the 
Louisville  road,  and  turning  into  cross-roads  on  the  Sanders 
ville  and  Savannah  road,  at  the  intersection,  encamped  abreast 
of  Eiddleville. 

On  the  29th  the  two  lower  columns  nearly  formed  a  junction ; 
the  advance,  under  General  Woods,  encamping  near  Summer- 
ville,  and  the  rest  along  the  lower  Savannah  road  and  near  Sun- 
derland's  Mill,  about  Sebastopol,  or  seven  miles  to  the  rear  of 
General  Woods.  The  Seventeenth  Corps  encamped  on  the 
upper  Savannah  road,  abreast  of  Station  No.  10,  on  the  Geor 
gia  Central  railway.  The  country  was  covered  with  open 
pine  woods  and  wire-grass.  Numerous  swamps  were  found 
along  the  Ohospee  Hiver  and  its  tributaries,  and  there  were 
very  few  clearings  or  plantations.  Quite  a  number  of  mules 
and  horses  were  captured  in  the  swamps,  the  citizens  having 
run  them  off  in  the  hope  of  escaping  the  Union  army  and 
Wheeler's  cavalry,  both  equally  dreaded. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  the  left  wing.  On  the  afternoon  of  the 
26th  of  November,  Jackson's  and  Geary's  divisions  of  Wil 
liams'  twentieth  corps  were  moved  down  to  Teimille  Station, 
leaving  Ward's  division  to  cover  the  train.  The  First  Mi 
chigan  Engineers  reported  for  duty  with  the  corps. 

On  the  27th,  28th,  and  29th,  the  Central  railway,  and  all  the 
wagon-bridges  over  Williamson's  Swamp  Creek,  were  destroyed 
from  Tennille  Station  to  the  Ogeechee  Eiver,  including  the 
long  railway  bridge  over  that  stream,  by  Jackson's  and  Geary's 
divisions,  and  the  Michigan  Engineers.  Ward's  division 
marched  with  the  trains,  by  way  of  Davisboro',  across  the 


276  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

Ogeechee  and  Eocky  Comfort  rivers,  and  encamped  near 
Louisville. 

On  the  30th,  Jackson  and  Geary  moved  up  the  Ogeechee  to 
Coward's  Bridge,  which  was  found  partly  destroyed,  but  easily 
repaired,  and  the  whole  corps  encamped  about  three  miles 
south  of  Louisville. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  27th  of  November,  the  trains  of  the 
Fourteenth  Corps,  under  escort  of  Carlin's  division,  moved  by 
the  way  of  Davisboro'  upon  Louisville,  while  Baird's  and 
Morgan's  divisions,  unencumbered,  moved  on  the  Finn's 
Bridge  road ;  thus  protecting  the  left  flank  from  any  demon 
strations  the  enemy's  cavalry  might  make  from  that  direction 
upon  the  trains. 

These  two  divisions,  united  under  the  command  of  Brig 
adier-General  Baird,  marching  on  a  road  between  the  Ogee 
chee  Eiver  and  Eocky  Comfort  Creek,  reached  Louisville 
early  in  the  afternoon  of  the  28th,  immediately  laid  a 
pontoon  bridge  across  the  creek,  and  commenced  the  pas 
sage  of  troops.  Owing  to  the  movements  of  Ward's  division 
of  the  Twentieth  Corps  with  the  trains,  occupying  the  main 
road  from  Davisboro'  to  Louisville,  Carlin's  division  and  the 
trains  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  moving  on  that  road  were  only 
able  to  jeach  the  Ogeechee  about  three  o'clock,  p.  M.  The 
Fifty-eighth  Indiana  Pontoniers,  under  Colonel  G.  P.  Buell, 
under  the  personal  supervision  of  General  Slocum,  imme 
diately  commenced  laying  their  bridges,  and  repairing  the 
roads  destroyed  by  the  enemy,  and  before  night  the  troops 
and  trains  were  passing  both  streams  into  their  camps  around 
Louisville. 

The  road,  running  as  it  does  here  through  an  immense 
cypress  swamp,  required  considerable  labor  to  put  and  keep 
it  in  condition  for  the  passage  of  trains,  and  it  was  not 
until  noon  the  next  day  that  the  entire  column  succeeded  in 
getting  into  camp.  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  a  re 
port  was  received  from  General  Kilpatrick  that  he  was  about 
ten  miles  from  Louisville,  on  the  road  leading  direct  to  Buck- 
head  Bridge,  hard  pressed  by  Wheeler. 


THE  LOST  ARMY  277 

Kilpatrick,  having  received  his  instructions  from  General 
Sherman,  had  also  started  from  Milledgeville  on  the  25th,  and 
marching  by  Sparta,  crossed  the  Ogeechee  River  at  the 
shoals,  and  thence  continuing  his  course  by  Spread  Oak, 
"Woodburn,  and  St.  Glair,  struck  the  railway  on  the  27th  at 
Waynesboro' ;  the  advance,  under  Captain  Estes,  assistant- 
adjutant-general,  having  destroyed  a  portion  of  the  track, 
and  partly  burned  the  railway  bridge  over  Briar  Creek  the 
day  previous.  During  the  march,  Kilpatrick's  flanks  and  rear 
had  been  repeatedly  attacked  by  Wheeler's  cavalry,  but  with 
out  delaying  the  movement.  Passing  through  Waynesboro', 
Kilpatrick  encamped  his  division  in  line  of  battle  on  the  rail 
way,  three  miles  south  of  the  town.  Several  attacks  were  made 
during  the  night  upon  Colonel  Murray's  line,  but  they  were 
easily  repulsed,  and  did  not  prevent  the  destruction  of  the 
track,  one  battalion  being  detailed  from  each  regiment  for  that 
purpose.  Here  Kilpatrick  learned  that  our  prisoners  had 
been  removed  from  Millen  two  days  previous,  and  the  great 
object  of  his  movement  in'that  direction  being  thus  frustrated, 
after  destroying  sufficient  track  to  prevent  transportation  on 
the  road  for  a  few  days,  he  deemed  it  prudent  to  retire  to  the 
support  of  the  infantry.  Accordingly,  Colonel  Atkins'  brigade 
was  ordered  to  move  out  to  the  intersection  of  the  Waynes 
boro'  and  Louisville  road,  and  there  take  up  position,  while 
Colonel  Murray  should  move  past  him  and  take  up  position 
in  his  rear,  and  so  on  in  succession  retire  from  any  force  that 
might  be  sent  in  pursuit.  By  some  misunderstanding,  Colonel 
Atkins  moved  on  without  halting  as  directed,  and  the  conse 
quence  was,  that  two  regiments,  the  Eighth  Indiana,  Colonel 
Jones,  and  Ninth  Michigan  Cavalry,  Colonel  Acker,  together 
with  General  Kilpatrick  himself  and  all  his  staff,  were  cut  off 
and  partly  surrounded.  But  these  two  regiments,  by  their 
splendid  fighting,  led  by  Kilpatrick,  broke  through  the  rebel 
lines,  and  slowly  fell  back,  repulsing  every  attack  of  the  enemy, 
until  the  main  column  was  again  reached.  The  cavalry  moved 
on,  crossed  Buckhead  Creek,  burned  the  bridge,  and  halted 
two  miles  from  the  creek,  where  information  soon  reached  Kil- 


278  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

patrick  that  Wheeler  was  crossing  with  his  entire  force. 
Parties  sent  out  having  ascertained  this  report  to  be  true, 
Kilpatrick  took  up  a  strong  position,  and  constructed  a  long 
line  of  barricades,  with  his  flanks  thrown  well  to  the  rear. 
These  dispositions  were  scarcely  completed  ere  the  enemy  came 
in  sight  and  made  a  most  desperate  charge,  but  was  hand 
somely  repulsed  at  all  points,  and  with  but  slight  loss.  The 
cavalry  moved  on  a  few  miles  further,  and  encamped  at  the 
first  place  where  forage  could  be  obtained,  the  enemy  making 
no  further  attempts  to  follow. 

Immediately  on  receipt  of  General  Kilpatrick' s  message, 
General  Jefferson  C.  Davis  sent  a  brigade  of  Baird's  division 
of  his  corps,  under  Colonel  Morton  C.  Hunter,  to  the  support 
of  the  cavalry ;  but  Wheeler  having  been  already  repulsed  in 
the  thorough  manner  just  narrated,  these  re-enforcements  were 
not  needed. 

During  the  29th  Kilpatrick  came  in  and  took  position  near 
the  Fourteenth  Corps,  on  the  east  bank  of  Big  Creek. 

Having  successfully,  and  almost  without  opposition,  passed 
the  last  of  the  three  large  rivers,  the  Ocmulgee,  the  Oconee, 
and  the  Ogeechee,  that  crossed  its  path  and  formed  the  strong 
natural  lines  of  defence  against  its  movements,  Sherman's 
army  now  lay  with  its  left  wing  and  the  cavalry  on  the  east 
bank  of  the  latter  stream,  its  right  in  close  communication 
with  it  on  the  other  side,  and  on  the  morrow  would  begin  the 
easy  and  unbroken  descent  to  the  sea. 


THE  LOST  ARMY.  279 


CHAPTEE  XXII. 

TO   THE    SEA. 

WE  shall  first  follow  the  movements  of  the  right  wing  down 
the  Ogeechee.  Osterhaus,  with  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  kept  the 
right,  and  Blair,  with  the  Seventeenth  Corps,  still  accompanied 
by  General  Sherman,  the  left. 

On  the  30th  of  November,  1864,  Woods'  and  and  Corse's 
divisions,  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  pushed  on  through  Summer- 
ville  northward,  till  they  reached  the  upper  Savannah  road, 
and  encamped  near  Deep  Creek.  Blair  moved  forward  to 
Barton,  or  Station  No.  9J  ;  he  rebuilt  the  partially  destroyed 
wagon  bridge,  laid  a  pontoon  bridge,  and  crossed  the  Ogeechee 
at  that  point. 

On  the  1st  of  December,  the  three  columns  moved  as  follows  : 
the  lower  one,  consisting  of  Hazen's  and  John  E.  Smith's  divi- 
sons,  on  the  Statesborough  road  ;  the  middle  column,  compris 
ing  Woods'  and  Corse's  divisions,  upon  the  Savannah  road ; 
and  Blair's  seventeenth  corps,  constituting  the  left,  along  the 
Georgia  Central  railway,  destroying  it  as  it  marched.  The 
two  right  columns  encamped  opposite  Station  No.  8,  General 
Woods  securing  and  repairing  the  wagon  bridge  across  the 
Ogeechee  at  that  point ;  and  a  small  force  crossed  over,  made, 
break  in  the  railway,  and  destroyed  the  depot.  The  Seven 
teenth  Corps  succeeded  in  reaching  Station  No.  9. 

On  the  2d  the  column  preserved  the  same  order  of  march. 
General  Blair  reached  Milieu,  having  completely  destroyed  the 
railway  up  to  that  point,  -including  the  depot  and  a  large 
quantity  of  lumber,  ties,  etc.  The  middle  column  encamped 


280  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

near  Clifton's  Ferry,  having  thrown  a  bridge  over  the  Ogeechee 
at  that  point,  and  sent  a  brigade  of  Corse's  division  to  assist  the 
Seventeenth  Corps  in  breaking  up  the  railway.  Scull's  Creek, 
a  wide  stream,  too  deep  to  be  forded,  was  carefully  bridged  in 
two  places.  Scouting  parties  hurried  on  to  Scarborough,  a 
little  below,  and  seized  a  mail  with  Savannah  papers  of  that 
day. 

On  the  3d,  the  Fifteenth  Corps  remained  in  position,  ex 
cepting  that  two  brigades  of  Corse's  division  crossed  the  river, 
and  aided  the  Seventeenth  Corps  in  destroying  the  railway 
from  Millen  to  Scarborough.  The  Seventeenth  Corps  came  up 
abreast,  encamping  near  Scarborough,  or  Station  No.  7. 

On  the  4th  the  central  column,  Woods  and  Corse,  marched  to 
Wilson's  Creek ;  the  left,  Blair  and  part  of  Corse's  division, 
reached  Station  No.  5£,  having  continued  the  destruction  of 
the  railway  up  to  that  point ;  and  the  right,  Hazen  and  John 
E.  Smith,  proceeded  as  far  as  Statesborough.  Hazen's  divi 
sion,  leading,  encountered  a  small  body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry, 
said  to  be  four  hundred  strong,  and  had  a  successful  skirmish 
with  them.  The  road  being  boggy,  Hazen  was  obliged  to  cor 
duroy  several  long  stretches  during  the  day. 

On  the  5th  the  two  columns  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  moved 
along  their  respective  roads  to  a  position  nearly  opposite  Guy- 
ton,  or  Station  No.  3.  General  Howard,  who  was  with  the 
central  column,  hearing  that  some  resistance  was  offered  to 
General  Blair  near  Ogeechee  Church,  caused  a  feint  of  cross 
ing  the  Ogeechee  to  be  made  at  Flat  Ford.  Some  men  were 
thrown  over  in  boats,  but  no  bridge  was  laid.  General  Sher 
man  detained  General  Blair  near  Station  No.  4J,  for  the  left 
wing  to  come  up. 

On  the  6th,  reconnoissances  were  made  towards  Wright's 
Bridge  and  Jenks'  Bridge  at  Eden  Station  with  a  view  of  saving 
them,  if  possible.  Colonel  Williamson's  brigade  of  General 
Woods'  division  reached  the  former  in  time  to  save  much  of  the 
timber,  but  all  the  planking  and  several  of  the  trestles  were 
already  burned.  He,  however,  constructed  a  foot-bridge  and 
crossed  over  a  small  force  which  he  pushed  forward  towards  the 


TO  THE  SEA.  281 

railway.  A  small  detachment  went  as  far  as  the  Twenty-Mile 
Station  and  returned,  skirmishing  all  the  way.  Colonel  Oliver's 
brigade,  of  Hazen's  division,  made  the  reconnoissance  to 
Jenks'  Bridge,  but  found  it  destroyed.  General  Howard  sent 
an  officer,  Lieutenant  Harney,  with  a  select  party  to  strike  the 
Gulf  railway,  but  he  found  the  bridge  across  the  Cannouchee 
burned  and  the  approaches  were  guarded  by  rebels,  so  that  he 
was  compelled  to  return  without  doing  the  work.  - 

On  the  7th,  Woods  remained  at  Wright's  Bridge,  except 
one  brigade  of  infantry,  that  crossed  the  foot-bridge  and 
marched  down  the  east  bank  of  the  Ogeechee  towards  Eden 
Station.  On  the  arrival  of  the  pontoons  at  Jenks'  Bridge, 
Captain  C.  B.  Keese,  chief-engineer  of  the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee,  finding  the  enemy  on  the  other  bank,  threw  over  a 
regiment  of  Colonel  Oliver's  brigade  and  cleared  the  way. 
The  bridge  was  immediately  laid.  General  Corse's  division 
had  arrived  by  this  time.  One  brigade,  General  Bice  com 
manding,  crossed  over,  met  the  enemy's  skirmishers  some  five 
hundred  yards  beyond,  drove  them  in,  and  in  a  very  handsome 
manner  routed  a  battalion  of  rebels  behind  rail-piles,  captur 
ing  seventeen  prisoners,  and  killing  and  wounding  several  more. 
The  brigade  lost  two  killed  and  two  or  three  wounded.  It  then 
formed  a  junction  with  a  brigade  of  Woods'  division  from 
Wright's  Bridge,  at  Eden  Station.  Hazen's  division  moved 
on  to  Black  Creek,  sending  forward  Colonel  Oliver's  brigade 
to  the  Cannouchee.  The  rest  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  encamped 
near  Jenks'  Bridge.  The  Seventeenth  Corps  encamped  in  the 
vicinity  of  Guyton,  or  Station  No.  3,  ceasing  to  destroy  the 
railway  after  leaving  Ogeechee  Church. 

On  the  8th  of  December,  as  the  enemy  was  reported  in  some 
force  near  the  twelve-mile  post,  having  a  line  of  works  in  his 
front,  General  Howard  resolved  to  turn  his  position  by  sending 
two  divisions  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  down  the  west  bank  of 
the  Ogeechee  to  force  a  crossing  of  the  Cannouchee,  and  throw 
forward  sufficient  detachments  to  break  the  Gulf  railway,  and 
if  possible  secure  King's  Bridge  over  the  Ogeechee,  about  a 
mile  above  the  railway,  and  also  to  reconnoitre  with  one 


282  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

division  between  the  Big  and  Little  Ogeechee  rivers.  The 
movement  on  the  right  bank  began  first,  led  by  General  Oster- 
haus  in  person,  with  Woods'  and  Hazen's  divisions.  General 
Howard  himself  accompanied  General  Corse,  who  found  a 
good  ridge  road  down  the  left  bank  of  the  main  Ogeechee, 
and  came  upon  some  carefully  constructed  but  abandoned 
works  three  miles  and  a  half  from  Eden,  or  Station  No.  2. 
The  road  was  obstructed  with  felled  trees  at  several  points, 
but  the  impediments  were  so  quickly  removed  by  the  pioneers 
that  the  column  did  not  halt.  On  reaching  the  Savannah 
Canal,  the  bridge  over  it  was  found  to  have  been  burned,  but 
a  new  one  was  made  in  less  than  half  an  hour.  The  Ogeechee 
bridge,  near  the  mouth  of  the  canal,  at  Dilleii's  Ferry,  was 
found  practicable  for  a  pontoon  bridge.  General  Corse  sent 
forward  a  reconnoissance,  which  discovered  the  enemy  in  force 
at  the  junction  of  this  road  and  the  King's  Bridge  and  Sa 
vannah  road.  General  Osterhaus  effected  a  crossing  of  the 
Cannouchee  with  two  brigades,  as  directed.  The  Seventeenth 
Corps,  meanwhile,  moved  up  abreast  of  Eden,  or  Station  No. 
2,  having  much  corduroying  to  do  and  many  obstructions  to 
clear  away.  After  reaching  the  canal,  General  Howard  re 
turned  to  Station  No.  2,  and  communicated  with  General 
Sherman  in  person,  who  directed  him  to  allow  General  Blair 
to  continue  on  the  Louisville  road. 

The  next  day,  December  9th,  the  Seventeenth  Corps  came 
upon  the  enemy  in  rifle-pits,  three  and  a  half  miles  from 
Station  No.  2.  General  Blair  drove  the  rebels  from  them, 
but  soon  came  upon  an  intrenched  line  with  guns  in  position. 
At  this  place  the  road  led  through  a  swamp  densely  covered 
with  the  wood  and  undergrowth  peculiar  to  this  region, 
and  apparently  impassable ;  but  General  Blair  moved  three 
lines  of  battle,  preceded  by  a  skirmish  line,  along  on  the  right 
and  left  of  the  road  for  some  two  or  three  miles,  occasionally 
in  water  knee-deep,  drove  the  enemy  from  every  position 
where  he  made  a  stand,  and  encamped  for  the  night  near 
Pooler,  or  Station  No.  1.  The  detached  brigades  of  the 
Fifteenth  Corps  succeeded  in  reaching  the  Savannah  and 


TO  THE  SEA.  283 

Gulf  railway  at  different  points,  and  destroying  it.  The 
third  division,  General  John  E.  Smith,  closed  up  on  Corse's 
at  the  canal.  As  soon  as  he  was  within  supporting  dis 
tance,  General  Corse  moved  forward  towards  Savannah.  He 
encountered  about  six  hundred  rebel  infantry  with  two  pieces 
of  artillery  near  the  cross-roads.  His  advance  brigade 
quickly  dislodged  them,  capturing  one  piece  of  artillery  and 
several  prisoners.  He  followed  them  up  across  the  Little 
Ogeechee,  and  by  General  Howard's  direction  took  up  a 
strong  position  about  twelve  miles  from  Savannah,  and  thence 
sent  out  a  detachment  to  break  the  Gulf  railway.  His  advance 
crossed  the  Little  Ogeechee,  and  halted  about  eight  miles 
from  the  city.  King's  Bridge  had  been  burned  by  the  rebels. 
All  the  enemy's  force  was  withdrawn  from  Osterhaus'  front 
in  the  morning,  except  the  independent  garrison  at  Fort 
McAllister,  situated  on  the  right  bank  and  near  the  mouth  of 
the  Ogeechee.  During  the  day  that  section  of  the  pontoon- 
bridge  which  had  been  with  General  Blair's  column,  was  sent 
to  Dillen's  Ferry,  near  Fort  Argyle,  and  laid  across  the  Ogee 
chee,  thus  substantially  uniting  the  two  right  columns  of 
Howard's  army. 

To  return  to  the  left  wing. 

Williams'  twentieth  corps  marched  from  Louisville  on  the 
1st  of  December.  From  that  time  to  the  8th,  its  line  of  march 
was  down  the  Peninsula  between  the  Ogeechee  and  Savannah 
rivers,  following  the  Louisville  and  Savannah  road,  encamping 
on  the  1st  on  Baker's  Creek  ;  on  the  2d  at  Buckhead  Church , 
on  the  3d  at  Horse  Creek  ;  on  the  4th  at  Little  Ogeechee ;  on 
the  5th  at  Sylvania  Cross-roads  ;  on  the  6th  near  Cowpens 
Creek  ;  on  the  7th  on  Jack's  Branch,  near  Springfield  ;  and  on 
the  8th  near  Eden  Cross-roads.  As  the  coast  neared,  the 
surface  of  the  country  became  flat  and  swampy.  Large  ponds 
or  pools  were  met  every  mile  or  so,  and  the  creeks  spread  out 
into  several  miry  branches.  The  roads  between  the  creeks 
and  ponds,  though  apparently  of  sand,  and  of  substantial 
character,  proved  to  be  upon  a  thin  crust,  which  was  soon  cut 
through  by  the  long  trains  into  the  deep  quicksand,  thus 


284  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

requiring  miles  of  corduroy.  At  several  of  the  swamps,  the 
enemy  had  attempted  to  obstruct  the  march  by  felling  timber. 

On  the  9th  the  direction  of  march  was  changed  to  the  east, 
taking  the  road  from  Eden  to  Monteith  Post-office,  on  the 
Charleston  railway.  At  the  large  Monteith  swamp,  the  enemy, 
besides  obstructing  the  road  for  nearly  a  mile  by  felling  trees, 
had  built  two  small  earthworks,  and  with  a  single  gun  and 
about  four  hundred  infantry  made  a  show  of  stopping  the 
march  of  the  corps.  Jackson's  division  being  in  advance,  was 
ordered  to  throw  out  several  regiments  on  each  flank,  while  a 
brigade  in  the  centre  should  make  a  feint,  to  engage  attention 
and  enable  the  pioneers  to  clear  the  obstructions.  As  soon  as 
a  portion  of  Robinson's  brigade,  under  Colonel  West,  Thirty- 
first  Wisconsin  Volunteers,  could  cross  the  swamp  the  enemy 
fled,  leaving  behind  a  considerable  quantity  of  new  clothing 
and  accoutrements.  Jackson's  loss  was  one  man  killed  and 
four  wounded. 

On  the  morning  of  the  10th,  the  corps  moved  down  to 
Monteith  Station,  on  the  Charleston  railway,  and  after  de 
stroying  some  miles  of  the  road,  marched  to  a  point  near  the 
five-mile  post,  on  the  Augusta  and  Savannah  railway.  Here, 
meeting  the  enemy's  strong  line  of  defences  behind  swramps 
and  artificial  ponds,  the  corps  was  ordered  to  encamp  for  the 
night.  During  the  afternoon  a  party  of  foragers,  with  some 
cavalry,  succeeded  in  capturing,  near  the  foot  of  Argyle  Island, 
a  rebel  dispatch-boat  called  the  Ida,  having  on  board  Colonel 
Clinch,  of  General  Hardee's  staff,  with  dispatches  for  the  rebel 
gunboats  on  the  river  above.  The  boat  was  unfortunately  set 
on  fire  and  burned. 

On  the  30th  of  November,  Carlin's  division  of  Jefferson  C. 
Davis'  fourteenth  corps  marched  to  Sebastopol,  with  a  view 
to  uncovering  the  crossing  of  the  Ogeechee  by  other  troops 
advancing  in  that  direction.  The  next  day,  in  the  general 
advance  of  the  army  upon  Millen,  Davis  was  ordered  to 
cross  Buckhead  Creek,  at  some  point  between  Waynesboro' 
and  Birdsville,  for  which  place  the  Twentieth  Corps  was 
moving. 


TO  THE   SEA.  285 

Baird's  division,  with  Kilpatrick's  cavalry,  was  ordered  to 
move  in  the  direction  of  Waynesboro',  and  after  crossing  Buck- 
head  Creek,  to  move  down  the  east  bank  of  that  stream 
and  take  position  near  Reynolds,  not  far  from  Buckhead 
bridge. 

Morgan's  division,  in  charge  of  the  whole  corps  train,  moved 
on  the  direct  road  to  the  bridge,  and  encamped  ten  miles  from 
Louisville. 

On  the  2d  of  December,  Baird  and  Kilpatrick  completed 
the  movement  just  indicated,  Carlin's  division  joined  the 
column  from  the  direction  of  Sebastopol,  and  the  whole  corps 
went  into  camp  at  the  crossing  of  the  Birdsville  and  Waynes- 
boro'  roads,  about  two  miles  from  the  bridge. 

The  change  in  the  direction  of  march  of  the  Twentieth  Corps 
to  the  Louisville  and  Springfield  road  again  caused  a  deflection 
in  the  line  of  march  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  ;  and  on  the'morn- 
ing  of  the  3d,  pontoon  bridges  were  laid  across  the  creek,  at  a 
point  about  five  miles  higher  up  the  stream,  and  the  troops  and 
trains  began  crossing  at  half-past  ten  o'clock.  Jacksonboro' 
had  by  this  time  been  designated,  by  General  Sherman,  as  the 
next  objective  point  for  the  concentration  of  the  corps  ;  and 
General  Davis  ordered  Baird  and  Kilpatrick  to  move  from 
Eeynolds,  in  the  direction  of  Waynesboro',  with  a  view  to 
leading  the  enemy  to  believe  that  the  next  advance  would  be 
upon  Augusta.  Carlin  and  Morgan,  after  a  hard  day's  work 
upon  the  roads,  went  into  camp  at  Lumpkin's  Station,  where 
the  Jacksonboro'  road  crosses  the  Augusta  and  Savannah 
railway.  Baird  and  Kilpatrick  took  position  near  Thomas' 
Station,  where  the  enemy  was  found  in  considerable  force. 

On  the  4th,  Carlin's  and  Morgan's  division,  with  the  three 
corps  trains,  after  destroying  three  miles  of  railway,  moved  in 
the  direction  of  Jacksonboro',  and  encamped  thirteen  miles 
beyond  Lumpkin's  Station.  Baird  and  Kilpatrick,  after  some 
fighting  with  Wheeler's  cavalry,  drove  the  enemy  from 
Waynesboro',  and  across  Brier  Creek.  Baird,  in  the  mean 
time,  destroyed  three  miles  of  railway  near  Thomas'  Station. 

On  the  5th,  after  a  hard  day's  march  over  country  roads, 


286  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

which  required  much  repairing,  the  whole  corps,  with  Kilpat- 
ric'k's  cavalry,  encamped  in  the  vicinity  of  Jacksonboro',  the 
advance  being  at  Buck  Creek  Post-office,  on  the  Savannah 
road. 

During  the  night,  the  bridge  across  Beaver-dam  Creek, 
at  Jacksonboro',  which  had  been  destroyed,  was  rebuilt  by 
Colonel  Buell,  of  the  Fifty-eighth  Indiana,  and  his  pontoniers ; 
and  early  on  the  morning  of  the  6th,  the  whole  column  marched 
on  the  river-road,  and  went  into  camp  at  and  in  advance  of 
Hudson's  Ferry,  on  the  Savannah  River,  making  an  average 
march  of  about  twenty  miles. 

On  the  7th,  the  column  moved  in  the  same  order  of  march, 
Baird  and  Kilpatrick,  with  Colonel  Atkins'  brigade,  unencum 
bered  by  the  trains,  covering  the  rear.  Morgan's  division, 
with  the  pontoon  train,  reached  Ebenezer  Creek  late  in  the 
evening,  and  began  cutting  away  the  fallen  timber  which 
obstructed  the  roadway  through  the  immense  swamp  which 
skirts  the  creeks  on  both  sides  at  this  point.  Notwithstand 
ing  an  exceedingly  hard  day's  march,  the  pontoniers,  under 
Colonel  Buell,  set  to  work  at  once  to  reconstruct  the  bridge, 
and  by  noon  the  next  day  the  column  commenced  crossing 
this  formidable  defile ;  but  in  spite  of  the  immense  amount  of 
labor  expended  upon  the  road  and  bridge,  to  make  them  pass 
able,  much  was  still  required  to  maintain  them  in  condition, 
and  it  was  not  until  daylight  on  the  9th  that  the  rear  of 
the  column  had  completed  the  crossing. 

During  the  8th,  the  enemy's  cavalry  made  several  attempts 
to  drive  in  the  rear  pickets  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  but  did  not 
succeed.  The  loss  in  the  corps  during  these  attacks  was  but 
slight,  although  at  times  the  skirmishing  was  quite  animated. 

On  the  morning  of  the  9th,  the  crossing  of  Ebenezer  Creek 
being  now  completed,  as  already  stated,  the  corps  marched 
from  its  camp  at  Ebenezer  Church  to  Cuyler's  plantation, 
where  General  Morgan,  who  was  in  the  advance,  found  the 
enemy  occupying  a  strongly-erected  field-work,  and  disposed 
to  dispute  his  advance.  Morgan  immediately  placed  two 
field-pieces  in  position  and  opened  fire  upon  the  work.  His 


TO  THE  SEA.  287 

infantry  was  soon  deployed  for  an  attack,  but  the  near  approach 
of  night,  and  the  impossibility  of  assaulting  the  position, 
through  the  impassable  swamp  in  the  front,  caused  General 
Davis  to  defer  the  attack  until  morning,  when  it  was  discovered 
the  enemy  had  abandoned  his  position. 

On  the  10th,  Morgan's  and  Carlin's  divisions,  with  trains, 
moved  to  the  Ten-mile  House,  and  went  into  camp,  giving  the 
road  to  the  Twentieth  Corps,  advancing  from  Monteith  and 
intersecting  the  Augusta  road.  Baird's  division  was  left  to 
cover  the  rear,  and  tear  up  the  railway  track  in  the  vicinity 
of  the  crossing  of  the  Savannah  Eiver,  and  if  possible  to 
destroy  the  bridge  at  that  point. 

To  preserve  the  historical  sequence,  it  is  necessary  to  glance 
separately  at  the  movements  of  the  cavalry  division  under 
Kilpatrick,  already  briefly  touched  upon  so  far  as  they 
were  directly  connected  with  the  operations  of  the  several 
corps. 

On  the  2d  of  December,  as  has  been  seen,  Kilpatrick  moved 
from  the  vicinity  of  Louisville,  on  the  Waynesboro'  road,  sup 
ported  by  Baird's  division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  t'o  cover  the 
movement  of  several  columns  on  Millen.  A  small  force  of  the 
enemy  was  encountered  and  dispersed  by  the  Eighth  Indiana, 
Colonel  Jones,  and  the  Fifth  Kentucky,  Colonel  Baldwin,  nine 
miles  from  Waynesboro',  not  without  a  severe  skirmish.  On 
reaching  Eocky  Creek,  the  enemy  was  found  in  considerable 
force  on  the  opposite  bank.  Baird's  division  came  up,  and  a 
force  of  both  cavalry  and  infantry  crossed  the  creek  and  simul 
taneously  charged  the  enemy,  who  rapidly  retreated  towards 
Waynesboro'  and  Augusta,  closely  pursued  for  some  distance 
by  the  cavalry. 

On  the  3d,  Kilpatrick  marched  to  Thomas'  Station  and 
encamped  for  the  night,  Jiaving  made  such  disposition  of  his 
forces  as  to  protect  Baird's  division,  then  deployed  along 
the  railway  and  engaged  in  its  destruction.  Wheeler, 
who  had  been  encamped  between  Waynesboro'  and  Brier 
Creek,  moved  in  the  early  part  of  the  evening  to  Waynes 
boro',  and,  with  a  portion  of  his  command,  made  a  vigorous 


288  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

attack  upon  one  of  Colonel  Atldns'  regiments,  stationed  upon 
the  railway,  three  miles  south  of  the  town.  This  attack  was 
easily  repulsed,  as  were  several  others,  made  during  the 
night.  Having  received  orders  that  day  from  General  Sher 
man  to  make  a  strong  reconnoissance  in  the  direction  of 
Waynesboro',  and  to  engage  Wheeler  whenever  he  might  be 
met,  Kilpatrick  directed  his  brigade  commanders  to  send  the 
surplus  animals  and  all  non-combatants  to  the  wagon-trains, 
and  notify  them  that  in  the  morning  he  would  move  to  engage, 
defeat,  and  rout  the  rebel  cavalry  encamped  at  Waynesboro'. 
At  daylight  on  the  4th  the  cavalry  moved  out  of  camp, 
Atkins'  brigade  leading  the  advance.  The  enemy's  skirmish 
line  was  met,  quickly  driven  in,  and  finally  retired  upon  his 
main  line,  consisting  of  dismounted  cavalry,  strongly  posted 
behind  long  lines  of  barricades,  with  their  flanks  well  secured. 
Colonel  Atkins  was  directed  to  move  forward  and  take  the 
barricades ;  but  the  enemy  was  found  to  be  more  strongly 
posted  than  was  anticipated,  and  the  first  attempt  was  a  fail 
ure.  The  Ninety-second  Illinois  Mounted  Infantry  was  dis 
mounted;  the  Tenth  Ohio  and  Ninth  Michigan  Cavalry,  in 
columns  of  fours,  by  battalions,  were  sent  in  on  the  right,  and 
the  Ninth  Ohio  Cavalry  was  placed  in  the  same  order  on  the 
left ;  the  Tenth  Wisconsin  battery,  Captain  Beebe,  was 
brought  up  to  within  less  than  six  hundred  yards,  and  opened 
upon  the  barricades,  and  the  enemy's  artillery,  in  all  five 
pieces,  was  forced  to  withdraw.  At  this  moment,  all  being 
ready,  the  charge  was  sounded ;  the  whole  line  moved  forward 
in  splendid  order,  and  never  halted  for  one  moment  until  the 
barricades  were  gained  and  the  enemy  routed.  A  few  hun 
dred  yards  beyond,  the  enemy  made  several  counter-charges, 
to  save  his  dismounted  men  and  check  Kilpatrick's  rapid  ad 
vance.  At  one  time  he  had  nearly  succeeded,  when  the  Eighth 
Ohio  Cavalry,  Colonel  Heath,  which  had  been  sent  out  on  Kil 
patrick's  right,  charged  the  enemy  in  flank  and  rear,  and  forced 
them  to  give  way  at  all  points,  and  rapidly  to  fall  back  to  the 
town  of  Waynesboro'.  Here  the  enemy  was  found  occupying  a 
second  line  of  barricades,  with  artillery,  as  before,  and  his  flanks 


TO   THE   SEA.  289 

so  far  extended  that  it  was  useless  to  attempt  to  turn  them. 
Kilpatrick  therefore  determined  to  break  his  centre.  Colonel 
Murray,  having  the  advance,  was  directed  to  make  a  disposi 
tion  accordingly.  The  Eighth  Indiana,  Colonel  Jones,  was 
dismounted  and  pushed  forward  as  skirmishers ;  the  Ninth 
Pennsylvania,  Colonel  Jordan,  in  columns  of  fours,  by  battal 
ions,  had  the  left ;  the  Third  Kentucky,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
King,  the  centre ;  the  Fifth  Kentucky,  Colonel  Baldwin,  and 
Second  Kentucky,  Captain  Foreman,  the  right.  The  advance 
was  sounded,  and  in  less  than  twenty  minutes  the  enemy  was 
driven  from  his  position,  the  town  gained,  and  "Wheeler's  en 
tire  force  completely  routed.  The  Fifth  Ohio,  Fifth  Kentucky, 
and  a  portion  of  the  Ninth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  followed  in 
close  pursuit  to  Brier  Creek,  a  distance  of  eight  miles  from 
the  point  from  where  the  first  attack  was  made.  After  burn 
ing  the  bridges  above  and  below  the  railway  bridge,  as  well  as 
the  latter,  the  cavalry  marched  to  Alexander,  on  the  Waynes- 
boro'  and  Jacksonboro'  road,  and  encamped  for  the  night. 

On  the  5th,  Kilpatrick  marched  from  Alexander  to  Jackson 
boro',  covering  the  rear  of  the  Fourteenth  Army  Corps,  as 
already  stated. 

On  the  6th,  Colonel  Murray's  brigade  marched  to  Spring 
field,  moving  in  rear  of  the  Twentieth  Corps,  and  Colonel 
Atkins'  brigade  moved  to  Hudson  Ferry. 

On  the  7th,  when  near  Sister's  Ferry,  the  Ninth  Michigan, 
Colonel  Acker,  acting  as  rear-guard  of  Colonel  Atkins'  brigade, 
received  and  repulsed  an  attack  made  by  Ferguson's  brigade 
of  Confederate  cavalry. 

On  the  8th,  Atkins'  brigade  crossed  Ebenezer  Creek,  and 
the  whole  division  united  on  the  Monteith  road,  ten  miles 
south  of  Springfield.  From  this  point  the  cavalry  moved  in 
rear  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps,  covering  the  rear  of  the  other 
corps  by  detachments. 

Thus,  on  the  10th  of  December,  1864,  the  enemy's  forces 
under  Hardee  were  driven  within  the  immediate  defences  of 
Savannah,  and  Sherman's  entire  army  having  leisurely  marched 
over  three  hundred  miles  in  twenty-four  days  with  trifling 

19 


290  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

opposition  through  the  vitals  of  the  enemy's  country,  subsist 
ing  upon  his  stock-yards  and  granaries,  was  massed  in  front 
of  the  city,  entirely  across  the  peninsula  lying  between  the 
Ogeechee  and  Savannah  rivers,  and  occupying  all  the  lines  of 
railway  communication  and  supply. 


A  CHRISTMAS  GIFT.  291 


CHAPTEE  XXIII. 

A   CHRISTMAS   GIFT. 

THE  defensive  works  constructed  by  the  enemy  to  cover  the 
rear  of  Savannah,  and  now  garrisoned  by  the  Confederate 
forces  under  Lieutenant-Gexieral  Hardee,  followed  substantially 
a  swampy  creek  which  empties  into  the  Savannah  River  about 
three  miles  above  the  city,  across  to  the  head  of  a  correspond 
ing  stream  flowing  into  the  Little  Ogeechee.  These  streams 
proved  singularly  favorable  to  the  enemy  as  a  cover,  being  very 
marshy  and  bordered  by  rice-fields,  which  were  flooded  either 
by  the  tide-water  or  by  inland  ponds,  the  gates  to  which  were 
controlled  and  covered  by  his  heavy  artillery.  The  only  ap 
proaches  to  the  city  were  by  five  narrow  causeways,  namely, 
the  two  railways,  and  the  Augusta,  the  Louisville,  and  the 
Ogeechee  roads,  all  of  which  were  commanded  by  the  enemy's 
heavy  ordnance. 

To  assault  an  enemy  of  unknown  strength  at  such  a  dis 
advantage  appeared  to  Sherman  unwise,  especially  as  he 
had  brought  his  army,  almost  unscathed,  so  great  a  distance, 
and  could  surely  attain  the  same  result  by  the  operation 
of  time.  He  therefore  instructed  his  army  commanders  closely 
to  invest  the  city  from  the  north  and  west,  and  to  recon 
noitre  well  the  ground  in  their  respective  fronts,  while  he 
gave  his  personal  attention  to  opening  communications  with 
the  fleet,  which  wTas  known  to  be  waiting  in  Tybee,  Wassaw, 
and  Ossabaw  sounds,  in  accordance  with  the  preconcerted  plan. 
Williams'  twentieth  corps  held  the  left  of  the  Union  line,  rest 
ing  on  the  Savannah  River,  near  Williamson's  plantation ;  Jef 
ferson  C.  Davis'  fourteenth  corps  was  on  its  right,  extending 
from  the  Augusta  railway,  near  its  junction  with  the  Charles- 


292  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

ton  railway,  to  Lawton's  plantation,  beyond  the  canal ;  Blair's 
seventeenth  corps  next,  and  Osterhaus'  fifteenth  corps  on  the 
extreme  right,  with  its  flank  resting  on  the  Gulf  railway,  at 
Station  No.  1.  General  Kilpatrick  was  instructed  to  cross  the 
Ogeechee  by  a  pontoon  bridge,  to  reconnoitre  Fort  McAllister, 
and  to  proceed  to  St.  Catherine's  Sound,  in  the  direction  of 
Sunbury  or  Kilkenny  Bluff,  and  open  communication  with  the 
fleet.  General  Howard  had  previously  sent  Captain  Duncan, 
one  of  his  best  scouts,  down  the  Ogeechee  in  a  canoe  for  a  like 
purpose  ;  but  it  was  also  necessary  to  have  the  ships  and  their 
contents,  and  the  Ogeechee  River,  close  to  the  rear  of  the 
camps,  as  the  proper  avenue  of  supply. 

The  enemy  had  burned  King's  Bridge,  over  the  Ogeechee, 
just  below  the  mouth  of  the  Cannouchee;  but  although  a 
thousand  feet  long,  it  was  reconstructed  in  an  incredibly  short 
time,  and  in  the  most  substantial  manner,  by  the  Fifty-eighth 
Indiana,  Colonel  Buell,  under  the  direction  of  Captain  C.  B. 
Reese,  of  the  Engineer  Corps  ;  and  on  the  13th  of  December, 
Hazen's  division  of  Osterhaus'  fiifteenth  corps  crossed  the 
bridge,  gained  the  west  bank  of  the  Ogeechee,  and  marched 
down  the  river  with  orders  to  carry  by  assault  Fort  McAllister, 
a  strong  inclosed  redoubt,  manned  by  two  companies  of  artil 
lery  and  three  of  infantry,  numbering  in  all  about  two  hundred 
men,  and  mounting  twenty-three  barbette  guns  and  one  mortar. 

On  the  morning  of  the  13th  of  December,  General  Sherman 
and  General  Howard  went  to  Dr.  Cheves'  rice-mill,  whence 
Fort  McAllister  was  in  full  view.  At  the  rice-mill  a  section  of 
De  Grass'  battery  was  firing  occasionally  at  the  fort  opposite, 
three  miles  and  a  half  distant,  as  a  diversion,  having  for  its 
principal  object,  however,  to  attract  the  attention  of  the  fleet. 
During  the  day  the  two  commanders  watched  the  fort  and  the 
bay,  endeavoring  to  catch  glimpses  of  the  division  moving  upon 
the  work,  and  of  vessels  belonging  to  the  fleet.  About  noon, 
the  rebel  artillery  at  McAllister  opened  inland,  firing  occasion 
ally  from  three  or  four  different  guns.  By  their  glasses  the 
generals  could  observe  Hazen's  skirmishers  firing  on  the  fort ; 
and  about  the  same  time  a  movable  smoke,  like  that  from  a 


A    CHRISTMAS    GIFT.  293 

steamer,  attracted  their  attention  near  the  mouth  of  the 
Ogeechee. 

Signal  communication  was  established  with  General  Hazen, 
who  gave  notice  that  he  had  invested  the  fort,  and  also  that 
he  observed  the  steamer.  General  Sherman  signalled  him  from 
the  top  of  the  mill  that  it  was  important  to  carry  the  fort  by 
assault  that  day. 

The  steamer  had  approached  near  enough  to  draw  the  fire 
of  the  fort  when  her  signal-flag  was  descried.  Captain  McClin- 
tock,  of  the  Signal  Corps,  aided  by  Lieutenant  Sampson, 
speedily  communicated  with  the  vessel,  and  ascertained  that 
she  was  a  tug,  sent  by  General  Foster  and  Admiral  Dahlgren 
for  the  purpose  of  communicating  with  the  army.  The  signal- 
officer  of  the  steamer  inquired,  "Is  McAllister  ours  ?" 

Just  at  that  moment  a  brisk  firing  was  observed  at  the 
fort.  Hazen  had  sounded  the  charge,  and  instantly  his  brave 
division  had  rushed  through  the  torpedoes  and  abattis  which 
obstructed  the  approach  to  the  fort,  and  gaining  the  parapet, 
after  a  hand-to-hand  struggle  of  a  few  moments'  duration, 
the  garrison  had  surrendered. 

From  their  position  at  the  rice-mill,  Sherman  and  Howard 
could  see  the  men  discharge  their  pieces  in  the  air,  and  hear 
their  shout  of  triumph  as  they  took  possession  of  the  fort  and 
raised  the  old  flag  over  their  conquest. 

Hazen's  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  about  ninety  men, 
while  the  garrison  lost  between  forty  and  fifty,  killed  and 
wounded ;  and  the  remainder,  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  in 
number,  were  captured,  together  with  twenty-two  pieces  of  ar 
tillery  and  a  large  quantity  of  ammunition. 

The  substantial  fruit  of  this  victory,  however,  was  to  bo 
found  in  the  fact  that  communication  with  the  sea  was  estab 
lished,  and  the  prompt  receipt  of  supplies  secured. 

As  soon  as  he  saw  the  Union  colors  planted  upon  the  walls 
of  the  fort,  Sherman  ordered  a  boat,  and,  accompanied  by 
General  Howard,  went  down  to  the  fort,  and  there  met  General 
Hazen,  who  had  not  yet  communicated  with  the  steamer,  nor 
indeed  seen  her,  as  the  view  was  interrupted  by  some  trees. 


294  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Determined  to  communicate  that  night  with  the  fleet,  Sherman 
got  into  another  boat,  and  caused  himself  to  be  rowed  down 
the  Ogeechee,  until  he  met  the  navy  tug-boat  Dandelion,  com 
manded  by  Lieutenant-Commander  Williamson,  who  informed 
him  that  Captain  Duncan,  who,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  sent 
down  the  river  a  few  days  previously  by  General  Howard,  had 
safely  reached  Major-General  Foster  and  Kear-Admlral  Dahl- 
gren,  commanding  the  land  and  naval  forces  on  the  South  At 
lantic  coast,  and  that  these  officers  were  hourly  expected  to 
arrive  in  Ossabaw  Sound,  where  the  Dandelion  was  then  lying. 

At  midnight,  Sherman  wrote  brief  notes  to  General  Foster  and 
the  admiral,  and  a  dispatch  to  the  secretary  of  war,  recount 
ing  the  main  facts  of  the  campaign,  and  the  present  situation. 

"  The  wreather  has  been  fine,"  he  said  to  Mr.  Stanton,  "  and 
supplies  were  abundant.  Our  march  was  most  agreeable,  and 

we  were  not  at  all  molested  by  guerrillas We  have 

not  lost  a  wagon  on  the  trip,  but  have  gathered  in  a  large  supply 
of  negroes,  mules,  horses,  etc.,  and  our  trains  are  in  far  better 
condition  than  when  we  started.  My  first  duty  will  be  to  clear 

the  army  of  surplus  negroes,  mules,  and  horses 

The  quick  work  made  with  McAllister,  and  the  opening  of 
communication  with  our  fleet,  and  the  consequent  independence 
for  supplies,  dissipates  all  their  boasted  threats  to  head  me  off 
and  starve  the  army.  I  regard  Savannah  as  already  gained." 

He  then  returned  to  Fort  McAllister,  and  before  daylight 
was  overtaken  by  Major  Strong,  of  General  Foster's  staff,  with 
intelligence  that  General  Foster  had  arrived  in  the  Ogeechee, 
near  Fort  McAllister,  and  was  very  anxious  to  meet  General 
Sherman  on  board  his  boat.  Sherman  accordingly  returned 
with  the  major,  and  met  General  Foster  on  board  the  steamer 
Nemaha ;  arid,  after  consultation,  determined  to  proceed  with 
him  dowrn  the  sound,  in  hopes  of  meeting  Admiral  Dahlgren, 
which,  however,  they  did  not  do  until  about  noon,  in  Wassaw 
Sound.  General  Sherman  there  went  on  board  the  admiral's 
flagship,  the  Harvest  Moon,  after  having  arranged  with  Gen 
eral  Foster  to  send  from  Hilton  Head  some  siege  ordnance 
and  boats  suitable  for  navigating  the  Ogeechee  Kiver.  Ad- 


A  CHRISTMAS  GIFT.  295 

miral  Dahlgren  furnished  all  the  data  concerning  his  fleet  and 
the  numerous  forts  that  guarded  the  inland  channels  between 
the  sea  and  Savannah;  and  Sherman  explained  to  him  how 
completely  Savannah  was  invested  at  all  points,  save  only  the 
plank-road  on  the  South  Carolina  shore,  known  as  the  "  Union 
Causeway,"  which  he  thought  he  could  reach  from  his  left 
flank  across  the  Savannah  Kiver.  The  general  also  informed 
the  admiral  that  if  he  would  simply  engage  the  attention  of 
the  forts  along  Wilmington  Channel,  at  Beaulieu  and  Hosedew, 
the  army  could  carry  the  defences  of  Savannah  by  assault  as 
soon  as  the  heavy  ordnance  arrived  from  Hilton  Head. 

On  the  15th,  Sherman  returned  to  the  lines  in  the  rear  of 
Savannah. 

Having  received  and  carefully  considered  all  the  reports  of 
division  commanders,  he  determined  to  assault  the  lines  of  the 
enemy  as  soon  as  the  heavy  ordnance  should  arrive  from  Port 
Eoyal,  first  making  a  formal  demand  for  surrender.  On  the 
17th,  a  number  of  thirty-pounder  Parrott  guns  having  reached 
King's  Bridge,  Sherman  proceeded  in  person  to  the  head 
quarters  of  Major-General  Slocum,  on  the  Augusta  road,  and 
dispatched  thence  into  Savannah,  by  flag  of  truce,  a  formal 
demand  for  the  surrender  of  the  place,  accompanied  by  a 
copy  of  Hood's  threat,  at  Dalton,  to  take  no  prisoners,  and  on 
the  following  day  received  an  answer  from  General  Hardee 
conveying  his  refusal  to  accede  thereto.  In  his  reply,  General 
Hardee  pointed  out  that  the  investment  was  still  incomplete. 

In  the  mean  time,  further  rec.onnoissances  from  the  left 
flank  had  demonstrated  that  it  was  impracticable  and  unwise 
to  push  any  considerable  force  across  the  Savannah  Kiver, 
since  the  enemy  held  the  river  opposite  the  city  with  iron-clad 
gunboats,  and  could  destroy  any  pontoons  laid  down  between 
Hutchinson's  Island  and  the  South  Carolina  shore,  and  thereby 
isolate  any  force  sent  over  from  that  flank.  Sherman,  there 
fore,  ordered  General  Slocum  to  get  into  position  the  siege- 
guns,  and  make  all  the  preparations  necessary  to  assault,  and 
to  report  the  earliest  moment  when  he  could  be  ready. 

General  Foster  had  already  established  a  division  of  troops 


296  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

on  the  peninsula  or  neck  between  the  Coosawhatchie  and  Tulli- 
finney  rivers,  at  the  head  of  Broad  Eiver,  whence  he  could  reach 
the  railway  with  his  artillery.  Sherman  himself  went  to  Port 
Royal,  and  made  arrangements  to  re-enforce  that  command  by 
one  or  more  divisions,  so  as  to  enable  it  to  assault  and  carry 
the  railway,  and  thence  turn  towards  Savannah  until  it  should 
occupy  the  causeway.  He  made  the  voyage  on  board  Admiral 
Dahlgren's  flag-ship,  the  Harvest  Moon,  which  put.  to  sea  the 
night  of  the  20th  ;  but  the  wind  was  high,  and  increased  during 
the  night,  so  that  the  pilot  considered  Ossabaw  Bar  impassable, 
and  ran  into  Tybee,  whence  the  steamer  proceeded  through 
the  inland  channels  into  Wassaw  Sound,  and  thence  through 
Bomney  Marsh.  But  the  ebb-tide  having  caught  the  Harvest 
Moon,  so  that  she  was  unable  to  make  the  passage,  Admiral 
Dahlgren  took  the  general  in  his  barge,  and  pulling  in  the  di 
rection  of  Vernon  Eiver,  the  army-tug  Eed  Legs  was  there 
met,  bearing  a  message  from  Captain  Dayton,  assistant-adju 
tant-general,  dated  that  morning,  the  21st,  to  the  effect  that 
the  troops  were  already  in  possession  of  the  enemy's  lines, 
and  were  advancing  without  opposition  into  Savannah.  Ad 
miral  Dahlgren  proceeded  up  the  Vernon  Eiver  in  his  barge, 
while  General  Sherman  went  on  board  the  tug,  in  which  he 
proceeded  to  Fort  McAllister,  and  thence  to  the  rice-mill, 
whence  he  had  viewed  the  assault,  and  on  the  morning  of  the 
22d  rode  into  the  city  of  Savannah. 

After  firing  heavily  from  his  iron-clads  and  the  batteries 
along  the  lines,  all  the  afternoon,  and  late  into  the  evening  of 
the  20th,  Hardee  had  evacuated  the  city  during  that  night, 
on  a  pontoon  bridge,  and  marched  towards  Charleston  on  the 
causeway  road.  The  night  being  very  dark,  and  a  strong 
westerly  wind  blowing,  although  the  sounds  of  movement 
were  heard  in  Geary's  front,  it  was  impossible  to  make  out  its 
direction  or  object,  and  when  the  pickets  of  that  division 
advanced  early  on  the  morning  of  the  21st  the  evacuation  had 
been  completed,  and  nothing  remained  but  to  occupy  the 
city. 

Immediately  on  his  arrival,  Sherman  dispatched  the  follow- 


A   CHRISTMAS  GIFT.  297 

ing  brief  note  to  President  Lincoln,  announcing  this  happy 
termination  of  the  campaign  : — 

"  I  beg  to  present  you,  as  a  Christmas  gift,  the  city  of  Sa 
vannah,  with  one  hundred  and  fifty  heavy  guns  and  plenty  of 
ammunition,  and  also  about  twenty-five  thousand  bales  of 
cotton." 

The  number  of  pieces  of  artillery  captured,  as  subsequently 
ascertained  by  actual  inspection  and  count,  was  one  hundred 
and  sixty-seven. 

Thus,  as  the  result  of  this  great  campaign,  was  gained  the 
possession  of  what  had  from  the  outset  been  its  chief  object. 

Its  present  value  was  mainly  as  a  base  for  future  operations. 

The  army  marched  over  three  hundred  miles  in  twenty-four 
days,  directly  through  the  heart  of  Georgia,  and  reached  the 
sea  with  its  subsistence  trains  almost  unbroken.  In  the 
entire  command,  five  officers  and  fifty-eight  men  were  killed, 
thirteen  officers  and  two  hundred  and  thirty-two  men  wounded, 
and  one  officer  and  two  hundred  and  fifty-eight  men  missing ; 
making  a  total  list  of  casualties  of  but  nineteen  commissioned 
officers  and  five  hundred  and  forty-eight  enlisted  men,  or  five 
hundred  and  sixty-seven  of  all  ranks.  Seventy-seven  officers, 
and  twelve  hundred  and  sixty-one  men  of  the  Confederate 
army,  or  thirteen  hundred  and  thirty-eight  in  all,  were  made 
prisoners.  Ten  thousand  negroes  left  the  plantations  of  their 
former  masters  and  accompanied  the  column  when  it  reached 
Savannah,  without  taking  note  of  thousands  more  who  joined 
the  army,  but  from  various  causes  had  to  leave  it  at  different 
points.  Over  .twenty  thousand  bales  of  cotton  were  burned, 
besides  the  twenty-five  thousand  captured  at  Savannah.  Thir 
teen  thousand  head  of  beef-cattle,  nine  million  five  hundred 
thousand  pounds  of  corn,  and  ten  million  five  hundred  thousand 
of  fodder,  were  taken  from  the  country  and  issued  to  the  troops 
and  animals.  The  men  lived  mainly  on  the  sheep  hogs, 
turkeys,  geese,  chickens,  sweet  potatoes,  and  rice,  gathered  by 
the  foragers  from  the  plantations  along  the  route  of  each  day's 


298  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

march.  Sixty  thousand  men,  taking  merely  of  the  surplus  which 
fell  in  their  way  as  they  marched  rapidly  on  the  main  roads, 
subsisted  for  three  weeks  in  the  very  country  where  the  Union 
prisoners  at  Andersonville  were  starved  to  death  or  idiotcy. 
Five  thousand  horses  and  four  thousand  mules  were  impressed 
for  the  cavalry  and  trains.  Three  hundred  and  twenty  miles 
of  railway  were  destroyed,  and  the  last  remaining  links  of 
communication  between  the  Confederate  armies  in  Virginia 
and  the  "West  effectually  severed,  by  burning  every  tie,  twist 
ing  every  rail  while  heated  red-hot  over  the  naming  piles  of 
ties,  and  laying  in  ruin  every  depot,  engine-house,  repair- 
shop,  water-tank,  and  turn-table. 

From  the  time  that  the  army  left  Atlanta,  until  its  arrival 
before  Savannah,  not  one  word  of  intelligence  was  received  by 
the  Government  or  people,  except  through  the  Confederate 
newspapers,  of  its  whereabouts,  movements,  or  fate ;  and  it 
was  not  until  Sherman  had  emerged  from  the  region  lying 
between  Augusta  and  Macon,  and  reached  Milieu,  that  the 
authorities  and  the  press  of  the  Confederacy  were  able  to  make 
up  their  minds  as  to  the  direction  of  his  march. 

Marching  in  four  columns,  on  a  front  of  thirty  miles,  each 
column  masked  in  all  directions  by  clouds  of  skirmishers, 
Sherman  was  enabled  to  continue  till  the  last  to  menace  so 
many  points,  each  in  such  force  that  it  was  impossible  for  the 
enemy  to  decide  whether  Augusta,  Macon,  or  Savannah  were 
his  immediate  objective ;  the  Gulf  or  the  Atlantic  his  destina 
tion  ;  the  Flint,  the  Oconee,  the  Ogeechee,  or  the  Savannah  his 
route  ;  or  what  his  ulterior  design. 

Immediately  upon  receipt  of  Sherman's  laconic  message, 
President  Lincoln  replied  : — 

"EXECUTIVE  MANSION, 
"  WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  Dec.  26, 1864. 

"  MY  DEAR  GENERAL  SHERMAN  : 

"  Many,  many  thanks  for  your  Christmas  gift, — the  capture 
of  Savannah. 

"  When  you  were  about  to  leave  Atlanta  for  the  Atlantic 


A  CHRISTMAS  GIFT.  299 

coast,  I  was  anxious,  if  not  fearful ;  but  feeling  you  were  the 
better  judge,  and  remembering  that  'nothing  risked  nothing 
gained,'  I  did  not  interfere.  Now,  the  undertaking  being  a 
success,  the  honor  is  all  yours,  for  I  believe  none  of  us  went 
further  than  to  acquiesce.  And  taking  the  work  of  General 
Thomas  into  the  count,  as  it  should  be  taken,  it  is  indeed  a 
great  success. 

"  Not  only  does  it  afford  the  obvious  and  immediate  military 
advantages,  but  in  showing  to  the  world  that  your  army  could 
be  divided,  putting  the  stronger  part  to  an  important  new  ser 
vice,  and  yet  leaving  enough  to  vanquish  the  old  opposing 
forces  of  the  whole — Hood's  army — it  brings  those  who  sat 
in  darkness  to  see  a  great  light. 

"  But  what  next  ?  I  suppose  it  will  be  safe  if  I  leave  Gen 
eral  Grant  and  yourself  to  decide. 

"  Please  make  my  grateful  acknowledgments  to  your  whole 
army,  officers  and  men. 

"  Tours  very  truly, 

"  A.  LINCOLN."     , 

In  concluding  his  official  report,  Sherman  thus  speaks  of  the 
services  rendered  by  his  subordinate  commanders,  and  of  the 
character  of  his  army  : — 

"  Generals  Howard  and  Slocum  are  gentlemen  of  singular 
capacity  and  intelligence,  thorough  soldiers  and  patriots, 
working  day  and  night,  not  for  themselves,  but  for  their 
country  and  their  men.  General  Kilpatrick,  who  commanded 
the  cavalry  of  this  army,  has  handled  it  with  spirit  and  dash 
to  my  entire  satisfaction,  and  kept  a  superior  force  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry  from  even  approaching  our  infantry  columns 
or  wagon-trains.  All  the  division  and  brigade  commanders 
merit  my  personal  and  official  thanks,  and  I  shall  spare  no 
efforts  to  secure  them  commissions  equal  to  the  rank  they 
have  exercised  so  well. 

"  As  to  the  rank  and  file,  they  seem  so  full  of  confidence  in 
themselves,  that  I  doubt  if  they  want  a  compliment  from  me  ; 


300  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

but  I  must  do  them  the  justice  to  say  that,  whether  called  on 
to  fight,  to  march,  to  wade  streams,  to  make  roads,  clear  out 
obstructions,  build  bridges,  make  '  corduroy,'  or  tear  up  rail 
roads,  they  have  done  it  with  alacrity  and  a  degree  of  cheer 
fulness  unsurpassed.  A  little  loose  in  foraging,  they  '  did 
some  things  they  ought  not  to  have  done,'  yet  on  the  whole 
they  have  supplied  the  wants  of  the  army  with  as  little 
violence  as  could  be  expected,  and  as  little  loss  as  I  calculated. 
Some  of  these  foraging  parties  had  encounters  with  the  enemy 
which  would,  in  ordinary  times,  rank  as  respectable  battles. 

"  The  behavior  of  our  troops  in  Savannah  has  been  so 
manly,  so  quiet,  so  perfect,  that  I  take  it  as  the  best  evidence 
of  discipline  and  true  courage.  Never  was  a  hostile  city,  filled 
with  women  and  children,  occupied  by  a  large  army  with  less 
disorder,  or  more  system,  order,  and  good  government.  The 
same  general  and  generous  spirit  of  confidence  and  good  feel 
ing  pervades  the  army  which  it  has  ever  afforded  me  especial 
pleasure  to  report  on  former  occasions." 


THE    END   OF   HOOD.  301 


CHAPTEE  XXIV. 

THE    END    OF    HOOD. 

IN  order  fully  to  comprehend  how  it  was  possible  for  a  cam 
paign  so  vast  in  its  magnitude,  so  decisive  in  its  results,  to  be 
conducted  to  a  successful  termination  with  only  nominal  oppo 
sition,  it  is  necessary  to  recur  to  the  position  of  Hood's  army, 
which  we  left  at  Florence  in  the  early  part  of  November,  con 
fronted  by  the  Union  army  under  Thomas,  then  concentrated 
at  Pulasld,  under  the  immediate  command  of  Major-General 
Schofield. 

It  will  be  remembered  that,  in  view  of  the  numerical 
inferiority  of  his  army,  comprising  the  Fourth  and  Twenty- 
third  Corps,  Hatch's  division,  and  Croxton's  and  Capron's 
brigades  of  cavalry,  amounting  to  less  than  thirty  thousand 
men  of  all  arms,  General  Thomas  had  decided  to  maintain  a 
defensive  attitude,  until  the  arrival  of  A.  J.  Smith  with  two 
divisions  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps  from  Missouri  and  the  rem 
nant  of  dismounted  cavalry  should  enable  him  to  assume  the 
offensive,  with  equal  strength,  against  Hood's  forces,  consist 
ing  of  the  three  old  corps  of  the  Confederate  army  of  the 
Tennessee,  under  Lee,  Stewart,  and  Cheatham,  estimated  at 
thirty  thousand  strong,  and  Forrest's  cavalry,  supposed  to 
number  twelve  thousand.  In  preparation  for  his  great  in 
vasion  of  Middle  Tennessee,  with  the  declared  intention  of  re 
maining  there,  Hood  had  caused  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  railway 
to  be  repaired,  and  occupied  Corinth,  so  that  his  supplies 
could  now  be  brought  from  Selma  and  Montgomery  by  rail  to 
that  point,  and  thence  to  Cherokee  Station,  on  the  Memphis 
and  Charleston  railway. 


302  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  12th  of  November  the  last  telegram 
was  received  from  General  Sherman,  and  all  railway  and  tele 
graphic  communication  with  his  army  ceased.  From  that 
time  until  the  17th  of  November  was  an  anxious  period  for 
Thomas,  uncertain  whether  he  should  have  to  pursue  Hood  in 
an  endeavor  on  his  part  to  follow  Sherman,  or  defend  Tennes 
see  against  invasion ;  but  on  that  day  Cheatham's  corps 
crossed  to  the  south  side  of  the  Tennessee,  and  suspense  was 
at  an  end.  Hood  could  not  follow  Sherman  now  if  he  would, 
for  Sherman  was  already  two  days'  march  from  Atlanta  on  his 
way  to  the  sea. 

On  the  19th  of  November,  Hood  began  his  advance,  on  par 
allel  roads  from  Florence  towards  Waynesboro'. 

General  Schofield  commenced  removing  the  public  property 
from  Pulaski  preparatory  to  falling  back  towards  Columbia. 

Two  divisions  of  Stanley's  fourth  corps  had  already  reached 
Lynnville,  fifteen  miles  north  of  Pulaski,  to  cover  the  passage 
of  the  wagons  and  protect  the  railway.  Capron's  brigade  of 
cavalry  was  at  Mount  Pleasant,  covering  the  approach  to 
Columbia  from  that  direction ;  and  in  addition  to  the  regular 
garrison,  there  was  at  Columbia  a  brigade  of  Ruger's  division 
of  the  Twenty-third  Corps.  The  two  remaining  brigades  of 
Euger's  division,  then  at  Johnsonville,  were  ordered  to  move, 
one  by  railway  around  through  Nashville  to  Columbia,  the 
other  by  road  via  Waverley  to  Centreville,  and  occupy  the 
crossings  of  Duck  River  near  Columbia,  Williamsport;  Gordon's 
Ferry,  and  Centreville.  About  five  thousand  men  belonging  to 
Sherman's  column  had  collected  at  Chattanooga,  comprising 
convalescents  and  furloughed  men  returning  to  their  regiments. 
These  men  had  been  organized  into  brigades,  to  be  made 
available  at  such  points  as  they  might  be  needed.  Thomas 
had  also  been  re-enforced  by  twenty  new  one-year  regiments, 
most  of  which,  however,  were  absorbed  in  replacing  old  regi 
ments  whose  terms  of  service  had  expired. 

On  the  23d,  in  accordance  with  directions  previously  given 
him,  General  E.  S.  Granger  commenced  withdrawing  the 
garrisons  from  Athens,  Decatur,  and  Huntsville,  Alabama,  and 


THE  END  OF  HOOD.  303 

moved  off  towards  Stevenson,  sending  five  new  regiments  of 
that  force  to  Murfreesboro',  and  retaining  at  Stevenson  the 
original  troops  of  his  command.  This  movement  was  rapidly 
made  by  rail,  and  without  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  enemy. 

The  same  night  General  Schofield  evacuated  Pulaski,  and 
reached  Columbia  on  the  24th.  The  commanding  officer  at 
Johnsonville  was  directed  to  evacuate  that  post  and  retire  to 
Clarksville.  During  the  24th  and  25th,  the  enemy  skirmished 
with  General  Schofield' s  troops  at  Columbia,  and  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  26th  his  infantry  came  up  and  pressed  Schofield's 
line  strongly  during  that  day  and  the  27th,  but  without  assault 
ing.  As  the  enemy's  movements  showed  an  undoubted  inten 
tion  to  cross,  General  Schofield  withdrew  to  the  north  bank  of 
Duck  Kiver,  during  the  night  of  the  27th.  Two  divisions  of 
the  Twenty-third  Corps  were  placed  in  line  in  front  of  the 
town,  holding  all  the  crossings  in  its  vicinity ;  while  Stanley's 
fourth  corps,  posted  in  reserve  on  the  Franklin  pike,  was  held 
in  readiness  to  repel  any  vigorous  attempt  the  enemy  should 
make  to  force  a  passage ;  and  the  cavalry,  under  Wilson,  held 
the  crossings  above  those  guarded  by  the  infantry. 

About  2  A.  M.  on  the  29th,  the  enemy  succeeded  in  pressing 
back  General  Wilson's  cavalry,  and  effected  a  crossing  on  the 
Lewisburg  pike  :  at  a  later  hour  part  of  his  infantry  crossed  at 
Huey's  Mills,  six  miles  above  Columbia.  Communication  with 
the  cavalry  having  been  interrupted,  and  the  hue  of  retreat 
towards  Franklin  being  threatened,  General  Schofield  made 
preparations  to  withdraw  to  Franklin.  General  Stanley,  with 
one  division  of  his  Fourth  Corps,  was  sent  to  Spring  Hill,  fifteen 
miles  north  of  Columbia,  to  cover  the  trains  and  hold  the  road 
open  for  the  passage  of  the  main  force  ;  and  dispositions  were 
made,  preparatory  to  a  withdrawal,  to  meet  any  attack  coming 
from  the  direction  of  Huey's  Mills.  General  Stanley  reached 
Spring  Hill  just  in  time  to  drive  off  the  enemy's  cavalry  and 
save  the  trains;  but  he  was  afterwards  attacked  by  the 
enemy's  infantry  and  cavalry  combined,  who  nearly  succeeded 
in  dislodging  him  from  the  position.  Although  not  attacked 
from  the  direction  of  Huey's  Mill?.  General  Schofield  was 


304  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

busily  occupied  all  day  at  Columbia  resisting  the  enemy's 
attempts  to  cross  Duck  River,  which  he  successfully  accom 
plished,  repulsing  the  enemy  many  times  with  heavy  loss. 
Giving  directions  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  as  soon  as 
covered  by  the  darkness,  at  a  late  hour  in  the  afternoon  Gen 
eral  Schofield,  with  Ruger's  division,  started  to  the  relief  of 
General  Stanley  at  Spring  Hill,  and  when  near  that  place 
came  upon  the  enemy's  cavalry,  bivouacking  within  eight 
hundred  yards  of  the  road,  but  easily  drove  them  off.  Post 
ing  a  brigade  to  hold  the  pike  at  this  point,  General  Schofield, 
with  Ruger's  division,  pushed  on  to  Thompson's  Station,  three 
miles  beyond,  where  he  found  the  enemy's  camp-fires  still 
burning,  a  cavalry  force  having  occupied  the  place  at  dark, 
but  subsequently  disappeared.  The  withdrawal  of  the  main 
force  in  front  of  Columbia  was  safely  effected  after  dark  on 
the  29th  ;  Spring  Hill  was  passed  without  molestation  about 
midnight,  and,  making  a  night  march  of  twenty-five  miles,  the 
whole  command  got  into  position  at  Franklin  at  an  early  hour 
on  the  morning  of  the  30th,  the  cavalry  moving  on  the  Lewis- 
burg  pike,  on  the  right  or  east  of  the  infantry. 

At  Franklin,  General  Schofield  formed  line  of  battle  on  the 
southern  edge  of  the  town,  and  hastened  the  crossing  of  the 
trains,  to  the  north  side  of  Harpeth  River. 

The  enemy  followed  closely  after  General  Schofield's  rear 
guard  in  the  retreat  to  Franklin,  and  repeatedly  assaulted  his 
works  until  ten  o'clock  at  night ;  but  Schofield's  position 
was  excellently  chosen,  with  both  flanks  resting  on  the  river, 
and  his  men  firmly  held  their  ground,  and  repulsed  every 
attack  along  the  whole  line.  Our  loss  was  one  hundred  and 
eighty-nine  killed,  one  thousand  and  thirty-three  wounded,  and 
one  thousand  one  hundred  and  four  missing,  making  an  aggre 
gate  of  two  thousand  three  hundred  and  twenty-six.  Seven 
hundred  and  two  prisoners  were  captured,  and  thirty-three 
stands  of  colors.  Major-General  Stanley  was  severely  wounded 
while  engaged  in  rallying  a  portion  of  his  command  which  had 
been  temporarily  overpowered  by  an  overwhelming  attack  of 
the  enemy.  The  enemy  lost  seventeen  hundred  and  fifty  killed, 


THE  END   OF  HOOD.  305 

three  thousand  eight  hundred  wounded,  and  seven  hundred 
and  two  prisoners,  making  an  aggregate  loss  to  Hood's  army 
of  six  thousand  two  hundred  and  fifty-two,  among  which 
number  were  six  general  officers  killed,  six  wounded,  and  one 
captured. 

On  the  evacuation  of  Columbia,  General  Thomas  sent  orders 
to  General  Milroy,  at  Tullahoma,  to  abandon  that  post  and 
retire  to  Murfreesboro',  joining  forces  with  General  Rousseau 
at  the  latter  place,  but  to  maintain  the  garrison  at  the  block 
house  at  Elk  River  bridge.  Nashville  was  placed  in  a  state  of 
defence,  and  the  fortifications  manned  by  the  garrison,  re- 
enforced  by  a  volunteer  force  which  had  been  previously 
organized  into  a  division  under  brevet  Brigadier-General  J. 
L.  Donaldson,  from  the  employes  of  the  quartermaster's  and 
commissary  departments.  This  latter  force,  aided  by  rail 
way  employes,  the  whole  under  the  direction  of  Brigadier- 
General  Tower,  worked  assiduously  to  construct  additional 
defences.  Major- General  Steedman,  with  the  five  thousand 
men  isolated  from  General  Sherman's  column,  and  a  brigade 
of  colored  troops,  started  from  Chattanooga  by  rail  011  the 
29th  November,  and  reached  Cowan  on  the  morning  of  the 
30th,  where  orders  were  sent  him  to  proceed  direct  to  Nash 
ville.  At  an  early  hour  on  the  morning  of  the  30th  the  advance 
of  Major-General  A.  J.  Smith's  command  arrived  at  Nashville 
by  transports  from  St.  Louis.  Thus,  General  Thomas  had 
now  an  infantry  force  nearly  equal  to  that  of  the  enemy, 
though  still  outnumbered  in  effective  cavalry ;  but  as  soon  as 
a  few  thousand  of  the  latter  arm  could  be  mounted  he  would 
be  in  a  condition  to  take  the  field  offensively  and  dispute  the 
possession  of  Tennessee  with  Hood's  army. 

Not  willing  to  risk  a  renewal  of  the  battle  on  the  morrow, 
and  having  accomplished  the  object  of  the  day's  operations, 
namely,  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  his  trains,  General  Scho- 
field,  by  direction  of  General  Thomas,  fell  back  during  the 
night  to  Nashville,  and  formed  line  of  battle  on  the  surround 
ing  heights  on  the  1st  of  December,  connecting  with  the  rest 
of  the  army ,  A.  J.  Smith's  corps  occupying  the  right,  resting 

20 


306  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

on  the  Cumberland  River,  below  the  city  ;  the  Fourth  Corps, 
temporarily  commanded  by  Brigadier-General  Thomas  J. 
Wood,  in  consequence  of  General  Stanley's  wound,  the  centre  ; 
and  Schofield's  twenty-third  corps  the  left,  extending  to  the 
Nolensville  pike.  The  cavalry  under  General  Wilson  took 
post  on  the  left  of  Schofield,  thus  securing  the  interval  between 
that  flank  and  the  river  above  the  city. 

General  Steedman's  troops  reached  Nashville  on  the  even 
ing  of  the  1st,  and  on  the  3d,  when  the  cavalry  was  moved 
to  the  north  side  of  the  river  at  Edgefield,  occupied  the  space 
on  the  left  of  the  line  vacated  by  its  withdrawal. 

On  the  morning  of  the  4th,  after  skirmishing  during  the  two 
preceding  days,  the  enemy  succeeded  in  gaining  a  position 
with  its  salient  on  the  summit  of  Montgomery  Hill,  within  six 
hundred  yards  of  the  Union  centre,  his  main  line  occupying 
the  high  ground  on  the  southeast  side  of  Brown's  Creek,  and 
extending  from  the  Nolensville  pike,  on  the  enemy's  extreme 
right,  across  the  Franklin  and  Granny  White's  roads,  in  a 
westerly  direction  to  the  hills  south  and  southwest  of  Richland 
Creek,  and  down  that  creek  to  the  Hillsboro'  road,  with  cavalry 
extending  from  both  flanks  to  the  river. 

Between  this  time  and  the  7th  of  December,  the  enemy,  with 
one  division  each  from  Cheatham's  and  Lee's  corps,  and  two 
thousand  five  hundred  of  Forrest's  cavalry,  attempted  to  take 
the  blockhouse  at  the  railway  crossing  of  Overall's  Creek, 
and  Fort  Rosecrans  at  Murfreesboro',  but  were  repulsed 
with  loss  by  Generals  Milroy  and  Eousseau,  commanding  the 
garrisons. 

Buford's  Confederate  cavalry  entered  Murfreesboro,'  but  was 
speedily  driven  out  by  a  regiment  of  infantry  and  a  section  of 
artillery,  and  on  retiring  moved  northward  to  Lebanon  and 
along  the  south  bank  of  the  Cumberland,  threatening  to  cross 
to  the  north  side  of  the  river  and  interrupt  the  railway  com 
munication  with  Louisville,  at  that  time  the  only  source  of 
supplies  for  Thomas'  army,  the  river  below  Nashville  being 
blockaded  by  batteries  along  the  shore.  The  gunboats  under 
Lieutenant-Commanding  Le  Roy  Fitch  patrolled  the  Cumber- 


THE  END  OF  HOOD.  307 

land  above  and  below  Nashville,  and  prevented  the  enemy 
from  crossing.  General  Wilson  sent  a  cavalry  force  to  Gallatin 
to  guard  the  country  in  that  vicinity. 

The  position  of  Hood's  army  around  Nashville  remained 
unchanged,  and  nothing  of  importance  occurred  from  the  3d  to 
the  15th  of  December,  both  armies  being  ice-bound  during  the 
latter  part  of  the  time.  In  the  mean  while  Thomas  was  pre 
paring  to  take  the  offensive  without  delay ;  the  cavalry  was 
being  remounted  and  new  transportation  furnished. 

On  the  14th,  Thonias  called  together  his  corps  commanders, 
announced  his  intention  of  attacking  on  the  morrow,  should 
the  weather  prove  propitious,  and  explained  his  plan  of  opera 
tions.  A.  J.  Smith,  holding  the  right,  was  to  form  on  the 
Harding  road  and  make  a  vigorous  attack  on  the  enemy's  left, 
supported  by  three  divisions  of  "Wilson's  cavalry,  ready  to 
assail  the  enemy  as  occasion  might  serve.  Wood,  with  the 
Fourth  Corps,  leaving  a  strong  skirmish  line  on  Laurens'  Hill, 
was  to  form  on  the  Hillsboro'  road,  supporting  Smith's  left, 
and  act  against  the  left  and  rear  of  the  enemy's  advanced  post 
on  Montgomerv  Hill.  Schofield  was  to  be  in  reserve,  covering 
Wood's  left.  Steedman's  troops  from  Chattanooga,  the  regular 
garrison  of  Nashville,  under  Brigadier-General  Miller,  and  the 
quartermaster's  employes,  under  Brevet  Brigadier-General 
Donaldson,  were  to  hold  the  interior  line  constituting  the  im 
mediate  defences  of  the  city,  the  whole  under  command  of 
Major-General  Steedman. 

On  the  appointed  day,  every  thing  being  favorable,  the  army 
was  formed  and  ready  at  an  early  hour  to  carry  out  this  plan. 
The  formation  of  the  troops  was  partially  concealed  from  the 
enemy  by  the  broken  nature  of  the  ground,  as  also  by  a  dense 
fog,  which  only  lifted  towards  noon.  The  enemy  was  ap 
parently  totally  unaware  of  any  intention  on  the  part  of 
Thomas  to  attack  his  position,  and  especially  did  not  seem 
to  expect  any  movement  against  his  left. 

General  Steedman  had,  on  the  previous  evening,  made  a 
heavy  demonstration  against  the  enemy's  right,  east  of  the 
Nolensville  pike,  succeeding  in  attracting  the  enemy's  attention 


308  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

to  that  part  of  his  line  and  inducing  him  to  draw  re-enforce 
ments  from  his  centre  and  left.  As  soon  as  Steedman  had  com 
pleted  this  movement,  Smith  and  Wilson  moved  out  along  the 
Harding  pike,  and  commenced  the  grand  movement  of  the  day 
by  wheeling  to  the  left  and  advancing  against  the  enemy's 
position  across  the  Harding  and  Hillsboro'  roads.  Johnson's 
division  of  cavalry  was  sent  at  the  same  time  to  look  after  a 
battery  of  the  enemy's  on  the  Cumberland  Elver,  at  Bell's 
Landing,  eight  miles  below  Nashville.  The  remainder  of  Gen 
eral  Wilson's  command,  Hatch's  division  leading  and  Knipe  in 
reserve,  moving  on  the  right  of  A.  J.  Smith,  first  struck  the 
enemy  along  Richland  Creek,  near  Harding's  house,  and  rap 
idly  drove  him  back,  capturing  a  number  of  prisoners ;  and 
continuing  to  advance,  while  slightly  swinging  to  the  left,  came 
upon  a  redoubt  containing  four  guns,  which  was  splendidly 
carried  by  assault  at  one  P.  M.  by  a  portion  of  Hatch's  division, 
dismounted,  and  the  captured  guns  turned  upon  the  enemy.  A 
second  redoubt,  stronger  than  the  first,  was  next  assailed  and 
carried  by  the  same  troops  that  captured  the  first  position, 
taking  four  more  guns  and  about  three  hundred  prisoners. 
Me  Arthur's  division  of  A.  J.  Smith's  corps,  on  the  left  of  the 
cavalry,  participated  in  both  of  the  above  assaults,  and  reached 
the  position  nearly  simultaneously. 

Finding  General  Smith  had  not  taken  as  much  distance  to 
the  right  as  he  had  expected,  General  Thomas  directed  Gen 
eral  Schoficld  to  move  his  Twenty- third  Corps  to  the  right  of 
General  Smith,  thereby  enabling  the  cavalry  to  operate  more 
freely  in  the  enemy's  rear.  This  was  rapidly  accomplished  by 
General  Schofield,  and  his  troops  participated  in  the  closing 
operations  of  the  day. 

The  Fourth  Corps  formed  on  the  left  of  A.  J.  Smith's  corps, 
and  as  soon  as  the  latter  had  struck  the  enemy's  flank,  as 
saulted  and  carried  Montgomery  Hill,  Hood's  most  advanced 
position,  at  one  p.  M.,  capturing  a  considerable  number  of 
prisoners.  Connecting  with  Garrard's  division,  forming  the 
left  of  Smith's  troops,  the  Fourth  Corps  continued  to  advance, 
carried  the  enemy's  entire  line  in  its  front  by  assault,  and 


THE  END  OF  HOOD.  309 

captured  several  pieces  of  artillery,  about  five  hundred  prison 
ers,  and  several  stands  of  colors.  The  enemy  was  driven  out 
of  his  original  line  of  works  and  forced  back  to  a  new  position 
along  the  base  of  Harpeth  Hills,  still  holding  his  line  of  retreat 
to  Franklin  by  the  main  road  through  Brentwood  and  by  the 
Granny  White  road. 

At  nightfall,  General  Thomas  readjusted  his  line  parallel  to 
and  east  of  the  Hillsboro'  road ;  Schofield's  command  on  the 
right,  Smith's  in  the  centre,  and  Wood's  on  the  left,  with  the 
cavalry  on  the  right  of  Schofield ;  Steedman  holding  the 
position  he  had  gained  early  in  the  morning. 

During  the  day  sixteen  pieces  of  artillery  and  twelve  hun 
dred  prisoners  were  captured.  The  enemy  was  forced  back 
at  all  points  with  heavy  loss,  while  the  Union  casualties  were 
unusually  light.  The  behavior  of  Thomas'  troops  was  un 
surpassed  for  steadiness  and  alacrity  in  every  movement. 

The  boastful  invasion  of  Tennessee  was  ended.  In  the 
morning  nothing  would  remain  for  Hood  but  flight. 

The  whole  command  bivouacked  in  line  of  battle  during  the 
night  on  the  ground  occupied  at  dark,  while  preparations 
were  made  to  renew  the  battle  at  an  early  hour  on  the 
morrow. 

At  six  A.  M.  on  the  10th,  Wood's  corps  pressed  back  the 
enemy's  skirmishers  across  the  Franklin  road  to  the  eastward 
of  it,  and  then  swinging  slightly  to  the  right,  advanced  due 
south  from  Nashville,  driving  the  enemy  before  him  until  he 
came  upon  a  new  main  line  of  works  constructed  during  the 
night,  on  Overton's  Hill,  about  five  miles  south  of  the  city 
and  east  of  the  Franklin  road.  General  Steedman  moved  out 
from  Nashville  by  the  Nolensville  pike,  and  formed  his  com 
mand  on  the  left  of  General  Wood,  effectually  securing  the 
latter's  left  flank,  and  made  preparations  to  co-operate  in  the 
movements  of  the  day.  A.  J.  Smith's  corps  moved  on  the 
right  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  and  establishing  connection  with  it, 
completed  the  new  line  of  battle.  General  Schofield's  troops 
remained  in  the  position  taken  up  by  them  at  dark  on  the  day 
previous,  facing  eastward  and  towards  the  enemy's  left  flank, 


310  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

the  line  of  the  corps  running  perpendicular  to  that  of  Smith's 
corps.  General  Wilson's  cavalry,  which  had  rested  for  the 
night  at  the  six-mile  post  on  the  Hillsboro'  road,  was  dis 
mounted  and  formed  on  the  right  of  Schofield's  command,  and 
by  110011  of  the  16th  had  succeeded  in  gaining  the  enemy's 
rear,  and  stretched  across  the  Granny  White  pike,  one  of  the 
two  outlets  towards  Franklin. 

As  soon  as  these  dispositions  were  completed,  and  having 
visited  the  different  commands,  General  Thomas  gave  direc 
tions  that  the  movement  against  the  enemy's  left  flank  should 
be  continued.  The  entire  line  approached  to  within  six  hun 
dred  yards  of  the  enemy  at  all  points.  His  centre  was  weak 
as  compared  with  his  right  at  Overton's  Hill,  or  his  left  on 
the  hills  bordering  the  Granny  White  road  ;  but  still  General 
Thomas  had  hopes  of  gaining  his  rear  and  cutting  off  his 
retreat  from  Franklin. 

About  three  P.  M.,  Post's  brigade  of  Wood's  corps,  supported 
by  Streight's  brigade,  was  ordered  by  General  Wood  to 
assault  Overton's  Hill.  This  intention  was  communicated  to 
General  Steedman,  who  ordered  the  brigade  of  colored  troops 
commanded  by  Colonel  Morgan,  Fourteenth  United  States 
colored  troops,  to  co-operate.  The  ground  on  which  the  two 
assaulting  columns  formed  being  open  and  exposed  to  the  en 
emy's  view,  he  was  enabled  to  draw  re-enforcements  from  his  ' 
left  and  centre  to  the  threatened  points.  The  assault  was 
made,  and  received  by  the  enemy  with  a  tremendous  fire  of 
grape,  canister,  and  musketry,  the  Union  troops  moving 
steadily  onward  up  the  hill  until  near  the  crest,  when  the 
reserves  of  the  enemy  rose  and  poured  into  the  assaulting 
column  a  most  destructive  fire,  causing  it  first  to  waver  and 
then  to  fall  back,  leaving  dead  and  wounded,  black  and  whito- 
indiscriminately  mingled,  lying  amid  the  abattis.  General 
Wood  at  once  reformed  his  command  in  the  position  it  had 
previously  occupied,  preparatory  to  a  renewal  of  the  assault. 

Immediately  following  the  effort  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  Gen 
erals  Smith's  and  Schofield's  commands  moved  against  the 
enemy's  works  in  their  respective  fronts,  carrying  all  before 


THE  END  OF  HOOD.  31 1 

them,  breaking  his  lines  in  a  dozen  places,  and  capturing  all 
of  his  artillery  and  thousands  of  prisoners,  among  the  latter 
four  general  officers.  The  Union  loss  was  scarcely  mention- 
able.  All  of  the  enemy  that  did  escape  were  pursued  over 
the  top  of  Brentwood  and  Harpeth  Hills.  General  Wilson's 
cavalry  dismounted,  attacked  the  enemy  simultaneously  with 
Schofield  and  Smith,  striking  him  in  reverse,  and  gaining  firm 
possession  of  the  Granny  White  pike,  thus  cut  off  his  retreat 
by  that  route.  Wood's  and  Steedman's  troops  hearing  the 
shouts  of  victory  coming  from  the  right,  rushed  impetuously 
forward  to  renew  the  assault  on  Overtoil's  Hill,  and  although 
meeting  a  very  heavy  fire,  the  onset  wras  irresistible.  The 
artillery  and  innumerable  prisoners  fell  into  our  hands.  The 
enemy,  hopelessly  broken,  fled  in  confusion  through  the  Brent- 
wood  pass,  the  Fourth  Corps  in  a  close  pursuit  for  several 
miles,  when  darkness  closed  the  scene,  and  the  troops  rested 
from  their  labors. 

As  the  Fourth  Corps  pursued  the  enemy  on  the  Franklin 
pike,  General  Wilson  hastily  mounted  Knipe's  and  Hatch's 
divisions,  and  directed  them  to  pursue  along  the  Granny 
White  pike  and  endeavor  to  reach  Franklin  in  advance  of  the 
enemy.  After  proceeding  about  a  mile  they  came  upon  the 
enemy's  cavalry  under  Chalmers,  posted  across  the  road  and 
behind  barricades.  The  position  was  charged  and  carried  by 
the  Twelfth  Tennessee  Cavalry,  Colonel  Spalding,  scattering 
the  enemy  in  all  directions,  and  capturing  quite  a  number  of 
prisoners,  among  them  Brigadier-General  E.  W.  Eucker. 

During  the  two  days'  operations  there  were  four  thousand 
four  hundred  and  sixty-two  prisoners  captured,  including  two 
hundred  and  eighty-seven  officers  of  all  grades  from  that  of 
major-general,  fifty-three  pieces  of  artillery,  and  thousands  of 
small-arms.  The  enemy  abandoned  on  the  field  all  of  his 
dead  and  wounded. 

Wilson's  cavalry,  closely  followed  by  Woods'  corps,  and  by 
easy  marches  by  Smith  and  Schofield,  pursued  the  flying  and 
demoralized  remnants  of  Hood's  army  across  the  Harpeth 
Eiver,  Kutherford's  Creek,  and  Duck  Eiver,  all  much  swollen 


312  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

by  heavy  rains  and  very  difficult  to  cross,  and  only  discontinued 
the  pursuit  on  the  29th  of  December,  when  it  was  ascertained 
by  General  Thomas  that,  aided  by  these  obstructions  to  our 
movement,  and  by  the  vigorous  resistance  of  his  rear-guard 
under  Forrest,  Hood  had  successfully  recrossed  the  Tennessee 
at  Bainbridge. 

"  With  the  exception  of  his  rear-guard,"  says  Thomas,  "  his 
army  had  become  a  disheartened  and  disorganized  rabble  of 
half-armed  and  barefooted  men,  who  sought  every  opportunity 
to  fall  out  by  the  wayside  and  desert  their  cause,  to  put  an  end 
to  their  sufferings." 

Thus  ended  Hood.  A  week  before,  the  victorious  columns 
of  the  army  he  had  set  out  to  destroy  entered  Savannah. 
Sherman's  army  passed  on  to  future  and  final  victories  : 
Hood's,  as  an  organized  force,  disappears  from  history. 

When  Jefferson  Davis  ordered  Hood  to  destroy  the  rail 
ways  leading  north  and  invade  Tennessee,  and  assured  his  fol 
lowers  that  in  thirty  days  the  Yankee  invader  would  be  driven 
out  of  Georgia,  he  had  counted,  with  a  mind  obscured  by  long 
concentrated  hate,  upon  Sherman's  being  compelled  to  follow 
Hood.  "  If  Hood  will  go  into  Tennessee,"  Sherman  had  ex 
claimed,  halting  at  the  last  stage  of  his  northward  march,  "  I 
will  give  him  his  rations."  And  so  saying,  he  changed  front  to 
the  rear  and  marched  down  to  the  sea.  He  knew  that  Davis 
had  thus  thrown  away  the  last  chance  of  success,  the  last 
hope  even  of  prolonging  the  war,  and  for  the  phantom  of  an 
invasion  had  exchanged  the  controlling  advantage  of  interior 
lines. 

In  order  that  the  Union  arms  should  profit  by  this  advan 
tage,  however,  it  was  an  essential  condition  that  Hood  should 
be  held  in  check.  To  this  end  Sherman  left  behind  him  an 
equal  army  and  Major-General  Thomas.  Slowly  and  doggedly 
retiring  with  inferior  numbers,  while  waiting  for  the  re-en 
forcements  which  were  to  render  them  equal  to  the  force  of 
the  enemy,  and  drawing  Hood  after  him  far  beyond  the  barrier 
of  the  Tennessee,  Thomas  saved  his  concentration  by  Scho- 
field's  masterly  battle  of  Franklin,  and  gathering  up  his  force 


THE  END  OF  HOOD.  313 

and  completing  his  preparations  with  such  deliberation  that  it 
seemed  to  many  the  hour  for  action  would  never  come,  in  the 
full  time  he  hurled  his  irresistible  blow  squarely  against  the 
weak  front  of  the  enemy  and  crushed  it.  Then  the  machinery 
so  carefully  studied  and  thoroughly  organized  seized  the  frag 
ments  and  ground  them  to  irrecoverable  atoms. 


\ 


314  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 


CHAPTEE    XXV. 

SAVANNAH. 

WHILE  in  Savannah,  General  Sherman  received  a  visit  from 
the  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Stanton,  and  had  the  satisfaction  of 
obtaining  the  promotions  he  had  recommended  on  his  subordi 
nate  commanders. 

General  Sherman  placed  General  Geary  in  temporary  com 
mand  of  the  city  of  Savannah,  and  directing  him  to  restore  and 
preserve  order  and  quiet,  adopted  at  the  same  time  a  policy 
of  conciliation  and  justice  which  soon  bore  its  fruits  in  the 
altered  tone  of  the  former  adherents  of  the  Confederate  cause. 
The  mayor,  K.  D.  Arnold,  who  but  a  short  time  before  had 
called  upon  the  inhabitants  to  arm  and  go  to  the  trenches  to 
defend  their  city  against  the  invader,  now  invoked  the  citizens 
to  recognize  the  existing  condition  of  affairs  and  to  yield  a 
ready  obedience  to  the  actual  authorities.  The  mayor  was 
continued  in  the  exercise  of  his  functions,  so  far  as  they  were 
exclusively  connected  with  persons  not  in  the  military  or  naval 
service. 

A  large  public  meeting  of  the  citizens  was  held,  at  which 
Mayor  Arnold's  views  were  substantially  adopted  and  Governor 
Brown  requested  to  take  measures  for  restoring  the  State  to 
the  Union.  A  National  Bank  was  established,  and  active 
measures  taken  to  resume  trade  with  the  North  and  foreign 
nations  so  soon  as  the  military  restrictions  should  be  removed. 
Divine  service  was  resumed  in  the  churches,  and  soon  Savan 
nah  was  more  tranquil  than  it  had  been  at  any  time  since  its 
capture  was  first  threatened  in  1862. 


SAVANNAH.  315 

On  the  14th  of  January,  General  Sherman  issued  the  follow 
ing  orders  in  regard  to  internal  trade,  the  conduct  of  the 
citizens,  and  the  outrages  of  the  Confederate  guerrillas  : — 

"  It  being  represented  that  the  Confederate  army  and  armed 
bands  of  robbers,  acting  professedly  under  the  authority  of  the 
Confederate  government,  are  harassing  the  people  of  Georgia 
and  endeavoring  to  intimidate  them  in  the  efforts  they  are 
making  to  secure  to  themselves  provisions,  clothing,  security 
to  life  and  property,  and  the  restoration  of  law  and  good 
government  in  the  State,  it  is  hereby  ordered  and  made 
public  : — 

"  I.  That  the  farmers  of  Georgia  may  bring  into  Savannah, 
Fernandma  or  Jacksonville,  Florida,  marketing  such  as  beef, 
pork,  mutton,  vegetables  of  any  kind,  fish,  etc.,  as  well  as 
cotton  in  small  quantities,  and  sell  the  same  in  open  market, 
except  the  cotton,  which  must  be  sold  by  or  through  the 
treasury  agents,  and  may  invest  the  proceeds  in  family  stores, 
such  as  bacon  and  flour,  in  any  reasonable  quantities,  groceries, 
shoes,  and  clothing,  and  articles  not  contraband  of  war,  and 
carry  the  same  back  to  their  families.  No  trade-stores  will  be 
attempted  in  the  interior,  or  stocks  of  goods  sold  for  them, 
but  families  may  club  together  for  mutual  assistance  and  pro 
tection  in  coining  and  going. 

"  II.  The  people  are  encouraged  to  meet  together  in  peace 
ful  assemblages  to  discuss  measures  looking  to  their  safety  and 
good  government,  and  the  restoration  of  State  and  national 
authority,  and  will  be  protected  by  the  national  army  when  so 
doing  ;  and  all  peaceable  inhabitants  who  satisfy  the  command 
ing  officers  that  they  are  earnestly  laboring  to  that  end,  must 
not  only  be  left  undisturbed  in  property  and  person,  but  must 
be  protected  as  far  as  possible  consistent  with  the  military 
operations.  If  any  farmer  or  peaceful  inhabitant  is  molested 
by  the  enemy,  viz.,  the  Confederate  army  of  guerrillas,  because 
of  his  friendship  to  the  National  Government,  the  perpetrator, 
if  caught,  will  be  summarily  punished,  or  his  family  made  to 
suffer  for  the  outrage  ;  but  if  the  crime  cannot  be  traced  to  the 


31G  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

actual  party,  then  retaliation  will  be  made  on  the  adherents  to 
the  cause  of  the  rebellion.  Should  a  Union  man  be  murdered, 
then  a  rebel  selected  by  lot  will  be  shot ;  or  if  a  Union  family 
be  persecuted  on  account  of  the  cause,  a  rebel  family  will  be 
banished  to  a  foreign  land.  In  aggravated  cases,  retaliation 
will  extend  as  high  as  five  for  one.  All  commanding  officers 
will  act  promptly  in  such  cases,  and  report  their  action  after 
the  retaliation  is  done." 

A  large  delegation  of  colored  men  called  upon  the  Secretary 
of  War,  Mr.  Stanton,  to  represent  their  views  as  to  the  con 
dition  and  requirements  of  their  race.  Twenty  of  the  number 
were  clergymen  of  various  denominations.  In  the  presence  of 
General  Sherman  and  the  acting  adjutant-general  of  the  army, 
Brevet  Brigadier-General  E.  D.  Townsend.  the  secretary  put 
a  number  of  questions  to  them,  in  order  to  develop  the  extent 
of  their  knowledge  and  comprehension  of  their  legal  and  moral 
rights  and  duties  under  the  existing  state  of  affairs.  These 
questions  were  answered  with  great  clearness  and  force  by  the 
Eeverencl  Garrison  Frazier,  one  of  the  number.  General 
Sherman  having  left  the  room  for  the  purpose,  the  secretary 
inquired  their  opinion  of  him.  Mr.  Frazier  replied  : — 

"  We  looked  upon  General  Sherman  prior  to  his  arrival  as  a 
man  in  the  providence  of  God  specially  set  apart  to  accomplish 
this  work,  and  we  unanimously  feel  inexpressible  gratitude  to 
him,  looking  upon  him  as  a  man  that  should  be  honored  for 
the  faithful  performance  of  his  duty.  Some  of  us  called  on 
him  immediately  upon  his  arrival,  and  it  is  probable  he  would 
not  meet  the  secretary  with  more  courtesy  than  he  met  us. 
His  conduct  and  deportment  towards  us  characterized  him  as 
a  friend  and  a  gentleman.  We  have  confidence  in  General 
Sherman,  and  think  whatever  concerns  us  could  not  be  under 
better  management." 

Immediately  afterwards,  with  the  approval  of  the  secretary, 
General  Sherman  issued  the  following  orders,  devoting  the 


SAVANNAH.  317 

abandoned  sea-islands  and  rice-fields  to  the  exclusive  use  of 
the  freedmen  : — 

"  I.  The  islands  from  Charleston  south,  the  abandoned  rice- 
fields  along  the  rivers  for  thirty  miles  back  from  the  sea,  and 
the  country  bordering  the  St.  John's  River,  Florida,  are  re 
served  and  set  apart  for  the  settlement  of  the  negroes  now 
made  free  by  the  acts  of  war  and  the  proclamation  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States. 

"II.  At  Beaufort,  Hilton  Head,  Savannah,  Fernandina, 
St.  Augustine,  and  Jacksonville  the  blacks  may  remain  in  their 
chosen  or  accustomed  vocations  ;  but  on  the  islands,  and  in 
the  settlements  hereafter  to  be  established,  no  white  person 
whatever,  unless  military  officers  and  soldiers  detailed  for 
duty,  will  be  permitted  to  reside,  and  the  sole  and  exclusive 
management  of  affair  svwill  be  left  to  the  freed  people  them 
selves,  subject  only  to  the  United  States  military  authority, 
and  the  acts  of  Congress.  By  the  laws  of  war  and  orders  of 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  the  negro  is  free,  and  must 
be  dealt  with  as  such.  He  cannot  be  subjected  to  conscription 
or  forced  into  military  service,  save  by  the  written  orders  of  the 
highest  military  authority  of  the  department,  under  such  regula 
tions  as  the  President  or  Congress  may  prescribe  ;  domestic 
servants,  blacksmiths,  carpenters,  and  other  mechanics  will  be 
free  to  select  their  own  work  and  residence ;  but  the  young 
and  able-bodied  negroes  must  be  encouraged  to  enlist  as  sol 
diers  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  to  contribute  their 
share  towards  maintaining  their  own  freedom,  and  securing 
their  rights  as  citizens  of  the  United  States. 

"  Negroes  so  enlisted  will  be  organized  into  companies,  bat 
talions,  and  regiments  under  the  orders  of  the  United  States 
military  authorities,  and  will  be  paid,  fed,  and  clothed  accord 
ing  to  law.  The  bounties  paid  on  enlistment  -may,  with  the 
consent  of  the  recruit,  go  to  assist  his  family  and  settlement  in 
procuring  agricultural  implements,  seed,  tools,  boats,  clothing, 
and  other  articles  necessary  for  their  livelihood. 

"  III.  Whenever  three  respectable  negroes,  heads  of  families, 


318  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

shall  desire  to  settle  on  lands,  and  shall  have  selected  for  that 
purpose  an  island  or  a  locality  clearly  defined  within  the  lim 
its  above  designated,  the  inspector  of  settlements  and  planta 
tions  will  himself,  or  by  such  subordinate  officer  as  he  may 
appoint,  give  them  a  license  to  settle  such  island  or  district, 
and  afford  them  such  assistance  as  he  can  to  enable  them  to 
establish  a  peaceable  agricultural  settlement.  The  three  par 
ties  named  will  subdivide  the  land,  under  the  supervision  of 
the  inspector,  among  themselves  and  such  others  as  may 
choose  to  settle  near  them,  so  that  each  family  shall  have  a 
plot  of  not  more  than  forty  acres  of  tillable  ground,  and, 
when  it  borders  on  some  water-channel,  with  not  more  than 
eight  hundred  feet  water-front,  in  the  possession  of  which  land 
the  military  authorities  "will  afford  them  protection  until  such 
time  as  they  can  protect  themselves,  or  until  Congress  shall 
regulate  their  title. 

"  The  quartermaster  may,  on  the  requisition  of  the  inspector 
of  settlements  and  plantations,  place  at  the  disposal  of  the  in 
spector  one  or  more  of  the  captured  steamers  to  ply  between 
the  settlements  and  one  or  more  of  the  commercial  points 
heretofore  named  in  orders,  to  afford  the  settlers  the  opportu 
nity  to  supply  their  necessary  wants,  and  to  sell  the  products 
of  their  land  and  labor. 

"  IV.  Whenever  a  negro  has  enlisted  in  the  military  service 
of  the  United  States,  he  may  locate  his  family  in  any  one  of 
the  settlements  at  pleasure,  and  acquire  a  homestead  and  all 
other  rights  and '  privileges  of  a  settler  as  though  present  in 
person. 

"  In  like  manner,  negroes  may  settle  their  families  and  engage 
on  board  the  gunboats,  or  in  fishing,  or  in  the  navigation  of 
the  inland  waters,  without  losing  any  claim  to  land  or  other  ad 
vantages  derived  from  this  system.  But  no  one,  unless  an 
actual  settler  -as  above  denned,  or  unless  absent  on  Govern 
ment  service,  will  be  entitled  to  claim  any  right  to  land  or 
property  in  any  settlement  by  virtue  of  these  orders. 

"  Y.  In  order  to  carry  out  this  system  of  settlement,  a  gen 
eral  officer  will  be  detailed  as  inspector  of  settlements  and 


SAVANNAH.  319 

plantations,  whose  duty  it  shall  be  to  visit  the  settlements  to 
regulate  their  police  and  general  management,  and  who  will 
furnish  personally  to  each  head  of  a  family,  subject  to  the  ap 
proval  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  a  possessory  title 
in  writing,  giving,  as  near  as  possible,  the  description  of  boun 
daries,  and  who  shall  adjust  all  claims  or  conflicts  that  may 
arise  under  the  same,  subject  to  the  like  approval,  treating 
such  titles  altogether  as  possessory.  The  same  general  officer 
will  also  be  charged  with  the  enlistment  and  organization  of 
the  negro  recruits,  and  protecting  their  interests  while  absent 
from  their  settlements,  and  will  be  governed  by  the  rules  and 
regulations  prescribed  by  the  War  Department  for  such  pur 
poses." 

On  the  26th  of  December,  he  issued  the  following  orders  in 
regard  to  the  government  of  the  city  of  Savannah  during  its 
occupancy  by  the  army  : — 

"  The  city  of  Savannah  and  surrounding  country  will  be 
held  as  a  military  post  and  adapted  to  future  military  uses, 
but  as  it  contains  a  population  of  some  twenty  thousand  peo 
ple  who  must  be  provided  for,  and  as  other  citizens  may  come, 
it  is  proper  to  lay  down  certain  general  principles,  that  all 
within  its  military  jurisdiction  may  understand  their  relative 
duties  and  obligations. 

"  I.  During  war,  the  military  is  superior  to  civil  authority, 
and  where  interests  clash,  the  civil  must  give  way  :  yet,  where 
there  is  no  conflict,  every  encouragement  should  be  given  to 
well-disposed  and  peaceful  inhabitants  to  resume  their  usual 
pursuits.  Families  should  be  disturbed  as  little  as  possible 
in  their  residences,  and  tradesmen  allowed  the  free  use  of 
their  shops,  tools,  etc.  Churches,  schools,  all  places  of  amuse 
ment  and  recreation,  should  be  encouraged,  and  streets  and 
roads  made  perfectly  safe  to  persons  in  their  usual  pursuits. 
Passes  should  not  be  exacted  within  the  line  of  outer  pickets ; 
but  if  any  person  shall  abuse  these  privileges  by  communi 
cating  with  the  enemy,  or  doing  any  act  of  hostility  to  the 


320  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Government  of  the  United  States,  he  or  she  will  be  punished 
with  the  utmost  rigor  of  the  law. 

"  Commerce  with  the  outer  world  will  be  resumed  to  an 
extent  commensurate  with  the  wants  of  the  citizens,  governed 
by  the  restrictions  and  rules  of  the  Treasury  Department. 

"  II.  The  chief  quartermaster  and  commissary  of  the  army 
may  give  suitable  employment  to  the  people,  white  and  black, 
or  transport  them  to  such  points  as  they  choose,  where  em 
ployment  may  be  had,  and  may  extend  temporary  relief  in  the 
way  of  provisions  and  vacant  houses  to  the  worthy  and  needy, 
until  such  time  as  they  can  help  themselves.  They  will  se 
lect,  first,  the  buildings  for  the  necessary  uses  of  the  army  ; 
next,  a  sufficient  number  of  stores  to  be  turned  over  to  the 
treasury  agent  for  trade-stores.  All  vacant  storehouses  or 
dwellings,  and  all  buildings  belonging  to  absent  rebels,  will 
be  construed  and  used  as  belonging  to  the  United  States  until 
such  times  as  their  titles  can  be  settled  by  the  courts  of  the 
United  States. 

"  III.  The  mayor  and  city  council  of  Savannah  will  continue 
and  exercise  their  functions  as  such,  and  will,  in  concert  with 
the  commanding  officer  of  the  post  and  chief  quartermaster, 
see  that  the  fire  companies  are  kept  in  organization,  the 
streets  cleaned  and  lighted,  and  keep  up  a  good  understand 
ing  between  the  citizens  and  soldiers.  They  will  ascertain 
and  report  to  the  chief  commissary  of  subsistence,  as  soon  as 
possible,  the  names  and  number  of  worthy  families  that  need 
assistance  and  support. 

"  The  mayor  will  forthwith  give  public  notice  that  the  time 
has  come  when  all  must  choose  their  course,  namely,  to  re 
main  within  our  lines  and  conduct  themselves  as  good  citi 
zens,  or  depart  in  peace.  He  will  ascertain  the  names  of  all 
who  choose  to  leave  Savannah,  and  report  their  names  and 
residence  to  the  chief  quartermaster,  that  measures  may  be 
taken  to  transport  them  beyond  the  lines. 

"  IY.  Not  more  than  two  newspapers  will  be  published  in 
Savannah,  and  their  editors  and  proprietors  will  be  held  to 
the  strictest  accountability,  and  will  be  punished  severely,  in 


SAVANNAH.  321 

person  and  property,  for  any  libellous  publication,  mischievous 
matter,  premature  news,  exaggerated  statements,  or  any  com 
ments  whatever  upon  the  acts  of  the  constituted  authorities  : 
they  will  be  held  accountable  even  for  such  articles  though 
copied  from  other  papers." 

On  the  15th  of  January,  Sherman  established  the  following 
trade  regulations  for  Savannah  : — 

"  The  Department  of  the  South  having  been  placed  within 
the  sphere  of  this  command,  and  it  being  highly  desirable 
that  a  uniform  policy  prevail  touching  commerce  and  inter 
course  with  the  inhabitants  of  the  South,  the  following  general 
rules  and  principles  will  be  adhered  to,  unless  modified  by 
law  or  the  orders  of  the  War  Department : 

"  I.  Commerce  with  foreign  nations  cannot  be  permitted  or 
undertaken  until  the  national  authority  is  established  to  an 
extent  that  will  give  the  necessary  courts  and  officers  to  con 
trol  and  manage  such  matters.  Trade  will  be  confined  to  a 
mere  barter  and  sale  proportioned  to  the  necessary  wants  of 
the  army,  and  of  the  inhabitants  dependent  on  it  for  the 
necessaries  of  life  ;  and  even  that  trade  must  be  kept  subject 
to  strict  military  control  or  surveillance. 

"II.  Trade-stores  will  be  permitted  at  Beaufort,  Hilton 
Head,  Savannah,  Fernandina,  St.  Augustine,  and  Jackson 
ville,  in  all  articles  of  food  and  clothing,  groceries,  ladies'  and 
children's  goods  generally,  and  articles  not  contraband  of 
war. 

"  III.  To  trade  is  a  privilege,  and  no  person  will  be  allowed 
to  buy  and  sell  for  profit  unless  he  be  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  and  subscribe  to  any  legal  oath  or  obligation  that  is 
or  may  be  prescribed  by  law  ;  and  at  points  threatened  by  an 
enemy,  the  officer  commanding  may  further  exact  as  a  condi 
tion,  that  the  trader  shall  himself  engage  to  serve  in  some 
military  capacity,  to  aid  in  defence  of  the  place. 

"  IV.  Persons  desiring  to  trade  will  apply  to  the  command 
ing  officer  of  the  post,  and  obtain  his  written  consent,  specify- 

21 


322  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS 

ing  the  kind,  nature,  and  extent  of  the  trade,  and  when  he 
requires  importations  from  Northern  cities,  he  will,  in  like 
manner,  apply  for  his  permit.  The  commanding  officer  of  the 
post  may  appoint  some  good  officer  to  supervise  these  mat 
ters,  who  will  frequently  inspect  the  stores,  and  when  there  is 
not  sufficient  competition,  will  fix  the  prices  of  sale.  These 
stores  will,  in  like  manner,  be  subject  to  the  supervision  of  the 
commanding  general  of  the  Department  of  the  South,  by  him 
self  or  an  inspector-general. 

"  V.  In  order  that  purchases  may  be  made  with  economy, 
the  commanding  officer  of  each  post  will  make  reports  of  his 
action  in  regard  to  trade,  with  the  names  of  traders,  amounts 
of  goods  desired  for  sale,  etc.,  to  the  commanding  general  of 
the  department,  who  will,  in  like  manner,  make  full  report  to 
the  secretary  of  the  United  States  treasury,  to  the  end  that  he 
may  instruct  the  collectors  of  ports,  from  which  shipments  are 
expected,  as  to  the  necessary  permits  and  clearances.  It 
being  utterly  impracticable  that  a  general  commanding  mili 
tary  operations  should  give  his  personal  attention  to  such 
matters,  it  is  desirable  that  as  much  power  as  possible  should 
be  delegated  to  post  commanders,  and  they  should  be  held  to 
the  strictest  account  that  no  trade  is  permitted  injurious  to 
the  military  interests  of  the  United  States. 

"  VI.  Sales  of  cotton  will  be  restricted  absolutely  to  the 
United  States  treasury  agents,  and  no  title  in  cotton  or  bill  of 
sale  will  be  respected  until  after  the  cotton  is  sold  at  New 
York.  Country  people  having  small  lots  of  cotton  are  per 
mitted  to  bring  the  same  in  to  be  exchanged  for  food  and 
clothing  for  their  families.  The  quartermaster  will  set  aside  a 
store  or  warehouse,  to  which  each  wagon  bearing  cotton  will, 
after  entering  the  military  lines,  proceed  direct,  where  an 
agent  of  the  Treasury  Department  will  receive  and  weigh  the 
same,  and  pay  for  it  the  price  fixed  in  the  eighth  section  of 
the  Act  of  Congress,  approved  July  2,  1864 — namely,  three- 
fourths  the  value  of  cotton  as  quoted  in  the  New  York 
market ;  and  the  secretary  of  the  treasury  is  hereby  requested 
to  make  appointments  of  agents  to  carry  out  the  provisions 


SAVANNAH.  323 

of  said  act  at  the  posts  of  Hilton  Head,  Savannah,  Fernandina, 
and  Jacksonville. 

"VII.  In  order  that  the  duties  hereby  imposed  on  com 
manding  officers  of  posts  may  not  be  neglected  or  slighted  by 
the  changes  incident  to  rank  and  changes  of  troops,  the  com 
manding  general  of  the  Department  of  the  South  will  appoint 
a  special  officer  to  command  at  each  of  said  posts,  with  a  small 
garrison,  not  to  be  changed  without  his  order ;  and  when 
other  troops,  commanded  by  a  senior,  are  added  or  arrive,  the 
command  of  the  post  will  not  change,  but  the  additional 
troops  will  be  encamped  near  by  and  act  according  to  special 
instructions." 

In  reply  to  a  gentleman  who  addressed  him  a  note  asking 
his  views  as  to  the  present  relations  of  Georgia  to  the  Federal 
Government,  Sherman  wrote,  on  the  8th  of  January  : 

"  DEAK  SIR — Yours  of  the  3d  instant  is  received,  and  in 
answer  to  your  inquiries,  I  beg  to  state  I  am  merely  a  military 
commander,  and  act  only  in  that  capacity  ;  nor  can  I  give  any 
assurances  or  pledges  affecting  civil  matters  in  the  future. 
They  will  be  adjusted  by  Congress  when  Georgia  is  again 
represented  there  as  of  old. 

"  Georgia  is  not  out  of  the  Union,  and  therefore  the  talk  of 
'  reconstruction'  appears  to  me  inappropriate.  Some  of  the 
people  have  been  and  still  are  in  a  state  of  revolt ;  and  as  long 
as  they  remain  armed  and  organized,  the  United  States  must 
pursue  them  with  armies,  and  deal  with  them  according  to 
military  law.  But  as  soon  as  they  break  up  their  armed 
organizations  and  return  to  their  homes,  I  take  it  they  will  be 
dealt  with  by  the  civil  courts.  Some  of  the  rebels  in  Georgia, 
in  my  judgment,  deserve  death,  because  they  have  committed 
murder,  and  other  crimes,  which  are  punished  with  death  by 
all  civilized  governments  on  earth.  I  think  this  was  the  course 
indicated  by  General  Washington,  in  reference  to  the  Whisky 
Insurrection,  and  a  like  principle  seemed  to  be  recognized  at 
the  time  of  the  .Burr  conspiracy. 


324  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

"  As  to  the  Union  of  the  States  under  our  Government,  we 
have  the  high  authority  of  General  Washington,  who  bade  us 
be  jealous  and  careful  of  it ;  and  the  still  more  emphatic  words 
of  General  Jackson,  '  The  Federal  Union,  it  must  and  shall  be 
preserved.'  Certainly,  Georgians  cannot  question  the  authority 
of  such  men,  and  should  not  suspect  our  motives,  who  are 
simply  fulfilling  their  commands.  Wherever  necessary,  force 
has  been  used  to  carry  out  that  end  ;  and  you  may  rest  as 
sured  that  the  Union  will  be  preserved,  cost  what  it  may.  And 
if  you  are  sensible  men  you  will  conform  to  this  order  of  things 
or  else  migrate  to  some  other  country.  There  is  no  other 
alternative  open  to  the  people  of  Georgia. 

"  My  opinion  is,  that  no  negotiations  are  necessary,  nor 
commissioners,  nor  conventions,  nor  any  thing  of  the  kind. 
Whenever  the  people  of  Georgia  quit  rebelling  against  their 
Government  and  elect  members  of  Congress  and  Senators,  and 
these  go  and  take  their  seats,  then  the  State  of  Georgia  will 
have  resumed  her  functions  in  the  Union. 

"  These  are  merely  my  opinions,  but  in  confirmation  of  them, 
as  I  think,  the  people  of  Georgia  may  well  consider  the  follow 
ing  words  referring  to  the  people  of  the  rebellious  States,  which 
I  quote  from  the  recent  annual  message  of  President  Lincoln 
to  Congress  at  its  present  session  : — 

"  '  They  can  at  any  moment  have  peace  simply  by  laying 
down  their  arms  and  submitting  to  the  national  authority 
under  the  Constitution.  After  so  much,  the  Government 
would  not,  if  it  could,,  maintain  war  against  them.  The  loyal 
people  would  not  sustain  or  allow  it.  If  questions  should  re 
main,  we  would  adjust  them  by  the  peaceful  means  of  legisla 
tion,  conference,  courts,  and  votes.  Operating  only  in  consti 
tutional  and  lawful  channels,  some  certain  and  other  possible 
questions  are  and  would  be  beyond  the  executive  power  to 
adjust ;  as,  for  instance,  the  admission  of  members  into  Con 
gress,  and  whatever  might  require  the  appropriation  of 
money.' 

"  The  President  then  alludes  to  the  general  pardon  and 
amnesty  offered  for  more  than  a  year  past,  upon  specified  and 


SAVANNAH.  325 

more  liberal  terms,  to  all  except  certain  designated  classes, 
even  these  being  '  still  within  contemplation  of  special 
clemency,'  and  adds : 

"  '  It  is  still  so  open  to  all,  but  the  time  may  come  when 
public  duty  shall  demand  that  it  be  closed,  and  that  in  lieu 
more  vigorous  measures  than  heretofore  shall  be  adopted.' 

"  It  seems  to  me  that  it  is  time  for  the  people  of  Georgia  to 
act  for  themselves,  and  return,  in  time,  to  their  duty  to  the 
Government  of  their  fathers." 

This  letter,  which  was  immediately  made  public  through 
the  local  newspapers,  was  shown  by  General  Sherman,  before 
its  publication,  to  the  secretary  of  war,  who  read  and  returned 
it,  simply  remarking  that,  like  all  the  general's  letters,  it  was 
sufficiently  emphatic,  and  not  likely  to  be  misunderstood. 
The  views  contained  in  it  afterwards  assumed  a  special  im 
portance,  arising  out  of  this  circumstance. 

To  the  secretary  of  war  he  wrote  on  the  2d  of  January, 
1865  :— 

"  SIR — I  have  just  received  from  Lieutenant-General  Grant 
a  copy  of  that  part  of  your  telegram  to  him  of  26th  Decem 
ber,  relating  to  cotton,  a  copy  of  which  has  been  immediately 
furnished  to  General  Eaton,  my  chief  quartermaster,  who  will 
be  strictly  governed  by  it. 

"  I  had  already  been  approached  by  all  the  consuls  and 
half  the  people  of  Savannah  on  this  cotton  question,  and  my 
invariable  answer  has  been  that  all  the  cotton  in  Savannah 
was  prize  of  war,  and  belonged  to  the  United  States,  and  no 
body  should  recover  a  bale  of  it  with  my  consent ;  and  that  as 
cotton  had  been  one  of  the  chief  causes  of  this  war,  it  should 
help  pay  its  expenses  ;  that  all  cotton  became  tainted  with 
treason  from  the  hour  the  first  act  of  hostility  was  committed 
against  the  United  States,  some  time  in  December,  1860,  and 
that  no  bill  of  sale  subsequent  to  that  date  could  convey  title. 

"  My  orders  were,  that  an  officer  of  the  quartermaster's  de 
partment,  United  States  army,  might  furnish  the  holder, 


326  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

agent,  or  attorney  a  mere  certificate  of  the  fact  of  seizure, 
with  description  of  the  bales,  marks,  etc.  ;  the  cotton  then  to 
be  turned  over  to  the  agent  of  the  Treasury  Department,  to 
be  shipped  to  New  York  for  sale.  But  since  the  receipt  of 
your  dispatch,  I  have  ordered  General  Eaton  to  make  the 
shipment  himself  to  the  quartermaster  at  New  York,  where 
you  can  dispose  of  it  at  pleasure.  I  do  not  think  the  Treas 
ury  Department  ought  to  bother  itself  with  the  prizes  or 
captures  of  war. 

"  Mr.  Barclay,  former  consul  at  New  York — representing 
Mr.  Molyneux,  former  consul,  but  absent  since  a  long  time-— 
called  on  me  in  person  with  reference  to  cotton  claims  by  Eng 
lish  subjects.  He  seemed  amazed  when  I  told  him  I  should 
pay  no  respect  to  consular  certificates,  and  that  in  no  event 
would  I  treat  an  English  subject  with  more  favor  than  one  of  our 
own  deluded  citizens  ;  and  that  for  my  part  I  was  unwilling 
to  fight  for  cotton  for  the  benefit  of  Englishmen  openly  en 
gaged  in  smuggling  arms  and  munitions  of  war  to  kill  us  ; 
that,  on  the  contrary,  it  would  afford  me  great  satisfaction  to 
conduct  my  army  to  Nassau  and  wipe  out  that  nest  of  pirates. 
I  explained  to  him,  however,  that  I  was  not  a  diplomatic 
agent  of  the  General  Government  of  the  United  States  ;  but 
that  my  opinion  so  frankly  expressed  was  that  of  a  soldier, 
which  it  would  be  well  for  him  to  heed.  It  appeared  also 
that  he  owned  a  plantation  on  the  line  of  investment  to  Sa 
vannah,  which,  of  course,  is  destroyed,  and  for  which  he  ex 
pected  me  to  give  him  some  certificate  entitling  him  to  in 
demnification,  which  I  declined  emphatically. 

"  I  have  adopted  in  Savannah  rules  concerning  property, 
severe  but  just,  founded  upon  the  laws  of  nations  and  the 
practice  of  civilized  governments  ;  and  am  clearly  of  opinion 
that  we  should  claim  all  the  belligerent  rights  over  conquered 
countries,  that  the  people  may  realize  the  truth  that  war  is  no 
child's  play. 

"  I  embrace  in  this  a  copy  of  a  letter  dated  December  31, 
1864,  in  answer  to  one  from  Solomon  Cohen,  a  rich  lawyer,  to 
General  Blair,  his  personal  friend,  as  follows  : — 


SAVANNAH.  327 

"  '  MAJOR-GENERAL  F.  P.  BLAIR,  commanding  Seventeenth  Army  Corps  : 

"  '  GENERAL — Your  note,  inclosing  Mr.  Cohen's  of  this  date,  is  received,  and 
I  answer  frankly,  through  you,  his  inquiries. 

"  '  First — No  one  can  practise  law  as  an  attorney  in  the  United  States  with 
out  acknowledging  the  supremacy  of  our  Government.  If  I  am  not  in  error,  an 
attorney  is  as  much  an  officer  of  the  court  as  the  clerk,  and  it  would  be  a  novel 
thing  in  a  Government  to  have  a  court  to  administer  law  that  denied  the 
supremacy  of  the  Government  itself. 

"  '  Second — No  one  will  be  allowed  the  privileges  of  a  merchant — or  rather,  to 
trade  is  a  privilege  which  no  one  should  seek  of  the  Government,  without  in 
like  manner  acknowledging  its  supremacy. 

"  '  Third — If  Mr.  Cohen  remains  in  Savannah  as  a  denizen,  his  property,  real 
and  personal,  will  not  be  disturbed,  unless  its  temporary  use  be  necessary  for 
the  military  authorities  of  the  city.  The  title  to  property  will  not  be  disturbed 
in  any  event,  until  adjudicated  by  the  courts  of  the  United  States. 

"  '  Fourth — If  Mr.  Cohen  leaves  Savannah  under  my  Special  Order,  No.  143, 
it  is  a  public  announcement  that  he  '  adheres  to  the  enemies  of  the  United 
States/  and  all  his  property  becomes  forfeited  to  the  United  States.  But  as  a 
matter  of  favor,  he  will  be  allowed  to  carry  with  him  clothing  and  furniture  for 
the  use  of  himself,  family,  and  servants,  and  will  be  transported  within  tho 
enemy's  lines — but  not  by  way  of  Port  Royal. 

"  '  These  rules  will  apply  to  all  parties,  and  from  them  no  exception  will  be 
made. 

"  '  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  general,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  '  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

"  'Major-General.' 

"  This  letter  was  in  answer  to  specific  inquiries  ;  it  is  clear 
and  specific,  and  covers  all  the  points,  and  should  I  leave 
before  my  orders  are  executed,  I  will  endeavor  to  impress 
upon  my  successor,  General  Foster,  their  wisdom  and  pro 
priety. 

"  I  hope  the  course  I  have  taken  in  these  matters  will  meet 
your  approbation,  and  that  the  President  will  not  refund  to 
parties  claiming  cotton  or  other  property  without  the  strong 
est  evidence  of  loyalty  and  friendship  on  the  part  of  the 
claimant,  or  unless  some  other  positive  end  is  to  be  gained." 

And  again  on  the  19th  :— 

"  Sm — When  you  left  Savannah  a  few  days  ago,  you  forgot 
the  map  which  General  Geary  had  prepared  for  you,  showing 
the  route  by  which  his  division  entered  the  city  of  Savannah — 


328  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

being  the  first  troops  to  occupy  that  city.  I  now  send  it  to 
you.  I  avail  myself  of  the  opportunity  also  to  inclose  you 
copies  of  all  my  official  orders  touching  trade  and  intercourse 
with  the  people  of  Georgia,  as  well  as  for  the  establishment  of 
the  negro  settlements.  Delegations  of  the  people  of  Georgia 
continue  to  come,  and  I  am  satisfied  a  little  judicious  hand 
ling,  and  by  a  little  respect  being  paid  to  their  prejudices,  we 
can  create  a  schism  in  Jeff.  Davis'  dominions.  All  that  I 
have  conversed  with  realize  the  truth  that  slavery,  as  an  insti 
tution,  is  defunct,  and  the  only  questions  that  remain  are, 
what  disposition  shall  be  made  of  the  negroes  themselves.  I 
confess  myself  unable  to  offer  a  complete  solution  for  these 
questions,  and  prefer  to  leave  it  to  the  slower  operations  of 
time.  We  have  given  the  initiative,  and  can  afford  to  wait 
the  working  of  the  experiment. 

"  As  to  trade  matters,  I  also  think  it  is  to  our  interest  to 
keep  the  people  somewhat  dependent  on  the  articles  of  com 
merce  to  which  they  have  been  hitherto  accustomed.  General 
Grover  is  now  here,  and  will,  I  think,  be  able  to  manage  this 
matter  judiciously,  and  may  gradually  relax  and  invite  cotton 
to  come  in  in  large  quantities. 

"  But  at  first  we  should  manifest  no  undue  anxiety  on  that 
score,  for  the  rebels  would  at  once  make  use  of  it  as  a  power 
against  us.  We  should  assume  a  tone  of  perfect  contempt  for 
cotton  and  every  thing  else,  in  comparison  with  the  great  ob 
ject  of  the  war — the  restoration  of  the  Union,  with  all  its 
rights  and  powers.  If  the  rebels  burn  cotton  as  a  war  meas 
ure,  they  simply  play  into  our  hands,  by  taking  away  the 
only  product  of  value  they  now  have  to  exchange  in  foreign 
ports  for  war-ships  and  munitions.  By  such  a  course,  also, 
they  alienate  the  feelings  of  the  large  class  of  small  farmers, 
that  look  to  their  little  parcels  of  cotton  to  exchange  for  food 
and  clothing  for  their  families.  I  hope  the  Government  will 
not  manifest  too  much  anxiety  to  obtain  cotton  in  large  quan 
tities,  and  especially  that  the  President  will  not  indorse  the 
contracts  for  the  purchase  of  large  quantities  of  cotton.  Sev 
eral  contracts,  involving  from  six  to  ten  thousand  bales,  in- 


SAVANNAH.  329 

dorsed  by  Mr.  Lincoln,  have  been  shown  me,  but  were  not  in 
such  a  form  as  to  amount  to  an  order  for  me  to  facilitate 
their  execution. 

"  As  to  Treasury  trade-agents,  and  agents  to  take  charge 
of  confiscated  and  abandoned  property,  whose  salaries  depend 
on  their  fees,  I  can  only  say  that,  as  a  general  rule,  they  are 
mischievous  and  disturbing  elements  to  a  military  govern 
ment,  and  it  is  almost  impossible  for  us  to  study  the  law  and 
regulations  so  as  to  understand  fully  their  powers  and  duties. 
I  rather  think  the  quartermaster's  department  of  the  army 
could  better  fulfil  all  their  duties,  and  accomplish  all  that  is 
aimed  at  by  the  law.  Yet,  on  this  subject,  I  will  leave  Gen 
erals  Foster  and  Grover  to  do  the  best  they  can." 


330  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 


CHAPTER    XXVI. 

NOKTHWARD. 

HOOD'S  army  being  effectually  broken  up,  Tennessee  and 
Kentucky  being  secure,  and  no  considerable  force  occupying 
the  Atlantic  slope  except  Lee's  army,  held  at  Petersburg  by 
Lieutenant-General  Grant,  the  next  move  for  Sherman  was 
obviously  Northward.  His  proposal  for  the  march  through 
Georgia  had  looked  forward  another  step  to  this  contingency. 
At  Savannah,  he  was  accordingly  met  by  instructions  from  the 
lieutenant-general  to  embark  his  army  on  transports  and 
hasten  to  the  James  Eiver  to  participate  in  the  final  combina 
tion  for  the  destruction  of  the  main  army  of  the  rebellion. 
Upon  Sherman's  earnest  representations  of  the  difficulty  of 
moving  sixty  thousand  infantry  and  ten  thousand  cavalry,  with 
their  due  proportion  of  artillery,  so  great  a  distance  by  water ; 
of  the  great  length  of  time  that  would  be  consumed  in  the 
operation  ;  of  the  comparative  immunity  the  enemy  would 
enjoy  in  his  intermediate  combinations  ;  and  finally,  on  his 
assurance  that  he  could  place  his  army  at  the  desired  point 
sooner,  in  better  condition,  and  with  more  injury  to  the  enemy 
by  marching  overland  ;  General  Grant  consented  to  this  modi 
fication  and  gave  the  necessary  orders  to  Sherman  to  act  upon 
it,  and  to  the  other  commanders  concerned  to  co-operate  with 
him  in  the  manner  we  shall  presently  perceive.  All  the  details 
were  left  entirely  to  Sherman. 

A  division  of  Emory's  nineteenth  corps,  under  Brevet  Major- 
General  Cuvier  Grover,  was  drawn  from  Sheridan's  Army  of 
the  Shenandoah,  and  sent  to  Savannah  as  a  garrison,  and  Gen 
eral  Grover  was  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  city.  This 


moil  §mMmm  TO  GQLDSBORO 

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NORTHWARD.  331 

division,  and  the  troops  previously  serving  in  the  Department 
of  the  South,  were  placed  under  the  command  of  Major-Gen 
eral  Foster,  the  department  commander,  to  whom  General 
Sherman  imparted  the  plan  of  campaign,  instructing  him  to 
follow  its  successful  progress  by  occupying  Charleston  and  any 
other  points  along  the  coast  that  circumstances  might  render 
important.  This  enabled  Sherman  to  take  with  him  the  entire 
army  with  which  he  had  made  the  campaign  through  Georgia. 

Sherman  determined  to  make  but  one  stride  from  Savannah 
to  Goldsboro',  North  Carolina. 

A  month  was  consumed  in  preparations.  By  the  15th  oi 
January,  1865,  all  was  ready,  and  the  movement  began. 

In  the  mean  time,  Major-General  John  A.  Logan  returned 
from  the  North  and  resumed  the  command  of  the  Fifteenth 
Corps,  relieving  General  Osterhaus. 

John  Alexander  Logan,  the  eldest  son  by  an  American  wife 
of  Doctor  John  Logan,  a  native  of  Ireland  who  emigrated  to 
Illinois  in  1823,  was  born  near  Murphysboro',  in  Jackson 
County,  Illinois,  on  the  9th  of  February,  1826.  His  parents 
had  eleven  children.  Until  his  fourteenth  year,  in  conse 
quence  of  the  unsettled  condition  of  the  State,  he  enjoyed  few 
of  the  advantages  of  education.  At  the  breaking  out  of  the 
war  with  Mexico,  in  1846,  he  entered  the  army  as  a  second- 
lieutenant  in  the  First  Kegiment  of  Illinois  Yolunteers,  and 
served  with  credit  until  the  peace.  In  1848,  being  then 
twenty-two  years  of  age,  he  returned  to  his  native  State,  and 
commenced  the  study  of  the  law.  In  November,  1849,  he 
was  elected  clerk  of  his  native  county,  and  held  the  position 
until  1850.  In  that  year  he  attended  a  course  of  law  studies 
at  Louisville,  and  in  1851  received  his  diploma.  Upon  his 
return  home  he  at  once  commenced  the  practice  of  his  profes 
sion,  with  his  maternal  uncle,  Judge  Alexander  M.  Jenkins. 
The  practical  character  of  Logan's  mind,  and  his  pleasant 
manners,  connected  with  his  rare  abilities  as  a  ready  speaker, 
soon  gained  for  him  great  popularity  among  the  voters  of  his 
county.  Success  quickly  followed.  In  1852  he  was  elected 
prosecuting  attorney  of  the  third  judicial  district,  and  estab- 


334  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

moment  of  laxity  and  want  of  knowledge  they  had  been  per 
mitted  to  attain,  Logan  mounted  steadily. 

Only  less  remarkable  is  the  case  of  Major-General  Blair ; 
but  Logan  abandoned  politics  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  and 
refused  to  be  a  candidate  for  any  civil  office,  while  Blair  ad 
hered  to  his  position  as  a  member  of  the  lower  House,  and 
continued  to  discharge  its  duties  until  Congress  interfered  by 
a  direct  legislative  prohibition. 

Howard,  with  Blair's  seventeenth  corps,  embarked  on  trans 
ports  at  Thunderbolt,  proceeded  to  Beaufort,  South  Carolina, 
and  there  disembarking,  struck  the  Charleston  and  Savannah 
railway  near  Pocotaligo  station,  and  effected  a  lodgment,  Leg- 
gett's  division  driving  away  the  enemy,  and  established  a 
secure  depot  of  supplies  at  the  mouth  of  Pocotaligo  Creek, 
within  easy  water  communication  by  the  Broad  River,  having 
the  main  depot  at  Hilton  Head.  Logan's  fifteenth  corps 
moved  partly  by  land  and  partly  by  water  ;  Woods'  and  Ha- 
zen's  divisions  following  the  Seventeenth  Corps  to  Beaufort ; 
John  E.  Smith's  marching  by  the .  coast  road  ;  and  Corse's, 
cut  off  by  the  freshets,  being  compelled  to  move  with  the 
left  wing. 

Slocum,  with  the  left  wing  and  Kilpatrick's  cavalry,  was  to 
move  on  Coosawhatchie,  South  Carolina,  on  the  Charleston  and 
Savannah  railway,  and  Robertville,  on  the  Columbia  road.  A 
good  pontoon  bridge  had  been  thrown  across  the  Savannah 
River,  opposite  the  city,  and  the  Union  causeway,  leading 
through  low  rice-fields,  had  been  repaired  and  corduroyed ; 
but  before  the  time  fixed  for  the  movement  arrived,  the  river 
became  swollen  by  heavy  rains,  so  that  the  pontoons  were 
swept  away,  and  the  causeway  was  four  feet  under  water. 

General  A.  S.  Williams,  with  Jackson's  and  Geary's  divisions 
of  the  Twentieth  Corps,  crossed  the  Savannah  at  Purysburg, 
and  marched  to  Hardeeville,  on  the  Charleston  railway,  where 
they  were  in  communication  with  Howard  at  Pocotaligo  ;  but 
the  rains  presently  cut  these  divisions  off  from  the  rest  of  the 
left  wing  at  Savannah,  which  was  compelled  by  the  freshet  to 
seek  a  crossing  higher  up  at  Sister's  Ferry,  opposite  which 


NORTHWARD.  335 

point,  on  the  Carolina  side,  the  two  divisions  indicated  accord 
ingly  directed  their  course  ;  while  Slocum,  with  Jefferson  C. 
Davis'  fourteenth  corps,  Geary's  division  of  the  Twentieth 
Corps,  and  Corse's  division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  temporarily 
separated  from  the  right  wing  by  the  flood,  marched  up  on  the 
Georgia  side,  leaving  Savannah  on  the  26th  January.  The 
gunboat  Pontiac,  Lieutenant-Commander  S.  B.  Luce,  was  de 
tailed  by  Admiral  Dahlgren  to  move  up  to  the  ferry  in  ad 
vance  of  the  troops,  and  cover  the  passage.  When  Slocum  at 
length  reached  the  river,  he  found  the  bottom  three  miles  in 
width,  so  that  it  was  only  on  the  7th  of  February,  and  with 
great  difficulty  and  labor,  that  the  crossing  was  completed, 
and  the  wing  concentrated  and  in  full  march  for  the  Charleston 
and  Augusta  railway.  Williams,  with  Jackson's  and  Ward's 
divisions  of  the  Twentieth  Corps,  reached  the  railway  at 
Graham's  Station,  fourteen  miles  west  of  Branchville,  on  the 
8th  of  February,  and  Slocum,  with  Davis'  fourteenth  corps 
and  Geary's  division,  arrived  at  Blackville,  seven  miles  further 
west,  on  the  10th.  Kilpatrick's  cavalry,  which  was  the  first  of 
this  wing  to  cross  at  Sister's  Ferry,  immediately  took  the  ad 
vance  on  Blackville,  by  Barnwell,  and  kept  the  extreme  left 
flank  from  this  time  forward. 

To  return  to  the  right  wing.  On  the  19th  of  January,  all 
his  preparations  being  complete,  and  all  his  orders  for  the 
march  published,  Sherman  instructed  his  chief  quartermaster 
and  chief  commissary,  Brevet  Brigadier-Generals  L.  C.  Eastern 
and  Amos  Beckwith,  to  fill  their  depots  at  Sister's  Ferry  and 
Pocotaligo,  and  then  to  quit  the  army,  go  to  Morehead  City, 
North  Carolina,  and  stand  ready  to  forward  supplies  thence  to 
Goldsboro'  about  the  15th  of  March. 

On  the  22d  of  January,  Sherman  embarked  at  Savannah  for 
Hilton  Head,  where  he  held  a  conference  with  Admiral  Dahl 
gren,  United  States  navy,  and  Major-General  Foster,  com 
manding  the  Department  of  the  South,  and  next  proceeded  to 
Beaufort,  riding  out  thence  on  the  24th  to  Pocotaligo,  where 
the  Seventeenth  Corps  was  encamped.  On  the  25th  a  demon 
stration  was  made  against  the  Combahee  Ferry  and  railroad 


336  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

bridge  across  the  Salkehatchie,  to  amuse  the  enemy,  who  had 
evidently  adopted  that  river  as  his  defensive  line  against  Sher 
man's  supposed  objective,  the  city  of  Charleston.  The  gen 
eral  reconnoitred  the  line  in  person,  and  saw  that  the  heavy 
rains  had  swollen  the  river  so  that  water  stood  in  the  swamps 
for  a  breadth  of  more  than  a  mile,  at  a  depth  of  from  one  to 
twenty  feet.  As  he  had  no  intention  of  approaching  Charles 
ton,  a  comparatively  small  force  was  able,  by  making  a  sem 
blance  of  preparations  to  cross,  to  keep  in  their  front  a  con 
siderable  force  of  the  enemy  disposed  to  contest  the  advance 
on  Charleston.  On  the  27th,  Sherman  rode  to  the  camp  of 
General  Hatch's  division  of  Foster's  command,  on  the  Tuli- 
finny  and  Coosawhatchie  rivers,  and  directed  those  places  to 
be  evacuated.  Hatch's  division  was  then  moved  to  Pocotaligo, 
to  keep  up  the  feints  already  begun,  until  the  right  wing  should 
move  higher  up  and  cross  the  Salkehatchie  about  Eiver's  or 
Broxton's  Bridge.  By  the  29th  of  January,  three  divisions 
of  the  Fifteenth  Corps — Woods',  Hazen's,  and  John  E. 
Smith's — had  closed  up  at  Pocotaligo,  and  the  right  wing 
had  loaded  its  wagons  and  was  ready  to  start.  Sherman 
therefore  directed  General  Howard  to  move  the  Seventeenth 
Corps  along  the  Salkehatchie  to  Kiver's  Bridge,  and  the  Fif 
teenth  Corps  by  Hickory  Hill,  Loper's  Cross-roads,  Anglesey 
Post-office,  and  Beaufort's  Bridge,  while  Hatch's  division  was 
ordered  to  remain  at  Pocotaligo,  feigning  on  the  Salkehatchie 
railway  bridge  and  ferry,  until  the  movement  should  have 
turned  the  enemy's  position,  and  forced  him  to  fall  back  be 
hind  the  Edisto. 

Blair's  seventeenth  and  Logan's  fifteenth  corps  drew  out  of 
camp  on  the  31st  of  January,  but  the  real  march  began  on  the 
1st  of  February.  All  the  roads  northward  had  for  weeks  been 
held  by  Wheeler's  cavalry,  who  had,  by  details  of  negro  labor 
ers,  felled  trees,  burned  bridges,  and  made  obstructions  to  im 
pede  our  march.  But  so  well  organized  were  the  pioneer  bat 
talions,  and  so  strong  and  intelligent  our  men,  that  felled  trees 
were  removed  and  bridges  rebuilt  by  -ill©-  heads  of  columns 
before  the  rear  could  close  up.  On  the  2d  of  February, 


NORTHWARD.  337 

Logan's  fifteenth  corps  readied  Loper's  Cross-roads,  and 
Blair's  seventeenth  corps  was  at  Elver's  Bridge.  From  Loper's 
Cross-roads  Sherman  communicated  with  General  Slocum,  who 
was  then  still  struggling  with  the  floods  of  the  Savannah  Eiver 
at  Sister's  Ferry,  and  instructed  him  to  overtake  the  right  wing 
on  the  South  Carolina  railway.  General  Howard,  with  the 
right  wing,  was  directed  to  cross  the  Salkehatchie,  and  push 
rapidly  for  the  South  Carolina  railway  at  or  near  Midway. 
The  enemy  held  the  line  of  the  Salkehatchie  in  force,  having 
infantry  and  artillery  intrenched  at  River's  and  Beaufort's 
bridges.  Blair,  with  the  Seventeenth  Corps,  was  ordered  to 
carry  Eiver 's  bridge,  and  Logan,  with  the  Fifteenth  Corps, 
Beaufort's  bridge.  The  former  position  was  carried  promptly 
and  skilfully  by  Mower's  and  Corse's  divisions  of  the  Seven 
teenth  Corps  ;  the  latter  under  Giles  A.  Smith,  on  the  3d  of 
February,  by  crossing  the  swamp,  nearly  three  miles  wide, 
with  water  varying  from  knee  to  shoulder  deep.  The  weather 
was  bitter  cold.  Generals  Mower  and  Smith  led  their  divisions 
in  person,  011  foot,  waded  the  swamp,  made  a  lodgment  below 
the  bridge,  and  turned  on  the  rebel  brigade  which  guarded  it, 
driving  it  in  confusion  and  disorder  towards  Branch ville.  Our 
casualties  were  one  officer  and  seventeen  men  killed,  and 
seventy  men  wounded,  who  were  sent  to  Pocotaligo.  The  line 
of  the  Salkehatchie  being  thus  broken,  the  enemy  retreated  at 
once  behind  the  Edisto  at  Branchville,  and  the  whole  army 
was  pushed  rapidly  to  the  South  Carolina  railway.  Blair's 
corps  and  General  Howard  in  person,  at  Midway,  seven  miles 
west  of  Branchville ;  Logan's  corps  at  Bamberg,  three  miles 
further  west ;  and  at  Graham's  Station,  Blair's  seventeenth 
corps,  by  threatening  Branchville,  forced  the  enemy  to  burn 
the  railway  bridge  and  Walker's  bridge  below,  across  the 
Edisto.  The  whole  army  was  at  once  set  to  work  to  destroy 
railway  track.  From  the  7th  to  the  10th  of  February  this 
work  was  thoroughly  prosecuted  by  the  Seventeenth  Corps 
from  the  Edisto  up  to  Bamberg,  and  by  the  Fifteenth  Corps 
from  Bamberg  up  to  Blackville.  In  the  mean  time,  General 
Kilpatrick  had  brought  his  cavalry  rapidly  by  Barnwell  to 

22 


338  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Blackville,  and  had  turned  towards  Aiken,  with  orders  to 
threaten  Augusta,  but  not  to  draw  needlessly  into  a  serious 
battle.  This  he  skilfully  accomplished,  skirmishing  heavily 
with  Wheeler's  cavalry,  first  at  Blackville  and  afterwards  at 
Williston  and  Aiken.  The  left  wing  being  now  up,  the  Twen 
tieth  Corps  at  Graham's  Station  and  the  Fourteenth  at  Black 
ville,  the  destruction  of  the  railway  was  continued  by  that  wing 
from  Blackville  up  to  Windsor.  All  the  army  was  thus  on  the 
railway  from  Midway  to  Johnson's  Station,  thereby  dividing 
the  enemy's  forces,  which  still  remained  at  Branchville  and 
Charleston,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Aiken  and  Augusta,  on  the 
other. 

The  enemy  was  all  this  time  uncertain  as  to  Sherman's  des 
tination  or  immediate  objective.  He  might  turn  on  Charles 
ton,  Augusta,  or  Columbia,  and  at  neither,  nor  at  all  com 
bined,  had  the  Confederates  an  army  able  to  oppose  him. 
Hardee  was  at  Charleston,  with  a  force  estimated  at  fifteen 
thousand  men,  compelled  to  hold  the  place  until  it  should  be 
untenable,  or  the  object  of  maintaining  it  should  have  passed. 
Wheeler,  with  that  portion  of  his  cavalry  so  frequently  met 
and  defeated  by  Kilpatrick  during  the  Georgia  campaign,  was 
at  and  near  Columbia,  strengthened  by  Wade  Hampton's  di 
vision  from  Lee's  army.  Augusta  was  occupied  by  the  Georgia 
militia.  Meanwhile,  the  remnants  of  the  Confederate  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  were  being  hurried  East ;  but  the  road  from 
Mississippi  was  a  long  one,  stripped  of  food  for  a  great 
portion  of  the  route,  the  railways  generally  useless,  and  the 
bridges  destroyed.  To  use  the  figurative  expression  of  the 
soldiers,  "  A  crow  could  not  fly  from  Atlanta  to  Savannah 
without  a  haversack." 


THROUGH  SOUTH  CAROLINA.  339 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 

THROUGH   SOUTH    CAROLINA. 

LEAVING  the  left  wing  to  complete  the  work  of  destroying 
the  Charleston  and  Savannah  railway  west  of  Branchville, 
Sherman  himself,  with  the  right  wing,  moved  on  Orangeburg, 
situated  thirteen  miles  north  of  Branchville,  on  the  State  road, 
between  Charleston  and  Columbia,  near  its  intersection  with 
the  railway  connecting  the  latter  with  Branchville.  Until 
this  point  should  be  reached  and  passed,  the  direction  of 
Sherman's  movement  would  not  be  fully  developed,  for  he 
still  continued  to  menace  Charleston,  Augusta,  and  Columbia  ; 
and  the  position  of  the  left  wing  might  equally  satisfy  the 
conditions  of  either  theory,  as  well  as  the  supposition  that  he 
might  move  by  his  right  by  Florence  or  Cheraw  directly  on 
Wilmington  or  Fayetteville. 

Blair's  seventeenth  corps  crossed  the  South  Fork  of  the 
Edisto  Biver  at  Binnaker's  Bridge,  and  moved  straight  on 
Orangeburg  ;  while  Logan,  with  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  crossed 
at  Herman's  Bridge,  and  moved  to  Poplar  Springs  in  support. 

On  the  12th  of  February,  the  Seventeenth  Corps  found  the 
enemy  intrenched  in  front  of  the  Orangeburg  Bridge,  but  swept 
him  away  by  a  dash,  and  followed  him,  forcing  him  across  the 
bridge,  which  was  partially  burned.  Behind  the  bridge  was  a 
battery  in  position,  covered  by  a  cotton  and  earth  parapet, 
with  wings  as  far  as  could  be  seen.  General  Blair  held 
Giles  A.  Smith's  division  close  up  to  the  Edisto,  and  moved 
the  other  two  to  a  point  about  two  miles  below,  where  he 
crossed  Force's  division  by  a  pontoon  bridge,  holding  Mower's 
in  support.  As  soon  as  Force  emerged  from  the  swamp  the 


340  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

enemy  gave  ground,  and  Giles  A.  Smith's  division  gained  the 
bridge,  crossed  over,  and  occupied  the  enemy's  parapet.  He 
soon  repaired  the  bridge,  and  by  four  p.  M.  the  whole  corps 
was  in  Orangeburg,  and  had  begun  the  work  of  destruction 
on  the  railway.  Blair  was  ordered  to  destroy  this  railway 
effectually  up  to  Lewisville,  and  to  push  the  enemy  across  the 
Congaree,  and  force  him  to  burn  the  bridges,  which  he  did  on 
the  14th. 

Hardee  now  perceiving  Sherman's  immediate  objective, 
evacuated  Charleston,  retreating  on  Florence,  parallel  to  the 
line  of  march  just  passed  over  by  Sherman's  army,  and  General 
Gillmore's  troops  entered  and  occupied  the  city  on  the  18th. 

Blair's  seventeenth  corps  followed  the  State  road,  and 
Logan's  fifteenth  corps  crossed  the  North  Edisto  from  Poplar 
Springs  at  Schilling's  Bridge,  above  the  mouth  of  Cawcaw 
Swamp  Creek,  and  took  a  country  road  which  entered  the 
State  road  at  Zeigler's. 

On  the  15th,  the  Fifteenth  Corps  found  the  enemy  in  a 
strong  position  at  the  bridge  across  Congaree  Creek,  with  a 
tete-du-pont  on  the  south  side,  and  a  well-constructed  fort  on 
the  north  side,  commanding  the  bridge  with  artillery.  The 
ground  in  front  was  very  bad,  level  and  clear,  with  a  fresh 
deposit  of  mud  from  a  recent  overflow.  General  Charles  R. 
Woods,  who  commanded  the  landing  division,  succeeded,  how 
ever,  in  turning  the  flank  of  the  tete-du-pont  by  sending  Stone's 
brigade  through  a  cypress  swamp  to  the  left ;  and  following  up 
the  retreating  enemy  promptly,  got  possession  of  the  bridge 
and  the  fort  beyond.  The  bridge  had  been  partially  damaged 
by  fire,  and  had  to  be  repaired  for  the  passage  of  artillery,  so 
that  night  closed  in  before  the  head  of  the  column  could  reach 
the  bridge  across  Congaree  River  in  front  of  Columbia.  That 
night  the  enemy  shelled  the  camps  of  the  right  wing  from  a 
battery  on  the  east  side  of  the  Congaree  above  Granby. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  16th  the  head  of  the  column 
reached  the  bank  of  the  Congaree,  opposite  Columbia,  but  too 
late  to  save  the  fine  bridge  which  spanned  the  river  at  that 
point,  and  which  was  burned  by  the  enemy.  While  waiting 


THROUGH  SOUTH  CAROLINA.  341 

for  the  pontoons  to  come  to  the  front,  people  could  be  seen 
running  about  the  streets  of  Columbia,  and  occasionally  small 
bodies  of  cavalry,  but  no  masses.  A  single  gun  of  Captain 
De  Grass'  battery  was  fired  at  their  cavalry  squads,  but  General 
Sherman  checked  his  firing,  limiting  him  to  a  few  shots  directed 
at  the  unfinished  State  House  walls,  and  a  few  shells  at  the  rail 
way  depot,  to  scatter  the  people  engaged  in  carrying  away  sacks 
of  corn  and  meal.  There  was  no  white  flag  or  manifestation 
of  surrender.  Sherman  directed  General  Howard  to  cross  the 
Saluda  at  the  Factory,  three  miles  above  the  city,  and  after 
wards  Broad  Eiver,  so  as  to  approach  Columbia  from  the  north. 

Slocum,  with  the  left  wing,  crossed  the  South  Edisto  on  the 
15th  of  February,  at  New  and  Guignard's  bridges,  and  moved 
to  a  position  on  the  Orangeburg  and  Edgeficld  road,  there  to 
await  the  result  of  the  movement  of  the  right  wing  upon  the 
former  place  ;  Howard  having  entered  Orangeburg  on  the 
12th,  and  being  then  in  march  on  Columbia.  On  the  14th 
Slocum  crossed  the  North  Edisto,  the  Twentieth  Corps  at 
Jones'  Bridge,  the  Fourteenth  Corps  at  Horsey's  Bridge,  and 
Kilpatrick  at  Gunter's  Bridge  ;  and,  all  three  columns  uniting 
at  and  below  Lexington,  the  advance  appeared  at  the  Saluda, 
within  an  hour  after  the  head  of  Howard's  column  reached  the 
river  on  the  16th. 

General  Howard  effected  a  crossing  of  the  Saluda,  near  the 
Factory,  on  the  16th,  skirmishing  with  cavalry,  and  the  same 
night  threw  a  flying-bridge  across  Broad  Eiver,  about  three 
miles  above  Columbia,  by  which  he  crossed  over  Stone's  Bridge 
Woods'  division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps.  Under  cover  of  this 
force  a  pontoon  bridge  was  laid  on  the  morning  of  the  17th. 
Sherman  was  in  person  at  this  bridge,  and  at  eleven  A.  M. 
learned  that  the  mayor  of  Columbia  had  come  out  in  a  carriage 
and  made  a  formal  surrender  of  the  city  to  Colonel  Stone, 
Twenty-fifth  Iowa  regiment,  commanding  the  third  brigade  of 
Woods'  division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps.  About  the  same  time, 
a  small  party  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps  had  crossed  the  Con- 
garee  in  a  skiff,  and  entered  Columbia  from  a  point  imme 
diately  west  of  the  city. 


342  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

In  anticipation  of  the  occupation  of  the  city,  Sherman  had 
given  written  orders  to  General  Howard  touching  the  con 
duct  of  the  troops.  These  instructions  were,  to  destroy  abso 
lutely  all  arsenals  and  public  property  not  needed  for  our  own 
use,  as  all  railways,  depots,  and  machinery  useful  in  war  to  an 
enemy,  but  to  spare  all  dwellings,  colleges,  schools,  asylums, 
and  harmless  private  property.  Sherman  was  the  first  to  cross 
the  pontoon  bridge,  and,  in  company  with  General  Howard, 
rode  into  the  city.  The  day  was  clear,  but  a  perfect  tempest 
of  wind  was  raging.  The  brigade  of  Colonel  Stone  was  already 
in  the  city,  and  was  properly  posted.  Citizens  and  soldiers 
were  on  the  streets,  and  general  good  order  prevailed.  Gen 
eral  Wade  Hampton,  who  commanded  the  Confederate  rear 
guard  of  cavalry,  had,  in  anticipation  of  the  capture  of 
Columbia,  ordered  that  cotton,  public  and  private,  should  be 
moved  into  the  streets  and  fired,  to  prevent  the  Yankee  in 
vaders  from  benefiting  by  its  use.  Bales  were  piled  every 
where,  the  rope  and  bagging  cut,  and  tufts  of  cotton  were 
blown  about  in  the  wind,  lodged  in  the  trees  and  against 
houses,  so  as  to  resemble  a  snow-storm.  Some  of  these  piles 
of  cotton  were  burning,  especially  one  in  the  very  heart  of  the 
city,  near  the  courthouse,  but  the  fire  was  partially  subdued 
by  the  labor  of  the  Union  soldiers. 

During  the  day,  Logan,  with  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  passed 
through  Columbia  and  out  on  the  Camden  road.  The  Seven 
teenth  Corps  did  not  enter  the  town  at  all. 

Before  a  single  public  building  had  been  fired  by  orders,  the 
smouldering  fires,  lighted  by  Hampton's  men,  were  rekindled  by 
the  wind,  and  communicated  to  the  buildings  around.  About 
dark,  the  flames  began  to  spread,  and  got  beyond  the  control 
of  the  brigade  on  duty  within  the  city.  The  whole  of  Woods' 
division  was  brought  in,  but  it  was  found  impossible  to  check 
the  progress  of  the  fire,  which,  by  midnight,  had  become 
unmanageable,  and  raged  until  about  four  A.  M.,  when,  the 
wind  subsiding,  it  was  got  under  control.  Sherman  himself 
was  up  nearly  all  night,  and  with  Generals  Howard,  Logan, 
Hazen,  Woods,  and  others,  labored  hard  to  save  houses  and 


THROUGH  SOUTH  CAROLINA.  343 

protect  families  thus  suddenly  deprived  of  shelter  and  of 
bedding  and  wearing  apparel.  In  his  official  report,  Sherman 
says  : — 

"  I  disclaim  on  the  part  of  my  army  any  agency  in  this  fire, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  claim  that  we  saved  what  of  Columbia 
remains  unconsumed.  And,  without  hesitation,  I  charge 
General  Wade  Hampton  with  having  burned  his  own  city  of 
Columbia,  not  with  a  malicious  intent,  or  as  the  manifestation 
of  a  silly  '  Koman  stoicism,'  but  from  folly  and  want  of  sense, 
in  filling  it  with  lint,  cotton,  and  tinder.  Our  officers  and  men 
on  duty  worked  well  to  extinguish  the  flames  ;  but  others  not 
on  duty,  including  the  officers  who  had  long  been  imprisoned 
there,  rescued  by  us,  may  have  assisted  in  spreading  the  fire 
after  it  had  once  begun,  and  may  have  indulged  in  unconcealed 
joy  to  see  the  ruin  of  the  capital  of  South  Carolina." 

During  the  18th  and  19th,  the  arsenal,  railway  depots, 
machine-shops,  foundries,  and  other  buildings  were  properly 
destroyed  by  detailed  working  parties,  and  the  railway-track 
torn  up  and  destroyed  to  Riiigsville,  and  the  Wateree  or  Ca- 
tawba  Bridge  in  the  direction  of  Winnsboro'. 

On  the  16th,  as  soon  as  the  head  of  Slocum's  column  ap 
peared  within  two  miles  of  Columbia,  as  already  stated,  Sher 
man  directed  him  to  march  by  the  left  again  directly  upon 
Winnsboro'.  Accordingly,  Slocum  crossed  the  Saluda  at 
Hart's  Ferry,  and  on  the  17th,  marching  by  Oakville  and  Rock- 
ville,  reached  the  Broad  River,  near  Alston.  Encamping  there 
on  the  18th,  on  the  19th  the  left  wing  crossed  the  Broad, 
entered  Alston,  and  began  breaking  up  the  railways  near  that 
place.  The  Spartansburg  railway  was  destroyed  for  fourteen 
miles  to  the  northward  of  Alston,  as  far  as  and  including  the 
bridge  over  the  Broad  River.  On  the  20th,  Slocum  crossed 
Little  River  and  reached  Winnsboro'  on  the  21st. 

Sherman,  with  the  right  wing,  having  destroyed  all  that 
remained  of  Columbia  likely  to  be  of  any  use  for  military  pur 
poses,  marched  on  the  20th  directly  on  Winnsboro',  the 
Fifteenth  Corps  moving  along  the  railway  and  destroying  it, 


344  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

and  the  Seventeenth  Corps  on  a  parallel  road.  On  the  21st, 
Howard  reached  Winnsboro'. 

The  movements  of  the  cavalry  acting  separately  on  the  ex 
treme  left  flank  of  the  army,  and  concealing  as  well  as  covering 
the  movements  of  the  infantry  columns,  must  now  be  brought 
down  to  the  same  period.  Kilpatrick,  as  we  have  already  seen 
in  following  the  march  of  the  infantry,  reached  Eobertville  on 
the  3d  of  February,  and  thence  marched  on  the  4th  to  Law- 
tonville,  on  the  5th  to  Allandale,  and  on  the  6th,  having  de 
monstrated  well  towards  Augusta,  driving  a  brigade  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry  before  him,  turned  short  to  the  right  and 
crossed  the  Salkehatchie  just  below  Barnwell. 

The  enemy,  about  three  hundred  strong,  occupied  a  well- 
chosen  position,  behind  earthworks  on  the  opposite  side  of  the 
river,  commanding  the  bridge,  which  was  already  on  fire  ;  but 
the  Ninth  Ohio  Cavalry,  Colonel  Hamilton,  and  the  Ninety- 
second  Illinois  Mounted  Infantry,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Yan 
Buskirk,  dashed  through  the  swamp,  the  men  wading  in  the 
water  up  to  their  arm-pits,  crossed  the  stream  on  trees  felled 
by  the  pioneers,  and  under  cover  of  a  rapid  fire  of  artillery, 
gallantly  carried  the  works,  driving  the  enemy  in  confusion 
towards  the  town  of  Barnwell.  Only  a  portion  of  the  bridge 
being  destroyed,  the  fire  was  extinguished,  and  it  was  quickly  re 
paired,  and  Kilpatrick  entered  the  town  of  Barnwell  at  four  p.  M. 

On  the  morning  of  the  7th,  he  struck  the  Charleston  and 
Atlanta  railway  at  Blackville,  driving  a  brigade  of  Wheeler's 
cavalry  from  the  town.  The  advance  was  engaged  alone  with 
the  enemy  at  this  point,  in  a  very  spirited  affair,  wherein 
Colonel  Jordan,  Captain  Estes,  assistant-adjutant-general, 
and  Captain  Northrope  greatly  distinguished  themselves. 

Here  the  cavalry  rested,  destroying  track  during  the  7th 
and  8th,  and  on  the  evening  of  the  8th  moved  up  the  railway 
in  the  direction  of  Augusta,  as  far  as  Williston  Station.  After 
posting  pickets  on  the  various  roads  leading  from  the  town, 
and  before  going  into  camp,  an  attack  was  made  on  Spencer's 
brigade,  holding  the  direct  road  to  Augusta.  Kilpatrick  di 
rected  Colonel  Spencer  at  once  to  move  out  with  his  brigade,  feel 


THROUGH   SOUTH   CAROLINA.  345 

the  enemy  and  ascertain  his  strength.  A  spirited  fight  ensued, 
in  which  six  regiments  of  Allen's  division  of  Wheeler's  cavalry, 
namely,  the  First,  Third,  Seventh,  Ninth,  Twelfth,  and  Fifty- 
first  Alabama,  were  totally  routed.  Colonel  Spencer  conducted 
the  fight  unaided,  and  displayed  skill  and  gallantry.  One 
officer  and  many  men  of  the  enemy  were  killed,  a  large  number 
wounded,  several  prisoners  were  taken,  and  five  battle-flags 
captured.  Colonel  Spencer  pressed  the  pursuit  so  closely,  for 
a  distance  of  seven  or  eight  miles,  that  the  enemy  was  finally 
forced  to  leave  the  road  and  scatter  through  the  woods  and 
swamps,  in  order  to  escape.  At  Williston,  Kilpatrick  re 
mained  till  ten  A.  M.  next  day,  one-third  of  his  entire  command 
being  employed  in  tearing  up  the  track,  three  miles  of  which 
were  effectually  destroyed,  together  with  the  depot  and  two  cars. 

On  the  9th  of  February,  he  moved  along  the  railway  to 
Windsor,  and  thence  to  Johnson's  Station,  destroying  portions 
of  the  track  up  to  that  point. 

The  cavalry  had  moved  from  Blackville  in  such  a  manner, 
and  Kilpatrick  had  so  manoeuvred,  as  to  create  the  impression 
on  the  minds  of  the  enemy  in  Augusta,  that  his  movement  was 
the  advance  of  the  main  army  directly  on  that  place.  On  the 
morning  of  the  llth,  it  was  found  that  this  feint  was.  a  com 
plete  success.  Wheeler  having  left  the  Edisto  unguarded  and 
uncovered  Columbia,  had,  by  marching  day  and  night,  reached 
Aiken  at  daylight  that  morning  with  his  entire  command. 
To  make  certain  of  this,  Atkins'  brigade  was  directed  to  move 
from  Johnson's  Station,  and  reconnoitre  in  the  direction  of 
Aiken.  His  advance  entered  the  town  without  opposition,  and 
a  moment  afterwards,  being  furiously  attacked  by  Wheeler's 
entire  force,  fell  back,  gallantly  fighting  and  disputing  every 
foot  of  ground  to  the  position  of  the  main  body  at  Johnson's, 
thus  giving  Kilpatrick  sufficient  time  to  make  all  neces 
sary  arrangements  to  check  Wheeler's  further  advance.  At 
eleven  A.  M.,  Wheeler,  with  one  brigade,  feigned  upon  Kilpat- 
rick's  left  flank,  and  charged,  mounted,  with  his  entire  command, 
but  was  handsomely  repulsed  with  a  loss  on  his  part  of  thirty- 
one  killed,  one  hundred  and  sixty  wounded,  and  sixty  taken 


346  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS 

prisoners.  "Wheeler  made  no  further  attack,  but  fell  back  to 
his  former  position  at  Aiken. 

Kilpatrick  remained  at  Johnson's,  destroying  the  railway 
and  constantly  demonstrating  towards  Augusta,  till  the  night 
of  the  12th,  when  he  left  Wheeler's  front,  crossed  the  South 
Fork  of  the  Edisto  at  Guignard's  Bridge,  and  encamped  four 
miles  beyond,  picketing  the  river  as  high  up  as  Pine  Log 
Bridge. 

On  the  14th,  the  cavalry  encamped  on  the  south  bank  of  the 
North  Edisto,  crossed  on  the  15th,  and  moved  well  in  on  the 
left  of  Davis'  fourteenth  corps,  and  marching  parallel  with  it, 
struck  the  Lexington  and  Augusta  road,  northward  of  and 
nine  miles  from  the  former  place.  Only  fifteen  hundred  of 
Wheeler's  cavalry  had  then  passed  over  the  road  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Columbia,  the  majority  of  his  command  being  inter 
cepted  by  Kilpatrick's  movement,  as  Cheatham's  corps  was  by 
that  of  the  infantry. 

On  the  17th,  Kilpatrick  crossed  the  Saluda  Eiver,  moved 
north,  and  found  that  Wheeler  had  already  crossed  and  was 
moving  for  the  railway  bridge  over  the  Broad  Eiver  at  Alston's. 

All  day  on  the  18th,  Kilpatrick  marched  parallel  to  Cheat- 
ham's  corps,  moving  on  Newberry,  and  at  some  points  not 
over  three  miles  distant  from  it,  a  bad  stream  alone  preventing 
him  from  striking  the  enemy  in  flank.  Kilpatrick  struck  the 
railway  at  Pomaria  Station,  destroyed  a  portion  of  the  track, 
the  depot,  and  several  bridges  between  that  point  and  Broad 
River,  and  reached  Alston's  Station,  on  Broad  Eiver,  on  the 
evening  of  the  18th. 

On  the  19th  he  crossed  the  Broad  Eiver,  and  on  the  evening 
of  the  20th  reached  Monticello,  and  found  that  Wheeler  had 
already  crossed  the  river  and  was  moving  on  Chesterfield. 

Winnsboro',  where  Sherman's  infantry  was  now  massed,  is 
situated  on  the  Charlotte  and  South  Carolina  railway,  seventy 
miles  south  of  Charlotte,  North  Carolina,  and  thirty-nine  miles 
north  of  Columbia;  Monticello  is  nearly  opposite,  between 
Winnsboro'  and  the  Broad  Eiver.  The  movement  of  the  en 
tire  army  so  far  in  this  direction  served  to  support  the  theory 


THROUGH  SOUTH  CAROLINA.  347 

that  Sherman  was  aiming  to  reach  Virginia  by  the  inland 
route,  by  way  of  Charlotte. 

In  the  mean  while,  Beauregard  had  been  relieved  from  the 
chief  command  of  the  Confederate  forces  operating  against 
Sherman,  and  the  Confederate  Congress,  stung  into  activity  by 
the  presence  of  an  unexpected  and  alarming  danger  threaten 
ing  to  overwhelm  their  cause,  had  wrung  from  Jefferson  Davis 
the  re  appointment  of  General  Johnston  to  the  supreme  con 
trol  of  all  the  troops  west  of  the  Chattahoochee  River  and 
south  of  Virginia.  Johnston  had  taken  up  a  position  at  Char 
lotte,  concentrating  there  the  forces  with  which  Beauregard  had 
evacuated  Columbia  and  the  local  garrisons  and  militia  of  North 
Carolina,  re-enforced  to  some  extent  from  Lee's  army,  and  was 
awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  remnants  of  the  Confederate  Army 
of  the  Tennessee.  The  remains  of  Cheatham's  corps  had 
reached  Branchville  as  Sherman  pushed  rapidly  past  that 
place  and  on  to  Orangeburg,  and  had  been  cut  off  from  John 
ston  by  the  direction  of  Sherman's  march  and  the  burning  of 
the  bridges  over  the  Saluda. 

With  an  army  so  greatly  inferior,  not  only  in  numbers, 
but  now  also  in  spirit  and  morale,  Johnston's  task  was  an 
exceedingly  difficult  one.  The  abandonment  of  Columbia  was 
the  turning  point  of  the  campaign.  That  gained,  Sherman 
could  choose  his  line  of  march  and  feint  on  Charlotte  while 
moving  on  Fayetteville  or  Wilmington,  or  march  on  the 
former  place  while  feigning  on  the  latter,  at  his  pleasure. 
That  lost,  the  Confederate  commander  must  choose  Char 
lotte  or  Goldsboro'  as  his  defensive  point.  They  are  too 
far  distant  to  warrant  the  attempt  to  defend  both.  If  he 
chose  Goldsboro',  he  would  not  only  seriously  expose  his  rear 
and  flank  to  a  movement  from  the  direction  of  Newbern  or  the 
Roanoke,  but  Sherman  would  be  able  to  march  quietly 
through  Charlotte  to  the  James.  If,  on  the  contrary,  he  de 
cided  to  defend  Charlotte,  the  defence  of  Goldsboro'  and  the 
seaboard  must  be  left  to  chance.  An  army  too  weak  to  hold 
Columbia  against  an  enemy  moving  from  Georgia  on  North 
Carolina  would  almost  necessarily  loose  the  whole  country 


348  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

south  of  the  Eoanoke.  Davis  took  no  steps  to  restore  the 
campaign  until  Columbia  was  abandoned.  Then  the  cam 
paign  was  lost. 

Sherman  pushed  his  advantage  to  the  utmost.  On  the  22d 
of  February,  Slocum  continued  his  march  towards  Charlotte, 
thoroughly  destroyed  the  railway  as  far  as  Blackstock,  or 
Blackstakes  Station,  fifteen  miles  from  Winnsboro'  and  fifty- 
five  from  Charlotte,  and  then  facing  to  the  right,  marched  for 
the  Wateree  or  Catawba  Kiver,  and  reached  it  that  night  at 
Rocky  Mount.  During  the  night  a  pontoon  bridge  was  laid 
across  the  Catawba,  and  Williams'  twentieth  corps  crossed  on 
the  morning  and  afternoon  of  the  23d,  followed  in  the  night  by 
Kilpatrick's  cavalry,  which  moved  rapidly  on  Lancaster,  dis 
tant  about  forty  miles  from  Charlotte,  with  the  object  of  keep 
ing  alive  the  idea  entertained  by  the  Confederates  that  the 
army  was  moving  on  the  latter  place.  On  the  evening  of  the 
23d,  a  heavy  rain  began  to  fall,  lasting  until  the  26th,  and 
swelling  the  rivers  so  that  the  pontoons  were  carried  away, 
and  it  was  impossible  for  the  troops  to  cross,  and  rendering 
the  roads  almost  impracticable.  Williams'  twentieth  corps 
reached  Hanging  Rock  on  the  26th,  and  there  waited  until  the 
1st  of  March  for  Jefferson  C.  Davis  to  come  up  with  the 
Fourteenth  Corps,  which  had  been  left  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Catawba  by  the  flood  and  the  consequent  destruction  of  the 
pontoon  bridge. 

Howard's  right  wing  having  destroyed  the  railway  up  to 
Winnsboro',  marched  thence  on  the  22d  of  February,  crossed 
the  Catawba  at  Peay's  Ferry,  and  moved  on  Cheraw,  Blair's 
seventeenth  corps  on  the  right,  by  Tiller's  and  Kelly's  bridges 
over  Lynch's  Creek,  and  Logan's  fifteenth  corps  taking  the 
direct  road  on  the  left  by  way  of  Young's  Bridge.  A  detach 
ment  of  Logan's  fifteenth  corps,  by  a  detour  to  the  right, 
entered  Camden  on  the  28th  of  February,  and  burned  the 
bridges  over  the  Catawba,  and  the  depot  of  the  Camden 
Branch  railway.  A  small  force  of  mounted  men,  under  Captain 
Duncan,  sent  out  to  break  the  Wilmington  and  Manchester 
railway,  was  met  by  Butler's  division  of  Confederate  cavalry, 


THROUGH  SOUTH  CAROLINA.  349 

at  Mount  Clio,  and  after  a  sharp  skirmish  returned  unsuccess 
ful.  At  Lynch's  Creek,  Sherman  halted  the  right  wing  for  three 
days  to  give  time  for  Slocum  with  the  left  wing  to  come  up. 

From  Monticello,  the  cavalry  moved  to  Blackstock,  or 
Blackstakes,  011  the  Columbia  and  Charlotte  railway,  and  dem 
onstrated  strongly  in  the  direction  of  Chester  until  the  main 
army  had  secured  the  passage  of  the  Catawba,  then  drew  off 
across  that  river,  moved  to  Lancaster,  and  again  demonstrated 
in  the  direction  of  Charlotte.  Wheeler  and  Hampton  had  now 
combined  their  forces  well  in  Kilpatrick's  front,  but  by  dem 
onstrations,  feints,  and  well-planned  devices,  were  deceived 
as  to  his  real  movements  for  several  days  ;  and  it  was  not  until 
the  main  army  had  crossed  Lynch's  Creek  and  reached  the 
Great  Pedee  that  they  discovered  their  mistake. 

Williams'  twentieth  corps  having  waited  at  Hanging  Rock 
from  the  26th  to  the  28th  of  February,  for  "Davis'  fourteenth 
corps  to  come  up,  011  the  1st  of  March  the  left  wing,  united, 
moved  to  Horton's  Ferry  on  Lynch's  Creek  ;  and  on  the  2d, 
the  Twentieth  Corps  entered  Chesterfield,  skirmishing  with 
Butler's  division  of  the  enemy's  cavalry. 

At  noon,  on  the  3d,  Blair's  seventeenth  corps  entered 
Cheraw,  capturing  twenty-five  pieces  of  artillery  and  a  large 
quantity  of  ammunition  and  material,  which  had  been  removed 
from  Charleston  when  that  city  was  evacuated.  The  guns  and 
stores  were  destroyed,  and  the  trestles  and  bridges  of  the 
Cheraw  and  Darlington  railway  burned  as  far  as  the  latter 
place  ;  but  a  mounted  force  sent  out  to  destroy  the  com 
munication  between  Florence  and  Charleston  encountered  a 
superior  body  of  the  enemy,  comprising  both  cavalry  and 
infantry,  and  was  compelled  to  return  without  accomplishing 
its  chief  object.  Logan's  fifteenth  corps  met  with  great  difficul 
ties  in  crossing  Lynch's  and  Black  creeks,  four  days  being- 
occupied  in  the  passage  of  the  former  stream,  which  rose  to 
such  an  extent  immediately  after  Corse's  division,  leading, 
reached  the  east  bank,  that  the  other  three  divisions  could 
not  have  followed  at  once  without  swimming  the  animals  more 
than  three-quarters  of  a  mile.  Upon  the  occupation  of  Cheraw 


350  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

by  Blair  the  enemy  retreated  beyond  the  Great  Pedee  Kiver, 
and  burned  the  bridge  over  that  stream. 

On  the  5th  of  March,  the  army  began  to  cross  the  Great 
Pedee,  the  right  wing  at  Cheraw,  the  left  wing  and  the  cavalry 
at  Sneedsboro'. 

On  the  6th,  both  wings  were  massed  on  the  east  bank  of  the 
Great  Pedee,  and  the  army  began  its  movement  directly  on 
Fayetteville  ;  Blair's  seventeenth  corps  leading  the  right  wing, 
and  Davis'  fourteenth  corps  taking  the  right  of  the  left  wing, 
and  moving  by  Love's  Bridge  over  the  Lumber  River,  so  as 
to  be  the  first  to  enter  the  town,  while  Kilpatrick's  cavalry 
was  kept  well  out  on  the  left  flank. 

From  the  time  of  leaving  Cheraw  and  Chesterfield,  the 
heavy  rains,  which  had  previously  so  greatly  obstructed  the 
movements  of  the  army,  continued  without  intermission  until 
Fayetteville  was  reached.  The  numerous  small  streams  be 
came  swollen  by  the  floods  and  very  difficult  to  pass,  and  the 
loose  soil  was  soon  worked,  by  the  passage  of  troops  and 
trains,  into  a  quicksand  of  unknown  depth,  in  which  the  ani 
mals  became  hopelessly  mired,  and  many  were  even  lost.  The 
days  were  spent  by  the  soldiers  in  wearily  dragging  through 
the  mud ;  the  nights,  in  corduroying  to  make  a  way  for  the 
trains. 

Davis,  with  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  reached  Love's  Bridge 
over  the  Lumber  River  on  the  7th  of  March,  crossed,  marched 
to  within  twenty  miles  of  Fayetteville  on  the  9th,  ten  miles 
nearer  on  the  10th,  and  on  the  llth  entered  the  town. 

Blair's  seventeenth  corps  reached  Laurel  Hill  on  the  8th, 
Gilchrist's  Bridge  over  the  Lumber  on  the  9th,  and  marched 
into  Fayetteville  on  the  12th. 

As  the  army  approached  this  point  both  wings  moved  more 
cautiously,  expecting  Hardee  to  make  a  fight  in  front  of  the 
town,  and  to  defend  the  crossing  of  the  Cape  Fear  River  ;  but, 
undoubtedly  in  consequence  of  his  inferiority  in  numbers,  he 
retired  without  offering  any  serious  opposition,  retreated  be 
yond  the  river,  and  burned  the  bridge  after  him. 

Kilpatrick,  having  sent  out  a  part  of  his  command  to  Mon- 


THROUGH  SOUTH  CAROLINA.  351 

roe  and  Wadesboro',  crossed  the  Great  Pedee  on  the  night  of 
the  6th  of  March,  and  occupied  Rockingham  on  the  7th,  after 
a  skirmish  with  Butler's  division  of  Hampton's  Confederate 
cavalry. 

On  the  8th,  Kilpatrick  crossed  the  Lumber  River  at  Love's 
Bridge,  and  at  Solemn  Grove  came  upon  the  rear  of  Hardee, 
who  was  then  in  full  retreat  on  Fayetteville,  on  the  Charlotte 
road.  Learning  from  prisoners  that  Hampton's  cavalry  was 
still  in  the  rear  of  Har dee's  troops,  but  rapidly  moving  in  the 
same  direction,  Kilpatrick  now  determined  to  intercept  him. 

Hampton  was  marching  upon  two  roads  ;  the  Morgantown 
road,  and  one  three  miles  further  to  the  north  and  parallel 
with  it.  Directly  south  and  east  from  Solemn  Grove,  Kilpat 
rick  posted  upon  each  road  a  brigade  of  cavalry  ;  and  learning 
that  there  was  a  road  still  further  north,  upon  which  the  en 
emy's  troops  might  move,  he  made  a  rapid  night's  march  with 
Colonel  Spencer's  brigade,  increased  by  four  hundred  dis 
mounted  men  and  one  section  of  artillery,  and  took  post  at  a 
point  where  the  road  last  mentioned  intersects  the  Morgantown 
road.  During  the  early  part  of  the  evening,  Kilpatrick  with 
his  staff  had  left  General  Atkins  and  joined  Colonel  Spencer, 
and  actually  ridden  through  one  division  of  Hampton's  cavalry, 
which  by  eleven  o'clock  had  flanked  General  Atkins,  and  was 
encamped  within  three  miles  of  Colonel  Spencer.  Kilpatrick's 
escort,  consisting  of  fifteen  men  and  one  officer,  was  captured, 
but  the  general  himself  escaped  with  his  staff. 

General  Atkins  and  Colonel  Jordan  discovered,  about  nine 
o'clock,  that  while  Hampton  was  amusing  them  in  front,  he 
was  passing  with  his  main  force  on  a  road  to  the  right.  These 
officers  at  once  made  every  effort  to  reach  Kilpatrick  before 
daylight,  but  failed  to  do  so  owing  to  the  bad  roads  and  almost 
incessant  skirmishing  with  the  enemy,  who  were  marching 
parallel  with  them,  and  at  some  points  scarcely  a  mile  distant. 

Hampton  had  marched  all  day,  and  rested  his  men  about 
three  miles  from  Colonel  Jordan's  position.  At  two  o'clock 
hi  the  morning,  just  before  daylight,  he  suddenly  and  furiously 
charged  Kilpatrick's  position  with  Horner's,  Allen's,  and 


352  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Butler's  divisions.  Hampton  led  the  centre  division,  Butler's, 
and  in  an  instant  had  driven  back  the  Union  troops,  taken 
possession  of  the  headquarters,  and  captured  all  the  artillery, 
and  Kilpatrick's  whole  command  was  in  full  flight.  Colonel 
Spencer  and  a  large  portion  of  the  general's  staff  were  taken 
prisoners. 

Kilpatrick  succeeded  in  escaping  on  foot  and  gaining  the 
cavalry  camp,  a  few  hundred  yards  in  the  rear,  where  he  found 
the  men  fighting  with  the  Confederate  cavalry  for  their  camp 
and  animals.  Finally  they  were  forced  back  five  hundred 
yards  further  to  an  impassable  swamp,  and  there,  while  the 
enemy,  eager  for  plunder,  was  engaged  in  pillaging  the  cap 
tured  camp,  Kilpatrick  rallied  them.  Inspired  by  his  example, 
and  led  by  the  general  in  person,  on  foot,  they  advanced 
upon  the  enemy,  retook  their  camp,  and,  encouraged  by  this 
success,  charged  the  enemy  in  the  act  of  harnessing  the  battery 
horses  and  plundering  the  headquarters,  retook  the  artillery, 
turned  it  upon  the  enemy,  hardly  twenty  paces  distant,  and 
finally  forced  them  out  of  the  camp  with  great  slaughter. 
Kilpatrick  then  immediately  re-established  his  line,  and  for 
an  hour  and  a  half  foiled  every  attempt  of  Hampton  to  retake 
it.  At  about  eight  o'clock,  General  Mitchell,  with  a  brigade  of 
infantry,  came  within  musket  range,  having  rapidly  marched 
across  the  country  from  the  plank-road  to  the  assistance  of  the 
cavalry,  and  at  once  moved  into  position  and  remained  there 
until  half-past  one  o'clock,  rendering  every  assistance  possible, 
though  the  battle  was  now  over. 

In  this  engagement  Kilpatrick  lost  four  officers  and  fifteen 
men  killed,  sixty-one  men  wounded,  and  one  hundred  and 
three  of  all  ranks  taken  prisoners. 

On  the  llth  of  March  the  cavalry  moved  into  Fayetteville, 
in  advance  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  and  on  the  12th  the 
entire  army  was  massed  at  that  place. 

From  Laurel  Hill,  on  the  8th  of  March,  Sherman  had  dis 
patched  a  brief  note,  by  two  picked  couriers,  through  the 
enemy's  country,  down  the  Cape  Fear  River  to  Wilmington, 
to  apprize  the  commander  of  the  Union  forces  on  the  North 


THROUGH  SOUTH  CAROLINA.  353 

Carolina  coast  of  liis  progress.  "  "We  are  all  well,"  it  said, 
"  and  have  done  finely.  Details  are,  for  obvious  reasons, 
omitted."  Both  of  these  scouts  reached  Wilmington  safely, 
and  on  the  14th  of  March  these  glad  tidings,  the  very  first 
received  from  the  army  since  it  swung  loose  from  Savannah 
and  Beaufort,  were  spread  before  the  country  in  an  official 
bulletin  from  the  secretary  of  war. 

On  the  12th,  the  army-tug  Davidson,  Captain  Ainsworth, 
and  the  gunboat  Eolus,  Lieutenant-Commander  Young,  of  the 
navy,  reached  Fayetteville  from  Wilmington,  with  full  intelli 
gence  of  the  important  events  that  had  transpired  in  other 
quarters,  in  the  eventful  six  weeks  during  which  Sherman's 
army  was  burrowing  through  the  Carolinas.  The  same  day 
the  Davidson  carried  back  to  Wilmington  detailed  information 
of  the  movements  and  condition  of  the  army,  and  full  instruc 
tions  concerning  Sherman's  future  plans,  to  General  Terry, 
who  had  captured  Wilmington,  and  now  commanded  there,  and 
to  General  Schofield,  who  was  at  Newbern. 

While  in  South  Carolina  the  troops  exercised  scarcely  any 
restraint  with  respect  to  the  property  of  the  inhabitants  ; 
plundering  and  destroying  without  stint.  They  regarded  the 
people  of  this  State,  as  a  body,  and  practically  without 
exception,  as  life-long  enemies  of  the  Union,  and  conceived 
that  upon  the  army  devolved  the  duty  of  punishing  them  for 
their  sins.  So  general  and  deeply-seated  was  this  impression, 
on  the  part  of  officers  and  men,  that  it  was  often  impossible 
for  their  commanders  to  control  the  manifestation  of  it ;  but 
from  the  moment  of  entering  North  Carolina  the  whole 
demeanor  of  the  army  changed,  and  the  men  yielded  with 
alacrity  to  the  customary  restraints  of  discipline. 

During  the  campaign  General  Wheeler  addressed  the  fol 
lowing  communication  to  General  Howard,  on  the  subject  of 
destroying  houses  and  cotton  : — 

"  GKAHAMS,  S.  C.,  February  7, 1865. 

"  GENEKAL — I  have  the  honor  to  propose  that,  if  the  troops 
of  your  army  be  required  to  discontinue  burning  the  houses 
of  our  citizens,  I  will  discontinue  burning  cotton.  '<* 

23 


354  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

"  As  an  earnest  of  the  good  faith,  in  which  my  proposition  is 
tendered,  I  leave  at  this  place  about  three  hundred  bales  oi 
cotton  unburned,  worth,  in  New  York,  over  a  quarter  of  a 
million,  and  in  our  currency,  one  and  a  half  millions.  I  trust 
my  having  commenced  will  cause  you  to  use  your  influence  to 
insure  the  acceptance  of  the  proposition  by  your  whole 
army. 

"  I  trust  that  you  will  not  deem  it  improper  for  me  to  ask 
that  you  will  require  the  troops  under  your  command  to  dis 
continue  the  wanton  destruction  of  property  not  necessary  for 
their  sustenance. 

"  Eespectfully,  general,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  J.  WHEELER, 
"  Major-General  C.  S.  A. 

'  Major-General  0.  0.  HOWARD, 

"  United  States  Army,  Commanding,  etc." 

To  this  General  Sherman  chose  to  reply  himself,  in  the  fol 
lowing  characteristic  terms : — 

"HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
In  the  field,  February  8,  1865. 

"  GENERAL — Yours,  addressed  to  General  Howard,  is  re 
ceived  by  me.  • 

"  I  hope  you  will  burn  all  cotton,  and  save  us  the  trouble. 
We  don't  want  it ;  and  it  has  proven  a  curse  to  our  country. 
All  you  don't  burn  I  will. 

"  As  to  private  houses,  occupied  by  peaceful  families,  my 
orders  are  not  to  molest  or  disturb  them,  and  I  think  my 
orders  are  obeyed.  Vacant  houses,  being  of  no  use  to  any 
body,  I  care  little  about,  as  the  owners  have  thought  them  of 
no  use  to  themselves.  I  don't  want  them  destroyed,  but  do 
not  take  much  care  to  preserve  them. 

"  I  am,  with  respect,  yours  truly,  etc. 

"  Major-General  J.  WHEELER, 

Commanding  Cavalry  Corps  Confederate  Army." 


THROUGH  SOUTH  CAROLINA.  355 

On  the  24th  of  February,  after  some  sharp,  but  ineffectual, 
correspondence  between  Kilpatrick  and  "Wheeler,  in  regard  to 
the  murder  of  the  Union  prisoners  and  foragers,  Sherman 
wrote  to  General  "Wade  Hampton  : — 

"  GENERAL — It  is  officially  reported  to  me  that  our  foraging 
parties  are  murdered,  after  being  captured,  and  labelled, '  Death 
to  all  Foragers.'  One  instance  is  that  of  a  lieutenant  and 
seven  men  near  Chester,  and  another  of  twenty,  near  a  ravine 
eighty  rods  from  the  main  road,  and  three  miles  from  Easter- 
ville.  I  have  ordered  a  similar  number  of  prisoners  in  our 
hands  to  be  disposed  of  in  like  manner.  I  hold  about  one 
thousand  prisoners  captured  in  various  ways,  and  can  stand  it 
as  long  as  you,  but  I  hardly  think  these  murders  are  commit 
ted  with  your  knowledge,  and  would  suggest  that  you  give 
notice  to  your  people  at  large  that  every  life  taken  by  them 
simply  results  in  the  death  of  one  of  your  confederates. 

"  Of  course,  you  cannot  question  my  right  to  forage  in  an 
enemy's  country.  It  is  a  war  right,  as  old  as  history.  The 
manner  of  exercising  it  varies  with  circumstances,  and  if  the 
country  will  supply  my  requisitions,  I  will  forbid  all  foraging ; 
but  I  find  no  civil  authorities  who  can  respond  to  calls  for 
forage  or  provisions,  and  therefore  must  collect  directly  of  the 
people. 

"  I  have  no  doubt  this  is  the  occasion  of  much  misbehavior 

• 

on  the  part  of  our  men,  but  I  cannot  permit  an  enemy  to 
judge  or  punish  with  wholesale  murder.  Personally,  I  regret 
the  bitter  feelings  engendered  by  this  war,  but  they  were  to 
be  expected,  and  I  simply  allege  that  those  who  struck  the 
first  blow,  and  made  war  inevitable,  ought  not,  in  fairness,  to 
reproach  us  for  the  natural  consequences.  I  merely  assert 
our  war-right  to  forage,  and  my  resolve  to  protect  my  foragers 
to  the  extent  of  life  for  life. 

"  I  am,  with  respect,  your  obedient  servant." 

To  this  General  Hampton  replied  at  great  length,  and  with 
acrimony,  denying  his  knowledge  of  any  such  murders,  and 


356  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

instead  of  investigating  the  circumstances,  declaring  his  fixed 
intention  of  executing  two  federal  prisoners,  preferably  com 
missioned  officers,  for  every  one  put  to  death  by  Sherman. 
As  a  beginning,  he  stated  that  he  should  hold  fifty-six  Union 
prisoners  as  hostages  for  the  safety  of  the  twenty-eight  Con 
federates  ordered  to  be  executed  by  Sherman. 

"  The  army,"  Sherman  wrote  to  the  lieutenant-general,  "  is 
in  splendid  health,  condition,  and  spirit,  although  we  have 
had  foul  weather,  and  roads  that  would  have  stopped  travel 
to  almost  any  other  body  of  men  I  ever  heard  of.  Our  march 

was  substantially  what  I  designed I  could  leave  here 

to-morrow,  but  want  to  clean  my  columns  of  the  vast  crowd  of 

refugees  and  negroes  that  encumber  me I  hope  you 

have  not  been  uneasy  about  us,  and  that  the  fruits  of  this 
march  will  be  appreciated." 


CO-OPERATIVE  MOVEMENTS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA.        357 


CHAPTEE  XXVIII. 

CO-OPERATIVE  MOVEMENTS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA. 

As  soon  as  Sherman  had  reached  Savannah,  reported  the 
condition  of  his  army,  developed  his  plans,  and  received  the 
assent  of  General  Grant  to  his  proposal  to  march  through  the 
Carolinas,  instead  of  moving  by  water  directly  to  the  support 
of  the  armies  before  Eichmond,  as  had  been  originally  intended 
and  ordered,  the  lieutenant-general  proceeded  to  put  in  motion 
the  parallel  combination  necessary  to  insure  the  success  of  the 
campaign. 

Sherman's  objective  being  Goldsboro',  the  first  step  to  be 
taken  obviously  was  to  secure  possession  of  "Wilmington,  and 
the  control  of  the  Cape  Fear  Eiver,  so  that  supplies  might,  if 
needful,  be  sent  up  that  stream,  and  likewise  in  order  that  no 
formidable  and  strongly  fortified  garrison  might  be  left  to 
menace  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  moving  column. 

In  anticipation  of  the  occasion  for  such  an  operation,  and 
desiring  to  secure  control  of  the  mouth  of  the  Cape  Fear 
Eiver,  at  a  time  when  attention  was  less .  strongly  directed  in 
that  quarter  than  would  be  the  case  when  the  execution  of  his 
plans  should  be  more  fully  developed,  General  Grant  had,  in 
December,  sent  a  large  force  from  the  Army  of  the  James, 
under  Major-General  Godfrey  Weitzel,  and  the  Navy  Depart 
ment  had  dispatched  a  powerful  fleet,  under  Eear-Admiral 
David  D.  Porter,  to  co-operate  in  the  reduction,  first  of  Fort 
Fisher  and  its  adjacent  works  on  Federal  Point,  and  after 
wards  of  Wilmington. 

Major-General  Benjamin  F.  Butler,  the  commander  of  the 


358  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Army  of  the  James,  accompanied  the  land  forces,  and  assumed 
control  of  their  movements.  After  numerous  delays  and  mis 
understandings,  the  navy  opened  a  furious  bombardment  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  24th  of  December,  1864,  and  kept  it  up 
until  nightfall,  and  all  Christmas-day,  at  the  rate  of  about  one 
shot  in  every  two  seconds.  During  the  afternoon  of  the  25th, 
under  cover  of  this  fire,  a  portion  of  the  troops  landed  and 
made  a  reconnoissance  of  the  Confederate  works  ;  but  a  storm 
coming  up,  General  Butler,  after  consulting  with  General 
Weitzel,  and  ascertaining  that  the  opinion  of  that  officer 
coincided  with  his  own,  ordered  the  troops  already  landed  to 
re-embark,  and,  on  the  27th,  withdrew  his  command  on  the 
transport  fleet  and  returned  to  the  James  River.  Admiral 
Porter,  however,  decided  to  remain  and  continue  the  naval 
operations  as  opportunity  might  offer. 

General  Grant  immediately  selected  Major-General  Alfred 
Howe  Terry  to  command  the  expedition,  and  directed  him  to 
renew  the  attempt  without  delay,  while  the  enemy  were  evi 
dently  counting  on  its  abandonment.  The  choice  was  an 
excellent  one.  General  Terry  was  a  young,  brave,  and  ac 
complished  officer,  who  had  entered  the  army  in  the  earliest 
period  of  the  war  as  colonel  of  the  Tenth  Regiment  of  Con 
necticut  Volunteers ;  and  by  active  service,  zeal,  fidelity,  and 
gallantry,  had,  step  by  step,  won  his  promotion  to  his  present 
position,  for  which,  by  study  and  careful  attention  to  duty,  he 
had  taken  pains  to  qualify  himself.  The  troops  placed  under 
his  orders  for  the  present  movement,  including  those  which 
had  taken  part  in  the  previous  failure,  consisted  of  a  division 
of  thirty-three  hundred  picked  men  from  Ord's  twenty-fourth 
army  corps,  under  Brigadier-General  Adelbert  Ames ;  a  divi 
sion  of  like  strength  from  Weitzel's  twenty-fifth  corps,  under 
Brigadier-General  Charles  J.  Paine  ;  a  brigade  fourteen  hun 
dred  strong,  also  from  Ord's  corps,  commanded  by  Colonel  J. 
C.  Abbott,  of  the  Seventh  New  Hampshire  ;  and  two  detached 
batteries  of  light  artillery. 

The  expedition  sailed  from  Hampton  Roads  on  the  6th  of 
January,  1865,  but,  owing  to  a  severe  storm,  followed  by  con- 


CO-OPERATIVE  MOVEMENTS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA.         359 

tinuous  unfavorable  weather,  did  not  reach  its  destination  off 
Federal  Point  and  begin  the  disembarkation  until  the  morn 
ing  of  the  13th.  By  three  o'clock  that  afternoon,  however, 
through  a  heavy  surf,  eight  thousand  men,  with  three  days' 
rations  in  their  haversacks  and  forty  rounds  of  ball  cartridges 
in  their  boxes,  had  been  landed  on  the  beach  above  the  fort, 
under  cover  of  the  admirable  disposition  and  effective  fire  of 
Admiral  Porter's  fleet,  and  every  thing  was  in  readiness  for  an 
attack.  After  some  time  lost  in  endeavoring  to  find  a  suitable 
point  for  the  establishment,  across  the  peninsula  whereon  Fort 
"Fisher  is  situated,  of  a  .line  of  defence  against  reinforcements 
seeking  to  aid  the  garrison  from  the  direction  of  "Wilmington, 
by  two  o'clock  on  the  14th,  Paine,  with  his  own  division  and  two 
brigades  of  Ames'  division,  reached  a  favorable  position  for  that 
purpose,  and  by  eight  o'clock  had  thrown  up  a  secure  line  of 
intrenchments.  During  the  day  the  enemy's  works  were  thor 
oughly  reconnoitred,  and  General  Terry  determined  on  his 
plan  of  attack  for  the  morrow.  Into  this  Admiral  Porter 
entered  heartily. 

Accordingly,  at  eight  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  15th  of 
January,  all  the  fleet,  except  one  division  left  to  support  the 
line  of  defence  across  the  neck,  went  into  action,  and  opened  a 
powerful  and  accurate  fire  upon  the  fort.  Withdrawing  the 
two  brigades  of  Ames'  division,  and  leaving  Paine  to  hold  this 
defensive  line  with  his  own  division  and  Abbott's  brigade,  at 
twenty-five  minutes  past  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  Terry 
gave  the  order  for  Ames  to  move  to  the  assault  of  the  western 
front.  Simultaneously,  by  a  concerted  signal,  the  direction  of 
the  fire  of  the  navy  was  changed,  and  Curtis'  brigade  of  Ames' 
division  sprang  to  the  assault,  while  a  battalion  of  marines  and 
seamen,  under  Commander  Breese  of  the  navy,  rushed  for 
ward  to  storm  the  northeast  bastion.  The  naval  assault  was 
soon  repulsed  with  heavy  loss,  but,  aided  by  a  well-directed 
and  effective  flank  fire  of  the  fleet,  continued  against  the  fort 
up  to  six  o'clock  p.  M.,  Ames,  afterwards  re-enforced  by  Ab 
bott's  brigade  and  the  Twenty-seventh  United  States  Colored 
regiment,  of  Paine's  division,  succeeded  in  effecting  an  entrance 


360  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

into  the  work,  and,  fighting  hand  to  hand  across  the  embank 
ments,  from  traverse  to  traverse,  over  nine  in  succession,  by 
nine  o'clock  at  night  the  last  opposition  of  the  enemy  died  out, 
the  entire  work  was  in  undisputed  possession  of  General  Terry 
and  his  gallant  troops,  and  the  garrison  were  prisoners. 

Hoke's  division  of  the  Confederate  army  came  down  from 
Wilmington  during  the  fight,  and  observed  Paine's  line,  but 
did  not  attack  it. 

On  the  16th  and  17th  of  January,  the  enemy  blew  up  Fort 
Caswell,  and  abandoned  it  and  the  extensive  works  on  Smith's 
Island,  at  Smithville  and  Reeve's  Point.  These  points  were 
immediately  occupied  by  General  Terry,  and  the  fleet  took 
up  position  in  the  river  and  along  the  coast,  to  defend  his 
flanks. 

Thus  the  mouth  of  Cape  Fear  River  was  in  the  secure  pos 
session  of  the  combined  land  and  naval  forces  under  General 
Terry  and  Admiral  Porter.  The  next  step  was  to  take  Wil 
mington. 

In  the  mean  while,  other  troops  were  moving  in  the  same 
direction  from  the  far  west.  As  soon  as  the  crushing  defeat 
of  Hood,  and  the  substantial  destruction  of  the  offensive  power 
of  his  army  by  Thomas,  had  liberated  a  portion  of  the  Union 
armies  defending  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  for  active  opera 
tion  in  other  quarters,  the  lieutenant-general  had  detached 
Schofield  with  his  Twenty-third  Corps,  and  ordered  him  to  An 
napolis.  The  order  to  this  effect  was  received  by  General 
Schofield  on  the  14th  of  January,  at  Clifton,  on  the  Tennessee 
River,  where  water  transportation  had  been  collected  to  move 
the  command  to  Eastport,  in  accordance  with  previous  plans, 
and  on  the  following  day  the  movement  began. 

The  troops  moved  with  their  artillery  and  horses,  but  with 
out  wagons,  by  steam  transports  to  Cincinnati,  Ohio,  and 
thence  by  railway  to  Washington  and  Alexandria,  Virginia  ;  a 
second  order  from  Washington  having,  in  the  mean  time, 
changed  the  destination  from  Annapolis.  Although  in  mid 
winter,  and  the  weather  unusually  severe,  even  for  that  season, 
the  movement  was  effected  without  delay,  accident,  or  suffer- 


CO-OPERATIVE  MOVEMENTS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA.         361 

ing  on  the  part  of  the  troops,  and  by  the  31st  of  January  the 
whole  command  had  arrived  at  Washington  and  Alexandria. 

At  the  latter  place  great  and  unavoidable  delay  was  caused 
by  the  freezing  of  the  Potomac,  which  rendered  its  navigation 
impossible  much  of  the  time  for  several  weeks.  Meanwhile 
General  Schofield  went  to  Fort  Monroe,  met  General  Grant, 
and  proceeded  with  him  to  the  mouth  of  Cape  Fear  River  to 
consult  with  Admiral  Porter  and  General  Terry  relative  to 
future  operations.  On  their  return  to  Washington  an  order  was 
issued  from  the  War  Department  creating  the  Department  of 
North  Carolina,  and  assigning  General  Schofield  to  its  com 
mand,  and  he  now  received  General  Grant's  instructions 
charging  him  with  the  conduct  of  the  campaign  in  that  de 
partment,  and  indicating  its  plan  and  objects. 

As  soon  as  it  became  possible  to  navigate  the  Potomac, 
Schofield  started  from  Alexandria  with  Major-General  Cox's 
division  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  reached  the  mouth  of  Cape 
Fear  Elver  on  the  9th  of  February,  and  landed  upon  the  pen 
insula  near  Fort  Fisher. 

The  enemy  still  occupied  Fort  Anderson  on  the  west  bank 
of  the  river,  with  a  collateral  line  running  to  a  large  swamp 
about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  distant,  and  a  line  opposite 
Fort  Anderson  running  across  the  peninsula  from  Cape  Fear 
Kiver  to  Masonboro'  Sound.  This  position  was  impregnable 
against  direct  attack,  and  could  be  turned  only  by  crossing 
Masonboro'  Sound  above  the  enemy's  left,  or  passing  around 
the  swamp  which  covered  his  right. 

The  force  which  General  Schofield  then  had  was  evidently 
too  small  for  so  extended  a  movement  as  either  of  these  ;  but 
time  being  all-important,  he  determined  to  make  the  attempt 
without  waiting  for  the  arrival  of  reinforcements. 

On  the  llth  of  February,  he  pushed  forward  General  Terry's 
line,  supported  by  General  Cox's  division,  drove  in  the  enemy's 
pickets,  and  intrenched  in  a  new  position,  close  enough  to  the 
enemy's  line  to  compel  him  to  hold  the  latter  in  force.  He 
then  made  preparations  to  send  a  fleet  of  navy  boats  and  pon 
toons  by  sea  to  a  point  on  the  beach,  above  the  enemy's  posi- 


362  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

tion,  while  a  force  composed  of  Cox's  division  of  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps  and  Ames'  division  of  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps, 
was  to  march  along  the  beach  in  the  night  to  the  point  where 
the  boats  were  to  land,  haul  them  across  into  the  sound,  and 
cross  the  latter  to  the  main-land  in  rear  of  Hoke's  position  at 
Wilmington. 

The  weather,  however,  became  so  stormy  as  to  render  the 
execution  of  this  plan  impossible.  On  the  night  of  February 
14th,  Schofield  attempted  to  move  the  pontoons  upon  their 
wagons  along  the  beach  with  the  troops,  but  the  unusually 
high  tides  caused  by  the  heavy  sea-wind  made  it  impracticable 
to  reach  the  point  of  crossing  before  daylight  in  the  morning, 
when  the  movement  would  be  discovered  by  the  enemy  before 
a  crossing  of  the  sound  could  be  secured.  Hence,  after  a  hard 
night's  work,  the  attempt  was  abandoned,  and  Schofield  turned 
attention  to  the  enemy's  right,  where  the  difficulties  of  both 
land  and  sea  would  not  have  to  be  jointly  encountered. 

Cox's  and  Ames'  divisions  were  crossed  over  to  Smithville, 
where  they  were  joined  by  Colonel  Moore's  brigade  of  Couch's 
division  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  which  had  just  debarked, 
and  advanced  along  the  main  "Wilmington  road  until  they 
encountered  the  enemy's  position  at  Fort  Anderson  and  the 
adjacent  works.  Here  two  brigades  were  intrenched  to  oc 
cupy  the  enemy,  while  General  Cox,  with  his  other  two 
brigades  and  Ames'  division,  marched  around  the  swamp 
covering  the  enemy's  right,  to  strike  the  Wilmington  road  in 
rear  of  Fort  Anderson.  The  distance  to  be  travelled  was  about 
fifteen  miles. 

The  enemy,  warned  by  his  cavalry  of  General  Cox's  move 
ment,  hastily  abandoned  his  works  on  both  sides  of  the  river 
during  the  night  of  the  19th  of  February,  and  fell  back  behind 
Town  Creek  on  the  west,  and  to  a  corresponding  position, 
covered  by  swamps,  on  the  east.  Thus,  with  but  trifling  loss 
and  without  serious  opposition,  General  Schofield  gained  the 
main  defences  of  Cape  Fear  River  and  of  Wilmington,  with 
ten  pieces  of  heavy  ordnance  and  a  large  amount  of  ammu 
nition. 


CO-OPERATIVE  MOVEMENTS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA.         363 

On  the  following  day  General  Cox  pursued  the  enemy  to 
Town  Creek,  behind  which  he  was  found  intrenched,  having 
destroyed  the  only  bridge  across  that  stream.  General  Terry 
also  encountered  the  enemy  in  his  new  position,  and  in  force 
superior  to  his  own.  Ames'  division  was  recrossed  to  the  east 
bank,  and  joined  Terry  during  the  night  of  the  19th. 

On  the  20th,  General  Cox  crossed  Town  Creek  below  the 
enemy's  position,  by  the  use  of  a  single  flat-boat  found  in  the 
stream  ;  and,  by  wading  through  swamps,  reached  the  enemy's 
flank  and  rear,  attacked  and  routed  him,  capturing  two  pieces 
of  artillery,  three  hundred  and  seventy-five  prisoners,  besides 
the  killed  and  wounded,  and  dispersed  the  remainder.  During 
the  night  General  Cox  rebuilt  the  bridge,  crossed  his  artillery, 
and  the  next  morning  pushed  on  towards  Wilmington  without 
opposition.  General  Terry  was  unable  to  make  any  further 
advance,  but  occupied  the  attention  of  all  of  Hoke's  force,  so 
that  he  could  not  send  any  to  replace  that  which  Cox  had  de 
stroyed. 

On  the  21st,  General  Cox  secured  a  portion  of  the  enemy's 
pontoon  bridge  across  Brunswick  River,  which  they  had  at 
tempted  to  destroy,  placed  a  portion  of  his  troops  on  Eagle 
Island,  and  threatened  to  cross  the  Cape  Fear  above  Wilming 
ton.  The  enemy  at  once  set  fire  to  their  steamers,  cotton,  and 
military  and  naval  stores,  and  abandoned  the  town  of  Wil 
mington.  General  Terry's  troops  entered  it  without  opposition 
early  in  the  morning  of  the  22d  of  February,  and  pursued  the 
enemy  across  Northeast  Eiver. 

The  total  loss  of  General  Schofield's  troops  in  the  operations 
from  February  llth  to  the  capture  of  Wilmington  was  about 
two  hundred  officers  and  men,  killed  and  wounded.  Fifty-one 
pieces  of  heavy  ordnance,  fifteen  light  pieces,  and  a  large 
amount  of  ammunition  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  captors. 

The  next  thing  to  be  done  was  to  take  and  hold  Goldsboro'. 
The  instructions  given  to  General  Schofield  by  the  lieutenant- 
general  contemplated,  in  the  event  of  a  failure  to  reach  that 
place,  the  occupation  of  some  point  as  far  as  possible  from  the 
coast  on  the  railway  lines  connecting  it  with  Goldsboro',  and 


364  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

the  reconstruction  of  the  railways  leading  to  the  rear.  Either 
Wilmington  or  Newbern  would  be  the  base  according  to  cir 
cumstances.  The  object  was  twofold :  Firstly,  to  render 
material  assistance  to  Sherman,  if  necessary,  in  his  northward 
march ;  Secondly,  to  open  a  secure  base  of  supplies  for  him 
on  line  of  that  march. 

Having  no  rolling-stock  at  "Wilmington,  and  being  nearly 
destitute  of  wagon  transportation,  Schofield  was  compelled  to 
operate  from  Newbern  alone  for  the  capture  of  Goldsboro'. 
He  had  already  sent  thither  about  five  thousand  troops  belong 
ing  to  Sherman's  army,  and  directed  Brigadier-General  Innis 
N.  Palmer,  commanding  the  garrison,  to  move,  with  as  little 
delay  as  practicable,  with  all  his  available  force  towards  Kins- 
ton,  to  cover  the  workmen  engaged  in  repairing  the  railway. 
As  soon  as  Wilmington  was  secured,  Huger's  division  of  the 
Twenty-third  Corps,  which  was  then  arriving  at  Cape  Fear 
inlet,  was  also  sent  by  sea  to  Morehead  City,  to  re-enforce  the 
column  moving  from  Newbern. 

On  the  25th,  finding  that  General  Palmer,  instead  of  moving 
promptly,  had  come  to  Wilmington  to  consult  in  regard  to 
details  and  difficulties,  General  Schofield  ordered  Major- 
General  Cox  to  take  command  at  Newbern.  and  push  forward 
at  once. 

Couch's  division  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  which  had 
nearly  completed  its  debarkation  when  Wilmington  was  cap 
tured,  was  brought  to  that  place,  and  with  Cox's,  temporarily 
commanded  by  Brigadier-General  Eeilly,  was  prepared  as 
rapidly  as  possible  to  join  the  column  moving  from  Newbern 
by  a  land  march.  These  arrangements  were  made  because 
of  the  scarcity  of  both  land  and  sea  transportation.  It  was 
not  until  March  6th  that  wagons  enough  became  available, 
including  those  belonging  to  General  Terry's  command,  to 
move  the  two  divisions  from  Wilmington  to  Kinston. 

On  the  6th,  General  Couch  set  out  with  his  own  and  Cox's 
divisions  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  and  inarched  by  Onslow 
and  Eichland's  for  Kinston. 

On  the  same  day  General  Schofield  went  by  sea  to  More- 


CO-OPERATIVE  MOVEMENTS  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA.        365 

head  City,  and  joined  General  Cox  beyond  Newbern  on  the 
8th.  General  Cox  had  advanced  to  "Wise's  Forks,  about  one 
and  a  half  miles  below  Southwest  Creek,  and  the  railway  was 
in  rapid  progress. 

The  force  in  front  of  General  Cox,  which,  from  the  best  in 
formation  at  hand,  was  supposed  to  consist  of  Hoke's  division 
and  a  small  body  of  reserves,  had  fallen  back  behind  South 
west  Creek,  and  General  Cox  had  sent  two  regiments,  under 
Colonel  Upham,  Fifteenth  Connecticut  Volunteers,  to  secure 
the  crossing  of  the  creek  on  the  Dover  road.  The  enemy,  hav 
ing  been  re-enforced  by  a  portion  of  the  old  Confederate  Army 
of  Tennessee,  recrossed  the  creek  some  distance  above  the 
Dover  road,  came  down  in  rear  of  Colonel  Upham's  position, 
and  surprised  and  captured  nearly  his  entire  command,  num 
bering  about  seven  hundred  men.  The  enemy  then  advanced, 
and  endeavored  to  penetrate  between  Carter's  and  Palmer's 
divisions,  respectively  occupying  the  Dover  -road  and  the  rail 
way,  but  was  checked  by  Ruger's  division  of  the  Twenty-third 
Corps,  which  was  just  arriving  upon  the  field.  There  was  no 
further  engagement  during  the  day  beyond  light  skirmishing, 
and  the  loss  on  either  side,  with  the  exception  of  the  prisoners 
captured  with  Colonel  Upham,  were  insignificant. 

It  being  evident  that  the  enemy's  force  was  at  least  equal 
to  that  of  General  Cox,  and  that  reinforcements  were  reaching 
them  as  rapidly  as  they  could  -be  brought  by  rail,  General 
Schofield  directed  General  Cox  to  put  his  troops  in  position, 
intrench  them  securely,  and  await  the  arrival  of  General 
Couch. 

On  the  9th  of  March,  the  enemy  pressed  Schofield's  line 
strongly,  and  felt  for  its  flanks.  Heavy  skirmishing  was  kept 
up  during  the  day,  but  no  assault  was  made. 

On  the  10th,  the  enemy  having  been  largely  re-enforced,  and 
doubtless  learning  of  the  approach  of  General  Couch's  column, 
made  a  heavy  attack  upon  General  Cox's  left  and  centre,  but 
was  decisively  repulsed,  and  with  heavy  loss.  Both  attacks 
were  met  mainly  by  Ruger's  division  of  the  Twenty-third 
Corps,  a  portion  of  which  had  been  rapidly  transferred  from 


366  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

the  centre  to  the  left  to  meet  the  attack  there,  and  then  re 
turned  to  the  centre  in  time  to  repel  the  attempt  011  that  portion 
of  the  line.  The  enemy  retreated  in  confusion  from  the  field, 
leaving  his  killed  and  wounded,  as  well  as  a  large  number  of 
arms  and  intrenching  tools,  and  during  the  night  fell  back 
across  the  Neuse,  and  burned  the  bridge  over  that  river.  The 
loss  of  Schofield's  army  in  this  engagement  was  about  three 
hundred  killed  and  wounded. 

On  the  llth,  without  further  opposition,  General  Couch 
arrived  with  his  two  divisions  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  and 
effected  a  junction  with  the  forces  under  General  Cox. 

Having  no  pontoon  train,  Schofield  was  unable  to  cross  the 
Neuse  until  the  bridge  could  be  repaired,  or  the  pontoons, 
which  had  just  arrived  from  the  North,  could  be  brought  by 
railway  from  Morehead  City.  The  crossing  was  effected  with 
out  opposition  on  the  14th,  the  enemy  having  abandoned 
Kinston,  and  moved  rapidly  towards  Smithfield  to  join  the 
force  under  Johnston,  who  was  then  actively  engaged  in  con 
centrating  all  his  available  force  to  oppose  Schofield's  advance 
from  Fayetteville. 

General  Schofield  showed  equal  energy  in  pushing  his  ad 
vance  straight  on  its  destination  in  spite  of  obstacles,  and  skill 
in  resisting  the  attempt  of  the  enemy  to  break  up  his  concen 
tration  on  Kinston.  The  junction  at  that  place,  in  the  pres 
ence  of  the  enemy,  though  behind  the  Neuse,  of  two  columns 
moving  simultaneously  from  Wilmington  and  Newbern  was 
not  only  justified  but  demanded,  at  once  by  the  lack  of  trans 
portation  for  a  preparatory  concentration  at  Newbern,  and  by 
the  necessity  for  avoiding  a  moment's  delay ;  but  it  was  an 
operation  of  exceeding  delicacy,  and  in  the  hands  of  a  com 
mander  less  skilful  in  his  designs,  less  mature  in  judgment, 
less  prompt  in  decision,  or  less  complete  in  execution,  might 
have  produced  the  most  unfavorable  results.  The  manner  in 
which  it  was  accomplished  proved  the  wisdom  displayed  by 
the  lieutenant-general  in  the  selection  of  General  Schofield  for 
this  important  command. 


TO  GOLDSBORO'.  367 


CHAPTEE  XXIX. 

TO  GOLDSBORO'. 

THE  12th,  13th,  and  14th  of  March  were  passed  by  Sher 
man's  army  at  Fayetteville,  in  totally  destroying  the  United 
States  arsenal  and  the  extensive  machinery  which  had  formerly 
belonged  to  the  old  United  States  armory  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
and  which  had  been  removed  thence  after  the  attempted  de 
struction  of  the  works  by  fire  in  April,  1861,  and  used  since 
that  time  in  the  manufacture  and  repair  of  arms  for  the  Con 
federate  troops.  Every  building  was  knocked  clown  and 
burned,  and  every  piece  of  machinery  utterly  broken  up  and 
ruined,  by  the  First  Regiment  Michigan  Engineers,  under  the 
immediate  supervision  of  Colonel  O.  M.  Poe,  chief-engineer 
of  the  Military  Division.  Much  valuable  property  of  great 
use  to  an  enemy  was  here  destroyed,  or  cast  into  the  river. 

Up  to  this  period,  Sherman  had  perfectly  succeeded  in  in 
terposing  his  superior  army  between  the  scattered  parts  of  the 
enemy.  But  the  fragments  that  had  left  Columbia  under 
Beauregard  had  been  re-enforced  by  Cheatham's  corps  from 
the  West  and  the  garrison  of  Augusta,  and  ample  time  had 
been  given  to  move  them  to  Sherman's  front  and  flank  about 
Raleigh.  Hardee  had  also  succeeded  in  getting  across  Cape 
Fear  River,  and  could  therefore  complete  the  junction  with 
Hoke.  These  forces,  when  once  united,  would  constitute  an 
army,  probably  superior  to  Sherman's  in  cavalry  and  formida 
ble  enough  in  artillery  and  infantry  to  justify  him  in  extreme 
caution  in  taking  the  last  step  necessary  to  complete  the 
march.  Sherman  accordingly  sent  orders  to  Schofield  to  move 
immediately,  with  all  his  available  force,  directly  on  Goldsboro', 


368  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

aiming  to  reach  that  place  nearly  simultaneously  with  the  main 
army  on  the  20th  of  March.  "While  the  work  of  destruction 
was  going  on  at  Fayetteville,  two  pontoon  bridges  were  laid 
across  Cape  Fear  River,  one  opposite  the  town,  the  other  three 
miles  below  it. 

General  Kilpatrick  was  ordered  to  move  up  the  plank-road 
to  and  beyond  Averysboro'.  He  was  to  be  followed  by  four 
divisions  of  Slocum's  left  wing,  with  as  few  wagons  as  possi 
ble  ;  the  rest  of  the  train,  under  escort  of  the  two  remaining 
divisions  of  that  wing,  to  take  a  shorter  and  more  direct  road 
to  Goldsboro'.  In  like  manner,  General  Howard  was  ordered 
to  send  his  trains,  under  good  escort,  well  to  the  right,  to 
ward  Faison's  Depot  and  Goldsboro',  and  to  hold  four  divi 
sions  light,  ready  to  go  to  the  aid  of  the  left  wing  if  attacked 
while  in  motion. 

The  weather  continued  very  bad,  and  the  roads  had  become 
a  mere  quagmire.  Almost  every  foot  of  them  had  to  be  cordu 
royed  to  admit  the  passage  of  wheels.  Still,  time  was  so  im 
portant,  that  punctually,  according  to  orders,  the  columns 
moved  out  from  Cape  Fear  River  on  "Wednesday,  the  15th  of 
March, 

General  Sherman  himself  accompanied  General  Slocum, 
who,  preceded  by  Kilpatrick's  cavalry,  moved  up  the  river  or 
plank-road  that  day  to  Kyle's  Landing,  Kilpatrick  skirmishing 
heavily  with  the  enemy's  rear-guard  about  three  miles  beyond, 
near  Taylor's  Hole  Creek.  At  General  Kilpatrick's  request, 
General  Slocum  sent  forward  a  brigade  of  infantry  to  hold  a 
line  of  barricades. 

Next  morning,  the  16th,  the  column  advanced  in  the  same 
order,  and  developed  the  enemy,  with  artillery,  infantry,  and 
cavalry,  in  an  intrenched  position  in  front  of  the  point  where 
the  road  branches  off  towards  Goldsboro'  through  Bentonville. 

Hardee,  in  retreating  from  Fayetteville,  had  halted  in  the 
narrow  swampy  neck  between  Cape  Fear  and  South  rivers,  in 
the  hope  of  holding  Sherman  there,  in  order  to  save  time  for 
the  concentration  of  Johnston's  armies  at  some  point  to  his 
rear,  such  as  Raleigh,  Smithfield,  or  Goldsboro'.  Hardee's  force 


TV     TTTC1      n  A  TV  TT>  A  T/^tATCJ 


uio.-r  to  -.well  that  pbu-;  ;>':>"     -fiiatiltaTioously  with  Ike  ^uiij 

f«v  or    *ho  20ch  oi'  M.;reL       Vjule  r.he  work  of  destruction 

V  eij  »      ar«r,u  Brides  wcre'laM 


Genera!  Ku^ityi^          i>rd,  •  up  tae  plank-road 

'":.!   ' 

divi-i  <  <  .-  ' 
;>le  :  of  t.he  traii^ 

>«•  -v"  r1  •  <1'  \viiiLr  to  taL'   ;»  -•''  O', i'f-sv  i t.111. 1  1'u  •>"»:*•  <hi»  >J  <  "!..d 

o' 

«.  .  :'•    ,-;-i-  •'."      Li  like  rnaa-ier.  General  r..{owar<!  \va&  ordered 

v?  Sin-i   hi «   traii:^.  iiiuK-i    p -iO'l  ts-cort,  ^vell  10  the  right,  to- 

c-:  .•,•  I-  ••.<.];';  IVtji>i  nnd  GV)id:4'Oro',  ai-o.  to  hold  four  divi- 

to  liie  »i.id  of  ?}-o  k-ft  wiu^  if  attacked 


roved  i^  admit  tho  passage  of  \'.-heeK 

p.-.»ftaut,  that   puuctual'y,.    accorciiu-    t,> 

piovcd  out  ft-oiij  Gape  Fear  Br\vr  on  \Vednesaay.  the  loth  of 

March 

Gerif'.r.J   Slicnnnn   hLr; ,-••-.•!(  accompanied  G<-!;eral  Slot-urn. 

•«:'•] T'O  by  fvilpatriek's  ca-vairy3  moveit  up  ti-.<.      ;v°i  c 

;'rit  virvv  t-:>  K^le/s  lavtal'ii::1.  Kilpatrick  skii'mishing1 

••   !vi;-?si:e;ti--gnrir<l  fil-out  tiiree  nrUe*  bf-yoiid, 

,-  i'-.v;  ."'H-k.     .-Vt  General  K.i Ip at tn<^  -.  request, 

/  fmV«n:  a  brigade  of  infevnt-vv  to  hold  «i 


ini  -,i*-\            :   '!;>'  etH'Uiy,  ^'ith  .  xt'antiy,  and 

^  »jT;  irijt           •  .>•'  "^/ninfv  .-'•   point  "where 

}^;.i:  lu-s  >:t  •                 '  »ld&l  :  ia<:h  Beiitonvillo. 

•fc.         r«-tr£}(i.tu»p  >;•.*•'   i^n,-'  ?.o.<l  halted  in  iho 

.rwnSi  ">  Keek  b--'  w/.  >  if;d  ^South  rivers,  in 

the  ho':^  «-.;  UvUiiug  ^ti-.-r-'-ui;               -^  ^-r  to  save  time  tor 

the  con'.:u-cu  ••-   .0;  ,                        -M^  ,,l  some  point  to  his 
rear,  such  a*  IiJiH#M .  S^iklit^.1      -r  \">ok.L-ooro'.  Bardee's  for<;c 


TO  GOLDSROKO'.  371 

column  well  strung  out,  owing  to  the  very  bad  roads,  and 
did  not  overtake  him  in  person  until  he  had  reached  Falling 
Creek  Church,  with  one  regiment  thrown  forward  to  the 
cross-roads  near  Cox's  Bridge  across  the  Neuse.  The  gen 
eral  had  reached  a  distance  of  about  six  miles  from  General 
Slocum  when  he  heard  artillery  in  that  direction,  but  was  soon 
made  easy  by  one  of  his  staff-officers  overtaking  him,  explain 
ing  that  Carlin's  division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  leading,  had 
encountered  Dibbrell's  division  of  rebel  cavalry,  which  it  was 
easily  driving.  But  soon  other  staff-officers  came  up,  report 
ing  that  Slocum  had  developed  near  Bentonville  the  whole  of 
the  rebel  army  under  General  Johnston  himself.  Sherman 
immediately  sent  orders  to  Slocum  to  call  up  the  two  divisions 
guarding  his  wagon-trains,  and  Hazen's  division  of  the  Fif 
teenth  Corps,  still  back  near  Lee's  Store  ;  and  to  fight  de 
fensively  until  Blair's  corps,  then  near  Mount  Olive  Station, 
with  the  three  remaining  divisions  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps, 
came  up  on  Johnston's  left  rear  from  the  direction  of  Cox's 
Bridge. 

In  the  mean  time,  while  on  the  road,  Sherman  received  a 
courier  from  General  Schofield,  who  reported  himself  in 
possession  of  Kinston,  somewhat  delayed  by  want  of  pro 
visions,  but  able  to  march  so  as  to  make  Goldsboro'  on  the 
21st.  A  dispatch  also  arrived  from  General  Terry,  who  was  at 
or  near  Faison's  Depot. 

Sherman  at  once  sent  orders  to  Schofield  to  push  for  Golds 
boro',  and  to  make  dispositions  to  cross  Little  River  in  the 
direction  of  Smithfield  as  far  as  Millard ;  to  General  Terry  to 
move  to  Cox's  Bridge,  lay  a  pontoon  bridge,  and  establish  a 
crossing;  and  to  General  Blair  to  make  a  night  march  to 
Falling  Creek  Church ;  and  at  daylight,  the  right  wing,  under 
General  Howard,  less  the  necessary  wagon  guards,  was  put  in 
rapid  motion  on  Bentonville.  General  Slocum's  head  of  col 
umn  had  advanced  from  its  camp  of  March  18th,  and  first 
encountered  Dibbrell's  cavalry,  but  soon  found  his  progress 
impeded  by  infantry  and  artillery.  The  enemy  attacked  his 
advance  guard,  gaining  a  temporary  advantage,  and  took 


372  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

three  guns  and  caissons  from  Carlin's  division  of  Davis'  four 
teenth  corps,  driving  the  two  leading  brigades  back  on  the 
main  body.  As  soon  as  General  Slocum  realized  that  he  had 
in  his  front  the  whole  Confederate  army,  he  promptly  de 
ployed  the  two  divisions  of  Davis'  fourteenth  corps,  and  rap 
idly  brought  up  on  their  left  the  two  divisions  of  Williams' 
twentieth  corps.  These  he  arranged  on  the  defensive,  and 
'hastily  prepared  a  line  of  barricades.  General  Kilpatrick 
also  came  up  at  the  sound  of  artillery,  and  massed  on  the 
left.  In  this  position,  the  left  wing  received  six  distinct 
assaults  by  the  combined  forces  of  Hoke,  Hardee,  and  Cheat- 
ham,  under  the  immediate  command  of  General  Johnston 
himself,  without  giving  an  inch  of  ground,  and  doing  good 
execution  on  the  enemy's  ranks,  especially  with  artillery, 
whereof  the  enemy  had  little  or  none. 

Johnston  had  moved  by  night  from  Smithfield  with  great 
rapidity,  and  without  unnecessary  wheels,  intending  to  over 
whelm  Sherman's  left  flank  before  it  could  be  relieved  by  its 
co-operating  columns.  But  Sherman  had  all  along  expected 
just  such  a  movement,  and  was  prepared  for  it. 

During  the  night  of  the  19th,  General  Slocum  got  up  his 
wagon-train  with  its  guard  of  two  divisions,  and  Hazen's 
division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  which  re-enforcement  enabled 
him  to  make  his  position  impregnable.  The  right  wing  found 
the  Confederate  cavalry  watching  its  approach,  but  unable  to 
offer  any  serious  opposition  until  the  head  of  column  encoun 
tered  a  considerable  body  behind  a  barricade  at  the  forks  of 
the  road  near  Bentonville,  about  three  miles  east  of  the  battle 
field  of  the  day  before.  This  force  was,  however,  quickly  dis 
lodged,  and  the  intersection  of  the  roads  secured.  On  moving 
forward  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  General  Logan  found  that  the 
enemy  had  thrown  back  his  left  flank,  and  had  constructed  a 
line  of  parapet  connecting  with  that  towards  General  Slocum, 
in  the  general  form  of  a  bastion,  having  its  salient  on  the 
main  Goldsboro'  road,  interposed  between  General  Slocum  on 
the  west  and  General  Howard  on  the  east,  while  the  flanks 
rested  on  Mill  Creek,  covering  the  road  back  to  Smithfield. 


TO  GOLDSBORO'.  373 

Sherman  instructed  General  Howard  to  proceed  with  due 
caution  until  he  should  have  made  a  strong  connection  on  his 
left  with  General  Slocum.  This  he  soon  accomplished,  and, 
by  four  p.  M.  of  the  20th,  a  complete  and  strong  line  of  battle 
confronted  the  enemy  in  his  intrenched  position,  and  General 
Johnson,  instead  of  catching  Sherman's  army  in  detail,  as  he 
had  designed,  wras  himself  on  the  defensive,  with  Mill  Creek  in 
his  rear,  spanned  by  but  a  single  bridge.  Nevertheless,  Sher 
man  having  no  object  to  accomplish  by  a  battle,  unless  at  an 
advantage,  continued  to  press  steadily  forward  with  skirmish 
ers  alone,  using  artillery  freely  on  the  wooded  space  held  by 
the  enemy,  and  feeling  strongly  the  flanks  of  his  position, 
which  were  as  usual  covered  by  the  endless  swamps  of  this 
region  of  country.  He  also  ordered  all  empty  wagojis  to  be 
sent  at  once  to  Kinston  for  supplies,  and  all  other  impedi 
ments  to  be  grouped  near  the  Neuse,  south  of  Goldsboro', 
holding  the  main  army  in  close  contact  with  the  enemy,  ready 
to  fight  him  if  he  should  venture  outside  of  his  parapets  and 
obstructions. 

Immediately  upon  the  occupation  of  Kinston,  General  Scho- 
field  put  a  large  force  of  troops  to  work  upon  the  railway,  in 
aid  of  the  Construction  Corps  under  Colonel  W.  W.  Wright, 
rebuilt  the  wagon-bridge  over  the  Neuse,  and  brought  forward 
supplies,  preparatory  to  a  further  advance. 

Schofield  moved  from  Kinston  on  the  morning  of  the  20th, 
and  entered  Goldsboro'  with  but  slight  opposition  on  the 
evening  of  the  21st. 

The  portion  of  his  command  which  had  remained  at  Wil 
mington,  under  Major-General  Terry,  moved  thence  on  the 
15th  of  March,  reached  Faison's  Depot  on  the  20th,  and  in 
compliance  with  the  orders  just  cited,  moved  from  that  point 
to  Cox's  Bridge,  and  secured  a  crossing  of  the  Neuse  on 
the  22d. 

Thus,  the  main  army,  under  Sherman  in  person,  being  at 
Bentonville  in  the  situation  described,  General  Schofield  oc 
cupying  Goldsboro',  and  General  Terry  holding  the  Neuse 
Paver,  ten  miles  above,  the  three  armies  were  in  actual  connec 


374  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

tion,  holding  both  banks  of  the  Neuse  and  having  free  com 
munication  with  the  sea,  by  the  river  and  the  double  line  of 
railway  to  Newbern  and  Wilmington,  and  the  great  object  of 
the  campaign  was  accomplished. 

On  the  21st  of  March,  a  steady  rain  prevailed,  during  which 
Mower's  division  of  Blair's  seventeenth  corps,  on  the  extreme 
right  of  the  main  army,  worked  well  to  the  right  around  the 
enemy's  flank,  and  nearly  reached  the  bridge  across  Mill  Creek, 
the  only  line  of  retreat  open  to  the  enemy.  Of  course,  there 
was  extreme  danger  that  the  enemy  would  turn  on  him  all  his 
reserve,  and,  it  might  be,  let  go  his  parapets  to  overwhelm 
Mower.  Accordingly,  Sherman  at  once  ordered  a  general 
attack  by  the  skirmish  line  from  left  to  right.  Quite  a  noisy 
battle  ensued,  during  which  General  Mower  was  enabled  to 
regain  his  connection  with  his  own  corps  by  moving  to  his  left 
rear.  He  had  developed  a  weakness  in  the  enemy's  position 
of  which  advantage  might  have  been  taken  ;  but  that  night  the 
enemy  retreated  on  Smithfield,  leaving  his  pickets  to  be  taken 
prisoners,  with  many  dead  unburied,  and  wounded  in  his  field 
hospitals. 

At  daybreak  of  the  22d,  pursuit  was  made  two  miles  beyond 
Mill  Creek,  but  checked  by  Sherman's  order. 

Slocum's  left  wing  lost  at  Bentonville  nine  officers  and  one 
hundred  and  forty-five  men  killed,  fifty-one  officers  and  eight 
hundred  and  sixteen  men  wounded,  and  three  officers  and  two 
hundred  and  twenty-three  men  missing — taken  prisoners  by 
the  enemy  ;  total,  twelve  hundred  and  forty-seven. 

Howard's  right  wing  lost  two  officers  and  thirty-five  men 
killed,  twelve  officers  and  two  hundred  and  eighty-nine  men 
wounded,  and  one  officer  and  sixty  men  missing ;  total,  three 
hundred  and  ninety-nine. 

Kilpatrick's  cavalry  was  held  in  reserve.  His  loss  was 
trifling.  The  aggregate  loss  of  the  army  at  Bentonville  was 
sixteen  hundred  and  forty-six. 

Two  hundred  and  sixty-seven  of  the  Confederates  were 
buried  on  the  field  by  the  two  wings,  and  sixteen  hundred  and 
twenty-five  made  prisoners. 


TO  GOLDSBORO'.  375 


Leaving  General  Howard  with  the  right  wing  and 
trick's  cavalry  at  Bentonville  during  the  22d,  to  bury  the  dead 
and  remove  the  wounded,  on  the  following  day  all  the  armies 
moved  to  the  camps  assigned  them  about  Goldsboro',  there 
to  receive  the  clothing  and  supplies  of  which  they  stood  in 
need.  Sherman  went  in  person  on  the  22d  to  Cox's  Bridge  to 
meet  General  Terry,  and  on  the  following  day  rode  into  Golds 
boro',  where  he  found  General  Schofield  and  his  army.  The 
left  wing  came  in  during  the  same  day  and  next  morning,  and 
the  right  wing  followed  on  the  24th,  on  which  day  the  cavalry 
moved  to  Mount  Olive  Station  and  General  Terry  back  to 
Faison's. 

In  the  mean  time  the  Railway  Construction  Corps,  under 
the  superintendence  of  the  indefatigable  Colonel  Wright,  had 
been  actively  at  work  repairing  the  railways  leading  to  Wil 
mington  and  Newbern.  As  early  as  the  25th  of  March,  only 
four  days  after  the  occupation  of  Goldsboro',  the  latter  line 
was  finished  and  the  first  train  of  cars  came  in,  and  the  ample 
supplies  provided  at  Morehead  City,  by  the  forethought  of 
General  Grant,  began  to  come  forward  to  the  army. 

Sherman,  in  his  official  report  of  the  campaign,  thus  sums 
up  its  results  :  — 

"  I  cannot,  even  with  any  degree  of  precision,  recapitulate 
the  vast  amount  of  injury  done  the  enemy,  or  the  quantity  of 
guns  and  materials  of  war  captured  and  destroyed.  In  general 
terms,  we  have  traversed  the  country  from  Savannah  to  Golds 
boro',  with  an  average  breadth  of  forty  miles,  consuming  ah1 
the  forage,  cattle,  hogs,  sheep,  poultry,  cured  meats,  corn- 
meal,  etc.  The  public  enemy,  instead  of  drawing  supplies 
from  that  region  to  feed  his  armies,  will  be  compelled  to  send 
provisions  from  other  quarters  to  feed  the  inhabitants.  A 
map  herewith,  prepared  by  my  chief  engineer,  Colonel  Poe, 
with  the  routes  of  the  four  corps  and  cavalry,  will  show  at  a 
glance  the  country  traversed.  Of  course  the  abandonment  to 
us  by  the  enemy  of  the  whole  sea-coast  from  Savannah  to 
Newbern,  North  Carolina,  with  its  forts,  dock-yards,  gun- 


376  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

boats,  etc.,  was  a  necessary  incident  to  our  occupation  and 
destruction  of  the  inland  routes  of  travel  and  supply.  But  the 
real  object  of  this  march  was  to  place  this  army  in  a  position 
easy  of  supply,  whence  it  could  take  an  appropriate  part  in  the 
spring  and  summer  campaigns  of  1865.  This  was  completely 
accomplished  on  the  21st  of  March  by  the  junction  of  the  three 
armies  and  occupation  of  Goldsboro'. 

"  In  conclusion,  I  beg  to  express,  in  the  most  emphatic 
manner,  my  entire  satisfaction  with  the  tone  and  temper  of  the 
whole  army.  Nothing  seems  to  dampen  their  energy,  zeal, 
or  cheerfulness.  It  is  impossible  to  conceive  a  march  involving 
more  labor  and  exposure,  yet  I  cannot  recall  an  instance  of 
bad  temper  by  the  way,  or  hearing  an  expression  of  doubt  as 
to  our  perfect  success  in  the  end.  I  believe  that  this  cheer 
fulness  and  harmony  of  action  reflects  upon  all  concerned 
quite  as  much  real  honor  and  fame  as  '  battles  gained '  or 
'  cities  won,'  and  I  therefore  commend  all,  generals,  staff, 
officers,  and  men,  for  these  high  qualities,  in  addition  to  the 
more  soldierly  ones  of  obedience  to  orders  and  the  alacrity 
they  have  always  manifested  when  danger  summoned  them 
'to  the  front.'" 

We  have  already  remarked  that  the  failure  to  defend 
Columbia  was  the  turning  point  of  the  campaign,  and  neces 
sarily  involved  its  loss,  since  it  enabled  Sherman  to  move 
either  on  Charlotte  or  Fayetteville  at  his  pleasure,  and  com 
pelled  Johnston  to  sacrifice  one  of  these  lines  to  the  defence 
of  the  other.  In  like  manner,  the  inability  to  cripple  Sher 
man's  army  in  detail,  and  thus  prevent  his  occupation  of  Golds 
boro',  carried  with  it  the  impossibility  of  preventing  his  junc 
tion  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  For,  should  Johnston 
attempt  to  oppose  Sherman  in  his  progress  to  the  Koanoke, 
on  the  Weldon  road,  he  must  necessarily  expose  himself  to  the 
danger  of  having  his  right  turned  and  being  compelled  to 
fight  a  battle  between  the  Neuse  and  the  Koanoke,  with  his 
back  to  the  sea.  Should  he  retire  behind  the  Koanoke  to 
dispute  its  passage,  his  rear  would  be  at  the  mercy  of  Grant, 


TO  GOLDSBORO'.  377 

and  with  a  large  river  and  a  powerful  enemy  in  his  front,  he 
must  then  choose  whether  to  abandon  the  attempt  or  submit 
to  be  hemmed  in  without  supplies.  Again,  if  Johnston  should 
decide  to  refuse  his  left  and  retire  on  Raleigh  or  on  the  south 
bank  of  the  Neuse,  he  would,  by  that  very  act,  abandon  all  hope 
of  being  able  to  restrain  the  accomplishment  of  his  adversary's 
purpose.  The  last  alternative,  though  ineffectual  to  oppose 
Sherman,  w^as  the  best  of  the  three,  being  the  only  one  that 
did  not  point  to  immediate  destruction,  and  it  was  the  one 
which  General  Johnston  promptly  and  very  properly  adopted. 


378  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 


CHAPTEE  XXX. 

THE    LAST    STROKE. 

SHERMAN  immediately  began  to  prepare  for  the  new  cam 
paign. 

On  the  24th  of  March,  the  day  after  his  arrival  at  Golds 
boro',  he  issued  the  following  orders  for  the  reorganization 
and  supply  of  the  army  as  the  first  step  in  that  direction  : — 

"I.  Major-General  Schofield,  commanding  the  Department 
of  North  Carolina,  will,  out  of  the  troops  of  his  command, 
organize  a  force  equivalent  to  two  corps,  or  five  divisions,  and 
proceed  to  equip  them  in  the  most  complete  manner  for  field 
service.  This  force,  while  operating  with  the  other  armies  in 
the  field,  will  be  styled  the  '  Centre.'  For  the  present,  Gen 
eral  Schofield  will  post  his  command  to  hold  Goldsboro',  and 
cover  the  railroad  back  to  "Wilmington  and  Morehead  City. 
He  will  also  aid  the  railroad  department  with  details,  to 
enable  it  to  finish,  in  the  shortest  possible  time,  the  two  roads, 
and  equip  them  for  service. 

"II.  Colonel  W.  "W.  "Wright,  of  the  railroad  department, 
will  use  extraordinary  means,  night  and  day,  to  complete  the 
two  railroads  from  Goldsboro'  back  to  Morehead  City  and 
Wilmington,  and  to  equip  them  to  the  capacity  of  three  hun 
dred  tons  per  day  of  freight. 

"  He  may  pay  any  price  for  labor,  call  for  details  of  soldiers, 
and  draw  rolling-stock  from  Savannah,  Charleston,  or  any 
point  within  this  command,  and  all  commanding  officers  and 
quartermasters  will  give  preference  to  the  shipment  of  such 
stock  over  any  other  work  whatever,  not  involving  life.  The 


THE  LAST   STROKE.  379 

work  of  these  railroads  is  limited  and  restricted  to  the  trans 
portation  in  the  order  following  :  '  Army  stores' — 1.  Ammuni 
tion  ;  2.  Food  for  men ;  3.  Clothing  for  men ;  4.  Grain  for 
animals  ;  5.  Camp  and  garrison  equipage ;  6.  Hay  and  long 
forage. 

"  Until  there  is  an  accumulation  of  supplies  at  Goldsboro', 
enough  to  fill  the  wagons  of  the  army,  no  officer,  soldier,  or 
citizen,  or  any  private  stores  whatever,  will  be  carried  on  the 
up  trip,  unless  it  be  mail  matter,  and  officers  or  couriers  bear 
ing  orders  for  army  headquarters,  nor  these  to  exceed  one  car 
load  per  day.  All  else  must  march  or  use  horses  and  wagons, 
from  the  salt-water  to  Goldsboro',  until  the  army  is  thorough 
ly  clothed  and  equipped.  Return  cars  may  load  according  to 
the  discretion  of  the  quartermaster  in  charge,  provided  there 
be  no  delay. 

"  To  facilitate  the  completion  of  these  roads,  Colonel  Poe 
will  cause  the  First  Michigan  Engineers  to  work  back  towards 
Newbern.  General  Howard  will  cause  to  be  built  the  railroad 
over  the  Neuse,  near  Goldsboro' ;  General  Slocum,  the  wagon- 
road  bridge  on  the  Mount  Olive  road,  and  General  Schofield 
the  railroad-bridge  over  Northeast  Branch,  near  Wilmington, 
leaving  Colonel  Wright  with  his  working  parties  to  look  after 
the  laying  or  ballasting  the  track,  and  getting  the  cars  in 
motion. 

"  III.  The  chief  quartermaster  and  commissary  of  the  army 
in  the  field,  Generals  Easton  and  Beckwith,  will  repair  at 
once  to  Goldsboro',  and  there  control  the  movement  of  sup 
plies  according  to  the  necessities  of  the  army  and  orders 
issued  at  these  headquarters.  All  estimates  and  requisitions 
will  be  addressed  accordingly. 

"  IV.  The  right  wing  of  the  army  will  group  to  the  front 
and  right  of  Goldsboro',  looking  north ;  the  left  wing,  in  front 
and  left  of  Goldsboro'  ;  the  centre  to  Goldsboro',  with  detach 
ments  to  cover  the  railroads  to  the  rear.  The  cavalry  will  be 
posted  at  or  near  Mount  Olive  Station.  All  will  send  forag- 
ing-parties  into  the  country,  being  careful  to  have  them  strong 
enough  and  well  guarded." 


380  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Slocum's  left  wing  now  adopted  the  title  of  the  Army  oi 
Georgia,  and  Major-General  Joseph  A.  Mower  succeeded 
General  Williams  in  the  command  of  the  Twentieth  Corps. 

The  centre,  under  Schofield,  composed  of  the  Tenth  and 
Twenty-third  Army  Corps,  respectively  commanded  by  Major- 
General  Alfred  H.  Terry  and  Jacob  D.  Cox,  perpetuated  the 
use  of  the  name  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  hitherto  belonging 
only  to  the  latter  organization.  Terry's  tenth  corps  consisted 
of  the  divisions  of  Brigadier  and  Breve-t  Majdr-General  Adel- 
bert  Ames  and  Brigadier-General  Charles  J.  Paine.  Cox's 
twenty-third  corps  comprised  the  divisions  of  Brigadier-Gen 
erals  Darius  N.  Couch,  Thomas  H.  Euger,  and  John  T.  Reilly. 

The  right  wing,  under  Howard,  still  retained  its  original 
designation  as  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and  was  composed, 
as  during  the  preceding  campaign,  of  Logan's  fifteenth  and 
Blair's  seventeenth  army  corps. 

Having  given  the  directions  just  quoted,  Sherman  turned 
over  the  chief  command  of  his  army  to  Major-General  Scho 
field,  the  next  in  rank,  and  hastened  to  City  Point,  to  have  an 
interview  with  Lieutenant-General  Grant,  for  the  purpose  of 
arranging  the  time  and  manner  of  their  co-operation  during 
the  coming  campaign.  He  arrived  at  General  Grant's  head 
quarters  on  the  evening  of  the  27th  of  March,  and  there  met 
President  Lincoln,  for  the  first  time  since  the  year  1861,  Gen 
eral  Grant  himself,  and  Generals  Meade  and  Ord,  commanding 
the  Armies  of  the  Potomac  and  James.  After  a  long  and  full 
conference  as  to  the  campaign  just  closed,  and  the  final  opera 
tions  now  proposed,  General  Sherman  received  his  instructions 
from  General  Grant,  and  set  out  on  the  naval  dispatch-boat 
Bat,  to  return,  by  way  of  Hatteras  Inlet  and  Newbern,  to  his 
headquarters  at  Goldsboro',  where  he  arrived  on  the  night  of 
the  30th  of  March. 

General  Sherman  had  informed  General  Grant  that  the  10th 
of  April  would  be  the  earliest  date  at  which  he  could  be  ready 
to  move,  and  all  things  were  now  arranged  accordingly. 

The  troops  were  still  busy  in  repairing  the  wear  and  tear  of 
their  recent  hard  march  from  Savannah,  and  in  replenishing 


THE   LAST  STROKE.  381 

clothing  and  stores  necessary  for  a  further  progress.  Owing 
to  a  mistake  in  the  railway  department  in  sending  locomotives 
and  cars  of  the  five-foot  guage,  the  army  was  now  limited  to 
the  use  of  the  few  locomotives  and  cars  of  the  four-foot  eight- 
and-a-half-inch  guage  already  in  North  Carolina,  with  such  of 
the  old  stock  as  was  captured  by  Major-General  Terry  at  Wil 
mington  and  on  his  way  up  to  Goldsboro'.  Yet  such  judi 
cious  use  was  made  of  them,  and  such  industry  displayed  in  the 
railway  management  by  Generals  Easton  and  Beckwith,.  Colo 
nel  Wright  and  Mr.  Van  Dyne,  his  assistant,  that  by  the  10th 
of  April  all  the  men  were  clad,  the  wagons  reloaded,  and  a 
sufficient  amount  of  forage  accumulated  for  the  proposed 
march. 

On  the  5th  of  April,  Sherman  issued  the  following  orders  for 
the  guidance  of  his  army  and  corps  commanrders,  and  heads 
of  staff  departments  : — 

"  The  next  grand  objective  is  to  place  this  army  with  its  full 
equipment  north  of  Roanoke  River,  facing  west,  with  a  base  of 
supplies  at  Norfolk  and  at  Wynton,  or  Murfreesboro'  on  the 
Chowan,  and  in  full  communication  with  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac,  about  Petersburg,  and  also  to  do  the  enemy  as  much 
harm  as  possible  en  route. 

"  I.  To  accomplish  this  -result,  the  following  general  plan 
will  be  followed,  or  modified  only  by  written  orders  from  these 
headquarters,  should  events  require  a  change  : — 

"1st.  On  Monday,  the  10th  of  April,  all  preparations  are 
presumed  to  be  completed,  and  the  outlaying  detachments  will 
be  called  in,  or  given  directions  to  meet  on  the  next  march.  All 
preparations  will  also  be  completed  to  place  the  railway  stock 
back  of  Kinston  on  the  one  road,  and  below  the  Northeast 
Branch  on  the  other. 

"  2d.  On  Tuesday,  the  llth,  the  columns  will  draw  out  on 
their  lines  of  march,  say  about  seven  miles,  and  close  up. 

"  3d.  On  Wednesday,  the  march  will  begin  in  earnest,  and 
will  be  kept  up  at  the  rate  say  of  about  twelve  miles  a  day,  or 
according  to  the  amount  of  resistance.  All  the  columns  will 


382  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

dress  to  the  left,  which  is  the  exposed  flank,  and  commanders 
will  study  always  to  find  roads  by  which  they  can,  if  necessary, 
perform  a  general  left  wheel ;  the  wagons  to  be  escorted  on  to 
some  place  of  security  on  the  direct  route  of  march. 

"  Foraging  and  other  details  may  continue  as  heretofore,  only 
more  caution  and  prudence  should  be  observed,  and  foragers 
should  not  go  in  advance  of  the  advance  guard,  but  look  more 
to  our  right-rear  for  corn,  bacon,  and  meal. 

"II.  The  left  wing,  Major-General  Slocum  commanding, 
will  aim  straight  for  the  railway  bridge  near  Smithfield,  thence 
along  up  the  Neuse  Kiver  to  the  railway  bridge  over  Neuse 
Eiver,  northeast  of  Ealeigh  (Powell's),  thence  to  Warrenton, 
the  general  point  of  concentration.  The  centre,  Major-Gen- 
eral  Schofield  commanding,  will  move  to  Whitley's  Mill,  ready 
to  support  the  left  until  it  is  past  Smithfield,  when  it  will  follow 
up,  substantially,  Little  Eiver  to  Eolesville,  ready  at  all  times 
to  march  to  the  support  of  the  left,  after  passing  Tar  Eiver, 
en  route  to  Warrenton. 

"  The  right  wing,  Major-General  Howard  commanding,  pre 
ceded  by  the  cavalry,  will  move  rapidly  on  Pikeville  and  Folk's 
Bridge,  ready  to  make  a  junction  with  the  other  armies  in  case 
the  enemy  offers  battle  this  side  of  Neuse  Eiver  about  Smith- 
field,  thence,  in  case  of  no  serious  opposition  on  the  left,  will 
work  up  towards  Earpsboro',  Andrews'  Bridge,  and  Warrenton. 

"  The  cavalry,  General  Kilpatrick  commanding,  leaving 
its  encumbrances  with  the  right  wing,  will  push  as  though 
straight  for  Weldon,  until  the  enemy  is  across  Tar  Eiver  and 
that  bridge  burned ;  then  it  will  deflect  towards  Nashville  and 
Warrenton,  keeping  up  a  general  communication  with  general 
headquarters. 

"  III.  As  soon  as  the  army  starts,  the  chief  quartermaster 
and  commissary  will  prepare  a  supply  of  stores  at  some  point 
in  Pamlico  and  Albemarle  sounds,  ready  to  be  conveyed  to 
Kinston,  or  Wynton  and  Murfreesboro',  according  to  develop 
ments.  As  soon  as  they  have  satisfactory  information  that 
the  army  is  north  of  the  Eoanoke,  they  will  forthwith  establish 
a  depot  at' Wynton  with  a  sub-depot  at  Miirfreesboro'. 


THE  LAST  STROKE.  383 

"  Major-General  Schofield  will  hold,  as  heretofore,  Wilming 
ton,  with  the  bridge  across  Northeast  Branch  as  an  outpost, 
Newbern  and  Kinston  as  its  outpost,  and  will  be  prepared  to 
hold  Wynton  and  Murfreesboro'  as  soon  as  the  time  arrives 
for  that  move.  The  navy  has  instructions  from  Admiral  Por 
ter  to  co-operate,  and  any  commanding  officer  is  authorized  to 
call  on  the  navy  for  assistance  and  co-operation,  always  in 
writing,  setting  forth  the  reasons, — of  which,  of  necessity,  the 
naval  commander  is  the  judge. 

"  IV.  The  general-in-chief  will  be  with  the  centre  habitually, 
but  may  in  person  shift  to  either  flank  where  his  presence  may 
be  needed,  leaving  a  staff-officer  to  receive  reports.  He  re 
quires  absolutely  a  report  of  each  army  or  grand  detachment 
each  night,  whether  any  thing  material  has  occurred  or  not : 
often  the  absence  of  an  enemy  is  a  very  important  fact  in  mil 
itary  prognostication." 

In  the  mean  time,  Major-General  George  Stoneman,  in  com 
mand  of  a  division  of  cavalry,  operating  from  East  Tennessee 
in  connection  with  Major-General  Thomas,  in  pursuance  of 
Sherman's  previous  orders,  had  reached  the  railway  about 
Greensboro',  N.  C.,  had  utterly  destroyed  it,  and  had  pushed 
along  it  to  Salisbury,  destroying  in  his  march  bridges,  cul 
verts,  depots,  and  all  kinds  of  rebel  supplies,  and  had  ex 
tended  the  breach  in  the  railway  down  to  the  Catawba  Bridge. 
This  was  fatal  to  the  hostile  armies  of  Lee  and  Johnston,  who 
depended  on  that  road  for  supplies,  and  as  their  ultimate  line 
of  retreat. 

Brevet  Major-General  J.  H.  Wilson,  in  command  of  the 
cavalry  corps  organized  by  himself,  under  the  orders  issued 
by  Sherman  before  turning  south  from  his  pursuit  of  Hood 
into  Tennessee,  had  started  from  the  neighborhood  of  De- 
catur  and  Florence,  Alabama,  and  moved  straight  into  the 
heart  of  Alabama,  on  a  route  prescribed  for  General  Thomas 
after  he  had  defeated  General  Hood  at  Nashville,  Tennes 
see.  But  the  road  being  too  heavy  for  infantry,  and  Gen 
eral  Thomas  being  already  greatly  weakened  by  detachments 


384  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

for  service  in  other  quarters,  lie  had  devolved  the  duty  on 
that  most  energetic  young  cavalry  officer,  General  "Wilson, 
who,  imbued  with  the  proper  spirit,  thus  struck  one  of  the  best 
blows  of  the  war  at  the  waning  strength  of  the  Confederacy. 
His  route  by  Tuscaloosa,  Selma,  Montgomery,  Columbus,  and 
Macon,  being  one  never  before  traversed  by  the  Union  troops, 
afforded  him  ample  supplies  for  men  and  animals  as  long  as 
his  column  was  in  motion. 

Meanwhile,  Grant  was  intently  watching  Lee,  seeking  to 
fathom  his  course  under  the  new  combinations  now  being 
developed.  If  Lee  should  remain  behind  his  lines  at  Peters 
burg,  in  the  passive  defensive  attitude  he  had  for  so  many 
months  successfully  maintained,  his  defeat  and  destruction 
would  be  almost  mathematically  certain  the  moment  Sherman 
should  cross  the  Roanoke ;  and  this,  as  we  have  shown,  John 
ston  was  powerless  to  prevent.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Con 
federate  general  might  summon  Johnston,  by  forced  marches, 
to  his  aid,  while  Sherman  was  refitting  and  getting  ready  to 
move,  and  then,  with  the  two  armies  united,  strike  Grant  a 
vigorous  blow ;  but  the  two  armies  united  would  not  possess 
sufficient  strength  to  overpower  Grant's  army,  behind  its 
secure  intrenchments :  and  before  even  the  semblance  of  a 
siege  could  be  undertaken,  even  supposing  the  Confederates 
to  possess  the  means  for  such  a  task,  Sherman  would  arrive, 
and  the  game  would  be  lost,  for  the  only  remaining  Confeder 
ate  forces  would  find  themselves  in  a  cul-de-sac,  without 
present  means  of  subsisting  so  large  a  number  of  men,  and 
without  a  possibility  of  escape.  Lee's  best  alternative  was 
undoubtedly  to  be  sought  in  a  junction  with  Johnston  at 
Raleigh  or  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Neuse,  and  a  vigorous 
blow  for  Sherman's  destruction  before  Grant  could  follow. 

It  was  for  the  first  signs  of  the  adoption  of  such  a  course 
that  Grant  now  looked  with  sleepless  eyes.  There  was  but  one 
way  to  meet  it — to  strike  the  evacuating  column  in  air,  in  the 
first  moment  of  retreat,  and  force  it  to  a  battl'e.  Accordingly, 
on  the  last  day  of  March,  thinking  he  saw  the  symptoms  of 
such  a  movement,  Grant  struck.  After  a  series  of  battles, 


THE   LAST   STROKE.  335 

among  the  most  determined  and  sanguinary  of  the  entire 
war,  on  the  3d  of  April  his  line  crushed  Lee's  shell  at  all 
points,  and  by  the  next  morning  Petersburg  and  Richmond 
were  evacuated ;  Lee,  with  the  remnants  of  his  army,  was  in 
full  flight,  his  men  scattering  like  chaff  before  the  wind ;  and 
the  officers  of  the  Confederate  government  were  individual 
fugitives,  vainly  seeking  the  protecting  wing  of  the  remains  of 
their  armies. 

The  news  of  the  battles  about  Petersburg  reached  Sherman 
at  Goldsboro',  on  the  6th  of  April.  Up  to  that  time  his  pur 
pose  was,  as  we  have  already  seen,  to  move  rapidly  northward, 
feigning  on  Raleigh,  and  striking  straight  for  Burkesville, 
thereby  interposing  between  Johnston  and  Lee.  But  the 
problem  was  now  greatly  changed,  and,  in  the  expressive  lan 
guage  of  Lieutenant-General  Grant  in  his  instructions  to 
Sherman,  the  Confederate  armies  of  Lee  and  Johnston  be 
came  the  strategic  points.  General  Grant  was  fully  able  to 
take  care  of  the  former,  and  Sherman's  task  was  to  destroy 
or  capture  the  latter. 

Johnston  at  that  time  had  his  army  well  in  hand  about 
Smithfield.  Sherman  estimated  his  infantry  and  artillery  at 
thirty-five  thousand,  and  his  cavalry  from  six  to  ten  thousand. 
Thus  deeming  his  adversary  superior  in  cavalry,  General  Kil- 
patrick  was  held  in  reserve  at  Mount  Olive,  with  orders  to  re 
cruit  his  horses,  and  be  ready  to  make  a  sudden  and  rapid 
march  on  the  10th  of  April. 

At  daybreak  on  the  day  appointed  all  the  heads  of  col 
umns  were  in  motion  against  the  enemy ; — Major-General 
Slocum  taldng  the  two  direct  roads  for  Smithfield;  Major- 
General  Howard  making  a  circuit  by  the  right,  and  feigning 
up  the  Weldon  road  to  disconcert  the  enemy's  cavalry ;  and 
Generals  Terry  and  Kilpatrick  moving  on  the  west  side  of  the 
Neuse  River,  aiming  to  reach  the  rear  of  the  enemy  between 
Smithfield  and  Raleigh.  General  Schofield  followed  General 
Slocum  in  support.  All  the  columns  met,  within  six  miles  of 
Goldsboro',  more  or  less  cavalry,  behind  the  usual  rail  barri 
cades,  which  were  swept  before  them,  and  by  ten  A.  M.  of  the 

25 


386  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

11  tli  Davis'  fourteenth  corps  entered  Smithfield,  closely  fol 
lowed  by  Mower's  twentieth  corps. 

Johnston  had  rapidly  retreated  across  the  Neuse  Biver,  and 
having  his  railway  to  lighten  up  his  trains,  could  fall  back 
faster  than  Sherman  could  pursue.  The  rains  had  also  set  in, 
making  the  resort  to  corduroy  absolutely  necessary  for  the 
passage  even  of  ambulances.  The  enemy  had  burned  the 
bridge  at  Smithfield,  and  as  soon  as  possible  General  Slocum 
got  his  pontoons  up,  and  crossed  over  a  division  of  the  Four 
teenth  Corps. 

"  Then,"  says  Sherman,  "  we  heard  of  the  surrender  of 
Lee's  army  at  Appornattox  Courthouse,  Yirginia,  which  was 
announced  to  the  armies  in  orders,  and  created  universal  joy. 
Not  one  officer  or  soldier  of  my  army  but  expressed  a  pride 
and  satisfaction  that  it  fell  to  the  lot  of  the  Armies  of  the 
Potomac  and  James  so  gloriously  to  overwhelm  and  capture 
the  entire  army  that  had  held  them  in  check  so  long  ;  and 
their  success  gave  us  new  impulse  to  finish  up  our  task." 

Without  a  moment's  hesitation,  Sherman  gave  orders  to 
drop  all  trains,  and  the  army  marched  rapidly  in  pursuit  to 
and  through  Ealeigh,  reaching  that  place  at  half-past  seven 
A.  M.  on  the  13th,  in  a  heavy  rain. 

The  next  day  the  cavalry  pushed  on  through  the  rain  to 
Durham's  Station,  Logan's  fifteenth  corps  following  as  far  as 
Morrisville  Station,  and  Blair's  seventeenth  corps  to  John's  Sta 
tion.  On  the  supposition  that  Johnston  was  tied  to  his  railway, 
as  a  line  of  retreat  by  Hillsboro',  Greenboro',  Salisbury,  and 
Charlotte,  Sherman  had  turned  the  other  columns  across  the 
bend  in  that  road  towards  Ashboro'.  Kilpatrick  was  ordered  to 
keep  up  a  show  of  pursuit  towards  the  Company's  Shops,  in 
Almancer  County  ;  Howard  to  turn  the  left  by  Hackney's  Cross 
roads,  Pittsburg,  St.  Lawrence,  and  Ashboro' ;  Slocum  to  cross 
Cape  Fear  River  at  Avon's  Ferry  and  move  rapidly  by  Car 
thage,  Caledonia,  and  Cox's  Mills  ;  while  Schofield  was  to  hold 
Raleigh  and  the  road  back,  with  spare  force  to  follow  by 
an  intermediate  route. 

By  the  15th,  though  the  rains  were  incessant,  and  the  roads 


THE  LAST  STROKE.  387 

almost  impracticable,  Major-General  Slocum  had  Jefferson  C. 
Davis'  fourteenth  corps  near  Martha's  Vineyard,  with  a  pon 
toon  bridge  laid  across  Cape  Fear  Eiver  at  Avon's  Ferry, 
and  Mower's  twentieth  corps  in  support ;  and  Major-General 
Howard  had  Logan's  fifteenth  and  Blair's  seventeenth  corps 
stretched  out  on  the  roads  towards  Pittsboro' ;  while  General 
Kilpatrick  held  Durham's  Station  and  Capitol  Hill  University. 

Johnston's  army  was  retreating  rapidly  on  the  roads  from 
Hillsboro'  to  Greensboro',  he  himself  being  at  Greensboro'. 

Thus  matters  stood  when  General  Sherman  received  a  com 
munication  from  General  Johnston  that  arrested  all  hostile 
movements  for  the  time  being. 


388  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 


CHAPTEE  XXXI. 

DAWN. 

FKOM  Smithfield,  on  the  12th  of  April,  Sherman  wrote  to 
General  Grant : — 

"  I  have  this  moment  received  your  telegram  announcing 
the  surrender  of  Lee's  army.  I  hardly  know  how  to  express 
my  feelings  ;  but  you  can  imagine  them.  The  terms  you  have 
given  Lee  are  magnanimous  and  liberal.  Should  Johnston 
follow  Lee's  example,  of  course  I  will  grant  the  same.  He  is 
retreating  before  me  on  Ealeigh,  and  I  shall  be  there  to-mor 
row.  Eoads  are  heavy  and  bad  ;  but  under  the  inspiration  of 
the  news  from  you  we  can  march  twenty-five  miles  a  day.  I 
am  twenty-eight  miles  from  Ealeigh,  but  a  part  of  my  army 
is  eight  miles  behind.  If  Johnston  retreats  south  I  will  follow 
him  ;  but  I  take  it  he  will  surrender  at  Ealeigh.  I  shall  expect 
to  hear  from  General  Sheridan  in  case  Johnston  does  not  sur 
render,  for  in  such  case  I  will  need  a  little  more  cavalry.  I 
would  make  sure  to  capture  the  whole  army." 

When  Sherman  entered  Ealeigh,  on  the  13th,  he  found  that 
the  inhabitants  had  not  heard  of  Lee's  surrender,  and  could 
hardly  credit  the  report.  Johnston  had  retreated  westward,  and 
Sherman  dispatched  to  Grant  that  he  would  move  at  once  to 
Ashboro',  Saulsbury,  or  Charlotte,  according  to  circumstances. 

Kilpatrick,  with  most  of  the  cavalry,  had  been  left  ten  miles 
to  the  south  and  west  of  Smithfield,  busy  after  the  enemy's 
locomotives  and  railway  trains,  and  had  reported  some  cap 
tures.  He  was  now  ordered  to  "  keep  pushing  the  enemy." 


DAWN.  389 

"  To-night,"  writes  Assistant  Adjutant-General  Dayton,  "  the 
general  will  inform  you  of  the  coming  move.  The  columns 
are  closing  up  here  now." 

Late  on  the  same  day,  General  Sherman  wrote  to  Kil- 
patrick  : — 

"  I  have  been  out  and  am  just  back,  and  hasten  to  answer 
yours  of  to-day.  I  will  send  a  locomotive  to  bring  up  the 
cars  you  have  captured.  Send  pickets  along  the  road  to  ad 
vise  the  conductor  where  to  stop.  It  will  take  all  day  to 
morrow  to  close  up  our  trains,  and  to  draw  out  on  the  new  line 
of  operations.  Rest  your  animals,  and  confine  your  opera 
tions  to  mere  feints,  and  get  ready  for  work  by  day  after  to 
morrow." 

On  the  14th,  Sherman  had  information  that  Johnston  was 
about  Greensboro'  and  Saulsbury,  and  had  his  troops  ready  to 
move  in  that  direction.  And  again  he  writes  to  Kilpatrick : — 

"  I  sent  you  orders  to-day,  by  which  you  will  see  I  am  to 
put  my  army  where,  if  Johnston  tries  to  pass  out  by  Charlotte, 
I  can  strike  him  in  flank,  or,  if  he  remains  at  Greensboro',  I 
can  capture  the  whole.  All  I  expect  of  you  is  to  keep  up  the 
delusion  that  we  are  following  him  via  the  University  and 
Hillsboro'  until  I  get  my  infantry  heads  of  column  across  the 
Haw  River,  when  I  want  you  to  cross  also,  and  feel  out  to 
wards  Greensboro'  till  I  get  to  Ashboro',  where,  if  he  remains 
at  Greensboro',  I  can  approach  him  from  the  south,  and  force 
him  to  battle,  to  surrender,  or  disperse.  You  will  perceive  we 
will  save  a  couple  of  days  by  cutting  across  the  bend  in  the 
direction  of  Saulsbury.  I  am  anxious  to  prevent  his  escape 
towards  Georgia." 

In  the  same  letter  General  Sherman  informed  his  chief  of 
cavalry  that  on  the  following  day  General  Howard  would  have 
one  corps  at  Jones'  Station,  and  another  corps  at  Morrison's, 
and  that  on  the  day  after  all  would  move  by  separate  roads 


390  SHERMAN   AND   HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

for  Ashboro' ;  and  added  :  "  The  people  here  manifest  more 
signs  of  subjugation  than  I  have  yet  seen  ;  but  Jeff.  Davis  has 
more  lives  than  a  cat,  and  we  must  not  trust  him.  If  you 
reach  the  university  do  not  burn  its  library,  buildings,  or  spe 
cific  property." 

On  the  14th  of  April,  after  all  the  dispositions  for  the  ad 
vance  on  Ealeigh  had  been  completed,  General  Sherman  re 
ceived  a  communication  from  General  Johnston,  by  a  flag  of 
truce,  requesting  an  armistice,  and  a  statement  of  the  best 
terms  on  which  he  could'  be  permitted  to  surrender  the  army 
under  his  command.  General  Sherman  instantly  dispatched 
his  answer,  and  sent  it  through  General  Kilpatrick  with  a  note 
of  instruction,  as  follows  :  "  The  letter  by  flag  of  truce  was 
from  General  Johnston,  which  is  the  beginning  of  the  end. 
Herewith  is  my  answer ;  send  it  at  once,  and  do  not  advance 
your  cavalry  beyond  the  university,  or  to  a  point  abreast  of  it 
on  the  railway.  I  will  be  at  Morrisville  to-morrow." 

"  I  am  fully  empowered  to  arrange  with  you,"  he  wrote  to 
General  Johnston,  "  any  terms  for  the  suspension  of  hostilities 
as  between  the  armies  commanded  by  you  and  those  com 
manded  by  myself,  and  am  willing  to  confer  with  you  to  that 
end. 

"  That  a  basis  of  action  may  be  had,  I  undertake  to  abide 
by  the  same  terms  and  conditions  entered  into  by  Generals 
Grant  and  Lee  at  Appomattox  Courthouse,  Virginia,  on  the 
9th  instant." 

On  the  evening  of  the  same  day,  the  three  army  commanders 
were  informed  of  the  communication  just  received  from  the 
enemy,  and  that  under  existing  circumstances  it  was  probable 
the  long  march  contemplated,  and  for  which  such  careful  prep 
aration  had  been  made,  might  become  unnecessary.  General 
Schofield  was  nevertheless  ordered  to  place  one  corps  of  the 
Army  of  the  Ohio  at  Holly  Springs,  and  the  other  just  outside 
of  Raleigh,  in  the  direction  of  the  proposed  route,  and  there 
await  further  instructions. 

General  Howard  was  directed  to  put  one  corps  of  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  at  Morrisville,  and  the  other  at  Jones'  Station, 


DAWN.  391 

and  then  expect  the  arrival  of  the  commander-in-chief  at  Mor- 
risville  ;  and  General  Slocum  was  ordered  to  remain  as  he  then 
was  until  further  orders. 

General  Sherman  then  immediately  prepared  copies  of  his 
correspondence  with  General  Johnston,  and  wrote  to  General 
Grant  on  the  same  day,  as  follows  : — 

"I  send  copies  of  a  correspondence  begun  with  General 
Johnston,  which  I  think  will  be  followed  by  terms  of  capitula 
tion.  I  will  accept  the  same  terms  as  General  Grant  gave 
General  Lee,  and  be  careful  not  to  complicate  any  points  of 
civil  policy.  If  any  cavalry  has  started  towards  me,  caution 
them  that  they  must  be  prepared  to  find  our  work  done.  It  is 
now  raining  in  torrents,  and  I  shall  await  General  Johnston's 
reply  here,  and  will  propose  to  meet  him  in  person  at  Chapel 
Hill.  I  have  invited  Governor  Vance  to  return  to  Raleigh 
with  the  civil  officers  of  his  State.  I  have  met  ex-Governor 
Graham,  Mr.  Badger,  Moore,  Holden,  and  others,  all  of  whom 
agree  that  the  war  is  over,  and  that  the  States  of  the  South 
must  reassume  their  allegiance,  subject  to  the  constitution  and 
laws  of  Congress,  and  that  the  military  power  of  the  South 
must  submit  to  the  national  arms.  This  great  fact  once  ad 
mitted,  all  the  details  are  easy  of  arrangement." 

JMeanwhile,  Major  McCoy,  of  General  Sherman's  staff,  then 
at  Durham's  Station,  was  directed  by  General  Sherman  to  re 
main  with  Kilpatrick  until  Johnston's  second  communication 
should  be  brought  within  the  lines  ;  so  that,  in  case  of  neces 
sity,  the  contents  of  the  message  could  be  sent  over  the  tele 
graphic  wires,  and  an  answer  returned  forthwith.  But  no 
message  came  from  Johnston  on  that  day.  On  the  16th,  Sher 
man  wrote  to  Brevet  Brigadier-General  Easton,  assistant 
quartermaster-general  at  Newbern  : — "  I  expect  every  hour 
an  answer  from  Johnston,  and  unless  he  makes  clear  and  satis 
factory  terms  to-day,  I  will  start  to-morrow  towards  Ashboro'. 
Hold  yourself  in  readiness  to  give  us  forage  here  (at  Raleigh) 
when  the  railway  is  done."  On  the  same  day,  General  Kil- 


392  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

patrick  having  telegraphed  to  General  Sherman  that  he  sus 
pected  bad  faith  on  the  part  of  Johnston,  and  suggested  pos 
sible  surprise,  and  having  described  certain  movements  of  the 
enemy,  not  consonant  with  the  maintenance  of  the  condition 
of  things  existing  at  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  the 
armistice,  Sherman  replied  : — "  I  have  faith  in  General  John 
ston's  personal  sincerity,  and  do  not  believe  he  would  resort 
to  a  subterfuge  to  cover  his  movements.  He  could  not  well 
stop  the  movement  of  his  troops  until  he  got  my  letter,  which 

I  now  hear  was  delayed  all  day  yesterday in  sending 

it  forward.  But  if  Johnston  does  gain  time  on  us  by  such 
we  will  make  up  for  it  at  the  expense  of  North  Carolina.  We 
will  be  all  ready  to  move  to-morrow  if  necessary." 

Later  on  the  same  day,  the  message  from  General  Johnston 
was  received  by  General  Sherman,  and  the  result  made  known 
to  Generals  Slocum,  Howard,  and  Schofield,  viz.,  that  General 
Johnston  desired  an  interview  with  General  Sherman,  near 
Durham's  Station,  with  a  view  to  arrange  terms  of  capitula 
tion.  Sherman  fixed  the  time  at  twelve  o'clock  on  the  next 
day,  the  17th. 

The  meeting  was  had  according  to  appointment.  Sherman 
frankly  tendered  the  same  terms  accorded  by  General  Grant 
to  General  Lee.  Johnston  acknowledged  the  terms  to  be 
both  fair  and  liberal,  but  asked  the  consideration  of  additional 
facts.  He  suggested  the  treaty  between  Generals  Grant  and 
Lee  had  reference  to  a  part  only  of  the  Confederate  forces, 
whereas  he  proposed  the  present  agreement  should  include 
all  the  remaining  armies  of  the  Confederacy,  and  thus  the  war 
should  be  at  an  end.  He  admitted,  frankly  and  candidly, 
there  was  no  longer  any  ground  for  hope  of  success  on  the 
part  of  the  Confederacy,  "  that  the  cause  was  lost,"  and  that 
this  admission  included  slavery,  State  rights,  and  every  other 
claim  for  which  the  war  had  been  inaugurated.  And  now  he 
desired  the  fragments  of  the  Confederate  armies  to  preserve 
their  company  and  regimental  organizations,  that  they  be 
marched  to  the  States  where  they  belonged  in  such  order  that 
they  might  not  be  broken  up  into  predatory  bands,  to  overrun 


DAWN.  393 

the  country  and  vex  the  inhabitants  ;  and  urged  that  that  was 
the  favorable  occasion  to  inaugurate  the  beginning  of  a  period 
of  peace  and  good-will  between  all  the  people  destined  to  live 
under  the  same  Government. 

Sherman  declared  that  while  he  honored  the  motives  of 
Johnston,  and  would  be  most  happy  to  promote  the  results 
suggested,  he  had  grave  doubts  whether  he,  Johnston,  had  the 
power  to  make  a  binding  treaty  beyond  the  usual  capitulation 
entered  into  by  and  between  commanders  of  armies  when  one 
surrenders,  on  terms,  to  the  other.  And  if  the  needed  au 
thority  did  exist,  so  far  as  Johnston  was  concerned,  he,  Sher 
man,  did  not  deem  himself  in  possession  of  the  necessary 
power  to  bind  the  Government  of  the  United  States  to  such 
terms. 

As  to  the  first  objection,  the  lack  of  power  on  his  part, 
General  Johnston  replied  that  he  felt  sure  he  could  satisfy 
General  Sherman  he  had  all  necessary  power  in  the  premises, 
and  suggested  that  the  conference  might  be  adjourned  over 
until  the  next  day,  to  enable  him  to  confer  with  General 
Breckinridge,  the  Confederate  secretary  of  war.  And  as  to 
the  second  objection,  he  urged  the  repeated  declarations  of 
President  Lincoln,  that  he  was  willing,  at  all  times,  to  nego 
tiate  a  peace  with  any  person  or  persons  who  could  control 
the  Confederate  armies.  Finally,  the  .convention  was  ad 
journed  until  the  next  day  at  twelve  o'clock  ai  the  same  place. 
On  the  same  day  General  Sherman  wrote  a  letter  to  Colonel 
Webster  at  Newbern,  to  be  telegraphed  to  General  Grant,  as 
follows : — 

"  I  have  returned  from  a  point  twenty-seven  miles  up  the 
railroad,  where  I  had  a  long  interview  with  General  Johnston, 
with  a  full  and  frank  interchange  of  opinions. 

"  He  evidently  seeks  to  make  terms  for  Jeff.  Davis  and  his 
cabinet. 

"He  wanted  to  consult  again  with  Mr.  Breckinridge  at 
Greensboro',  and  I  have  agreed  to  meet  him  at  noon  to-mor 
row  at  the  same  place. 


394  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

"  We  lose  nothing  in  time,  as,  by  agreement,  both  armies 
stand  still ;  and  the  roads  are  drying  up,  so  that  if  I  am  forced 
to  pursue,  will  be  able  to  make  better  speed. 

"  There  is  great  danger  that  the  Confederate  armies  will 
dissolve,  and  fill  the  whole'  land  with  robbers  and  assassins, 
and  I  think  this  is  one  of  the  difficulties  that  Johnston  labors 
under. 

"  The  assassination  of  Mr.  Lincoln  shows  one  of  the  ele 
ments  in  the  rebel  army  which  will  be  almost  as  difficult  to 
deal  with  as  the  main  armies.  Communicate  substance  of  this 
to  General  Grant ;  and  also,  that  if  General  Sheridan  is  march 
ing  down  this  way,  to  feel  for  me  before  striking  the  enemy. 

"  I  don't  want  Johnston's  army  to  break  up  into  fragments." 

It  will  be  remembered  that  during  his  hurried  visit  to  City 
Point  to  confer  with  General  Grant,  General  Sherman  also  had 
the  good  fortune  to  meet  President  Lincoln,  and  freely  inter 
change  views  with  him.  Any  one  who  knows  any  thing  of  the 
personal  opinions  and  desires  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  knows  that, 
above  all  things,  he  desired  an  end  of  the  war  on  any  terms 
that  proposed  a  permanent  peace.  He  was  now,  more  than 
ever,  impressed  by  the  sacrifices  and  sufferings  of  the  people 
on  both  sides  of  the  contest.  Here,  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Petersburg,  he  had  seen  war  for  the  first  time,  and  it  har 
rowed  his  generous  soul  to  the  very  bottom.  He  walked  over 
ground  covered  with  the  bodies  of  the  slain,  more  numerous 
than  he  could  count  or  cared  to  count ;  he  saw  living  men  with 
broker^  heads  and  mangled  forms,  and  heard  the  hopeless 
groans  and  piteous  wails  of  the  dying,  whom  no  human  hand 
could  save  ;  he  witnessed  the  bloody  work  of  the  surgeons— 
those  carpenters  and  joiners  of  human  frames — and  saw  am-' 
putated  legs  and  arms  piled  up  in  heaps  to  be  carted  away 
like  the  offal  of  a  slaughter-house  ;  and  he  turned  from  the 
horrid  sight,  exclaiming:  "And  this  is  icar — horrid  war — the 
trade  of  barbarians  /"  And,  appealing  to  his  principal  officers, 
he  inquired  :  "  Gentlemen,  is  there  no  way  by  which  we  can 
put  a  stop  to  this  fighting  ?" 


DAWN.  395 

The  President  was  in  this  frame  of  mind  when  General 
Sherman  reported  to  him  at  City  Point.  He  had  infused  the 
same  feeling  among  all  the  officers  who  were  near  him.  He 
was  willing  to  recognize  the  existence  of  State  governments, 
to  convene  rebel  State  legislatures,  to  confer  with  rebel  State 
civil  officers,  and  to  exercise  the  pardoning  power  to  the  ut 
most  extent ;  in  fact,  to  concede  any  thing  that  he  could  safely 
concede,  and  to  do  any  thing  that  he  could  safely  do,  to  end 
the  war  and  restore  the  supremacy  of  the  Government  of  the 
United  States. 

Deeply  impressed  with  these  views,  General  Sherman  re 
turned  to  his  command  in  North  Carolina. 

On  the  17th  of  April,  the  army  was  shocked  by  the  appalling 
intelligence  of  President  Lincoln's  assassination  on  the  evening 
of  the  14th.  The  deep  gloom  which  settled  upon  the  hearts 
of  men  overshadowed  a  terrible  determination.  If  there  were 
those  in  the  South  who  did  not  thoroughly  detest  this  infamous 
and  cowardly  act,  for  them  there  need  be  no  appeal  for  mercy. 

Sherman  at  once  announced  the  melancholy  news  to  the 
army  in  the  following  general  orders  : — 

"  HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
In  the  Field,  Raleigh,  April  17,  1865. 

SPECIAL    FIELD    ORDERS,    NO.    50. 

"The  general  commanding  announces  with  pain  and  sorrow 
that,  on  the  evening  of  the  llth  instant,  at  the  theatre  in 
Washington  City,  his  Excellency,  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  Mr.  Lincoln,  was  assassinated  by  one  who  uttered  the 
State  motto  of  Virginia.  At  the  same  time  the  secretary  of 
state,  Mr.  Seward,  whilst  suffering  from  a  broken  arm,  was 
also  stabbed  by  another  murderer  in  his  own  house,  but  still 
survives,  and  his  son  was  wounded,  supposed  fatally. 

"  It  is  believed  by  persons  capable  of  judging,  that  other 
high  officers  were  designed  to  share  the  same  fate.  Thus  it 
seems  that  our  enemy,  despairing  of  meeting  us  in  manly 
warfare,  begin  to  resort  to  the  assassin's  tools.  Your  general 
does  not  wish  you  to  infer  that  this  is  universal,  for  he  knows 


396  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

that  the  great  mass  of  the  Confederate  army  would  scorn  to 
sanction  such  acts,  but  he  believes  it  the  legitimate  consequence 
of  rebellion  against  rightful  authority.  We  have  met  every 
phase  which  this  war  has  assumed,  and  must  now  be  prepared 
for  it  in  its  last  and  worst  shape,  that  of  assassins  and  guerril 
las  ;  but  woe  unto  the  people  who  seek  to  expend  their  wild 
passions  in  such  a  manner,  for  there  is  but  one  dread  result. 
"  By  order  of  MAJOB-GENEBAL  W.  T.  SHEBMAN. 

"L.  M.  DAYTON,  Major  and  Asst.  Adjt.-Gen." 

On  the  18th  of  April  negotiations  were  resumed.  After  the 
first  meeting  General  Sherman  conferred  with  his  principal 
officers,  all  of  whom  favored  a  treaty  on  the  basis  proposed  by 
Johnston.  The  course  pursued  at  Eichmond,  the  general  tone 
and  spirit  of  the  newspaper  press,  private  letters  from  home, 
all  indicated  a  general  spirit  of  amnesty  and  forgiveness.  It 
is  a  singular  fact  that  soldiers  who  suffer  privation,  wounds, 
and  death  in  the  cause  of  their  country,  are  much  more  forgiv 
ing,  generous,  and  considerate  towards  their  enemies  than 
their  friends  at  home,  who  live  in  comfort  and  read  their 
patriotic  sentiments  reflected  in  the  morning  papers.  Finally, 
the  following  memorandum,  or  basis  of  agreement,  was  drawn 
up  by  General  Sherman  himself,  which,  for  the  time  being, 
was  satisfactory  to  all  present  as  a  proposition  to  be  submitted 
to  the  President  of  the  United  States  for  ratification  or  re 
jection  : — 

"  Memorandum,  or  basis  of  agreement,  made  this,  the  18th 
day  of  April,  A.  D.  1865,  near  Durham's  Station,  in  the  State 
of  North  Carolina,  by  and  between  General  Joseph  E.  John 
ston,  commanding  the  Confederate  army,  and  Major-General 
W.  T.  Sherman,  commanding  the  Army  of  the  United  States, 
both  present. 

"  I.  The  contending  armies  now  in  the  field  to  maintain  the 
status  quo  until  notice  is  given  by  the  commanding  general  of 
any  one  to  his  opponent,  and  reasonable  time,  say  forty-eight 
hours,  allowed. 


DAWN.  397 

"  II.  The  Confederate  armies  now  in  existence  to  be  dis 
banded  and  conducted  to  their  several  State  capitals,  there  to 
deposit  their  arms  and  public  property  in  the  State  arsenal ; 
and  each  officer  and  man  to  execute  and  file  an  agreement  to 
cease  from  acts  of  war,  and  to  abide  the  action  of  both  State 
and  Federal  authorities.  The  number  of  arms  and  munitions 
of  war  to  be  reported  to  the  chief  of  ordnance  at  Washington 
City,  subject  to  the  future  action  of  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  and  in  the  mean  time  to  be  used  solely  to  maintain 
peace  and  order  within  the  borders  of  the  States  respectively. 

"  III.  The  recognition  by  the  executive  of  the  United 
States  of  the  several  State  governments,  on  their  officers  and 
legislatures  taking  the  oath  prescribed  by  the  constitution  of 
the  United  States  ;  and  where  conflicting  State  governments 
have  resulted  from  the  war,  the  legitimacy  of  all  shall  be  sub 
mitted  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 

"  IV.  The  re-establishment  of  all  Federal  courts  in  the 
several  States,  with  powers  as  defined  by  the  constitution  and 
laws  of  Congress. 

"  V.  The  people  and  inhabitants  of  all  States  to  be  guaran 
teed,  so  far  as  the  Executive  can,  their  political  rights  and 
franchise,  as  well  as  their  rights  of  person  and  property,  as 
defined  by  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  and  of  the 
States  respectively. 

"  YI.  The  executive  authority  or  Government  of  the  United 
States  not  to  disturb  any  of  the  people  by  reason  of  the  late 
war,  so  long  as  they  live  in  peace  and  quiet,  and  abstain  from 
acts  of  armed  hostility,  and  obey  the  laws  in  existence  at  the 
place  of  their  residence. 

"  VII.  In  general  terms,  it  is  announced  that  the  war  is  to 
cease  ;  a  general  amnesty,  so  far  as  the  Executive  of  the  United 
States  can  command,  on  condition  of  the  disbandment  of  the 
Confederate  armies,  the  distribution  of  arms,  and  the  resump 
tion  of  peaceful  pursuits  by  officers  and  men  hitherto  compos 
ing  said  armies. 

"  Not  being  fully  empowered  by  our  respective  principals  to 
fulfil  these  terms,  we  individually  and  officially  pledge  ourselves 


398  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

to  promptly  obtain  authority,  and  will  endeavor  to  carry  out 
the  above  programme." 

Immediately  General  Sherman  made  his  arrangements  to 
send  the  agreement  to  Washington  with  all  possible  haste,  and 
wrote  the  following  private  letter  of  advice  and  explanation, 
directed  to  both  General  Grant  and  General  Halleck  : — 

"  I  inclose  herewith  a  copy  of  an  agreement  made  this  day 
between  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  and  myself,  which,  if 
approved  by  the  United  States,  will  produce  peace  from  the 
Potomac  to  the  Kio  Grande.  Mr.  Breckinridge  was  present 
at  our  conference,  in  his  capacity  as  major-general,  and  satis 
fied  me  of  the  ability  of  General  Johnston  to  carry  out  to  the 
full  extent  the  terms  of  the  agreement ;  and  if  you  will  get  the 
President  to  simply  indorse  the  copy,  and  commission  me  to 
carry  out  the  terms,  I  will  follow  them  to  the  conclusion. 

"  You  will  observe  that  it  is  an  absolute  submission  of  the 
enemy  to  the  lawful  authority  of  the  United  States,  and  dis 
perses  his  armies  absolutely  ;  and  the  point  to  which  I  attach 
most  importance  is,  that  the  dispersion  and  disbandment  of 
these  armies  is  done  in  such  a  manner  as  to  prevent  their 
breaking  up  into  guerrilla  bands. 

"  On  the  other  hand,  we  can  retain  just  as  much  of  our  army 
as  we  please.  I  agreed  to  the  mode  and  manner  of  the  sur 
render  of  arms  set  forth,  as  it  gives  the  States  the  means  of 
repressing  guerrillas,  which  we  could  not  expect  them  to  do  if 
we  stripped  them  of  all  arms. 

"  Both  Generals  Johnston  and  Breckinridge  admitted  that 
slavery  was  dead,  and  I  could  not  insist  on  embracing  it  in 
such  a  paper,  because  it  can  be  made  with  the  States  in  detail. 
I  know  that  all  the  men  of  substance  South  sincerely  want 
peace,  and  I  do  not  believe  they  will  resort  to  war  again 
during  this  century.  I  have  no  doubt  but  that  they  will  in  the 
future  be  perfectly  subordinate  to  the  laws  of  the  United  States. 

"  The  moment  my  action  in  this  matter  is  approved,  I  can 
spare  five  corps,  and  will  ask  for  orders  to  leave  General  Scho- 


DAWN.  399 

field  here  with  the  Tenth  Corps,  and  to  march  myself  with  the 
Fourteenth,  Fifteenth,  Seventeenth,  Twentieth,  and  Twenty- 
third  corps  via  Burkesville  and  Gordonsville  to  Frederick  or 
Hagerstown,  there  to  be  paid  and  mustered  out. 

"  The  question  of  finance  is  now  the  chief  one,  and  every 
soldier  and  officer  not  needed  should  be  got  home  at  work. 
I  would  like  to  be  able  to  begin  the  march  north  by  May  1st. 
I  urge  on  the  part  of  the  President  speedy  action,  as  it  is  im 
portant  to  get  the  Confederate  armies  to  their  homes  as  well 
as  our  own." 

On  the  same  day  General  Sherman  wrote  the  following  pri 
vate  note  to  General  Halleck  in  regard  to  the  assassination  of 
Mr.  Lincoln,  and  the  man  Clark,  supposed  to  have  been  de 
tailed  to  murder  himself  : — 

"  GENERAL — I  received  your  dispatch  describing  the  man 
Clark  detailed  to  assassinate  me.  He  had  better  be  in  a  hurry, 
or  he  will  be  too  late. 

"  The  news  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  death  produced  a  most  intense 
effect  on  our  troops.  At  first  I  feared  it  would  lead  to  ex 
cesses,  but  now  it  has  softened  down,  and  can  easily  be 
guided. 

"  None  evinced  more  feeling  than  General  Johnston,  who 
admitted  that  the  act  was  calculated  to  stain  his  cause  with  a 
dark  hue.  And  he  contended  that  the  loss  was  most  serious 
to  the  people  of  the  South,  who  had  begun  to  realize  that  Mr. 
Lincoln  was  the  best  friend  the  South  had. 

"  I  cannot  believe  that  even  Mr.  Davis  was  privy  to  the 
diabolical  plot ;  but  think  it  the  emanation  of  a  set  of  young 
men  at  the  South,  who  are  very  devils.  I  want  to  throw  upon 
the  South  the  care  of  this  class  of  men,  who  will  soon  be  as 
obnoxious  to  their  industrial  classes  as  to  us. 

"  Had  I  pushed  Johnston's  army  to  an  extremity,  these 
would  have  dispersed,  and  would  have  done  infinite  mischief." 

All  things  being  now  ready,  Major  Hitchcock,  a  staff-officer, 


400  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

was  sent  forward  with  directions  to  keep  his  own  counsel ;  to 
proceed  as  fast  as  possible  direct  to  Washington,  and  deliver 
his  charge  to  the  new  President,  await  his  pleasure,  and  re 
turn  with  his  answer.  The  messenger  arrived  at  Washington 
at  a  moment  ill  suited  to  the  favorable  consideration  of  liberal 
terms  of  peace.  Mr.  Lincoln  had  been  cruelly  murdered  by 
a  dastardly  wretch  in  the  supposed  employ  of  the  rebel  gov 
ernment  ;  another  conspirator  had  stealthily  entered  the 
domicil  of  Mr.  Seward,  who  was  then  ill  and  helpless  in  his 
bed,  and,  after  hewing  his  way  over  the  prostrate  forms  of  the 
attendants  of  the  sick-chamber  and  of  the  members  of  the 
family  present,  to  the  bedside  of  the  helpless  minister,  pounced 
upon  him  with  all  the  ferocity  of  a  fiend  with  a  purpose  to 
destroy  his  life.  It  had  been  discovered  that  the  conspiracy 
not  only  compassed  the  life  of  Mr.  Lincoln  and  Mr.  SeAvard, 
but  that  of  other  high  officials  of  the  Government,  and  in  the 
army  as  well.  Such  indignation  was  never  felt  in  this  country 
before  ;  and  the  sorrow  experienced  by  reason  of  the  death  of 
the  great  and  good  Mr.  Lincoln,  as  all  were  wont  now  to  call 
him,  was  spontaneous,  deep,  and  universal.  Every  head  was 
bowed  down,  every  heart  wTas  sad,  and  every  mind  was  occu 
pied  with  thoughts  of  the  awful  crime. 

It  was  under  such  circumstances  that  the  newly  inaugurated 
President  and  the  panic-stricken  members  of  the  old  cabinet 
met  to  break  the  package  sent  by  General  Sherman,  and  to 
deliberate  on  terms  of  peace  ! 

The  document  was  read,'  but  a  funeral  sermon  would  have 
sounded  better.  Every  paragraph,  every  line,  and  every  word 
of  the  unfortunate  document,  when  read  by  the  light  of  sur 
rounding  circumstances,  and  listened  to  by  men  in  such  frame 
of  mind,  appeared  like  an  amnesty  for  unpardonable  sins,  .and 
a  pardon  in  advance  for  the  assassins.  Nay  more,  the  liberal 
spirit  of  the  soldier  which  pervaded  the  entire  document,  so 
discordant  with  the  sentiment  of  the  hour,  was  suggestive  of 
complicity  with  treason  itself.  Under  the  circumstances,  any 
terms  short  of  utter  annihilation  of  all  rebels  and  rebel  syni- 


DAWN.  401 

patliizers,  were  not  to  be  considered  for  a  moment.  Peace 
itself  was  treason,  and  only  vengeance  loyalty. 

It  was  the  desire  of  the  secretary  of  war,  Mr.  Stanton,  to 
relieve  General  Sherman  from  command  at  once,  but  Gen 
eral  Grant,  who  was  present  at  the .  cabinet  meeting,  himself 
volunteered  to  take  the  answer  of  the  President  to  General 
£»ierman  ;  and  to  him  was  accordingly  confided  full  control 
and  discretion  in  the  matter. 

General  Grant  proceeded  at  once  to  North  Carolina,  and  on 
the  evening  of  the  23d  arrived  at  Morehead  City,  whence  he 
sent  word  to  General  Sherman  that  the  truce  with  Johnston 
had  been  disapproved,  and  notified  him  of  the  contents  of  the 
following  letter  of  instructions  from  the  secretary  of  war  : — 

"  WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

"  Washington  City,  April  21,  1865. 

"  GENERAL — The  memorandum  or  basis  agreed  upon  between 
General  Sherman  and  General  Johnston  having  been  submit 
ted  to  the  President,  they  are  disapproved.  You  will  give  no 
tice  of  the  disapproval  to  General  Sherman,  and  direct  him  to 
resume  hostilities  at  the  earliest  moment. 

"  The  instructions  given  to  you  by  the  late  President,  Abra 
ham  Lincoln,  on  the  3d  of  March,  by  my  telegram  of  that  date 
addressed  to  you,  express  substantially  the  views  of  President 
Andrew  Johnson,  and  will  be  observed  by  General  Sherman. 
A  copy  is  herewith  appended. 

"  The  President  desires  that  you  proceed  immediately  to 
the  headquarters  of  General  Sherman,  and  direct  operations 
against  the  enemy. 

"  Yours  truly, 

"  EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

"Secretary  of  War. 

"  To  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  GRANT." 

This  dispatch  was  received  on  the  morning  of  the  24th. 
General  Sherman  instantly  gave  notice  to  General  Johnston 
as  follows  : — 


402  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

"  You  will  take  notice  that  the  truce  or  suspension  of  hos 
tilities  agreed  to  between  us  on  the  18th  instant  will  close  in 
forty-eight  hours  after  this  is  received  at  your  lines." 

At  the  same  time  he  wrote  : — 

"  I  have  replies  from  Washington  to  my  communications  of 
the  18th.  I  am  instructed  to  limit  my  operations  to  your  im 
mediate  command,  and  not  attempt  civil  negotiations.  I 
therefore  demand  the  surrender  of  your  army  011  the  same 
terms  as  were  given  to  General  Lee  at  Appomattox,  Ya.,  on 
the  9th  April,  instant,  purely  and  simply," 

Within  an  hour  after  the  reception  of  General  Grant's  dis 
patch,  a  courier  was  riding  with  all  haste  towards  Durham's 
Station  with  this  notice  and  demand  for  General  Johnston. 
Immediately  on  the  return  of  the  messenger,  General  Sherman 
issued  orders  to  his  troops  terminating  the  truce  on  the  26th, 
at  twelve  o'clock  M.,  and  ordered  all  to  be  in  readiness  to 
march  at  that  time,  on  routes  previously  prescribed  in  the 
special  field-orders  of  April  14th,  from  positions  held  April 
18th.  These  dispositions  were  already  made  when  General 
Grant  arrived  at  Kaleigh.  He  then  informed  General  Sher 
man  that  he  had  orders  from  the  President  to  direct  all  mili 
tary  movements,  and  General  Sherman  explained  to  him  the 
exact  position  of  the  troops.  General  Grant  was  so  well  satis 
fied  with  the  situation,  that  he  concluded  not  to  interfere  with 
the  arrangements  already  made,  and  to  leave  their  execution 
in  the  hands  of  General  Sherman. 

As  for  General  Johnston,  he  was  powerless  ;  he  could  nei 
ther  fight  nor  retreat.  He  must  either  disperse  his  army  or 
surrender  it  on  the  terms  proposed.  On  the  25th  he  invited 
General  Sherman  to  another  conference,  with  a  view  to  sur 
render.  It  was  now  the  province  of  General  Grant  to  take 
the  lead  in  the  negotiations,  but  he  preferred  that  the  entire 
business  should  be  consummated  by  General  Sherman.  Nev 
ertheless,  he  recommended  and  even  urged  General  Sherman 


DAWN.  403 

to  afford  General  Johnston  another  interview,  which  was  finally 
appointed  to  take  place  at  the  hour  designated  for  the  termi 
nation  of  the  truce. 

At  this  conference  final  terms  were  soon  concluded,  and  the 
second  grand  army  of  the  Confederacy  was  surrendered  to  the 
power  of  the  United  States  upon  the  following  terms  : — 

"  Terms  of  a  military  convention  entered  into  this  twenty-sixth  (26th)  day  of 
April,  1865,  at  Bennett's  house,  near  Durham's  Station,  North  Carolina,  be 
tween  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  commanding  the  Confederate  Army, 
and  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman,  commanding  the  United  States  Army  in 
North  Carolina. 

"  All  acts  of  war  on  the  part  of  the  troops  under  General 
Johnston's  command  to  cease  from  this  date.  All  arms  and 
public  property  to  be  deposited  at  Greensboro',  and  delivered 
to  an  ordnance  officer  of  the  United  States  Army.  Eolls  of 
all  officers  and  men  to  be  made  in  duplicate,  one  copy  to  be 
retained  by  the  commander  of  the  troops,  and  the  other  to  be 
given  to  an  officer  to  be  designated  by  General  Sherman. 
Each  officer  and  man  to  give  his  individual  obligation  in  wri 
ting  not  to  take  up  arms  against  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  until  properly  released  from  this  obligation.  The  side- 
arms  of  officers,  and  their  private  horses  and  baggage,  to  be 
retained  by  them. 

"  This  being  done,  all  the  officers  and  men  will  be  permitted 
to  return  to  their  homes,  not  to  be  disturbed  by  the  United 
States  authorities  so  long  as  they  observe  their  obligations 
and  the  laws  in  force  where  they  may  reside. 

"  "W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General, 

"  Commanding  the  Army  of  the  United  States  in 
North  Carolina. 

"  J.  E.  JOHNSTON,  General, 

"  Commanding  Confederate  States  Army 
in  North  Carolina. 

"  Approved :  U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant-General. 
"  RALEIGH,  N.  C.,  April  36, 1865." 


404  SHERMAN   AND   HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

General  Sherman  says,  in  his  report : — 

"  And  although  undue  importance  has  been  given  to  the  so- 
called  negotiations  which  preceded  it,  and  a  rebuke  and  public 
disfavor  cast  on  me  wholly  unwarranted  by  the  facts.  I  rejoice 
in  saying  it  was  accomplished  without  further  ruin  and  de 
vastation  to  the  country ;  without  the  loss  of  a  single  life  of 
those  gallant  men  who  had  followed  me  from  the  Mississippi 
to  the  Atlantic  ;  and  without  subjecting  brave  men  to  the  un 
gracious  task  of  pursuing  a  fleeing  foe  that  did  not  wish  to 
fight.  And  I  challenge  the  instance,  during  the  last  four  years, 
when  an  armed  and  defiant  foe  stood  before  me,  that  I  did  not 
go  in  for  a  fight ;  and  I  would  blush  for  shame  if  I  had  ever 
struck  or  insulted  a  fallen  foe." 

It  will  now  become  necessary  to  recur  to  events  transpiring 
at  Washington  and  Eichmond  during  the  absence  of  the  lieu 
tenant-general. 


CORRESPONDENCE   DURING  THE  TRUCE.  4Q5 


CHAPTEK   XXXII. 

CORRESPONDENCE  DURING  THE  TRUCE. 

IN  order  to  a  more  perfect  understanding  of  the  intentions 
of  the  framers  of  the  original  memorandum  of  agreement,  in 
proposing  and  consenting  to  the  terms  of  the  armistice,  it  is 
now  necessary  to  refer  to  the  correspondence  that  took  place 
during  the  period  that  intervened  between  the  signature  of  the 
agreement  by  General  Sherman  and  General  Johnston  on  the 
18th  of  April,  1865,  and  the  night  of  the  23d  of  the  same  month, 
when  General  Sherman  received  the  first  notification  that  the 
Government  had  refused  to  ratify  his  action. 

Immediately  on  signing  the  truce,  Sherman  dispatched  the 
following  order,  by  a  flag  of  truce,  through  the  lines  of  the 
Confederate  army  to  General  Stoneman,  commanding  the 
cavalry  in  Johnston's  rear  : — 

"  GENERAL — General  Johnston  and  I  have  agreed  to  maintain 
a  truce  in  the  nature  of  static  quo,  by  which  each  agrees  to 
stand  fast  till  certain  propositions  looking  to  a  general  peace 
are  referred  to  our  respective  principals.  You  may,  therefore, 
cease  hostilities,  but  supplies  may  come  to  me  near  Kaleigh. 

"  Keep  your  command  well  in  hand,  and  approach  Durham's 
Station  or  Chapel  Hill,  and  I  will  supply  you  by  our  railroad. 
As  soon  as  you  reach  the  outer  pickets  report  to  me  in  person 
or  by  telegraph." 

This  was  indorsed  by  General  Johnston  for  the  guidance  oi 
his  troops,  as  follows  : — 


406  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

"The  above  order  is  given  by  agreement  between  Major- 
General  Sherman  and  myself.  The  march  of  Major-General 
Stoneman's  command  under  it  is  not  to  be  interfered  with  by 
Confederate  troops. 

"  J.  E.  JOHNSTON, 

"  General." 

At  the  same  time  the  following  communication  was  dis 
patched,  through  the  same  channels,  addressed  to  the  com 
manding  general  of  the  armies  of  the  United  States  in 
Virginia : — 

"  GENERAL — I  have  agreed  with  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston 
for  a  temporary  cessation  of  active  hostilities,  to  enable  me  to 
lay  before  our  Government  at  Washington  the  agreement  made 
between  us,  with  the  full  sanction  of  Mr.  Davis,  and  in  the 
presence  of  Mr.  Brecldnridge,  for  the  disbandment  of  all  the 
armies  of  the  Confederacy  from  here  to  the  Eio  Grande. 

"  If  any  of  your  forces  are  moving  towards  Johnston,  I  beg 
you  to  check  them  where  they  are,  or  at  the  extremity  of  any 
railroad  where  they  may  be  supplied,  until  you  receive  orders 
from  General  Grant,  or  until  I  notify  you  that  the  agreement 
is  at  an  end  and  hostilities  resumed." 

On  the  19th,  orders  were  sent  to  General  Gillmore  to  cease 
active  operations  in  South  Carolina. 

"You  may  now  recall  General  Hatch  to  the  Santee,"  Sher 
man  wrote  to  General  Gillmore.  "  Keep  pickets  about 
Branchville  and  the  Santee  Bridge,  and  await  the  further  de 
velopments.  I  have  no  doubt  that  a  general  surrender  of  all 
the  Confederate  armies  is  arranged,  and  only  awaits  a  con 
firmation  from  Washington.  All  is  well  with  us  and  every 
where." 

Thus  far,  however,  no  measures  had  been  taken  to  check  the 
devastation  caused  by  the  bold  Wilson's  unembarrassed  raid 
through  Georgia  and  Alabama.  General  Johnston,  therefore, 
wrote  to  General  Sherman  as  follows  : — 


CORRESPONDENCE   DURING   THE   TRUCE.  407 

"  GREENSBORO',  April  19,  1865. 

"  GENEKAL — As  your  troops  are  moving  from  tlie  coast  to 
wards  the  interior  of  South  Carolina,  and  from  Columbus 
towards  Macon,  Georgia,  I  respectfully  suggest  that  you  send 
copies  of  your  orders  announcing  the  suspension  of  hostilities 
for  transmittal  to  them,  supposing  the  interior  route  to  be  the 
shortest. 

"  Most  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  J.  E.  JOHNSTON, 

"  General  C.  S.  A." 

To  this  General  Sherman  replied  on  the  20th  : — 

"  GENERAL — At  your  request  I  send  you,  by  Major  Saunders, 
several  written  and  printed  copies  of  an  order  I  have  made  to 
this  army,  which  announces  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  etc.  I 
dispatched  a  steamer  from  Morehead  City  yesterday,  for 
Charleston,  with  orders  to  General  Gillmore  to  cease  all  acts 
of  destruction,  public  or  private,  and  to  draw  Generals  Hatch 
and  Potter  back  of  the  frontier.  Also,  by  half-past  eleven  A.  M. 
yesterday,  Major  Hitchcock  was  on  a  fleet  steamer  at  More- 
head  City,  carrying  a  request  to  General  Meade  to  check  the 
movement  of  his  army  on  Danville  and  Weldon ;  so  that  I 
hope  your  people  will  be  spared  in  the  Carolina^.  But  I  am 
apprehensive  of  Wilson,  who  is  impetuous  and  rapid.  If  you 
will  send  by  telegraph  and  courier  a  single  word,  he  will  stop, 
and  then  the  inclosed  order  will  place  his  command  at  a 
point  convenient  to  our  supplies. 

"  I  send  you  a  late  paper,  showing  that  in  Yirginia  the  State 
authorities  are  acknowledged  and  invited  to  resume  their  law 
ful  functions." 

On  the  20th,  while  this  dispatch  was  on  the  way,  Wilson  ap 
peared  before  Macon  and  demanded  the  surrender  of  the  city. 
Being  informed  by  the  commanding  officer  of  the  existence  of 
the  armistice,  he  sent  the  following  dispatch,  under  flag  of 
truce,  to  be  telegraphed  to  Sherman  : — 


408  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

"  To  MAJOR-GENERAL  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Through  headquarters  of  GENERAL  BEAUREGARD  : 

"  My  advance  received  the  surrender  of  this  city  with  its 
garrison  this  evening.  General  Cobb  had  previously  sent  me, 
under  a  flag  of  truce,  a  copy  of  the  telegram  from  General 
Beauregard,  declaring  the  existence  of  an  armistice  between 
all  the  troops  under  your  command  and  those  of  General 
Johnston.  Without  questioning  the  authority  of  this  dispatch, 
or  its  application  to  my  command,  I  could  not  communicate 
orders  in  time  to  prevent  the  capture.  I  shall  therefore  hold 
the  garrison,  including  Major-Generals  Cobb  and  G.  W.  Smith 
and  Brigadier-General  McCall,  prisoners  of  war. 

"  Please  send  me  orders.  I  shall  remain  here  a  reasonable 
length  of  time  to  hear  from  you. 

"J.  H.  WILSON, 
"  Brevet  Major-General  U.  S.  A." 

This  dispatch  was  transmitted  by  telegraph  by  General 
Beauregard  to  General  Johnston,  and  by  the  latter  forwarded 
through  General  Wade  Hampton,  by  flag  of  truce,  to  its  des 
tination,  accompanied  by  the  following  letter  from  General 
Johnston  : — 

"HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  TENNESSEE, 
April  21,  1865-9.30  A.  M. 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Care  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  HAMPTON,  via  Hillsboro  : 

"I  transmit  a  dispatch,  just  received  by  telegraph  from 
Major-General  Wilson,  United  States  Army.  Should  you  de 
sire  to  give  the  orders  asked  for  in  the  same  manner,  I  beg 
you  to  send  them  to  me  through  Lieutenant-General  Hamp 
ton's  office. 

"  I  hope  that,  for  the  sake  of  expedition,  you  are  willing  to 
take  this  course.  I  also  send,  for  your  information,  a  copy  of 
a  dispatch  received  from  Major-General  Cobb. 

"  J.  E.  JOHNSTON." 
With  this  letter  General  Johnston  also  transmitted  a  copy 


CORRESPONDENCE  DURING  THE   TRUCE.  4Q9 

of  the  following  telegram  from  Major-General  Howell  Cobb, 
commanding  the  Confederate  troops  at  Macon  : — 

"  To  GENERAL  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD  : 

"  On  receipt  of  yo'ur  dispatch  at  eleven  o'clock  to-day,  I 
sent  a  flag  of  truce  to  General  Wilson,  with  copy  of  the  same, 
and  informing  him  that  I  had  issued  orders  to  carry  out  armis 
tice,  desisting  from  military  operations.  The  flag  met  the 
advance  fourteen  miles  from  the  city.  Before  hearing  from  it 
the  advance  moved  on  the  city,  and  having  moved  my  picket, 
were  in  the  city  before  I  was  aware  of  their  approach. 

"  An  unconditional  surrender  wras  demanded,  to  which  I  was 
forced  to  submit,  under  protest.  General  Wilson  has  since 
arrived,  and  holds  the  city  and  garrison  as  captured,  notwith 
standing  my  protest.  He  informs  me  he  will  remain  in  his 
present  position  a  reasonable  length  of  time  to  hear  from  his 
dispatch  to  General  Sherman,  sent  to  your  care. 

"  HOWELL  COBB, 

"  Major-General." 

Sherman  immediately  issued  the  following  orders  to  General 
Wilson,  and  caused  them  to  be  transmitted  through  the  same 
channels  by  which  he  had  received  the  report  of  that  officer : — 

"  HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
In  the  Field,  Raleigh,  N.  C.,  April  21,  1865. 

"GENERAL  JAMES  H.  WILSON, 

Commanding  Cavalry  Division  Mississippi,  Macon,  Ga. : 

"  GENERAL — A  suspension  of  hostilities  was  agreed  on  be 
tween  General  Johnston  and  myself,  on  Tuesday,  April  18,  at 
twelve  noon.  I  want  that  agreement  religiously  observed,  and 
you  may  release  the  generals  captured  at  Macon.  Occupy 
ground  convenient,  and  contract  for  supplies  for  your  com 
mand,  and  forbear  any  act  of  hostility  until  you  hear  or  have 
reason  to  believe  hostilities  are  resumed.  In  the  mean  time, 
it  is  also  agreed  the  position  of  the  enemy  must  not  be  altered 
to  our  prejudice. 


410  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

"  You  know  by  this  time  that  General  Lee  has  surrendered 
to  General  Grant  the  rebel  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  and 
that  I  only  await  the  sanction  of  the  President  to  conclude 
terms  of  peace  coextensive  with  the  boundaries  of  the  United 
States.  You  will  shape  your  conduct  on  this  knowledge,  un 
less  you  have  overwhelming  proof  to  the  contrary." 

At  the  same  time  Sherman  wrote  to  General  Johns 
ton  : — 

"  GENEKAL — I  send  you  a  letter  for  General  Wilson,  which, 
if  sent  by  telegraph  and  courier,  will  check  his  career.  He 
may  distrust  the  telegraph,  therefore  better  send  the  original, 
for  he  cannot  mistake  my  handwriting,  with  which  he  is  fa 
miliar.  He  seems  to  have  his  blood  up,  and  will  be  hard  to 
hold.  If  he  can  buy  corn,  fodder,  and  rations  down  about 
Fort  Valley,  it  will  obviate  the  necessity  of  his  going  up  to 
Eome  or  Dalton. 

"  It  is  reported  to  me  from  Cairo  that  Mobile  is  in  our  pos 
session,  but  it  is  not  minute  or  official. 

"  General  Baker  sent  in  to  me,  wanting  to  surrender  his 
command,  on  the  theory  that  the  whole  Confederate  army  was 
surrendered.  I  explained  to  him,  or  his  staff-officer,  the  exact 
truth,  and  left  him  to  act  as  he  thought  proper.  He  seems  to 
have  disbanded  his  men,  deposited  a  few  arms  about  twenty 
miles  from  here,  and  himself  awaits  your  action.  I  will  not 
hold  him,  his  men,  or  arms  subject  to  any  condition  other  than 
the  final  one  we  may  agree  on. 

"  I  shall  look  for  Major  Hitchcock  back  from  Washington 
on  Wednesday,  and  shall  promptly  notify  you  of  the  result. 
By  the  action  of  General  Weitzel  in  relation  to  the  Virginia 
Legislature,  I  feel  certain  we  will  have  no  trouble  on  the  score 
of  recognizing  existing  State  governments.  It  may  be  the 
lawyers  will  want  us  to  define  more  minutely  what  is  meant 
by  the  guarantee  of  rights  of  person  and  property.  It  may 
be  construed  into  a  compact  for  us  to  undo  the  past  as  to  the 
rights  of  slaves  and  'leases  of  plantations'  on  the  Mississippi, 


CORRESPONDENCE  DURING  THE  TRUCE.  4H 

of  'vacant  and  abandoned'  plantations.  I  wish  you  would 
talk  to  the  best  men  you  have  on  these  points ;  and,  if  pos 
sible,  let  us  in  our  final  convention  make  these  points  so  clear 
as  to  leave  no  room  for  angry  controversy. 

"  I  believe  if  the  South  would  simply  and  publicly  declare 
what  we  all  feel,  that  slavery  is  dead,  that  you  would  inaugu 
rate  an  era  of  peace  and  prosperity  that  would  soon  efface  the 
ravages  of  the  past  four  years  of  war.  Negroes  would  remain 
in  the  South,  and  afford  you  abundance  of  cheap  labor,  which 
otherwise  will  be  driven  away ;  and  it  will  save  the  country 
the  senseless  discussions  which  have  kept  us  all  in  hot  water 
for  fifty  years. 

"  Although,  strictly  speaking,  this  is  no  subject  for  a  mili 
tary  convention,  yet  I  am  honestly  convinced  that  our  simple 
declaration  of  a  result  will  be  accepted  as  good  law  every 
where.  Of  course,  I  have  not  a  single  word  from  Washington 
on  this  or  any  other  point  of  our  agreement,  but  I  know  the 
effect  of  such  a  step  by  us  will  be  universally  accepted." 

Johnston  immediately  replied,  suggesting  a  modification  of 
Sherman's  orders  to  "Wilson  : — 

"  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  TENNESSEE, 
"  April  22,  18G5— 2.30  P.  M. 

"  MAJOK-GENEEAL  W.  T.  SHEBMAN, 

Commanding   U.  S.  Forces,  Raleigh,  N.  C.  : 

"  Your  telegram  to  brevet  Major-General  Wilson  is  just  re 
ceived.  I  respectfully  suggest  that  the  sentence,  '  In  the 
mean  time  it  is  also  agreed  that  the  position  of  the  enemy's 
forces  must  not  be  altered  to  our  prejudice,'  be  so  modified  as 
to  read,  *  In  the  mean  time  it  is  also  agreed  that  the  position 
of  the  forces  of  neither  belligerent  shall  be  altered  to  the  pre 
judice  of  the  other  ;'  and  on  this  principle  you  direct  Major- 
General  Wilson  to  withdraw  from  Macon  and  release  its 
garrison. 

"  J.  E.  JOHNSTON, 

General." 


412  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

To  this  General  Sherman  felt  impelled  to  decline  acceding, 
and  accordingly  answered  on  the  23d  : — 

"  GENERAL — Your  communication  of  twenty  minutes  past  two 
p.  M.  of  yesterday  is  received.  My  line  of  communication  with 
General  "Wilson  is  not  secure  enough  for  me  to  confuse  him  by  a 
change  in  mere  words.  Of  course  the  status  quo  is  mutual,  but 
I  leave  him  to  apply  it  to  his  case  according  to  his  surroundings. 
I  would  not  instruct  him  to  undo  all  done  by  him  between  the 
actual  date  of  our  agreement  and  the  time  the  knowledge  of  it 
reached  him.  I  beg,  therefore,  to  leave  him  free  to  apply  the 
rule  to  his  own  case.  Indeed,  I  have  almost  exceeded  the 
bounds  of  prudence  in  checking  him  without  the  means  of  di 
rect  communication,  and  only  did  so  on  my  absolute  faith  in 
your  personal  character. 

"  I  inclose  a  dispatch  for  General  Wilson,  in  cipher,  which, 
translated,  simply  advises  him  to  keep  his  command  well  to 
gether,  and  to  act  according  to  the  best  of  his  ability,  doing 
as  little  harm  to  the  country  as  possible,  until  he  knows  hos 
tilities  are  resumed." 

Meanwhile,  General  Sherman  had  received,  through  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  a  dispatch  written  in  the  cipher  of  the  War 
Department,  and  on  causing  it  to  be  translated,  read  as 
follows : — 

"HEADQUARTERS  CAVALRY  CORPS,  MILITARY  DIVISION 
OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  Macon,  Ga.,  April  21,  1865. 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Through  GENERAL  JOHNSTON  : 

"  Your  dispatch  of  yesterday  is  received.  I  shall  at  once 
proceed  to  carry  out  your  instructions.  If  proper  arrange 
ments  can  be  made  to  have  sugar,  coffee,  and  clothing  sent 
from  Savannah  to  Augusta,  they  can  be  brought  thither  by 
the  way  of  Atlanta  by  railroad,  or  they  can  be  sent  by  boat 
directly  to  this  place  from  Darien.  I  shall  be  able  to  get  for 
age,  bread,  and  meat  from  Southeastern  Georgia.  The  rail- 


CORRESPONDENCE  DURING  THE  TRUCE.  413 

road  from  Atlanta  to  Dalton  or  Cleveland  cannot  be  repaired 
in  three  months.  I  have  arranged  to  send  an  officer  at  once, 
via  Eufala,  to  General  Canby,  with  a  copy  of  your  dispatch. 
General  Cobb  will  also  notify  General  Taylor  of  the  armistice. 
I  have  about  three  thousand  prisoners  of  war,  including  Gen 
erals  Cobb,  Smith,  McCall,  Mercer,  and  Robertson.  Can  you 
arrange  with  General  Johnston  for  their  immediate  release  ? 
Please  answer  at  once.  I  shall  start  a  staff-officer  to  you  to 
morrow. 

"J.  H.  WILSON, 
"  Brevet  Major-General  commanding." 

He  immediately  replied  as  follows,  on  the  23d  : — 

"  Cipher  dispatch  received.  There  is  a  general  suspension 
of  hostilities,  awaiting  the  assent  of  our  new  President  to  cer 
tain  civil  points  before  making  a  final  military  convention  of 
peace.  Act  according  to  your  own  good  sense  until  you  are 
certain  the  war  is  over.  Keep  possession  of  some  key-point 
that  will  secure  your  present  advantages,  rest  your  men  and 
horses,  and  in  a  few  days  you  will  receive  either  positive  in 
formation  of  peace,  or  may  infer  the  contrary.  My  messenger 
should  be  back  from  Washington  to-morrow." 

On  the  22d,  Sherman  reported  his  action  as  follows  to  Lieu- 
tenant-General  Grant,  sending  the  dispatch  by  telegraph  to 
Morehead  City  to  be  forwarded  by  a  fleet  steamer  to  Fort 
Monroe,  and  thence  telegraphed  to  Washington  : — 

"  General  Wilson  held  Macon  on  the  20th,  with  Ho  well  Cobb, 
G.  W.  Smith,  and  others  as  prisoners ;  but  they  claimed  the 
benefit  of  my  armistice,  and  he  has  telegraphed  to  me  through 
the  rebel  lines  for  orders.  I  have  answered  him  that  he  may 
draw  out  of  Ma.con,  and  hold  his  command  for  further  orders, 
unless  he  has  reason  to  believe  that  the  rebels  are  changing 
the  status  to  our  prejudice.  A  brigade  of  rebels  offered  to  sur 
render  to  me  yesterday  ;  but  I  prefer  to  make  one  grand  finale, 


414*  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

which  I  believe  to  be  perfectly  practicable.  There  will  be  no 
trouble  in  adjusting  matters  in  North  Carolina,  Georgia,  and 
Alabama,  and  I  think  South  Carolina  ought  to  be  satisfied, 
with  Charleston  and  Columbia  in  ruins.  All  we  await  is  an 
answer  from  you  and  the  President.  Weather  fine ;  roads 
good.  Troops  ready  for  fight  or  home." 

On  the  23d,  he  wrote  to  Generals  Johnston  and  Hardee  : — 

"  I  send  a  bundle  of  papers  for  you  jointly.  These  are  the 
latest.  Telegraph  dispatches  are  here  to  19th.  Young  Fred. 
Seward  is  alive,  having  been  subjected  to  the  trepan,  and  may 
possibly  recover. 

"There  appears  no  doubt  the  murder  of  Mr.  Lincoln  was 
done  by  Booth,  and  the  attempt  on  Mr.  Seward  by  Surratt, 
who  is  in  custody.  All  will  sooner  or  later  be  caught.  The 
feeling  North  on  this  subject  is  more  intense  than  any  thing 
that  ever  occurred  before.  General  Ord,'  at  Richmond,  has 
recalled  the  permission  given  for  the  Virginia  Legislature, 
and  I  fear  much  the  assassination  of  the  President  will  give  a 
bias  to  the  popular  mind  which,  in  connection  with  the  desire 
of  our  politicians,  may  thwart  our  purpose  of  recognizing 
'  existing  local  governments.'  But  it  does  seem  to  me  there 
must  be  good  sense  enough  left  on  this  continent  to  give  order 
and  shape  to  the  now  disjointed  elements  of  government.  I 
believe  this  assassination  of  Mr.  Lincoln  will  do  the  cause  of 
the  South  more  harm  than  any  event  of  the  war,  both  at  home 
and  abroad,  and  I  doubt  if  the  Confederate  military  authori 
ties  had  any  more  complicity  with  it  than  I  had.  I  am  thus 
frank  with  you,  and  have  asserted  as  much  to  the  War  De 
partment.  But  I  dare  not  say  as  much  for  Mr.  Davis  or  some 
of  the  civil  functionaries,  for  it  seems  the  plot  was  fixed  for 
March  4th,  but  delayed,  awaiting  some  instructions  from 
'  Bichmond?  You  will  find  in  the  newspapers  I  send  you,  all 
the  information  I  have  on  this  point. 

"Major  Hitchcock  should  be  back  to-morrow,  and  if  any 
delay  occurs  it  will  result  from  the  changed  feeling  about 


CORRESPONDENCE  DURING  THE  TRUCE.  415 

Washington,  arising  from  this  new  and  unforeseen  complica 
tion." 

On  the  night  of  the  23d,  Major  Hitchcock  returned  from 
Washington  with  the  dispatches  which  we  read  in  the  pre 
ceding  chapter,  and  Lieutenant-General  Grant  arrived  in  per 
son  to  direct  operations. 

On  the  25th  General  Sherman  wrote  to  Admiral  Dahlgren  : — 

"  I  expect  Johnston  will  surrender  his  army  to-morrow. 
We  have  had  much  negotiation,  and  things  are  settling  down 
to  the  terms  of  General  Lee's  army. 

"  Jeff.  Davis  and  cabinet,  with  considerable  specie,  are  mak 
ing  their  way  towards  Cuba.  He  passed  Charlotte  going 
south  on  the  23d,  and  I  think  he  will  try  to  reach  Florida 
coast,  either  Cedar  Keys  or  lower  down.  Catch  him  if  you 
can.  Can't  you  watch  the  east  coast  and  send  word  round  to 
the  west  coast  ? 

"  Copy  for  General  Gillmore,  who  has  the  cipher." 

And  on  May  2d  he  wrote  to  General  Thomas  : — 

"  Captain  Hasea  is  here  en  route  for  Nashville,  from  General 
Nelson,  now  at  Macon.  He  got  possession  of  that  place  just 
as  he  learned  of  the  suspension  of  hostilities  that  preceded  the 
final  surrender  of  Johnston's  army  at  Greensboro'.  I  have  sent 
word  to  General  Nelson  to  parole  his  prisoners  there  on  the 
same  terms  as  prescribed  to  Johnston  and  Lee,  and  to  return 
to  the  neighborhood  of  Decatur,  Alabama,  and  then  report  to 
you  or  rne.  I  came  to  Savannah  from  Raleigh  to  send  stores 
up  to  Augusta  by  boat  for  Nelson,  and  to  take  steps  to  occupy 
Augusta. 

"  I  will  have  much  to  tell  you,  at  some  future  time,  of  the 
details  of  my  negotiations  with  Johnston,  which  have  been 
misconstrued  by  the  people  at  the  North  ;  but  I  can  afford  to 
let  them  settle  down  before  telling  all  the  truth.  At  my  first 
interview  with  Johnston  he  admitted  the  Confederate  cause 


416  SHERMAN   AND   HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

was  lost,  and  that  it  would  be  murder  for  him  to  allow  any 
more  conflicts  ;  but  he  asked  me  to  help  him  all  I  could  to 
prevent  his  army  and  people  breaking  up  into  guerrilla  bands. 
I  deemed  that  so  desirable,  that  I  did  make  terms,  subject 
to  the  approval  of  the  President,  which  may  be  deemed  too 
liberal.  But  the  more  I  reflect,  the  more  satisfied  I  am  that 
by  dealing  with  the  people  of  the  South  magnanimously  we 
will  restore  four-fifths  of  them  at  once  to  the  condition  of  good 
citizens,  leaving  us  only  to  deal  with  the  remainder.  But  my 
terms  were  not  approved,  and  Johnston's  present  surrender 
only  applies  to  the  troops  in  his  present  command,  viz.,  east 
of  Chattahoochee. 

"  The  boat  is  in  motion,  and  I  write  with  great  difficulty, 
and  will  wait  a  more  convenient  season  to  give  you  fuller  de 
tails." 


THE  REJECTED  AGREEMENT.  417 


CHAPTEE    XXXIII. 

THE    EEJECTED  AGKEEMENT. 

ON  the  22d  day  of  April  the  secretary  of  war,  Mr.  Stanton, 
caused  to  be  prepared  and  published  in  the  daily  newspapers 
of  the  city  of  New  York  the  following  bulletin  : — 

"  MAJOK-GENEEAL  Dix,  New  York  : 

"  Yesterday  evening  a  bearer  of  dispatches  arrived  here  from 
General  Sherman.  An  agreement  for  a  suspension  of  hostili 
ties,  and  a  memorandum  of  what  is  called  '  a  basis  of  peace/ 
had  been  entered  into  on  the  18th  instant,  by  General  Sher 
man  with  the  rebel  General  Johnston,  the  rebel  General  Breck- 
inridge  being  present  at  the  conference. 

"  A  cabinet,  meeting  was  held  at  eight  o'clock  in  the  even 
ing,  at  which  the  action  of  General  Sherman  was  disapproved 
by  the  President,  by  the  secretary  of  war,  by  General  Grant, 
and  by  every  member  of  the  cabinet.  General  Sherman  was 
ordered  to  resume  hostilities  immediately,  and  he  was  directed 
that  the  instructions  given  by  the  late  President,  in  the  follow 
ing  telegram,  which  was  penned  by  Mr.  Lincoln  himself,  at  the 
Capitol,  on  the  night  of  the  3d  of  March,  were  approved  by 
President  Andrew  Johnson,  and  were  reiterated  to  govern  the 
action  of  military  commanders. 

"  On  the  night  of  the  3d  of  March,  while  President  Lincoln 
and  his  cabinet  were  at  the  Capitol,  a  telegram  from  General 
Grant  was  brought  to  the  secretary  of  war,  informing  him 
that  General  Lee  had  asked  for  a  conference  to  make  arrange 
ments  for  terms  of  peace.  The  letter  of  General  Lee  was  pub 
lished  in  a  message  of  Davis  to  the  rebel  Congress.  General 

27 


418  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Grant's  telegram  was  submitted  to  Mr.  Lincoln,  who,  after 
pondering  a  few  minutes,  took  up  his  pen,  and  wrote  with  his 
own  hand  the  following  reply,  which  he  submitted  to  the  secre 
tary  of  state  and  the  secretary  of  war.  It  was  then  dated,  ad 
dressed,  and  signed  by  the  secretary  of  war,  and  telegraphed 
to  General  Grant. 

"  '  WASHINGTON,  March  3,  1865 — 12.30  p.  M. 
" '  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  GRANT  : 

"  '  The  President  directs  me  to  say  to  you  that  he  wishes  you  to  have  no  con 
ference  with  General  Lee,  unless  it  be  for  the  capitulation  of  General  Lee's 
army,  or  some  minor  and  purely  military  matters.  He  instructs  me  to  say  you 
are  not  to  decide  or  confer  upon  any  political  questions.  Such  questions  the 
President  holds  in  his  own  hands,  and  will  submit  them  to  no  military  confer 
ence  or  conditions.  Meantime  you  are  to  press  to  the  utmost  your  military 
advantages. 

"  '  EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

" '  Secretary  of  War.' 

"  The  orders  of  General  Sherman  to  General  Stoneman  to 
withdraw  from  Salisbury  and  join  him,  will  probably  open  the 
way  for  Davis  to  escape  to  Mexico,  or  Europe,  with  his  plun 
der,  which  is  reported  to  be  very  large,  including  not  only  the 
plunder  of  the  Bichmond  banks,  but  previous  accumulations. 
A  dispatch  received  by  this  department  from  Eichmond  says  : 

"  '  It  is  stated  here  by  respectable  parties,  that  the  amount 
of  specie  taken  south  by  Jefferson  Davis  and  his  partisans  is 
very  large,  including  not  only  the  plunder  of  the  Kichmond 
banks,  but  previous  accumulations.  They  hope,  it  is  said,  to 
make  terms  with  Sherman,  or  some  other  Southern  com 
mander,  by  which  they  will  be  permitted,  with  their,  effects, 
including  the  gold  plunder,  to  go  to  Mexico  or  Europe.  John 
ston's  negotiations  look  to  this  end.' 

"  After  the  cabinet  meeting  last  night,  General  Grant  started 
for  North  Carolina,  to  direct  future  operations  against  John 
ston's  army. 

"EDWIN  M.  STANTON, 

"  Secretary  of  War.' 

To  this  dispatch  was  appended  in  the  newspapers  the  fol 
lowing  remarks  : — 


THE    REJECTED   AGREEMENT.  419 

"  It  is  reported  that  this  proceeding  of  General  Sherman 
was  disapproved  for  the  following,  among  other  reasons  : — 

"  First. — It  was  an  exercise  of  authority  not  vested  in  Gen 
eral  Sherman,  and  on  its  face  shows  that  both  he  and  John 
ston  knew  that  General  Sherman  had  no  authority  to  enter 
into  any  such  arrangement. 

"  Second. — It  was  an  acknowledgment  of  the  rebel  govern 
ment. 

"  Third. — It  is  understood  to  re-establish  rebel  State  gov 
ernments  that  had  been  overthrown  at  the  sacrifice  of  many 
thousands  of  loyal  lives  and  immense  treasure,  and  placed 
arms  and  munitions  of  war  in  the  hands  of  rebels,  at  their 
respective  capitals,  which  might  be  used  as  soon  as  the  armies 
of  the  United  States  were  disbanded,  and  used  to  conquer  and 
subdue  loyal  States. 

"  Fourth. — By  the  restoration  of  the  rebel  authority  in  their 
respective  States,  they  would  be  enabled  to  re-establish  sla 
very. 

"  Fifth. — It  might  furnish  a  ground  of  responsibility,  by  the 
Federal  Government,  to  pay  the  rebel  debt,  and  certainly  sub 
jects  loyal  citizens  of  the  rebel  States  to  debts  contracted  by 
rebels  in  the  name  of  the  States. 

"Sixth. — It  put  in  dispute  the  existence  of  loyal  State 
governments,  and  the  new  State  of  Western  Virginia,  which 
had  been  recognized  by  every  department  of  the  United  States 
Government. 

"  Seventh. — It  practically  abolished  the  confiscation  laws, 
and  relieved  rebels  of  every  degree  who  had  slaughtered  our 
people  from  all  pains  and  penalties  for  their  crimes. 

"  Eighth. — It  gave  terms  that  had  been  deliberately,  repeat 
edly,  and  solemnly  rejected  by  President  Lincoln,  and  better 
terms  than  the  rebels  had  ever  asked  in  their  most  prosperous 
condition. 

"  Ninth. — It  formed  no  basis  of  true  and  lasting  peace,  but 
relieved  the  rebels  from  the  pressure  of  our  victories,  and  left 
them  in  condition  to  renew  their  effort  to  overthrow  the  United 
States  Government,  and  subdue  the  loyal  States,  whenever 


420  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

their  strength  was  recruited,  and  any  opportunity  should 
offer." 

The  agreement  between  General  Sherman  and  General 
Johnston  was  in  perfect  accord  with  President  Lincoln's  pol 
icy  at  that  time,  so  far  as  it  was  known  to  his  generals  or  the 
public.  The  telegram  dated  3d  of  March,  and  sent  by  Mr. 
Stanton  to  General  Grant,  was  a  special  instruction  intended 
to  govern  the  conduct  of  General  Grant  alone  at  that  particu 
lar  time  and  in  that  particular  case.  It  was  not  communicated 
to  General  Sherman  for  his  guidance,  and  was  wholly  unknown 
to  him.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  reasons  for  that  in 
struction,  it  was  entirely  ignored  a  month  afterwards  by  Mr. 
Lincoln  himself.  After  Lee's  surrender,  Mr.  Lincoln  concluded 
to  recognize  the  existing  Legislature  of  Virginia,  and  author 
ized  the  then  military  commandant  at  Kichmond  to  permit  it 
to  assemble.  On  the  6th  day  of  April,  while  at  City  Point,  he 
made  this  memorandum  and  handed  it  to  Senator  Wilkinson, 
who  delivered  it  to  General  Weitzel  on  the  7th  : — 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  WEITZEL,  Richmond,  Virginia  : 

"  It  has  been  intimated  to  me  that  the  gentlemen  who  have 
acted  as  the  Legislature  of  Virginia,  in  support  of  the  rebel 
lion,  may  now  desire  to  assemble  at  Eichmond  and  take  meas 
ures  to  withdraw  the  Virginia  troops  and  other  support  from 
resistance  to  the  General  Government.  If  they  attempt  it, 
give  them  permission  and  protection,  until,  if  at  all,  they  at 
tempt  some  action  hostile  to  the  United  States,  in  which  case 
you  will  notify  them,  give  them  reasonable  time  to  leave,  and 
at  the  end  of  which  time  arrest  any  who  remain.  Allow  Judge 
Campbell  to  see  this,  but  do  not  make  it  public. 

"Yours,  etc., 

"A.  LINCOLN." 

General  Weitzel,  so  authorized,  approved  a  call  for  the 
meeting  of  the  Legislature  at  Eichmond  on  the  llth.  The 
call  was  in  these  words  :— 


THE  REJECTED  AGREEMENT.  421 

"  The  undersigned,  members  of  the  Legislature  of  the  State 
of  Virginia,  in  connection  with  a  number  of  citizens  of  the 
State,  whose  names  are  attached  to  this  paper,  in  view  of  the 
evacuation  of  the  city  of  Eichniond  by  the  Confederate  gov 
ernment  and  its  occupation  by  the  military  authorities  of  the 
United  States,  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia,  and  the  suspension  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  civil  power 
of  the  State,  are  of  the  opinion  that  an  immediate  meeting  of 
the  General  Assembly  of  the  State  is  called  for  by  the  exigen 
cies  of  the  situation.  The  consent  of  the  military  authorities 
of  the  United  States  to  a  session  of  the  Legislature  in  Rich 
mond,  in  connection  with  the  governor  and  lieutenant-governor, 
to  their  free  deliberation  upon  the  public  affairs,  and  to  the 
ingress  and  departure  of  all  its  members  under  safe  conduct, 
has  been  obtained. 

"  The  United  States  authorities  will  afford  transportation 
from  any  point  under  their  control  to  any  of  the  persons  before 
mentioned. 

"  The  matters  to  be  submitted  to  the  Legislature  are  the 
restoration  of  peace  to  the  State  of  Virginia,  and  the  adjust 
ment  of  the  questions,  involving  life,  liberty,  and  property, 
that  have  arisen  in  the  State  as  a  consequence  of  war. 

"  We,  therefore,  earnestly  request  the  governor,  lieutenant- 
governor,  and  members  of  the  Legislature  to  repair  to  this 
city  by  the  25th  of  April,  instant. 

"  We  understand  that  full  protection  to  persons  and  prop 
erty  will  be  afforded  in  the  State,  and  we  recommend  to 
peaceful  citizens  to  remain  at  their  homes  and  pursue  their 
usual  avocations  with  confidence  that  they  will  not  be  inter 
rupted. 

"  We  earnestly  solicit  the  attendance  in  Richmond,  on  or 
before  the  25th  of  April,  instant,  of  the  following  persons, 
citizens  of  Virginia,  to  confer  with  us  as  to  the  best  means  of 
restoring  peace  to  the  State  of  Virginia.  We  have  secured  safe 
conduct  from  the  military  authorities  of  the  United  States  for 
them  to  enter  the  city  and  depart  without  molestation." 


422  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

The  foregoing  was  published  in  the  Richmond  papers  on  the 
12th,  and  announced  in  hand-bills,  posted  in  all  conspicuous 
places.  On  the  same  day  the  Richmond  Whig  contained  the 
following  editorial  article,  congratulating  the  country  on  this 
pleasing  state  of  things  : — 

"It  is  understood  that  this  invitation  has  been  put  forth  in 
pursuance  of  the  plan  of  proceeding  assented  to  by  President 
Lincoln.  At  all  events,  it  will  be  hailed  by  the  great  body  of 
the  people  of  Virginia  as  the^rs^  step  towards  the  reinstatement 
of  the  Old  Dominion  in  the  Union.  It  is  probable  that  some  of 
the  members  of  the  Legislature  may  decline  to  come.  In 
every  such  case  the  people  of  the  county  or  senatorial  district 
should  select  some  influential  and  intelligent  citizen,  who  is 
willing  to  take  part  in  this  business,  and  commission  him,  as 
far  as  they  can,  »to  represent  them  at  the  conference. 

"  The  views  and  purposes  of  the  members  of  the  Legislature 
should  be  ascertained  at  once.  Every  one  can  foresee  diffi 
culties  in  the  way  of  formal  action  :  in  the  beginning  several 
complex  questions  are  to  be  met  at  the  threshold  ;  but  "  where 
there  is  a  will  there  is  a  way,"  and  whatever  the  difficulties 
presented,  the  important  business  must  be  undertaken. 

"  In  this  connection  we  may  say  that  the  recent  interview 
between  the  President  and  Judge  Campbell  related  to  the  res 
toration  of  peace  in  all  the  States,  and  not  to  Virginia  alone, 
as  might  be  inferred  from  the  brief  notice  of  the  '  consultation 
of  citizens'  published  in  the  Whig  of  Saturday.  Whilst  every 
one  will  rejoice  at  the  restoration  of  peace  and  prosperity  in 
all  the  States,  we  cannot  refrain  from  the  expression  of  the 
hope  that  the  public  men  who  are  to  take  part  in  the  reinstate 
ment  of  Virginia  to  her  ancient  position  in  the  sisterhood  of 
States,  will  address  themselves  to  that  business  without  un 
necessary  delay.  Virginia  was  not  consulted  nor  waited  for 
when  secession  became  the  determined  policy  of  the  '  cotton 
States,'  and  there  is  no  sound  reason  why  '  co-operation' 
with  them,  in  accepting  the  President's  terms  of  peace,  should 
be  the  rule  of  proceeding  now.  Let  Virginia  lead  the  way 


THE   REJECTED   AGREEMENT.  423 

back  to  the  Union,  and  present  an  example  of  prompt  action 
to  the  other  States  of  the  late  '  Confederacy.' 5: 

These  publications  were  made  in  Eichmond  six  days  before 
the  agreement  between  Sherman  and  Johnston  was  concluded, 
and  'the  facts  were  well  known  in  both  armies,  were  freely 
commented  upon,  and  the  movement  highly  approved  by  the 
commanding  officers,  who  generally  regarded  the  policy  thereby 
indicated  as  wise  and  of  universal  application.  This  call  and 
the  Richmond  comments  were  reproduced  by  the  leading  news 
papers  of  the  United  States,  with  approving  comments,  on  the 
14th  of  April,  the  very  day  of  the  assassination,  and  four  days 
anterior  to  the  agreement.  The  New  York  Herald  of  that 
date  contained  a  leading  article  vindicating  the  policy  indi 
cated,  and  claiming  for  Mr.  Lincoln  great  credit  for  inaugu 
rating  it.  Other  leading  journals,  such  as  the  New  York  Tri 
bune,  Post,  and  World,  all  concurred  in  the  most  liberal  terms 
of  peace.  The  Herald  article  says  : — 

"  The  rebellion  is  indeed  demolished.  Bead  the  call  which 
we  publish  to-day  from  congressmen,  assemblymen,  editors, 
judges,  lawyers,  planters,  etc. — a  powerful  body  of  the  most 
conspicuous  rebels  of  old  Virginia — inviting  the  rebel  gov 
ernor,  lieutenant-governor,  and  Legislature  of  that  State  to 
mee.t  in  Eichmond,  under  the  protection  of  the  '  old  flag,'  to 
consider  their  present  situation.  Old  Virginia,  the  head  and 
front  of  the  rebellion,  surrenders,  and,  broken  up,  disorganized 
and  exhausted,  all  her  confederates  in  the  service  of  Jefferson 
Davis,  under  the  same  protection,  will  speedily  follow  her 
good  example. 

"  This  is  a  shrewd  and  sagacious  movement  on  the  part  of 
President  Lincoln.  He  not  only  pardons  the  leading  rebels 
of  Virginia,  from  the  governor  down,  but  invites  him  and  them, 
and  their  late  rebel  Legislature,  to  meet  in  council  at  Eich 
mond,  to  deliberate  upon  the  ways  and  means  for  the  restora 
tion  of  the  State  to  the  blessings  of  the  Union,  under  the  new 
condition  of  things  produced  by  this  tremendous  war.  The 


424  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

assemblage  thus  convened  cannot  fail  to  be  influenced  by  the 
generous  spirit  of  President  Lincoln.  It  will  realize  the  fact 
that  Yirginia  having  been,  like  a  brand  from  the  flames,  res 
cued  from  the  Moloch  of  her  Southern  Confederacy,  vengeance 
is  at  an  end,  charity  prevails,  and  that  the  '  Old  Dominion' 
must  prepare  for  a  new  State  charter,  upon  new  ideas,  and  for 
the  new  life  of  regeneration  and  prosperity  that  lies  before  her. 
At  the  same  time,  while  the  moral  influence  of  this  great  and 
wise  concession  in  behalf  of  reconstruction  in  Yirginia  will 
have  a  powerful  effect  upon  the  leading  spirits  of  all  the  other 
rebellious  State's,  we  may  expect  from  the  debates  of  the 
meeting  thus  assembled,  that  the  administration  will  derive 
much  valuable  information,  and  will  be  greatly  assisted  in  the 
solution  of  the  difficult  details  of  reconstruction  in  all  the  re 
conquered  States. 

"  We  are  inclined  to  suspect  that  Mr.  Lincoln,  in  this  exhi 
bition  of  the  spirit  of  conciliation,  did  not  forget  a  certain 
anecdote  in  the  life  of  Herod  the  Great,  of  Judea,  as  the  king 
of  that  country  under  the  supreme  authority  of  Eome.  In  the 
war  of  the  Eoman  factions  which  followed  the  death  of  Julius 
Caesar,  Herod  took  the  side  of  the  unfortunate  Brutus  and 
Cassius.  Marc  Antony,  then  falling  into  the  possession  of 
Judea,  called  Herod  to  an  account,  and  asked  him  what  he 
had  to  say  in  his  defence.  Herod  replied :  '  Only  this  :  if  I 
have  been  troublesome  as  your  enemy,  may  I  not  be  useful  as 
your  friend?'  Marc  Antony  took  the  hint,  and  Herod  con 
tinued  useful  as  a  servant  of  Eome  to  the  day  of  his  death. 
The  same  idea,  we  infer,  influenced  the  President  in  those 
recent  consultations  at  Eichmond,  to  which  we  may  trace  the 
experiment  of  this  extraordinary  call  for  the  meeting  of  the 
rebel  Legislature  of  Virginia.  He  wants  to  make  those  men 
useful  as  friends  of  the  Union  who  have  been  so  energetic  and 
troublesome  as  its  enemies." 

Such  was  the  published  policy  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  as  it  came 
under  the  notice  of  General  Sherman,  and  such  the  arguments 
by  which  it  was  sustained.  With  his  opportunities  for  correct 


THE    REJECTED   AGREEMENT.  425 

information,  Sherman  approved  of  both.  He  had  the  most 
satisfactory  evidence  of  the  complete  overthrow  of  the  power 
of  the  Confederacy  and  the  subjugation  of  the  spirit  of  the 
rebellion.  For  four  long  years  he  had  been  constantly  em 
ployed  in  destroying  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy  and  wast 
ing  its  power  of  resistance.  He  had  just  marched  his  grand 
army  from  the  mountains,  in  Georgia,  to  the  sea,  and  from  the 
sea  back  to  the  mountains,  in  North  Carolina ;  he  had  over 
come  every  foe,  laid  waste  every  field,  destroyed  every  article 
of  subsistence,  every  instrument  of  war,  and  every  means  of 
transportation,  in  his  desolate  track ;  and  now,  with  his  grand 
army  well  in  hand,  he  stood  amid  a  wilderness  of  ruin,  with 
no  resolute  foe  willing  to  accept  the  gage  of  battle.  He  knew 
the  power  of  the  enemy  was  broken,  and  every  particle  of  the 
spirit  of  war  taken  out  of  the  Southern  people. 

General  Sherman  is  no  petty  dealer  of  small  wares  ;  he  fights 
an  enemy  with  all  his  might,  and  having  conquered,  he  for 
gives  with  ah1  his  heart ;  and  in  the  spirit  of  Mr.  Lincoln, 
whose  teachings  he  followed,  he  was  willing  to  say  to  General 
Johnston :  "  Take  your  army  home  in  good  order,  turn  over 
your  arms  at  the  State  capitals,  there  to  remain  subject  to  the 
disposition  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States;  let  your 
men  go  to  work  to  repair  your  desolate  country,  under  the 
ample  folds  of  the  flag  of  the  Union ; — go  and  sin  no  more,  and 
may  God  bless  you  !" 

To  denounce  Sherman's  truce,  therefore,  is  to  denounce  the 
policy  of  Mr.  Lincoln ;  and  to  condemn  Sherman,  is  to  defame 
the  memory  of  the  man  the  nation  mourns.  If  Sherman  was 
slow  in  mastering  radical  ideas,  so  was  Mr.  Lincoln.  Indeed, 
Sherman  moved  faster  than  Lincoln ;  for  while  Lincoln  was 
contemplating  the  effect  of  his  emancipation  proclamation, 
and  comparing  it  to  the  "pope's  bull  against  the  come*t," 
Sherman  declared  that  the  subject-matter  of  the  proclamation 
was  within  the  war-power  of  the  President,  and  that  nothing 
remained  to  make  it  effective  but  the  triumph  of  our  arms ; 
and  this  reduced  the  question  to  one  of  material  power.  If 
the  rebellion  triumphed,  the  nation  was  conquered  and  slavery 


426  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

survived ;  if  the  nation  conquered,  slavery  died  as  an  incident 
of  the  war,  by  force  of  a  lawful  proclamation,  issued  by  proper 
authority  during  the  war.  If  Sherman  had  been  a  politician 
and  not  a  soldier,  his  political  ideas  might  have  developed 
and  improved  more  rapidly :  but  if  his  political  progress  was 
slow,  his  army  moved  fast,  and  brought  home  peace  ;  and  if  he 
erred,  it  was  on  the  side  of  magnanimity,  and  the  attributes 
of  Deity  prescribe  no  penalty  for  such  sins. 

It  is  important  to  remember  that  General  Sherman  con 
cluded  his  agreement  with  General  Johnston  while  filled  with 
the  spirit  of  President  Lincoln's  policy  with  respect  to  the  Vir 
ginia  Legislature,  and  that  no  notice  of  the  change  of  that 
policy  or  the  revocation  of  the  order  to  General  Weitzel,  of 
April  6th,  reached  him  until  the  agreement  had  been  already 
disapproved. 

Mr.  Stanton  deemed  that  General  Sherman  had  transcended 
his  authority.  The  surrender  of  all  rebels  in  arms,  as  pro 
posed  to  Johnston  by  him,  was,  however,  a  purely  military 
question,  and  he  treated  it  as  a  soldier ;  but  when  the  terms 
proposed  by  Johnston  were  found  to  embrace  political  subjects, 
he  neither  finally  accepted  nor  decidedly  rejected  them,  but 
promptly  referred  them  to  his  superior,  the  President.  If  he 
had  been  invested  with  the  requisite  authority  to  conclude  a 
treaty  on  purely  civil  matters,  he  would  not  have  referred  the 
stipulations  to  the  President  for  his  approval,  but  would  have 
closed  the  matter  at  once.  Sherman  declared  to  Johnston  he 
had  no  authority,  and  Johnston  knew  he  had  no  authority, 
to  make  a  final  agreement  without  the  approval  of  the  Presi 
dent,  and  it  was  so  stated  in  the  instrument  itself  as  a  reason 
for  sending  it  to  Washington  for  the  consideration  and  action 
of  the  President. 

Furthermore,  it  was  objected  that  it  was  a  "  practical  ac 
knowledgment  of  the  rebel  government."  It  has  ever  been  an 
unpleasant  thing  to  do,  to  acknowledge  even  the  actual  exist 
ence  of  the  rebel  government ;  nevertheless  we  had  previously 
done  so  in  many  ways  :  by  declaring  the  ports  of  the  Southern 
States  blockaded,  by  sending  flags  of  truce  to  rebel  com- 


THE   REJECTED   AGREEMENT.  427 

manders  to  obtain  leave  to  carry  off  our  wounded  and  bury  our 
dead,  by  appointing  commissioners  to  arrange  a  cartel  for 
the  exchange  of  prisoners,  and  by  fighting  its  armies  on  a 
hundred  battle-fields  at  an  expense  of  hundreds  of  millions  of 
treasure  and  hundreds  of  thousands  of  lives.  But  the  agree 
ment  did  not  in  any  way  recognize  the  rightful  existence  of 
the  rebel  government,  and  never  since  the  war  began  was  it 
proposed  to  recognize  its  actual  existence  under  such  agree 
able  circumstances.  Its  condition  was  utterly  hopeless. 
General  Johnston,  at  the  head  of  the  only  formidable  military 
force  belonging  to  it,  presented  himself  to  General  Sherman 
and  made  this  proposition :  "  I  propose  to  stop  the  war  and 
surrender  all  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy,  on  condition  that 
the  Southern  people  shall  be  allowed  to  live  like  other  respect 
able  people  under  the  free  and  enlightened  Government  of  the 
United  States."  All  he  asked  besides  was  a  receipt.  Sher 
man  promptly  wrote  out  a  voucher,  and  sent  it  to  Washington 
for  approval.  It  was  not  the  acknowledgment  of  the  exist 
ence  of  the  rebel  government  so  much  as  a  receipt  for  the 
rebel  government  itself,  soul  and  body,  which  Johnston  was 
to  deliver  into  the  hands  of  Sherman.  And  it  could  make 
no  difference  in  whose  name  the  voucher  was  given,  since 
the  rebel  government  was  to  perish  the  instant  it  was  de 
livered. 

Again  :  "  By  the  restoration  of  the  rebel  authority  in  their 
respective  States,  they  would  be  enabled  to  re-establish 
slavery." 

This  objection  is  well  founded,  and,  indeed,  as  we  shall 
presently  perceive,  occurred  to  General  Sherman  himself  on 
further  reflection.  It  would  have  constituted  a  valid  reason 
for  requiring  the  amendment  of  the  agreement  by  the  insertion 
of  a  distinct  declaration  on  this  subject,  if  it  had  not  been  al 
ready  decided  by  the  administration  not  to  permit  any  terms 
except  those  necessarily  involved  in  the  surrender  of  the  Con 
federate  armies.  But  the  ruling  conviction  of  General  Sher 
man's  mind,  that  slavery  had  received  its  death-blow  beyond 
the  power  of  resurrection,  caused  him  to  lose  sight  of  the 


428  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

'necessity  for  a  formal  recognition  of  a  fact,  as  he  thought, 
already  patent  to  all.  Johnston  so  admitted  at  his  conference 
with  Sherman,  and  Sherman  so  believed.  Sherman  was  of 
opinion  that  slavery  was  abolished  by  act  of  war,  and  that  it 
was  wiped  out  of  existence  by  the  President's  proclamation. 
As  far  back  as  the  1st  of  January,  1864,  he  wrote,  for  the  in 
formation  of  the  people  of  Alabama  :  "  Three  years  ago,  by  a 
little  reflection  and  patience,  you  could  have  had  a  hundred 
years  of  peace  and  prosperity,  but  you  preferred  war.  Very 
well.  Last  year  you  could  have  saved  your  slaves,  but  now 
it  is  too  late :  all  the  powers  of  earth  cannot  restore  your  slaves 
any  more  than  your  dead  grandfathers." 

On  his  march  from  Atlanta,  in  Georgia,  to  Goldsboro',  in 
North  Carolina,  the  negroes  came  in  crowds  to  see  him,  and  to 
inquire  if  it  was  true  "  Massa  Lincoln,"  as  they  designated  the 
President,  liad  really  made  them  free  ;  when  General  Sherman 
gave  them  every  assurance  that  they  had  been  made  free,  they 
and  their  children  forever,  but  advised  them  to  remain  at 
home  and  work,  and  do  their  best  to  make  a  living  for  them 
selves,  until  President  Lincoln  should  send  them  word  what 
else  to  do. 

It  appears,  however,  that  after  the  messenger  left  for  Wash 
ington  with  the  agreement,  General  Sherman  reflected  that  an 
article  declaring  slavery  abolished  should  properly  have  been 
inserted ;  when  he  immediately  addressed  a  letter  to  General 
Johnston,  with  the  view  to  framing  such  a  clause,  to  be  added 
when  the  agreement  should  be  returned.  This  letter,  dated  on 
the  21st  of  April,  and  given  in  full  on  page  407,  proceeds  : — 

"  The  action  of  General  Weitzel  in  relation  to  the  Legisla 
ture  of  Virginia,  indicates  that  existing  State  governments 
will  be  recognized  by  the  General  Government.  It  may  be, 
however,  the  lawyers  will  want  us  to  define  more  minutely 
what  is  meant  by  the  guarantee  of  the  rights  of  persons  and  prop 
erty.  It  may  be  construed  into  a  compact  for  us  to  undo  the 
past  as  to  the  rights  of  slaves,  and  leases  of  plantations  on  the 
Mississippi,  of  vacant  and  abandoned  plantations,  etc. 


THE  REJECTED  AGREEMENT.  429 

"  I  wish  you  would  talk  to  the  best  men  you  have  on  these 
points,  and,  if  possible,  let  us,  in  the  final  convention,  make 
them  so  clear  as  to  leave  no  room  for  angry  controversy.  I 
believe,  if  you  would  simply  and  publicly  declare  what  we  all 
feel  and  know,  that  slavery  is  dead,  that  you  would  inaugurate 
an  era  of  peace  and  prosperity  that  would  soon  efface  the 
ravages  of  the  past  four  years  of  war.  Negroes  would  remain 
in  the  South,  and  afford  you  an  abundance  of  cheap  labor,  which 
otherwise  will  be  driven  away ;  and  it  will  save  the  country 
the  unhappy  discussions  which  have  kept  us  all  in  hot  water 
for  fifty  years.  Although,  strictly  speaking,  this  is  no  subject 
of  a  military  convention,  yet  I  am  honestly  convinced  that  our 
simple  declaration  of  a  result  will  be  accepted  as  good  law 
everywhere." 

This  letter  was  written  under  the  full  belief  that  his  agree 
ment  with  Johnston  would  be  approved,  for  nothing  had  oc 
curred  as  yet  to  cast  a  shadow  of  doubt  upon  the  matter. 
There  was  no  question  in  his  own  mind  that  slavery  was  a 
dead  institution,  and  there  seemed  to  be  no  question  on  the 
subject  in  the  minds  of  Johnston  and  Breckinridge.  Johnston 
admitted  it  frankly,  and  declared  Davis  himself  had  settled 
that  matter  when  he  called  upon  the  negro  for  help  ;  and 
Breckinridge  said,  at  the  interview  on  the  18th  :  "  The  dis 
cussion  of  the  slavery  question  is  at  an  end.  The  constitu 
tional  amendment  forever  forbidding  slavery  is  perfectly  fair, 
and  will  be  accepted  in  that  spirit  by  the  people  of  the  South." 
Hence  Sherman  had  no  doubt  the  additional  article  would  be 
conceded,  and  he  thought  it  might  do  good.  But  the  utter 
rejection  of  the  agreement  by  the  President  and  cabinet,  put 
an  end  to  all  further  efforts  in  that  direction.  If  the  adminis 
tration  at  Washington  had  accepted  the  stipulations  as  an 
initiatory  proceeding,  to  be  altered  and  amended  to  suit  all 
the  exigencies  of  the  new  peace,  and  had  sent  them  back  with 
amendments  and  instructions,  an  opportunity  seemed  pre 
sented  for  at  once  establishing  a  peace  on  an  enduring  basis. 
It  is  to  be  regretted  that  Sherman's  after-thought,  on  the 


430  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

slavery  subject,  had  not  been  his  fore-thought.  It  was  fit  and 
proper  that  the  question  of  slavery,  the  substantial  cause  of 
the  war,  should  be  then  and  there  settled  by  an  express  stip 
ulation,  declared  in  the  presence  of  the  two  armies  by  their 
commanders.  This  would  have  settled  the  matter  forever ;  an 
amendment  of  the  constitution  forbidding  slavery  would  then 
have  been  unnecessary,  except  for  the  benefit  of  the  border 
States  not  in  rebellion,  and  to  prevent  any  of  the  States  from 
reviving  the  institution  at  some  future  day,  and  the  new  era 
would  immediately  have  been  inaugurated. 

It  was  our  misfortune  during  the  war,  from  first  to  last,  that 
we  had  no  leading  head  that  could  rightly  comprehend  the 
situation,  and  at  the  same  time  grasp  and  organize  the  power 
and  resources  of  the  country,  so  as  to  put  down  the  rebellion 
by  a  short,  sharp,  and  vigorous  conflict.  At  first  our  rulers 
undertook  to  do  it  by  three  months'  militia — by  a  mere  show 
of  power  and  by  moral  suasion  ;  but  the  people  saw,  in  ad 
vance  of  the  Government,  it  required  a  great  effort,  and,  under 
the  inspiration  of  the  hour,  two  hundred  thousand  volunteers 
tendered  their  services  for  the  war.  A  few  of  these  were  ac 
cepted,  and  many  rejected,  and  the  golden  moment  was  past. 
Afterwards,  when  they  were  called  for,  they  could  not  be  had. 
The  first  two  years  of  the  war  were  literally  frittered  away. 
Then  the  Government  offered  and  paid  large  bounties,  and  ob 
tained  raw  recruits,  and  also  many  mercenaries  who  deserted, 
— all  costing  the  Government  more  money  for  actual  services 
rendered  than  would  have  been  necessary  to  pay  the  same 
number  of  men  from  the  beginning ;  and  the  war  was  prolonged. 
Then  came  a  law  for  a  draft,  with  a  commutation  clause  at 
tached  which  rendered  it  inoperative,  so  far  as  raising  men  for 
the  army  was  concerned.  Then  came  a  little  trick  of  a  policy 
for  raising  negro  troops  in  Maryland ;  and  then  more  negro 
troops ;  and  then  another  draft.  As  to  the  treatment  of  the 
inhabitants  of  conquered  territory,  and  as  to  trade  in  cotton, 
there  was  no  policy.  No  one  knew,  and  none  could  tell 
whether  the  rebel  States  were  to  be  considered  in  the  Union 
or  out  of  the  Union.  If  any  thing  like  a  policy  for  the  army 


THE  REJECTED  AGREEMENT.  431 

was  ever  thought  of,  it  was  first  urged  upon  the  Government 
by  officers  in  the  field,  or  committees  or  individuals  of  the 
people  at  home  :  if  by  the  former,  it  was  usually  rejected,  and 
the  authors  rebuked  ;  if  by  the  latter,  it  was  ventilated  first  in 
newspapers,  and  if  found  sufficiently  popular,  it  was  accepted, 
to  be  in  its  turn  thrown  aside,  like  the  old  iron  of  a  machine- 
shop. 

The  Government,  in  fact,  felt  itself  unprepared  to  make  an 
ultimate  decision  on  the  complex  question  of  a  final  peace,  and 
preferred,  by  a  temporizing  policy,  to  gain  time  for  a  more  ma 
ture  consideration  of  its  perplexing  problems.  Grant's  terms 
to  Lee  were  liberal,  but,  in  some  respects,  indefinite.  Lee's 
men  were  to  lay  down  their  arms  and  go  home,  where  they 
should  be  protected  in  their  persons  and  property  so  long  as 
they  remained  there  and  obeyed  the  laws.  But  whether  the 
word  property  meant  slave  property,  or  the  word  laws  meant 
the  laws  passed  by  the  rebel  State  of  Yirginia,  does  not  appear 
by  the  treaty,  and  must  be  left  to  judicial  construction,  or  to 
the  arbitrary  decision  of  the  Government.  But  that  was  a 
partial  arrangement,  and  related  to  the  submission  of  one  of 
the  armies  of  the  Confederacy  only ;  whereas  General  Johnston 
offered  to  act  on  behalf  of  eight  millions  of  people,  whose 
military  head  he  practically  was,  and  proposed,  nay,  insisted, 
as  far  as  it  was  in  his  power  to  insist,  that  terms  of  peace 
should  then  and  there  be  agreed  upon  and  forever  settled. 
Here  was  an  opportunity  for  statesmanship.  The  armies  of 
the  United  States  had  fought  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy 
as  long  as  the  latter  were  willing  to  fight — they  could  do  no 
more  ;  it  remained  now  for  diplomacy  to  do  the  rest,  and  Sher 
man  held  up  the  opportunity. 

The  administration,  however,  desired  no  compact,  demanded 
simply  the  absolute  surrender  or  destruction  of  the  military 
power  of  the  rebellion,  and  reserved  to  itself  the  control  of  the 
entire  subject  of  reorganization  in  all  its  parts.  Both  methods 
had  and  still  have  many  zealous  partisans.  Time  alone  can 
decide  between  them. 

That  Mr.  Stanton  and  General  Sherman  should  differ  in 


432  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

opinion  is  not  strange.  Two  men  beholding  the  same  object 
from  different  points  of  observation  are  apt  to  describe  it  di- 
Versely  ;  and  yet  neither  may  see  it  aright :  and  it  is  to  be  re 
gretted  that,  at  such  a  crisis,  the  administration  should  mo 
mentarily  have  lost  sight  of  the  consideration  manifestly  due 
to  Sherman's  great  and  patriotic  services,  and  should  have 
permitted  that  disapproval  of  his  action  to  be  presented  to  the 
people  in  such  a  manner  as  naturally  to  arouse  their  indigna 
tion  and  distrust  against  him.  The  excitement  of  that  moment 
may  indeed  excuse  what  nothing  can  fully  justify.  General 
Sherman  had  given  most  noble  testimony  in  favor  of  the  Union 
cause  ;  every  thought  of  his  mind  and  every  aspiration  of  his 
heart  were  given  to  the  best  interests  of  his  country.  He 
never  failed  us  in  the  hour  of  need ;  and  on  the  very  date  of 
this  bulletin,  April  21st,  he  wrote  a  letter  to  an  old  personal 
friend  in  North  Carolina,  which  is  here  reproduced,  and  which 
has  the  same  ring  of  intense  patriotism  which  characterized 
every  act  and  every  thought  of  his  eventful  career,  and  shows 
how  foreign  from  his  mind  all  unworthy  motives  were  at  that 
time, 

"  I  have  before  me  your  letter  addressed  to  General  Hawley, 
inclosing  a  paper  signed  by  John  Dawson,  Edward  Kiddon, 
and  others,  testifying  to  your  feelings  of  loyalty  -and  attach 
ment  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  Of  course,  I 
am  gratified  to  know  the  truth  as  to  one  for  whom  I  entertained 
friendship,  dated  far  back  in  other  and  better  days.  I  will  be 
frank  and  honest  with  you.  Simple  passive  submission  to 
events,  by  a  man  in  the  prime  of  life,  is  not  all  that  is  due  to 
society  in  times  of  revolution.  Had  the  Northern  men  resid 
ing  at  the  South  spoken  out  manfully  and  truly  at  the  outset, 
the  active  secessionists  could  not  have  carried  the  masses  of 
men  as  they  did. 

"  It  may  not  be  that  the  war  could  have  been  avoided,  but 
the  rebellion  would  not  have  assumed  the  mammoth  propor 
tions  it  did.  The  idea  of  war  to  perpetuate  slavery  in  1861 
was  an  insult  to  the  intelligence  of  the  age.  As  long  as  the 


THE  REJECTED  AGREEMENT.  433 

South  abided  by  the  conditions  of  our  fundamental  compact 
of  government,  the  constitution,  all  law-abiding  citizens  were 
bound  to  respect  the  property  in  slaves,  whether  they  approved 
or  not;  but  when  the  South  violated  that  compact  openly, 
publicly,  and  violently,  it  was  absurd  to  suppose  we  were 
bound  to  respect  that  kind  of  property,  or  in  fact  any  kind  of 
property. 

"I  have  a  feeling  allied  to  abhorrence  towards  Northern 
men  resident  South,  for  their  silence  or  acquiescence  was  one 
of  the  causes  of  the  war  assuming  the  magnitude  it  did  ;  and, 
in  consequence,  we  mourn  the  loss  of  such  men  as  John  F. 
Eeynolds,  McPherson,  and  thousands  of  noble  gentlemen,  any 
one  of  whom  was  worth  all  the  slaves  of  the  South,  and  half 
the  white  population  thrown  in. 

"  The  result  is  nearly  accomplished,  and  is  what  you  might 
have  foreseen,  and  in  a  measure  prevented — desolation  from 
the  Ohio  to  the  Gulf,  and  mourning  in  every  household." 

Of  General  Sherman's  military  ability,  vigor,  enterprise, 
patriotism,  and  zeal  for  the  public  good,  no  generous  or  just 
mind  can  entertain  a  doubt.  Of  the  general  soundness  of  his 
judgment,  he  has  also  given  conspicuous  proofs.  His  policy 
in  regard  to  trade  in  cotton,  and  in  regard  to  the  proper  treat 
ment  of  the  inhabitants  of  conquered  territory  during  the  ex 
istence  of  war,  was  much  in  advance  of  the  President  and 
cabinet ;  and  his  personal  knowledge  of  the  condition,  temper, 
and  spirit  of  the  Southern  people  entitled  his  opinions  to 
greater  weight  than  those  of  any  other  general  officer  in  the 
field.  Nevertheless,  conditions  of  peace  which  may  appear  fail- 
to  a  soldier,  may,  in  the  view  of  a  statesman,  appear  inad 
missible  ;  but  the  fact  that  an  able  and  experienced  soldier 
entertains  them,  ought  to  shield  them  from  that  sort  of  con 
demnation  which  belongs  to  voluntary  complicity  with  treason. 

Nor  did  this  unfortunate  affair  begin  and  end  with  Mr. 
Stanton  alone.  On  the  26th  of  April,  General  Halleck,  then 
at  Eichmond,  in  command  of  the  Military  Division  of  the 
James,  dispatched  a  telegram  to  the  War  Department  at 

28 


434  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Washington,  amongst  other  things,  advising  that  instructions 
be  given  to  General  Sherman's  subordinate  officers  to  obey  no 
orders  given  by  him.  This  telegram  was  immediately  commu 
nicated  by  the  secretary  of  war  to  General  Dix,  and  made 
public  through  the  daily  newspapers.  Meeting  Sherman's 
notice  a  fortnight  later,  it  excited  his  indignation  to  the  high 
est  pitch.  In  his  anger,  he  would  listen  to  no  excuse  for  what 
he  deemed  the  treachery  of  his  former  friend.  He  considered 
the  action  of  General  Halleck  as  uncalled  for  and  unpardon 
able  ;  and  when  the  fact  became  known  to  him,  on  the  10th 
of  May,  wrote  to  General  Halleck :  "  After  your  dispatch  to 
Mr.  Stanton,  of  April  26th,  I  cannot  have  any  friendly  inter 
course  with  you.  I  will  come  to  City  Point  to-morrow,  and 
march  with  my  troops,  and  I  prefer  we  should  not  meet." 
Further  correspondence  ensued  between  the  same  officers, 
but  General  Sherman  seems  to  have  felt  that  his  honor  had 
been  assailed  through  design  or  indifference,  and  that  in  either 
case  the  act  was  too  gross  for  pardon.  He  curtly  declined  a 
complimentary  review  tendered  his  troops  by  General  Halleck, 
and  caused  his  troops  to  march  through  the  city  without 
taking  any  notice  whatever  of  that  officer. 

Neither  Grant  or  Sherman  knew  of  Mr.  Stanton's  bulletin 
until  several  days  after  its  publication.  Indeed,  General  Sher 
man  was  profoundly  ignorant  of  it,  and  of  the  storm  of  indig 
nation  it  had  raised  at  home  against  him,  until  on  his  way 
home  from  Savannah,  whither  he  had  gone  to  make  sundry 
dispositions  for  the  government  of  his  subordinate  command 
ers,  while  his  army  was  on  the  march  to  Eichmond,  and  not 
knowing  of  the  instructions  issued  from  the  War  Office  to  dis 
regard  his  orders,  and  at  a  moment  when,  unconscious  of  hav 
ing  done  wrong,  happy  that  the  war  was  over,  justly  proud 
of  the  honorable  part  he  had  acted  in  it,  and  delighted  with 
the  prospect  of  soon  meeting  his  family  and  friends  from 
whom  he  had  been  long  separated,  he  was  on  his  way  home 
to  rest  from  his  hard  labors.  Instead  of  commendation  for 
having  done  his  country  some  service,  it  seemed  to  his  sensi 
tive  mind  that  he  could  read  of  nothing  and  hear  of  nothing 


THE    REJECTED    AGREEMENT  435 

but  abuse  or  suspicion.  Instead  of  coming  home  filled  with 
a  soldier's  pride  and  happiness,  he  felt  he  was  returning  like  a 
culprit  to  defend  himself  against  the  unjust  suspicions  of  a 
Government  and  people  he  had  so  faithfully  served.  Smart 
ing  under  the  rebuke  of  the  Government  and  the  comments  of 
the  press,  he  attributed  both  to  personal  hostility  and  a  settled 
prearranged  design  of  undermining  his  influence  and  destroy 
ing  his  popularity,  and  resented  both  on  all  occasions,  public 
and  private.  The  most  offensive  part  of  the  entire  matter  to 
him  was  that  General  Halleck  should  have  recommended  and 
Mr.  Sfcanton  published,  that  subordinate  officers  should  be  in 
structed  in  the  same  manner  and  to  the  same  effect  of  General 
Washington's  orders  after  the  defection  of  Benedict  Arnold  ! 


436  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 


CHAPTEE  XXXIV. 

HOMEWARD. 

THE  historian  who  shall  hereafter  chronicle,  in  full,  the 
events  of  the  civil  war  in  America,  and  sketch  the  men  who 
therein  figured  most  prominently,  will  find  the  path  by  which 
General  Sherman  ascended  as  straight  as  it  was  difficult  of 
ascent.  His  patriotism  was  not  of  that  doubtful  character 
which  seeks  reward  through  the  forms  of  Government  con 
tracts.  He  was  born  with  the  instincts  of  a  soldier,  was  edu 
cated  for  a  soldier,  and  was  ambitious  to  do  the  work  of  a 
soldier.  He  loved  the  Union,  and  ever  set  himself  against  the 
dangerous  heresy  that  would  admit  of  its  peaceful  dissolution. 
A  resident  of  the  South  before  the  war,  as  soon  as  he  divined 
the  purposes  of  the  secessionists,  he  broke  away  and  arranged 
himself  with  the  friends  of  the  Union.  While  Mr.  Stanton  was 
yet  a  member  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  cabinet,  and  while  such  men 
as  Jefferson  Davis,  Judah  P.  Benjamin,  and  Jacob  Thompson 
were  yet  in  office  under  the  Government  of  the  United  States, 
and  all-powerful  in  their  influence  over  President  Buchanan, 
Sherman  had  already  determined  to  resign  an  honorable  po 
sition  in  the  State  of  Louisiana  and  offer  his  services  to 
sustain  the  cause  of  the  Union.  On  the  18th  of  January,  1861, 
as  we  have  already  seen,  he  wrote  to  Governor  Moore  :  "  If 
Louisiana  withdraws  from  the  Federal  Union,  I  prefer  to 
maintain  my  allegiance  to  the  old  constitution  as  long  as  a 
fragment  of  it  remains,  and  my  longer  stay  here  would  be 
wrong  in  every  sense  of  the  word."  He  saw  the  war  coming, 
and  gave  the  alarm,  whilst  others  cried,  "  Peace !  be  still !" 


HOMEWAKD.  437 

As  soon  as  Mr.  Lincoln  was  inaugurated,  lie  visited  him,  and 
warned  him  that  the  South  was  organizing  a  formidable  rebel 
lion,  that  the  Southern  people  were  united  and  in  earnest,  and 
that  they  would  take  us  all  unprepared.  He  declared  to  his 
countrymen  they  were  sleeping  on  a  volcano,  all  unconscious 
of  the  danger.  He  scouted  the  idea  of  putting  down  the 
rebellion  with  three  months'  militia.  The  disastrous  result 
of  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  confirmed  him  in  his  views  of  the 
utter  inutility  of  the  temporary  expedients  of  the  Government, 
and  he  so  declared.  Sent  to  the  West,  he  called  for  an  army 
of  two  hundred  thousand  men,  to  operate  from  Kentucky  as  a 
base,  and  reclaim  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  River. 
As  early  as  1862,  he  declared  cotton  prize  of  war,  long  in  ad 
vance  of  the  Government ;  and  in  1863  he  established  trade 
regulations  for  Memphis  and  other  places  within  his  depart 
ment  ;  and  finally,  after  aiding  in  that  series  of  brilliant 
military  operations  which  opened  the  Father  of  Waters  "  to 
go  unvexed  to  the  sea,"  he  assisted  Lieutenant-General  Grant 
in  planning  the  two  conclusive  campaigns  of  the  war — the  one 
towards  Bichmond,  and  the  other  towards  Atlanta — so  event 
ful  of  result ;  and  in  executing  his  part  of  the  programme, 
fought  Joe  Johnston  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  days  suc 
cessively,  and  at  length  captured  Atlanta,  at  a  moment  when 
our  natural  resources  were  well-nigh  exhausted,  and  the  na 
tional  heart  sick  with  long  watching  and  waiting  for  success. 
Striking  out  boldly  from  Atlanta  to  the  sea,  guided  solely  by 
his  own  judgment,  against  the  advice  of  General  Halleck,  and 
with  the  approbation  of  General  Grant  alone,  he  cut  loose 
from  his  base,  descended  into  Georgia,  struck  terror  into  the 
heart  of  the  rebellion,  captured  Savannah,  and  planted  our 
victorious  standards  on  the  shore  of  the  Atlantic.  Striking 
out  again,  he  captured  Pocotaligo  and  Columbia,  compelled 
the  evacuation  of  Charleston,  laid  waste  the  State  of  South 
Carolina,  again  met  and  whipped  Joe  Johnston,  and  after 
marching  and  fighting  for  twelve  months,  without  rest,  he 
halted  his  victorious  army  at  the  capital  of  North  Carolina, 
in  time  to  witness  the  funeral  ceremonies  of  the  Confederacy 


438  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

and  the  complete  triumph  of  our  cause.  And  for  what  ? — to 
be  the  subject  of  such  utterly  unfounded '  suspicions,  as  to  be 
by  some  even  suspected  for  a  traitor !  History  furnishes  no 
example  of  such  cruel  ingratitude  and  injustice. 

Immediately  on  the  conclusion  of  the  definitive  cartel  of 
surrender,  General  Sherman  issued  the  following  orders,  for 
the  future  movement  of  his  army.  Its  work  was  done,  and 
nothing  remained  for  the  greater  portion  of  it,  not  required 
to  garrison  the  conquered  territory,  but  to  return  home  and 
disband. 

"  HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
"  In  the  Field,  Raleigh,  N.  C.,  April  27,  1865. 

"SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  No.  66." 

"  Hostilities  having  ceased,  the  following  changes  and  dis 
positions  of  the  troops  in  the  field  will  be  made  with  as  little 
delay  as  practicable  : — 

"  I.  The  Tenth  and  Twenty-third  corps  will  remain  in  the 
Department  of  North  Carolina,  and  Major-General  J.  M.  Scho- 
field  will  transfer  back  to  Major-General  Gillmore,  command 
ing  Department  of  the  South,  the  two  brigades  formerly  be 
longing  to  the  division  of  brevet  Major-General  Grover,  at 
Savannah.  The  Third  division,  cavalry  corps,  brevet  Major- 
General  J.  Kilpatrick  commanding,  is  hereby  transferred  to 
the  Department  of  North  Carolina,  and  General  Kilpatrick 
will  report  in  person  to  Major-General  Schofield  for  orders. 

"  II.  The  cavalry  command  of  Major-General  George  Stone- 
man  will  return  to  East  Tennessee,  and  that  of  brevet  Major- 
General  J.  H.  Wilson  will  be  conducted  back  to  the  Tennes 
see  Kiver,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Decatur,  Alabama. 

"  III.  Major-General  Howard  will  conduct  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee  to  Hichmond,  Virginia,  following  roads  substan 
tially  by  Lewisburg,  Warrenton,  Lawrenceville,  and  Peters 
burg,  or  to  the  right  of  that  line.  Major-General  Slocum  will 
conduct  the  Army  of  Georgia  to  Richmond  by  roads  to  the 
left  of  the  one  indicated  for  General  Howard,  viz.,  by  Oxford, 
Boydton,  and  Nottoway  Courthouse.  These  armies  will  turn 


HOMEWARD.  439 

in  at  this  point  the  contents  of  their  ordnance  trains,  and  use 
the  wagons  for  extra  forage  and  provisions.  These  columns 
will  be  conducted  slowly  and  in  the  best  of  order,  and  aim  to 
be  at  Richmond,  ready  to  resume  the  march,  by  the  middle  of 
May. 

"  IV.  The  chief-quartermaster  and  commissary  of  the  mili 
tary  division,  Generals  Easton  and  Beckwith,  after  making 
proper  dispositions  of  their  departments  here,  will  proceed  to 
Richmond  and  make  suitable  preparations  to  receive  those 
columns,  and  to  provide  them  for  the  further  journey." 

On  the  10th  of  March,  Sherman  himself  set  out  for  Alexan 
dria,  Virginia,  whither  he  arrived  on  the  19th.  During  those 
nine  days  of  dreary  march  along  the  war-paths  and  across  the 
battle-fields  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  he  had  ample  op 
portunity  for  reflection  on  the  vanity  of  all  human  glory.  He 
thought  much  and  anxiously  upon  his  own  peculiar  situation, 
reviewed  carefully  all  his  former  relations  with  Mr.  Stanton,  to 
discover,  if  possible,  what  motive  he  had  for  turning  upon  him  ; 
and  looked  into  the  newspapers  hoping  to  find  some  disavowal 
or  note  of  explanation,  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Stanton,  that  would 
disabuse  the  public  mind  of  the  false  impressions  he  had  him 
self  created ;  but  all  in  vain.  The  public  mind  had  settled 
down  into  the  opinion  that  General  Sherman  was  not  quite 
as  bad  as  had  been  supposed  ;  but  still  there  was  something, 
it  was  believed,  in  regard  to  his  case,  very  inexplicable.  Under 
such  circumstances  it  was  some  relief  to  his  sense  of  injury, 
to  writ'e  and  forward  to  a  personal  friend  the  following  letter, 
dated  at  Camp  Alexandria, — the  first  word  to  the  public  from 
him  in  regard  to  the  matter  : — 

"  I  am  just  arrived.  All  my  army  will  be  in  to-day.  I  have 
been  lost  to  the  world  in  the  woods  for  some  time,  yet,  on 
arriving  at  the  '  settlements,'  find  I  have  made  quite  a  stir 
among  the  people  at  home,  and  that  the  most  sinister  motives 
have  been  ascribed  to  me.  I  have  been  too  long  fighting  with 
real  rebels  with  muskets  in  their  hands  to  be  scared  by  mere 


440  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

non-combatants,  no  matter  how  high  their  civil  rank  or  sta 
tion.  It  is  amusing  to  observe  how  brave  and  firm  some  men 
become  when  all  danger  is  past.  I  have  noticed  on  field  of 
battle  brave  men  never  insult  the  captured  or  mutilate  the 
dead ;  but  cowards  and  laggards  always  dp.  I  cannot  now  re 
call  the  act,  but  Shakspeare  records  how  poor  Falstaff,  the 
prince  of  cowards  and  wits,  rising  from  a  feigned  death, 
stabbed  again  the  dead  Percy,  and  carried  his  carcass  aloft  in 
triumph  to  prove  his  valor. 

"  Now  that  the  rebellion  in  our  land  is  dead,  how  many  Fal- 
staffs  appear  to  brandish  the  evidence  of  their  valor,  and  seek 
to  appropriate  honors  and  the  public  applause  for  deeds  that 
never  were  done ! 

"  As  to  myself,  I  ask  no  reward,  no  popularity  ;  but  I  sub 
mit  to  the  candid  judgment  of  the  world,  after  all  the  facts 
shall  be  known  and  understood. 

"  I  do  want  peace  and  security,  and  the  return  to  law  and 
justice  from  Maine  to  the  Bio  Grande  ;  and  if  it  does  not  exist 
noiv,  substantially,  it  is  for  State  reasons  beyond  my  compre 
hension.  It  may  be  counted  strange  that  one  who  has  no 
fame  but  as  a  soldier  should  have  been  so  careful  to  try  and 
restore  the  civil  power  of  the  Government,  and  the  peaceful 
jurisdictions  of  the  federal  courts  ;  but  it  is  difficult  to  discover 
in  that  fact  any  just  cause  of  offence  to  a  free  and  enlightened 
people.  But  when  men  choose  to  slander  and  injure,  they  can 
easily  invent  the  necessary  facts  for  the  purpose  when  the 
proposed  victim  is  far  away  engaged  in  public  service  of  their 
own  bidding.  But  there  is  consolation  in  knowing  that  though 
truth  lies  in  the  bottom  of  a  well,  the  Yankees  have  persever 
ance  enough  to  get  to  that  bottom." 

General  Sherman  now  determined  not  to  visit  Washington, 
but  to  remain  in  camp  with  his  army  until  he  should  receive 
further  orders  from  General  Grant.  Afterwards,  on  being  in 
vited  by  General  Grant,  he  visited  him  at  his  headquarters  in 
Washington  ;  and,  on  being  informed  by  him  that  the  President 
had  expressed  a  desire  to  see  him,  he  called  immediately  on 


HOMEWARD.  441 

the  President,  and  then  learned,  for  the  first  time,  that  the  tel 
egram  published  by  Mr.  Stanton  on  the  22d  of  April,  and  the 
"  nine  reasons"  given  as  those  of  the  President  and  cabinet 
were  the  work  of  Mr.  Stanton  alone.  This  fact  settled,  there 
was  now  no  ill-feeling  between  General  Sherman  and  the  officers 
of  the  Government,  and  the  matter  thus  became  a  personal 
affair  between  him  and  Mr.  Stanton  alone.  General  Sherman 
did  not  complain  that  his  agreement  with  Johnston  was  disap 
proved.  The  merits  and  demerits  of  that  agreement  were 
matters  of  opinion  and  judgment,  and  the  President  had  the 
right,  and  it  was  his  duty,  to  exercise  his  best  judgment,  and 
his  action  in  the  premises  could  be  no  just  ground  of  complaint. 
It  was  the  publication  that  constituted  the  gravamen  of  the 
offence ;  its  tone  and  style,  the  insinuations  it  contained,  the 
false  inferences  it  occasioned,  and  the  offensive  orders  to  the 
subordinate  officers  of  General  Sherman,  which  succeeded  the 
publication — these  were  the  causes  of  the  trouble,  and  for 
these  Mr.  Stanton  was  alone  responsible. 

On  the  20th  of  May,  both  the  grand  armies  of  the  Union 
were  encamped  in  the  vicinity  of  the  national  capital.  The 
war  was  over,  and  our  noble  volunteers  were  about  to  be  dis 
banded.  Before  these  grand  armies  should  be  dispersed, 
however,  the  lieutenant-general  proposed  to  give  them  a 
handsome  review.  The  wide  streets  of  Washington  were  ad 
mirably  adapted  for  such  purpose.  The  review  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was  ordered  for  the  23d,  and  that  known  as 
Sherman's  army,  for  the  24th.  Thousands  of  people,  from  all 
parts  of  the  country,  flocked  to  Washington  to  witness  the 
grand  pageant,  and  to  express  their  admiration  for  the  noble 
men  who  had  brought  home  peace.  The  most  ample  prepa 
rations  had  been  made  for  the  occasion.  The  President  was 
seated  on  an  elevated  stand,  surrounded  by  his  cabinet  officers, 
foreign  ministers,  distinguished  strangers,  their  wives  and 
daughters  and  personal  friends ;  Pennsylvania  Avenue  was 
lined  on  both  sides,  and  from  end  to  end,  with  admiring  people  ; 
every  window  presented  its  tableau  of  fair  spectators ;  and 
the  occasion  was  such  as  never  before  was  witnessed  on  the 


442  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

American  continent.  Those  great  armies  now  passing  in 
review  witliin  sight  of  that  vast  assemblage  were,  surely, 
calculated  to  impress  all  beholders  with  a  profound  sense 
of  the  greatness  and  power  of  the  United  States ;  and  were 
it  not  for  those  tattered  banners,  which  tell  us  of  the  distant 
battle-fields  on  which  these  regiments  contended  for  the 
mastery,  of  the  hand  to  hand  conflict,  and  of  comrades  slain, 
we  might  rejoice  without  a  feeling  of  sorrow.  Nevertheless 
we  may  rejoice,  for  those  brave  men  by  their  marching 
and  fighting  brought  home  to  their  distracted  land  the  bless 
ing  of  peace,  and  we  can  now  look  up  to  heaven  and  bless 
God  that  it  is  so  !  From  end  to  end,  from  side  to  side,  along 
the  shore,  amid  the  valley  and  on  the  mountain-top — all  are 
at  peace ! 

As  before  mentioned,  the  review  of  General  Sherman's 
army  was  on  the  24th  of  May.  The  day  was  exceedingly 
beautiful.  The  army  was  uniformed  and  equipped  as  on  the 
march ;  there  was  no  attempt  at  mere  military  display.  Com 
manders  appeared  to  take  pride  in  presenting  their  respective 
commands  as  they  served  on  the  march  and  in  the  field.  The 
foragers  were  out  in  force,  with  their  pack-trains  loaded  with 
forage  and  provisions  ;  the  pioneer  corps,  composed  of  black 
men,  carried  their  axes,  spades,  and  shovels ;  while  the  cavalry, 
infantry,  and  artillery  made,  an  imposing  display  of  the  three 
arms  of  the  service.  General  Sherman  rode  at  the  head  of 
the  column,  and  as  he  moved  slowly  along  the  avenue,  he  was 
greeted  with  cheers  on  every  side ;  the  ladies  in  the  exuber 
ance  of  their  joy  waved  their  congratulations,  covered  him 
with  bouquets  of  flowers,  and  bedecked  his  horse  with  ever 
greens.  None  were  so  much  surprised  at  these  manifestations 
of  respect  as  himself.  Arriving  opposite  the  headquarters  of 
Major-General  Augur,  the  chief  was  observed  to  turn  aside, 
halt,  and  lift  his  hat,  in  token  of  the  most  profound  respect. 
This  was  an  act  of  courtesy  from  the  soldier  to  the  statesman. 
Mr.  Seward,  too  ill  to  take  his  place  beside  the  President,  had 
been  brought  to  General  Augur's  headquarters,  and  wrapped 
in  the  robes  of  the  sick-chamber,  stood  for  a  moment  at  the 


HOMEWARD.  443 

window  to  exchange  salutations  with  the  great  military  chief. 
It  was  a  touching  sight. 

The  President's  stand  was  erected  in  front  of  the  White 
House  ;  from  it  wings  had  been  extended  to  the  right  and  left, 
so  that  the  grounds  of  the  White  House,  fronting  on  Pennsyl 
vania  Avenue,  were  nearly  covered.  These  were  all  soon 
passed  by  the  head  of  the  column,  when  the  general  wheeled 
out,  dismounted,  and  ascended  the  stairs,  to  take  his  place 
near  the  lieutenant-general.  On  making  his  appearance  on 
the  stand,  he  was  cordially  met  by  the  President,  Lieutenant- 
General  Grant,  and  Messrs.  Dennison,  Speed,  and  Harlin  of 
the  cabinet,  and  received  their  hearty  congratulations  while 
his  veteran  army  moved  on  in  their  triumphal  march.  Mr. 
Stantdn  rose  also  and  offered  his  hand,  as  if  pleased  to  con 
gratulate  General  Sherman  ;  but  the  latter  affected  not  to  see  him  1 

There  are  those  who,  lightly  estimating  injuries  to  character 
and  reputation,  especially  when  their  own  are  not  involved,  who 
regretted  General  Sherman  should  have  taken  that  occasion 
to  resent  what  he  deemed  a  personal  insult;  and  will  still 
more  regret  to  find  the  memory  of  the  event  herein  perpetu 
ated  ;  yet  there  is  some  consideration  due  to  the  sensitiveness 
of  a  soldier  who  felt  his  honor  had  been  questioned  :  and  since, 
under  the  circumstances,  he  could  not,  without  hypocrisy,  re 
ceive  Mr.  Stanton's  congratulations,  it  was  well  he  did  not 
observe  their  tender. 

General  Sherman  now  prepared  to  take  leave  of  his  army. 
There  is  something  exceedingly  touching  in  the  exhibition  of 
that  ardent  attachment  which  always  exists  between  the 
officers  and  men  of  a  well-ordered  and  properly  disciplined 
army.  All  General  Sherman's  dispatches  show  his  high  esti 
mate  of  the  valor  of  his  troops;  and  on  the  other  hand,  his 
officers  and  men  were  equally  proud  of  their  chief.  In  truth, 
the  material  of  that  army  was  never  surpassed  in  any  age  or 
country.  Lord  Melville  once  declared  in  parliament,  that 
"  bad  men  made  the  best  soldiers,"  and  we  are  told  the  un 
worthy  sentiment  had  many  admirers  in  England.  But  not  so 
in  this  country.  The  men  who  fought  the  battles  of  the 


444  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

Union  were  among  the  best  in  the  land,  and  in  the  general, 
were  improved  by  their  patriotic  experience.  They  now 
understand  better  the  unspeakable  blessings  of  peace ;  they 
know  better  the  value  of  friendships ;  they  can  better  submit 
to  hardships  ;  they  are  better  qualified  to  preserve  order  and 
obey  the  laws,  and  are  better  Christians  than  when  they  first 
entered  the  military  service.  Bad  men  are  made  worse  by 
military  service,  but  good  men  are  made  better.  And  it  is 
confidently  believed  that  "  Sherman's  men,"  as  they  are 
familiarly  called,  and  as  they  are  proud  to  call  themselves, 
will  prove  to  be  as  distinguished  in  the  pursuits  of  peace  as 
they  were  renowned  in  the  feats  of  war. 

We  conclude  this  chapter  with  General  Sherman's  farewell 
order  to  his  troops.  To  be  the  author  of  such  an  order,  with 
such  good  cause  to  write  it,  is  a  happiness  but  few  soldiers 
ever  enjoyed. 

"HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
In  the  field,  Washington,  D.  d,  May  30,  1865. 

"SPECIAL  FIELD  ORDERS,  No.  76. 

"  The  general  commanding  announces  to  the  Armies  of  the 
Tennessee  and  Georgia,  that  the  time  has  come  for  us  to  part. 
Our  work  is  done,  and  armed  enemies  no  longer  defy  us. 
Some  of  you  will  be  retained  in  service  until  further  orders. 
And  now  that  we  are  about  to  separate,  to  mingle  with  the 
civil  world,  it  becomes  a  pleasing  duty  to  recall  to  mind  the 
situation  of  national  affairs  when,  but  little  more  than  a  year 
ago,  we  were  gathered  about  the  twining  cliffs  of  Lookout 
Mountain,  and  all  the  future  was  wrapped  in  doubt  and  un 
certainty.  Three  armies  had  come  together  from  distant  fields, 
with  separate  histories,  yet  bound  by  one  common  cause — the 
union  of  our  country  and  the  perpetuation  of  the  Government 
of  our  inheritance.  There  is  no  need  to  recall  to  your  memo 
ries  Tunnell  Hill,  with  its  Rocky  Face  Mountain,  and  Buzzard 
Boost  Gap,  with  the  ugly  forts  of  Dalton  behind.  We  were 
in  earnest,  and  paused  not  for  danger  and  difficulty,  but 
dashed  through  Snake  Creek  Gap,  and  fell  on  Eesaca,  then 


HOMEWARD.  445 

on  to  the  Etowah,  to  Dallas,  Kenesaw ;  and  the  heats  of  sum 
mer  found  us  on  the  banks  of  the  Chattahoochee,  far  from 
home  and  dependent  on  a  single  road  for  supplies.     Again  we 
were  not  to  be  held  back  by  any  obstacle,  and  crossed  over 
and  fought  four  heavy  battles  for  the  possession  of  the  citadel 
of  Atlanta.     That  was  the  crisis  of  our  history.     A  doubt  still 
clouded  our  future  ;  but  we  solved  the  problem,  and  destroyed 
Atlanta,  struck  boldly  across  the  State  of  Georgia,  secured  all 
the  main  arteries  of  life  to  our  enemy,  and  Christmas  found 
us  at  Savannah.     "Waiting  there  only  long  enough  to  fill  our 
wagons,  we  again  began  a  march,  which  for  peril,  labor,  and 
results  will  compare  with   any  ever  made  by  an  organized 
army.     The  floods  of  the  Savannah,  the  swamps  of  the  Com- 
bahee  and  Edisto,  the  high  hills  and  rocks  of  the  Santee,  the 
flat  quagmires  of  the  Pedee   and  Cape  Fear  rivers,  were  all 
passed  in  midwinter,  with  its  floods  and  rains,  in  the  face  of 
an  accumulating  enemy ;  and  after  the  battles  of  Averysboro' 
and  Bentonsville,  we  once  more  came  out  of  the  wilderness  to 
meet  our  friends  at  Goldsboro'.     Even  then  we  paused  only 
long  enough  to  get  new  clothing,  to  reload  our  wagons,  and 
again  pushed  011  to  Ealeigh.  and  beyond,  until  we  met  our 
enemy,  suing  for  peace  instead  of  war,  and  offering  to  submit 
to  the  injured  laws  of  his  and  our  country.     As  long  as  that 
enemy  was  defiant,  nor  mountains,  nor  rivers,  nor  swamps,  nor 
hunger,  nor  cold  had  checked  us  ;  but  when  he  who  had  fought 
us  hard  and  persistently,   offered  submission,   your  general 
thought  it  wrong  to  pursue  him  further,  and  negotiations  fol 
lowed  which  resulted,  as  you  all  know,  in  his  surrender.     How 
far  the  operations  of  the  army  have  contributed  to  the  over 
throw  of  the  Confederacy,  of  the  peace  which  now  dawns  on 
us,  must  be  judged  by  others,  not  by  us.     But  that  you  have 
done  all  that  men  could  do  has  been  admitted  by  those  in 
authority ;  and  we  have  a  right  to  join  in  the  universal  joy 
that  fills  our  land  because  the  war  is  over,  and  our  Govern 
ment  stands  vindicated  before  the  world  by  the  joint  action  of 
the  volunteer  armies  of  the  United  States. 

"  To  such  as  remain  in  the  military  service,  your  general 


446  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

need  only  remind  you  that  successes  in  the  past  are  due  to 
hard  work  and  discipline,  and  that  the  same  work  and  disci 
pline  are  equally  important  in  the  future.  To  such  as  go  home, 
he  will  only  say,  that  our  favored  country  is  so  grand,  so  ex 
tensive,  so  diversified  in  climate,  soil,  and  productions,  that 
every  man  may  surely  find  a  home  and  occupation  suited  to 
his  tastes ;  and  none  should  yield  to  the  natural  impotence 
sure  to  result  from  our  past  life  of  excitement  and  adventure. 
You  will  be  invited  to  seek  new  adventure  abroad  ;  but  do  not 
yield  to  the  temptation,  for  it  will  lead  only  to  death  and  dis 
appointment. 

"  Your  general  now  bids  you  all  farewell,  with  the  full  belief 
that,  as  in  war  you  have  been  good  soldiers,  so  in  peace  you 
will  make  good  citizens  ;  and  if,  unfortunately,  new  war  should 
arise  in  our  country,  Sherman's  army  will  be  the  first  to  buckle 
on  the  old  armor  and  come  forth  to  defend  and  maintain  the 
Government  of  our  inheritance  and  choice. 


DIGRESSIVE.  447 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 

DIGEESSIYE. 

IN  preparing  tlie  foregoing  pages,  in  order  to  avoid  those 
digressions  which  often  mar  the  continuity  of  a  narrative,  we 
have  omitted  several  letters  of  interest  which  will  be  given  in 
this  chapter. 

During  the  first  year  of  the  war,  the  newspaper  press  unwit 
tingly  occasioned  great  embarrassment  to  the  army.  Such  was 
the  public  greed  for  news,  that  publishers  had  their  correspond 
ents  in  every  camp,  who  did.  not  hesitate  to  give  publicity  to 
any  and  all  operations  of  the  army  ;  so  that,  while  the  people 
were  merely  gratified,  the  enemy  was  advised  and  greatly 
benefited.  General  Sherman  was  among  the  first  to  perceive 
and  attempt  to  reform  this  evil.  It  required  a  bold  man  to 
run  counter  to  the  wishes  of  the  newspaper  press.  Neverthe 
less  he  did  not  hesitate  to  do  so,  when  he  judged  that  the  best 
interests  of  the  country  required  it.  In  1861,  while  in  com 
mand  in  Kentucky,  he  was  not  only  embarrassed  but  alarmed, 
in  finding  all  his  operations  telegraphed  and  published  in  the 
daily  papers,  even  his  plans  foreshadowed,  and  the  number 
and  strength  of  his  forces  given.  At  that  time,  the  allegiance 
of  Kentucky  was  hollow  and  compulsory.  In  fact,  many  of 
her  young  men  had  gone  into  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy, 
leaving  their  relatives  and  friends  behind  to  act  the  part  of 
spies  and  informers.  Kentucky  was  then  our  point  of  support 
for  the  operations  of  the  Valley  of  the  Mississippi,  and  we  were 
obliged  to  draw  our  lines  through  counties  and  districts  whose 
people  were  only  bound  to  us  by  a  fear  that  was  taciturn, 


448  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

supple,  and  treacherous,  and  which,  like  the  ashes  of  volcanoes, 
concealed  terrific  flames,  the  eruption  of  which  might  be  in 
duced  or  provoked  by  the  slightest  cause.  General  Sherman, 
conscious  of  his  weakness,  and  of  the  dangers  by  which  he 
was  surrounded,  banished  every  newspaper  correspondent 
from  his  lines,  and  declared  summary  punishment  for  all  who 
should  in  future  give  information  of  his  strength,  position,  or 
movements.  A  proceeding  so  unusual  was  ill-appreciated  by 
the  press,  and  the  result  was  a  lively  fire  in  the  rear,  which 
was  somewhat  annoying  to  him.  Nevertheless  he  persisted 
in  this  policy  throughout  the  war  ;  and  the  further  our  lines 
were  advanced  into  the  enemy's  country,  the  more  valuable 
became  the  rule.  The  following  letter  was  written,  early  in 
1863,  in  vindication  of  his  policy  : — 

"  When  John  C.  Calhoun  announced  to  President  Jackson 
the  doctrine  of  secession,  he  did  not  bow  to  the  opinion  of 
that  respectable  source,  and  to  the  vast  array  of  people  of 
whom  Mr.  Calhoun  was  the  representative.  He  saw  the  wis 
dom  of  preventing  a  threatened  evil  by  timely  action.  He 
answered  instantly  :  '  Secession  is  treason,  and  the  penalty  for 
treason  is  death.'  Had  Jackson  yielded  an  inch,  the  storm 
would  then  have  swept  over  this  country. 

"  Had  Mr.  Buchanan  met  the  seizure  of  our  mints  and 
arsenals  in  the  same  spirit,  he  would  have  kept  this  war  within 
the  limits  of  actual  traitors,  but  by  temporizing  he  gave  the 
time  and  opportunity  for  the  organization  of  a  rebellion  of 
half  the  nation. 

"  So  in  this  case.  Once  establish  the  principle  asserted  by 
you,  that  the  press  has  a  right  to  keep  paid  agents  in  our 
camps,  independent  of  the  properly  accredited  commanders, 
and  you  would  be  able  soon  to  destroy  any  army  ;  we  would 
then  have  not  only  rebellion  on  our  hands,  but  dissensions  and 
discord  in  our  armies,  mutiny  in  our  camps,  and  disaster  to 
our  arms.  In  regard  to  this  matter  I  may  be  mistaken,  but 
for  the  time  being  I  must  be  the  judge. 

"  I  am  110  enemy  to  freedom  of  thought,  freedom  of  speech 


DIGRESSIVE.  449 

and  of  the  press  ;  but  the  army  is  no  proper  place  for  con 
troversies.  When  armies  take  the  field  all  discussion  should 
cease.  No  amount  of  argument  will  move  the  rebellion  ;  the 
rebels  have  thrown  aside  the  pen  and  taken  the  sword.  We 
must  do  the  same,  or  perish  or  be  conquered,  and  become  the 
contempt  of  all  mankind." 

But  newspaper  correspondents  are  not  so  easily  put  down 
by  the  pen  alone,  although  it  may  be  wielded  by  the  hand  that 
holds  the  sword  as  well.  During  the  forepart  of  1863,  Mr. 
Thomas  W.  Knox,  a  correspondent  for  the  New  York  Herald, 
was  excluded  from  our  lines  in  the  department  commanded  by 
General  Grant,  in  consequence  of  offensive  language  used  by 
him  in  letters  published  in  the  newspaper  with  which  he  was 
connected.  Mr.  Knox  appealed  to  the  President,  who,  after 
hearing  his  statement  of  the  case,  allowed  him  to  return  to 
General  Grant  with  a  letter,  as  follows  : — 

"  Whereas,  it  appears  to  my  satisfaction  that  Thomas  W. 
Knox,  a  correspondent  of  the  New  York  Herald,  has  been,  by 
the  sentence  of  court-martial,  excluded  from  the  military  de 
partment  of  Major- General  Grant,  and  also  that  General 
Thayer,  president  of  the  court,  and  Major-General  McClernand, 
in  command  of  a  corps  of  that  department,  and  many  other 
respectable  persons,  are  of  opinion  that  Mr.  Knox's  offence 
was  technically  rather  than  wilfully  wrong,  and  that  the  sen 
tence  should  be  revoked,  therefore  said  sentence  is  hereby  re 
voked,  so  far  as  to  allow  Mr.  Knox  to  return  to  General  Grant's 
headquarters,  and  to  remain,  if  General  Grant  shall  give  his 
express  assent,  and  to  again  leave  the  department  if  General 
Grant  refuse  such  assent." 

Whereupon  General  Grant  addressed  Mr.  Knox  : — 

"  The  letter  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  authoriz 
ing  you  to  return  to  these  headquarters,  and  to  remain  with 

29 


450  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

ray  consent,  or  leave  if  such  consent  is  withheld,  has  been 
shown  to  me. 

"  You  came  here  first  in  violation  of  a  positive  order  from 
General  Sherman.  Because  you  were  not  pleased  with  his 
treatment  of  army  followers  who  had  violated  his  orders,  you 
attempted  to  break  down  his  influence  with  his  command  and 
to  blast  his  reputation  with  the  public  ;  you  made  insinuations 
against  his  sanity,  and  said  many  things  which  were  untrue, 
and  so  far  as  your  letter  had  influence,  it  was  calculated  to 
injure  the  public  service.  General  Sherman  is  one  of  the 
purest  men,  and  one  of  the  ablest  soldiers  in  the  country ;  you 
have  attacked  him  and  have  been  sentenced  to  expulsion  from 
the  department  for  such  offence.  Whilst  I  would  conform  to 
the  slightest  wish  of  the  President,  where  it  is  founded  on  a 
fair  representation  of  both  sides  of  any  question,  my  respect 
for  General  Sherman  is  such,  that  in  this  case  I  must  decline, 
unless  General  Sherman  first  gives  his  consent  for  your  re- 


Mr.  Knox  then  addressed  General  Sherman  : — 

"  Inclosed  please  find  copy  of  the  order  of  the  President, 
authorizing  me  to  return  to  this  department,  and  to  remain, 
with  General  Grant's  approval.  General  Grant  has  expressed 
his  willingness  to  give  such  approval,  provided  there  is  no 
objection  from  yourself. 

"  Without  referring  in  detail  to  past  occurrences,  permit  me 
to  express  my  regret  at  the  want  of  harmony  between  portions 
of  the  army  and  the  press,  and  the  hope  there  may  be  a  better 
feeling  in  future.  I  should  be  pleased  to  receive  your  assent 
in  the  present  subject-matter.  The  eyes  of  the  whole  North 
are  now  turned  upon  Yicksburg,  and  the  history  of  the  events 
soon  to  culminate  in  its  fall  will  be  watched  with  great  eager 
ness.  Your  favor  in  the  matter  will  be  duly  appreciated  by 
the  journal  I  represent  as  well  as  myself." 

The  secular  press  of  this  country  is  a  great  power,  for  both 
good  and  evil,  and  the  man  who  can  show  us  how  we  may 


DIGRESSIVE.  451 

have  the  one  without  the  other,  will  prove  himself  a  great 
benefactor  of  his  race.  But  this  is  impossible.  Honest  truth 
is  too  slow  for  enterprising  error ;  truth  stays  at  home,  and 
waits  to  entertain  such  friends  as  corne  to  seek  her  counsels, 
while  error,  with  her  specious  promises  and  plausible  theories, 
advertises  in  the  newspapers,  and  careers  through  the  world. 
The  reason  why  the  press  is  not  an  unmixed  good,  is  because 
all  editors,  publishers,  and  correspondents  are  not  cultivated, 
high-toned,  honest,  and  honorable  men.  But  if  they  were  so, 
and  if  they  earnestly  and  faithfully  set  themselves  to  work  to 
teach  the  people  virtue,  and  to  publish  nothing  but  unvar 
nished  truth,  such  is  the  character  of  mankind,  they  would 
have  but  few  pupils.  The  stream  can  rise  no  higher  than  its 
fountain,  and  a  people  are  no  better  than  the  newspapers 
they  read. 

The  calling  of  the  editor,  in  this  country,  is  as  high  and 
honorable  as  that  of  any  of  the  learned  professions.  If  his 
errors  and  follies  are  more  apparent  than  those  of  the  lawyer, 
it  is  because  they  are  more  exposed  to  observation.  The 
editor  speaks  every  day  to  the  public — the  lawyer  speaks  but 
seldom,  and  then  carefully  before  the  judges.  The  man  who 
talks  much,  is  apt  sometimes  to  talk  unwisely.  But  the  stand 
ard  of  each  is  elevated  or  lowered  according  to  the  public 
demand.  During  the  early  part  of  the  war,  the  public  demand 
was  for  the  sensational,  and  army  correspondents  were,  for 
the  most  part,  as  deficient  in  good  sense  and  judgment  as  in 
good  manners.  Subsequently,  the  public  demand  was  for 
truth  and  fact,  and  only  such  as  might  be  consistent  with  the 
public  interests ;  and  then,  the  letters  from  army  correspond 
ents  became  valuable  contributions  to  authentic  history.  But 
the  following  letter  to  Mr.  Knox  in  reply  to  the  one  just  cited, 
bears  on  the  former  period,  and  the  action  in  this  case  ended 
all  controversy  between  General  Sherman  and  army  corres 
pondents. 

"  Yours  of  April  6th,  inclosing  a  copy  of  the  President's  action 
in  your  case,  and  General  Grant's  letter  to  you,  is  received. 


452  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

I  am  surprised  to  learn  that  the  officers  named  in  the  Presi 
dent's  letter  have  certified  to  him  that  the  offence,  for  which 
you  were  tried  and  convicted,  was  merely  technical — viz.,  dis 
obedience  of  orders  emanating  from  the  highest  military  au 
thority,  and  the  publication  of  wilful  and  malicious  slanders 
and  libels  against  their  brother  officers.  I  cannot  so  regard 
the  matter. 

"  Aside  from  the  judgment  of  a  court,  and  upon  your  own 
theory  of  your  duties  and  obligations  alone,  you  must  be  ad 
judged  unfit  to  be  here.  After  having  enumerated  to  me  the 
fact  that  newspaper  correspondents  were  a  fraternity,  bound 
together  by  a  common  interest,  that  must  write  down  all  who 
stand  in  their  way,  and  bound  to  supply  the  public  demand 
for  news,  even  at  the  expense  of  truth  and  fact,  if  necessary,  I 
cannot  consent  to  the  tacit  acknowledgment  of  such  a  princi 
ple  by  tolerating  such  a  correspondent.  Come  with  a  musket 
or  sword  in  your  hand,  prepared  to  share  with  us  our  fate  in 
sunshine  and  in  storm,  in  success  and  in  defeat,  in  plenty  and 
in  scarcity,  and  I  will  welcome  you  as  a  brother  and  associate. 
But  come  as  you  now  do,  expecting  me  to  ally  the  honor  and 
reputation  of  niy  country  and  my  fellow-soldiers  with  you  as 
a  representative  of  the  press, — you  who,  according  to  your 
own  theory,  will  not  carefully  distinguish  between  truth  and 
falsehood, — and  my  answer  is,  never !" 

The  military  student  of  this  day  will  find  a  new  element  in 
his  calculations,  of  which  the  campaigns  of  Napoleon  will  fur 
nish  no  illustrations — namely,  the  value  of  the  railway.  It  was 
the  fortune  of  General  Sherman,  in  his  Atlanta  campaign,  to 
furnish  an  illustrious  example  of  this  interesting  problem. 

Previous  to  that  campaign,  a  single  track,  with  suitable 
switches  and  turnouts,  was  estimated  as  being  capable  of 
transporting  supplies  and  ammunition  sufficient  for  an  army, 
duly  proportioned,  one  hundred  thousand  strong,  one  hundred 
miles  from  its  base.  Sherman's  problem  was  to  make  it  do 
the  work  for  such  an  army  at  a  distance  of  five  hundred  miles 
from  its  base.  He  started  with  three  thousand  and  five  hun- 


DIGRESSIVE.  453 

dred  wagons,  ambulances  included.  He  had  thirty-five  thou 
sand  horses  besides  the  cavalry.  The  line  of  march  was 
across  a  mountainous  region,  furnishing  no  supplies  of  pro 
visions  or  forage.  It  was  estimated  the  cavalry  could'  gather 
sufficient  forage  for  its  own  use,  but  forage  for  all  other  ani 
mals  had  to  be  transported.  All  the  beef  was  to  be  carried 
on  the  hoof.  Baggage  was  economized  to  the  last  pound. 
Non-combatants  of  every  character  and  description,  except 
such  as  pertained  to  the  medical  department,  were  denied 
transportation.  Even  the  agents  of  the  Christian  Commission, 
whose  mission  it  was  to  administer  to  the  bodily  and  spiritual 
wants  of  the  dying  soldier,  were  left  in  the  rear,  because  they 
could  not  march  on  foot  and  carry  their  own  supplies.  But 
the  problem  was  one  of  logistics  and  not  of  benevolence.  It 
was  a  strictly  mathematical  calculation  of  food  for  a  hundred 
thousand  men,  whose  business  it  was  to  march  and  fight,  and 
of  ammunition  with  which  to  fight,  and  of  forage  for  animals 
necessary  and  in  constant  use,  with  no  margin  for  accidents 
or  unusual  misfortunes ;  it  was  a  problem  of  pure  Avar,  to 
which  all  other  matters  must  yield.  And  in  nothing  did  Gen 
eral  Sherman  display  the  high  qualities  of  a  great  commander 
more  conspicuously,  than  in  the  firmness  with  which  he  ad 
hered  to  the  logic  of  his  own  calculations.  When  the  agents 
of  the  Christian  Commission  presented  a  petition  for  trans 
portation  of  themselves  and  supplies,  he  indorsed  on  it : — 
"  Certainly  not — oats  and  gunpowder  are  more  indispensable 
at  the  front  than  benevolent  agents.  The  weight  of  every 
non-combatant  transported  deprives  me  of  so  many  pounds  of 
bread  that  I  must  have.  Each  regiment  has  its  chaplain,  and 
these  must  do  the  work  desired." 

In  1863-4,  our  Government  adopted  the  humane  and  liberal 
policy  of  issuing  rations  to  the  non-combatants  of  Eastern  and 
Middle  Tennessee,  impoverished  by  the  war,  a  policy  which 
gave  some  embarrassment  to  military  commanders  in  that  re 
gion.  General  Sherman  found  it  so  prejudicial  to  the  military 
service  that  he  discontinued  it ;  whereupon  President  Lincoln, 


454  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

at  the  request  of  influential  citizens  of  that  State,  expressed  a 
desire  the  policy  should  be  resumed.  The  Atlanta  campaign 
had  been  planned  without  reference  to  the  business  of  feeding 
the  inhabitants  of  Tennessee,  and  it  was  evident,  if  the  means 
of  transportation  were  to  be  used  for  this  purpose,  the  cam 
paign  must  stop.  General  Sherman  received  the  President's 
dispatch  on  the  5th  of  May,  the  day  before  his  troops  were 
put  in  motion,  and  dispatched  the  following  answer  : — 

"  We  have  worked  hard  with  the  best  talent  of  the  country, 
and  it  is  demonstrated  the  railroad  cannot  supply  the  army 
and  the  people  both.  One  or  the  other  must  quit  eating  ra 
tions,  and  the  army  must  be  the  last  to  quit,  and  don't  intend 
to  quit  unless  Joe  Johnston  makes  us  quit.  The  issue  to  citi 
zens  has  been  enormous,  and  the  same  weight  in  corn  or  oats 
would  have  saved  thousands  of  mules  whose  carcasses  now 
corduroy  the  roads  in  Tennessee,  and  which  we  need  so  much. 
We  have  paid  Tennessee  ten  for  one  of  provisions  taken  in 
war.  I  am  now  about  to  move,  and  cannot  change  the  order. 
Let  the  petitioners  hurry  into  Kentucky  and  make  up  a  cara 
van  of  cattle  and  wagons,  and  come  over  the  mountains  by 
Cumberland  Gap  and  Somerset  to  relieve  their  suffering 
friends,  as  they  used  to  do  before  a  railroad  was  built.  I  am 
willing  to  relieve  all  actual  cases  of  suffering  within  our  reach 
by  appropriating  the  savings  from  soldiers'  rations,  which  are 
considerable.  A  people  long  assisted  by  a  generous  Govern 
ment  are  apt  to  rely  more  on  the  Government  than  on  their 
own  exertions." 

The  earnestness  which  characterized  all  of  General  Sher 
man's  dispatches  about  this  time,  and  the  tenacity  with  which 
he  adhered  to  military  rules,  show  he  felt  he  had  work  to  do, 
and  that  he  had  resolved  to  do  it.  He  thought  of  nothing  but 
his  army ;  all  others  must  take  care  of  themselves. 

In  all  wars  of  long  duration  there  are  periods  of  reaction 
and  irresolution  among  the  people  at  home,  whose  duty  it  is 
to  sustain  the  war.  Our  great  civil  war  turned  out  to  be  a 


DIGRESSIVE.  455 

greater  affair  than  was  at  first  supposed.  The  exhibitions  of 
confidence  and  enthusiasm  with  which  our  early  volunteers 
were  greeted  on  their  way  to  the  field  will  not  soon  be  forgot 
ten.  How  the  people  cheered  !  how  the  bells  pealed  out !  how 
the  flags  waved !  Even  the  little  boys  and  girls  waved  their 
tiny  bunting  in  token  of  patriotic  zeal.  But  when  the  tug  of 
war  came,  and  the  contending  armies,  wrestling  like  giants  for 
the  mastery,  after  years  of  terrible  struggling,  marching,  and 
fighting  without  success,  needed  re-enforcements  in  order  to 
secure  eventual  triumph,  and  none  seemed  willing  to  help,  our 
troops  in  the  field  were  not  a  little  disheartened,  and  some  de 
serted.  Nor  was  this  all.  There  were  those  at  home  who 
tried  to  arrest  the  war,  and  tried  to  discourage  recruiting,  and 
tried  to  promote  desertions  ;  and,  availing  themselves  of  a  free 
press,  spread  their  vicious  sentiments  through  the  army  itself. 
It  was  to  prevent  such  results  that  General  Milroy  applied  to 
General  Sherman  for  a  remedy,  which  application  called  forth 
the  following  response,  addressed  to  Major-General  Thomas  : — 

"  IN  THE  FIELD,  NEAR  ATLANTA,  August  5, 1864. 
"General  Milroy's  letter  of  July  26,  with  your  indorsement, 
is  now  before  me.  He  asks  to  suppress  the  sale  and  circula 
tion,  in  his  district,  of  certain  mischievous  and  treasonable 
newspapers,  and  transmits  to  me  certain  slips  as  proofs  of  the 
mischievous  character  of  such  papers.  I  would  willingly  sup 
press  them  were  it  possible  to  do  so,  but  in  human  nature 
there  is  so  much  of  the  mule  left,  that  prohibition  of  a  news 
paper  only  increases  its  circulation.  The  press  is  a  power  in 
the  land.  For  a  quarter  of  a  century  past  it  had  been  sowing 
the  whirlwind,  and  now  we  reap  the  storm.  It  is  my  opinion 
that  the  freedom  of  the  press  to  publish  mischievous  matter, 
like  personal  slander,  libel,  false  statements  of  facts,  or  other 
matter  calculated  to  promote  desertions  in  the  army,  or  de 
signed  to  give  information  to  the  enemy,  should  be  regulated 
by  statute  law.  At  present  we  are  going  through  the  expensive 
but  natural  process  which  may  result  in  a  resort  to  the  knife 
and  pistol  for  the  defence  of  reputation.  It  is  already  demon- 


456  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

strated,  we  must  use  the  military  power  to  put  down  the  cir 
culation  of  newspapers  hurtful  to  the  public  service. 

"  The  suppression  of  the  few  papers  mentioned  by  General 
Milroy  would  be  something  like  undertaking  to  dam  up  the 
tributaries  of  the  Ohio  to  stop  the  flood  of  the  Mississippi. 
If  General  Milroy  finds  anybody  selhng  mischievous  publi 
cations  within  the  sphere  of  his  authority,  he  might  give  him 
a  good  thrashing,  or  put  him  in  the  stocks;  but  he  cannot 
reach  the  editors  and  publishers,  who  are  making  money  by 
the  publication  in  New  York,  Chicago,  or  Louisville. 

"  Each  military  commander,  subject  to  me,  may  suppress 
all  disorders  and  immoralities  in  the  sphere  of  his  command 
as  best  he  can :  but  my  belief  is,  the  proper  remedy  is  to  pun 
ish  the  men  who  publish  the  objectionable  matter,  if  residing 
in  his  jurisdiction ;  or  if  absent,  then  the  party  who  circulates 
the  papers.  Give  a  good  horsewhipping  to  any  man  who 
would  dare  advise  a  soldier  to  desert.  This  is  all  the  notice  I 
would  take  of  such  things  at  this  epoch  of  the  war." 

In  May,  1863,  the  Union  Club  at  Memphis,  Tennessee, 
passed  some  resolutions  commemorative  of  the  restoration  of 
law  and  order  in  that  city,  which  were  transmitted  to  General 
Sherman  by  a  gentleman  of  that  place,  to  which  he  responded 
as  follows : — 

"  WALNUT  HILLS,  MISSISSIPPI,  May  25, 1868. 

"  Yours  of  18th  instant  is  received.  I  thank  you  for  the 
kind  sentiments  expressed,  and  desire  you  to  express  to  the 
Union  Club  the  assurance  of  my  continued  regard  and  in 
terest. 

"  In  union  are  strength,  power  to  do  good,  power  to  repress 
evil — honor,  fame,  and  glory  to  our  beloved  country.  In  dis 
union  are  weakness,  discord,  suspicion,  ruin,  and  misery. 
How  any  well-balanced  mind  can  hesitate  in  a  choice  between 
these  passes  my  comprehension.  Therefore,  on  all  proper 
occasions,  do  honor  to  that  day  which  saw  our  national  emblem 
restored  to  its  proper  place  in  Memphis.  Rejoice,  and  let 
your  children  rejoice,  at  each  anniversary  of  the  day  which 


DIGRESSIVE.  457 

beheld  the  downfall,  in  your  city,  of  that  powerful  faction 
which  had  for  a  long  period  usurped  all  the  functions  of  gov 
ernment,  and.  made  patriots  tremble  for  their  personal  safety 
in  the  very  centre  of  the  republic.  Now  all  is  changed ;  right 
ful  government  once  more  prevails.  The  great  Valley  of  the 
Mississippi  comprises  the  principal  interests  of  this  country  ; 
and  Memphis  is  in  the  centre,  and,  like  the  heart,  must  regulate 
the  pulsation  of  life  throughout  the  more  remote  arteries  and 
veins.  Let  me  exhort  you  to  be  calm,  magnanimous,  and  pa 
tient.  Boast  not  over  your  fallen  neighbors,  but  convince 
them  of  their  delusion,  and  that  the  Union  men  are  above 
petty  malice,  and  will  even  respect  their  prejudices,  if  not  in 
curable. 

"I  deplore  the  devastation  and  misery  that  attend  the  pro 
gress  of  the  war ;  but  all  history  teaches  that  war,  pestilence, 
and  famine  are  the  usual  means  by  which  the  Almighty  arrests 
the  progress  of  error,  and  allays  the  storm  of  human  passion." 

The  long  duration  of  the  war,  and  the  necessity  of  more 
troops  to  re-enforce  our  wasting  armies,  compelled  Congress  to 
pass  a  conscript  law.  The  idea  of  a  universal  draft  was  espe 
cially  unwelcome  to  the  people  of  New  England.  Their  repre 
sentatives  were  on  the  sharp  lookout  for  expedients  to  save 
their  people  from  the  sweeping  operations  of  a  general  draft. 
To  satisfy  them,  it  was  provided  in  the  law  that  any  State 
might  raise  volunteers  in  rebel  States,  to  be  credited  to  the 
quota  of  the  States  raising  them,  respectively  ;  and  as  the 
negroes  were  the  only  loyal  people  available  in  the  rebel  States, 
of  course  the  only  prospect  of  obtaining  volunteers  was  in 
that  direction.  Eecruiting  agents  soon  presented  themselves 
to  commanders  of  armies,  duly  certified  from  their  respective 
States,  full  of  confidence  and  zeal,  and  well  assured  that  for 
every  negro  sent  to  the  war,  one  white  man  would  be  left  at 
home.  General  Sherman,  like  many  others,  did  not  like  that 
provision  of  the  law.  There  was  something  about  it  unmanly ; 
it  showed  a  disposition  to  shirk  the  duties  of  the  citizen  in  a 
time  of  danger ;  it  showed  that  the  desire  of  ease  and  the  love 


458  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

of  gain  were  beginning  to  prevail  against  the  suggestions  of 
patriotism  and  honor  ;  and  the  idea  of  shifting  on  the  shoulders 
of  the  poor  negroes  the  sacred  duty  of  fighting  the  battles  of 
the  country,  to  the  extent  suggested,  was  offensive  to  our  brave 
white  men,  who  had  been  fighting  hard  and  long  to  sustain 
our  common  Government,  leaving  all  others  home  to  profit  by 
the  war  ;  and  they  felt  that  those  they  left  at  home  should 
now  bear  a  hand.  Besides  this,  the  thing  was  wholly  imprac 
ticable.  General  Sherman  submitted  his  objections,  and  the 
impracticable  features  of  the  measure,  to  the  President,  who, 
in  answer,  sent  the  following  dispatch  : — 

"  EXECUTIVE  CHAMBEB,  July  18, 1864. 

"  I  have  seen  your  dispatch,  and  objections  to  agents  of 
Northern  States  opening  recruiting  near  your  camps.  An  act 
of  Congress  authorizes  this,  giving  the  appointment  of  agents 
to  tire  States,  and  not  to  the  executive  government.  It  is  not 
for  the  War  Department  or  myself  to  restrain  or  modify  the 
law  in  its  execution,  further  than  actual  necessity  may  require. 
To  be  candid,  I  was  for  the  passage  of  the  law,  not  apprehend 
ing  at  the  time  it  would  produce  such  inconvenience  to  armies 
in  the  field  as  you  now  cause  me  to  fear.  Many  of  the  States 
were  very  anxious  for  it.  I  hoped  that,  with  State  bounties 
and  active  exertions,  they  would  get  out  substantial  additions 
to  our  colored  forces,  which,  unlike  white  troops,  help  us  where 
they  come  from  as  well  as  where  they  go  to.  I  still  hope  for 
advantage  from  the  law,  and  being  a  law,  it  must  be  treated  as 
such  by  all.  We  here  will  do  all  we  can  to  save  you  from  dif 
ficulties  arising  from  it.  May  I  ask,  therefore,  that  you  will 
give  it  your  hearty  co-operation  ?" 

This  letter  of  the  President's  was  sufficient.  There  was  the 
law,  and  there  the  expression  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  desire  to  see  it 
carried  out.  It  could  make  no  difference  that  the  law  was  not 
practicable  of  execution — it  must  be  obeyed,  and  Sherman 
proceeded  to  give  directions  to  carry  it  out. 

General  Sherman  did  not  always  write  in  the  vehement  style. 


DIGRESSIVE.  459 

Some  of  his  letters  have  a  spice  of  humor  in  them  quite  re 
freshing,  as  the  following  specimen  will  show.  The  gentleman 
to  whom  it  was  addressed  was  a  chaplain  in  the  rebel  army, 
who  had  been  captured  at  Chattanooga,  and  relieved  from 
capture,  and,  as  it  would  seem,  was  relieved  of  his  horse  at  the 
same  tinTe,  which  latter  fact  he  felt  to  be  a  great  hardship ; 
and  when  Sherman  arrived  at  Atlanta  the  chaplain  applied  by 
letter,  sent  through  our  lines,  for  an  order  to  compel  the  fellow 
who  deprived  him  of  his  horse  to  restore  him,  or  the  general 
to  send  him  another  one  in  his  stead.  This  was  the  gen 
eral's  decision,  dated  at  Atlanta,  on  the  16th  of  September, 
1864  :— 

"  DEAR  SIR — Your  letter  of  September  14th  is  received.  I 
approach  a  question  involving  a  title  to  a  '  horse'  with  defer 
ence  for  the  laws  of  war.  That  mysterious  code,  of  which  we 
talk  so  much  but  know  so  little,  is  remarkably  silent  on  the 
'  horse.'  He  is  a  beast  so  tempting  to  the  soldier, — to  him  of 
the  wild  cavalry,  the  fancy  artillery,  or  the  patient  infantry, — 
that  I  find  more  difficulty  in  recovering  a  worthless,  spavined 
beast  than  in  paying  a  million  of  '  greenbacks  ;'  so  that  I  fear 
I  must  reduce  your  claim  to  one  of  finance,  and  refer  you  to 
the  great  Board  of  Claims  in  Washington,  that  may  reach 
your  case  by  the  time  your  grandchild  becomes  a  great-grand 
father. 

"  Privately,  I  think  it  was  a  shabby  thing  in  the  scamp  of 
the  Thirty -first  Missouri  who  took  your  horse,  and  the  colonel 
or  his  brigadier  should  have  restored  him.  But  I  cannot  un 
dertake  to  make  good  the  sins  of  omission  of  my  own  colonels 
or  brigadiers,  much  1-ess  those  of  a  former  generation.  '  When 
this  cruel  war  is  over,'  and  peace  once  more  gives  you  a  parish, 
I  will  promise,  if  near  you,  to  procure,  out  of  one  of  Uncle 
Sam's  corrals,  a  beast  that  will  replace  the  one  taken  from  you 
so  wrongfully  ;  but  now  it  is  impossible.  We  have  a  big  jour 
ney  before  us,  and  need  all  we  have,  and,  I  fear,  more  too ;  so 
look  out  when  the  Yanks  are  about  and  hide  your  beaste,  for 
my  experience  is  that  all  soldiers  are  very  careless  in  a  search 


460  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

for  title.     I  know  that  General  Hardee  will  confirm  this  my 
advice." 

It  will  be  recollected  that  Chief- Justice  Chase,  in  the  spring 
of  1865,  doffed  his  official  robes,  and,  like  a  true  American, 
made  a  journey  South  in  search  of  a  cure  for  the  national  dis 
temper.  The  civil  war  had  come  to  a  pause.  The  leaders  of 
the  rebellion  had  been  overthrown,  and  were  now,  like  a  com 
munity  of  pirates,  cast  upon  a  desolate  island  in  mid  ocean, 
cursing  each  other,  and  dividing  their  ill-gotten  gains  amid 
thunder,  and  lightning,  and  storm.  Abstract  justice  was  on 
a  tour  of  observation  and  inquiry ;  and  the  presiding  officer  of 
the  highest  civil  tribunal  in  the  land  met  a  leader  of  armies, 
when  the  two  friends  talked  together.  The  topic  of  discussion 
was,  the  healing  of  the  nation.  The  following  letter  indicates 
the  convictions  of  the  soldier. 

"  STEAMER  PRUSSIA,  BEAUFORT  HARBOR, 
May  6,  1865—6  A.  M. 

"  On  reaching  this  ship  late  last  night,  I  found  your  valued 
letter,  with  the  printed  sheet,  which  I  have  also  read. 

"  I  am  not  yet  prepared  to  receive  the  negro  on  terms  of 
political  equality,  for  the  reason  it  will  raise  passions  and  pre 
judices  at  the  North,  which,  superadded  to  the  causes  yet 
dormant  at  the  South,  might  rekindle  the  war,  whose  fires  are 
now  dying  out,  and  which  by  skilful  management  might  be 
kept  down.  As  you  must  observe,  I  prefer  to  work  with 
known  facts,  rather  than  to  reason  ahead  to  remote  conclusions. 
By  way  of  illustration,  we  are  now  weather-bound.  Is  it  not 
best  to  lay  quiet  at  anchor  till  those  white-cap  breakers  look 
less  angry,  and  the  southwest  winds  shift  ?  I  think  all  old 
sailors  will  answer  yes  ;  whilst  we,  impatient  to  reach  our  goal, 
are  tempted  to  dash  through  at  risk  of  life  and  property.  I 
am  willing  to  admit  that  the  conclusions  you  reach  by  pure 
mental  process  may  be  all  correct ;  but  don't  you  think  it 
better  first  to  get  the  ship  of  State  in  some  order,  that  it  may 
be  handled  and  guided  ?  Now,  all  at  the  South  is  pure  anarchy. 


DIGRESSIVE.  451 

The  military  power  of  the  United  States  cannot  reach  the 
people  who  are  spread  over  a  vast  surface  of  country. 

"  We  can  control  the  local  State  capitals,  and,  it  may  be, 
slowly  shape  political  thoughts,  but  we  cannot  combat  existing 
ideas  with  force.  I  say  honestly,  that  the  assertion  openly  of 
your  ideas  of  universal  negro  suffrage,  as  a  fixed  policy  of  our 
General  Government,  to  be  backed  by  physical  power,  wih1  pro 
duce  new  war,  sooner  or  later,  and  one  which,  from  its  des 
ultory  character,  will  be  more  bloody  and  destructive  than 
the  last. 

"  I  am  rejoiced  that  you,  upon  whom  devolves  so  much,  are 
aiming  to  see  facts  and  persons  with  your  own  eye. 

"  I  think  the  changes  necessary  in  the  future  can  be  made 
faster  and  more  certain,  by  means  of  our  constitution,  than  by 
any  plan  outside  of  it.  If  now  we  go  outside  of  the  constitu 
tion  for  a  means  of  change,  we  rather  justify  the  rebels  in  their 
late  attempt.  Whereas  now,  as  General  Schofield  tells  us,  the 
people  of  the  South  are  ready  and  willing  to  make  the  neces 
sary  changes  without  shock  or  violence.  I  have  felt  the  past 
war  as  bitterly  and  keenly  as  any  man  could,  and  I  frankly 
confess  myself  '  afraid'  of  a  new  war  ;  and  a  new  war  is  bound 
to  result  from  the  action  you  suggest,  of  giving  to  the  enfran 
chised  negroes  so  large  a  share  in  the  delicate  task  of  putting 
the  Southern  States  in  practical  working  relations  with  the 
General  Government.  The  enfranchisement  of  the  negro  should 
be  exceptional  and  not  general,  founded  upon  a  standard  of 
intelligence,  or  by  reason  of  valuable  military  service  during 
the  war  or  hereafter." 

At  the  close  of  the  war  General  Howard  was  made  chief  of 
the  Freedmen's  Bureau,  headquarters  at  Washington.  His 
duties  were,  "  to  correct  that  in  which  the  law,  by  reason  of 
its  universality,  was  deficient."  He  was  placed  at  the  head  of 
a  species  of  Poor  Law  Board,  with  vague  powers  to  define 
justice,  and  execute  loving-kindness  between  four  millions  of 
emancipated  slaves  and  all  the  rest  of  mankind.  He  was  to 
be  not  exactly  a  military  commander,  nor  yet  a  judge  of  a 


462  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Court  of  Chancery,  but  a  sort  of  combination  of  the  religious 
missionary  and  school  commissioner,  with  power  to  feed  and 
instruct,  and  this  for  an  empire  half  as  large  as  Europe.  But 
few  officers  of  the  army  would  have  had  the  moral  courage  to 
accept  such  appointment,  and  fewer  still  were  as  well  fitted  to 
fill  it,  and  discharge  one-half  its  complicated  and  multifarious 
duties.  As  soon  as  General  Howard  concluded  to  accept  his 
new  appointment,  he  apprized  his  old  commander  of  the  fact 
by  a  friendly  letter,  and  received  the  following  in  answer  : — 

"!N  THE  FIELD,  DUMFRIES,  Va.,  May  17th,  1865—9  P.  M. 

"  Your  letter  of  May  12,  inclosing  General  Orders,  "War  De 
partment,  No.  91,  of  May  12,  reached  me  here,  on  arrival  at 
camp,  about  dark. 

"  Colonel  Strong  is  camped  just  behind  me,  General  Logan 
about  two  miles  back,  and  the  Fifteenth  Corps  at  Acquia 
Creek,  eight  miles  back.  Copies  of  orders  No.  91  are  being 
made,  and  will  be  sent  back  to  them.  I  hardly  know  whether 
to  congratulate  you  or  not,  but  of  one  thing  you  may  rest 
assured,  that  you  possess  my  entire  confidence,  and  I  cannot 
imagine  that  matters  that  may  involve  the  future  of  four  mil 
lions  of  souls  could  be  put  in  more  charitable  and  more  con 
scientious  hands.  So  far  as  man  can  do,  I  believe  you  will, 
but  I  fear  you  have  Hercules'  task.  God  has  limited  the  power 
of  man,  and  though,  in  the  kindness  of  your  heart,  you  would 
alleviate  all  the  ills  of  humanity,  it  is  not  in  your  power ;  nor 
is  it  in  your  power  to  fulfil  one-tenth  part  of  the  expectations 
of  those  who  framed  the  bureau  for  the  freedmen,  refugees, 
and  abandoned  estates.  It  is  simply  impracticable.  Yet  you 
can  and  will  do  all  the  good  one  man  may,  and  that  is  all  you 
are  called  on  as  a  man  and  Christian  to  do ;  and  to  that  extent 
count  on  me  as  a  friend  and  fellow-soldier  for  counsel  and 
assistance.  I  believe  the  negro  is  free  by  act  of  master  and 
by  the  laws  of  war,  now  ratified  by  actual  consent  and  power. 
The  demand  for  his  labor,  and  his  ability  to  acquire  and  work 
land,  will  enable  the  negro  to  work  out  that  amount  of  free 
dom  and  political  consequence  to  which  he  is  or  may  be  en- 


DIGRESSIVE.  463 

titled  by  natural  right  and  the  acquiescence  of  Ms  fellow- 
men. 

"  There  is  a  strong  prejudice  of  race,  which  over  our  whole 
country  exists.  The  negro  is  denied  a  vote  in  all  the  Northern 
States,  save  two  or  three,  and  then  qualified  by  conditions  not 
attached  to  the  white  race ;  and  by  the  constitution  of  the 
United  States,  to  States  is  left  the  right  to  fix  the  qualification 
of  voters.  The  United  States  cannot  make  negroes  vote  in 
the  South,  any  more  than  they  can  in  the  North,  without 
revolution  ;  and  as  we  have  just  emerged  from  one  attempted 
revolution,  it  would  be  wrong  to  begin  another.  I  notice  in 
our  country,  one  class  of  people  make  war  and  leave  others 
to  fight  it  out. 

"  I  do  believe  the  people  of  the  South  realize  the  fact  that 
their  former  slaves  are  free,  and  if  allowed  reasonable  time, 
and  are  not  harassed  by  confiscation  and  political  complica 
tions,  will  very  soon  adapt  their  condition  and  interests  to 
their  new  state  of  facts. 

"  Many  of  them  will  sell,  or  lease  on  easy  terms,  parts  of 
their  land  to  their  former  slaves,  and  gradually  the  same 
political  state  of  things  will  result  as  now  exists  in  Maryland, 
Kentucky,  and  Missouri.  The  people  cannot  afford  to  pay 
the  necessary  taxes  to  maintain  separate  colonies  of  negroes, 
or  the  armies  needed  to  enforce  the  rights  of  negroes  dwelling 
in  the  Southern  States,  in  a  condition  antagonistic  to  the  feel 
ings  and  prejudice  of  the  people,  the  result  of  which  will  be 
internal  war,  and  the  final  extermination  of  the  negro  race. 
But  I  am  not  familiar  with  the  laws  of  Congress  which  origin 
ated  your  bureau,  but  repeat  my  entire  confidence  in  your 
pure  and  exalted  character,  and  your  ability  to  do  in  the  prem 
ises  all  that  any  one  man  can  do." 


464:  SHEKMAN   AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

AT     H  OME. 

BELIEVED  from  the  cares  and  responsibilities  of  his  command, 
and  while  awaiting  the  further  orders  of  the  Government, 
Sherman  sought  and  obtained  permission  from  the  lieutenant- 
general  to  visit  his  home,  his  family,  and  his  friends. 

On  his  arrival  at  his  old  home,  at  Lancaster,  Ohio,  on  the 
24th  of  June,  1865,  General  Sherman  was  met  at  the  railway 
station  by  several  thousands  of  his  friends,  neighbors,  and 
veteran  soldiers,  and  was  welcomed  by  Judge  Hunter,  on  the 
part  of  the  citizens,  and  Colonel  Connell,  on  behalf  of  the 
veterans. 

The  general  replied  : — 

"  FKIENDS  OF  MY  BOYHOOD  : 

"  I  thank  you  for  this  most  hearty  welcome.  I  am  especially 
thankful  for  the  kind  words  of  the  tried  and  valued  friend  of 
my  family,  Mr.  Hunter,  and  for  the  warmth  with  which  Colonel 
Connell  and  the  soldiers  have  received  me.  With  the  latter,  I 
can  deal  in  very  few  words,  for  they  know  that  with  us  words 
are  few  and  mean  much,  and  that  when  the  time  comes  again, 
we  will  go  where  the  stars  and  stripes  lead,  without  asking 
many  questions. 

"  My  old  friends  and  neighbors,  I  knew  your  fathers  before 
you  better  than  yourselves,  for  it  is  near  thirty  years  since  I 
left  here  a  boy ;  and  now,  in  full  manhood,  I  find  myself  again 
among  you,  with  a  name  connected  with  the  history  of  our 
country. 


AT   HOME.  465 

"  During  the  past  four  years  my  mind  has  been  so  intent 
upon  but  one  thing— the  success  of  our  arms — that  I  have 
thought  of  nothing  else.  I  claim  no  special  honor,  only  to 
have  done  a  full  man's  share  ;  for  when  one's  country  is  in 
danger,  the  man  who  will  not  defend  it,  and  sustain  it,  with 
his  natural  strength,  is  no  man  at  all.  For  this  I  claim  no 
special  merit,  for  I  have  done  simply  what  all  the  boys  in  blue 
have  done.  I  have  only  labored  with  the  strength  of  a  single 
man,  and  have  used  the  brains  I  inherited  and  the  education 
given  by  my  country.  The  war  through  which  we  have  just 
passed  has  covered  a  wide  area  of  country,  and  imposed  upon 
us  a  task  which,  like  a  vast  piece  of  machinery,  required  many 
parts,  all  of  which  were  equally  important  to  the  working  of 
the  whole.  Providence  assigned  me  my  part,  and  if  I  have 
done  it,  I  am  well  satisfied. 

"  The  past  is  now  with  the  historian,  but  we  must  still 
grapple  with  the  future.  In  this  we  need  a  guide,  and,  fortu 
nately  for  us  all,  we  can  trust  the  constitution  which  has  safely 
brought  us  through  the  gloom  and  danger  of  the  past.  Let 
each  State  take  care  of  its  own  local  interests  and  affairs — Ohio 
of  hers,  Louisiana  of  hers,  Wisconsin  of  hers — and  the  best 
results  will  follow.  You  all  know  well  that  I  have  lived  much 
at  the  South,  and  I  say  that  though  we  have  had  bitter  and 
fierce  enemies  in  war,  we  must  meet  this  people  again  in  peace. 
The  bad  men  among  them  will  separate  from  those  who  ask 
for  order  and  peace,  and  when  the  people  do  thus  separate  we 
can  encourage  the  good,  and,  if  need  be,  we  can  cut  the  head 
of  the  bad  off  at  one  blow.  Let  the  present  take  care  of  the 
present,  and  with  the  faith  inspired  by  the  past,  we  can  trust 
the  future  to  the  future.  The  Government  of  the  United 
States  and  the  constitution  of  our  fathers  have  proven  their 
strength  and  power  in  time  of  war,  and  I  believe  our  whole 
country  will  be  even  more  brilliant  in  the  vast  and  unknown 
future  than  in  the  past. 

"  Fellow-soldiers  and  neighbors,  again  I  thank  you.  I  do 
not  wish  you  to  consider  this  a  speech  at  all,  for  I  do  not  pro 
fess  to  be  a  man  of  words.  I  prefer  to  see  you  separately,  at 

30 


466  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS, 

jour  leisure,  in  a  social  way.  I  shall  be  with  you  for  some 
days,  and  shall  be  pleased  to  have  you  call  in  whenever  you 
feel  like  it,  in  the  old  familiar  way,  without  any  of  the  formality 
and  reserve  which  were  proper  enough  in  the  midst  of  the 
armies." 

He  remained  with  his  family  but  a  few  days  when  an  invita 
tion  from  his  old  comrades  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  to 
attend  their  barbecue  at  Louisville,  on  the  approaching  4th  of 
July,  in  honor  of  victory  and  peace,  again  drew  him  from  his 
retirement.  On  his  way  to  Louisville,  he  passed  through 
Cincinnati,  arriving  there  on  the  night  of  the  30th  of  June,  to 
find  that  the  citizens  had  hastily  arranged  a  formal  welcome. 

On  making  his  appearance  on  the  balcony  of  the  Burnett 
House,  General  Sherman  was  greeted  with  deafening  cheers. 
Mr.  Stanberry,  in  a  pleasant  and  courteous  speech,  formally 
tendered  the  welcome  of  the  city,  and  then,  with  a  brief  refer 
ence  to  the  general's  extraordinary  career,  introduced  him  to 
the  citizens.  Mr.  Stanberry  was  frequently  interrupted  by 
applause,  and  at  the  close  of  his  address  three  cheers  were 
given  for  Sherman,  who,  in  response,  said  : — 

"  FELLOW  CITIZENS — I  am  not  so  accustomed  to  speaking  as 
my  friend  Stanberry,  and  therefore  you  must  be  a  little  more 
silent  as  to  noise,  and  charitable  as  to  words.  I  am  very 
proud  that  he,  before  every  other  man,  has  received  me  here 
on  this  portico,  for,  as  he  says,  he  knew  my  father  before  me, 
and  all  my  family.  He  knew  me  when  I  was  a  little  red 
headed  boy,  running  about  Lancaster  stealing  his  cherries.  I 
am  thankful  that  he  has  introduced  me,  for  I  believe  he  un 
derstands  the  workings  of  my  heart  as  well  as  I  do  myself,  and 
I  know  that  he  can  tell  it  better  than  I  can,  therefore  I  accept 
his  version  without  qualification. 

"  While  we  are  here  together  to-night  let  me  tell  you,  as  a 
point  of  historical  interest,  that  here,  upon  this  spot,  in  this 
very  hotel,  and  I  think  almost  in  the  room  through  which  I 
reached  this  balcony,  General  Grant  and  I  laid  down  our  maps 


AT  HOME.  467 

and  studied  the  campaign  which  ended  our  war.  I  had  been 
away  down  in  Mississippi  finishing  up  an  unfinished  job  I  had 
down  there,  when  he  called  for  me  by  telegraph  to  meet  him 
in  Nashville.  But  we  were  bothered  so  much  there  that  we 
came  up  here,  and  in  this  hotel  sat  down  with  our  maps  and 
talked  over  the  lines  and  the  operations  by  means  of  which 
we  were  to  reach  the  heart  of  our  enemy.  He  went  to  Rich 
mond,  and  I  to  Atlanta.  We  varied  as  to  time  ;  but  the  result 
was  just  as  we  laid  it  out  in  this  hotel,  in  March,  1864. 

"  General  Grant  and  I  had  only  one  object  to  fulfil.  Our 
hearts  and  feelings  are  one  :  we  were  determined  the  United 
States  should  survive  this  war  with  honor  ;  and  that  those  who 
came  after  us,  in  future  years  and  centuries,  should  never  turn 
upon  this  generation  and  say  we  were  craven  cowards.  Now 
what  is  the  truth  ?  Are  you  not  proud  ?  You  are  not  proud 
of  me,  but  you  are  proud  of  the  result.  General  Grant,  and 
General  Sherman,  and  every  other  patriot  think  of  but  one 
thing  ;  we  don't  bother  ourselves  about  local  details  ;  we  think 
of  only  one  idea — the  supremacy  of  our  country  represented 
by  Congress,  the  judiciary,  and  the  executive — the  people  be 
ing  a  part  of  the  grand  whole.  We  may  think  differently 
about  the  roads,  the  mud,  about  horses  and  mules ;  but  in  one 
thing  we  do  not  differ — that  this  country  shall  survive,  and  be 
honored  not  only  here  but  all  over  the  world. 

"  When  our  thoughts  are  of  this  character,  don't  let  us  bother 
ourselves  about  little  things.  There  are  great  thoughts  abroad 
in  America,  and  you  and  I  and  all  of  us  are  charged  with  them, 
and  let  us  see  that  our  country  stands  unchanged  as  to  boun 
daries.  We  have  the  best  country  on  earth.  Our  history  in 
the  past  is  beautiful,  and  her  future  is  in  our  keeping.  I  hope 
and  pray  that  the  present  generation  will  maintain  the  present ; 
and  I  know  that  those  who  come  after  us  will  make  that  pres 
ent  more  glorious  than  it  now  is.  We  have  but  begun  the 
work.  I  have  travelled  from  one  part  of  the  country  to  the 
other,  and  I  know  that  we  are  almost  in  a  state  of  wilderness 
yet.  Not  one  acre  in  ten  in  Ohio,  and  not  one  in  forty  in  Ten 
nessee,  is  improved  as  it  ought  to  be.  When  we  are  as  popu- 


±68  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Ions  as  Europe,  it  will  be  time  to  tread  upon  our  neighbor's 
heels.  You  in  Ohio  have  the  most  lovely  country  the  sun 
ever  shone  upon ;  and  every  returned  Ohio  soldier,  I  hope, 
will  take  my  advice  and  go  to  his  farm  and  cultivate  it  the 
best  he  can,  rather  than  wander  away  into  new  enterprises. 
For  fifty  years  to  come,  at  least,  I  never  want  to  hear  a  word 
about  war  in  America.  If  anybody,  at  home  or  abroad,  treads 
upon  our  coat-tails  we  will  be  ready  for  a  fight.  But  I  am  for 
peace  now.  The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  is  now  peaceably 
disposed.  We  simply  warn  our  friends  not  to  tread  upon 
our  coat-tails  ;  that  is  all.  " 

The  general  then  thanked  the  people  for  the  interest  they 
had  taken  in  his  presence,  and  bid  them  good-night. 

The  army  received  their  old  leader  with  cordial  and  unre 
strained  enthusiasm.  After  spending  an  agreeable  anniver 
sary  among  his  old  fellow-soldiers,  Sherman  went  to  St.  Louis 
to  assume  formal  command  of  his  new  military  division,  pre 
paratory  to  availing  himself  of  a  more  extended  holiday. 

At  a  public  dinner  given  to  him  by  the  citizens  at  St.  Louis 
he  spoke  as  follows  : — 

"  Here,  in  St.  Louis,  probably  began  the  great  centre  move 
ment  which  terminated  the  war — a  battle-field  such  as  never 
before  was  seen,  extending  from  ocean  to  ocean  almost,  with 
the  right  wing  and  the  left  wing  ;  and  from  the  centre  here  I 
remember  one  evening,  up  in  the  old  Planters'  House,  sitting 
with  General  Halleck  and  General  Cullum,  and  we  were  talk 
ing  about  this,  that,  and  the  other.  A  map  was  on  the  table, 
and  I  was  explaining  the  position  of  the  troops  of  the  enemy 
in  Kentucky  when  I  came  to  this  State.  General  Halleck 
knew  well  the  position  here,  and  I  remember  well  the  question 
he  asked  me — the  question  of  the  school  teacher  to  his  child 
— '  Sherman,  here  is  the  line  :  how  will  you  break  that  line  ?' 
'  Physically,  by  a  perpendicular  force.'  '  Where  is  the  per 
pendicular  ?'  '  The  line  of  the  Tennessee  Eiver.'  General 
Halleck  is  the  author  of  that  first  beginning,  and  I  give  him 


AT  HOME.  469 

credit  for  it  with  pleasure.  Laying  down  his  pencil  upon  the 
map,  he  said,  '  There  is  the  line,  and  we  must  take  it.'  The 
capture  of  the  forts  on  the  Tennessee  River  by  the  troops  led 
by  Grant  followed.  These  were  the  grand  strategic  features 
of  that  first  movement,  and  it  succeeded  perfectly. 

"  General  Halleck's  plan  went  further — not  to  stop  at  his 
first  line,  which  ran  through  Columbus,  Bowling  Green,  cross 
ing  the  river  at  Henry  and  Donelson,  but  to  push  on  to  the 
second  line,  which  ran  through  Memphis  and  Charleston ;  but 
troubles  intervened  at  Nashville,  and  delays  followed  ;  oppo 
sition  to  the  last  movement  was  made,  and  I  myself  was 
brought  an  actor  on  the  scene. 

"  I  remember  our  ascent  of  the  Tennessee  River  :  I  have 
seen  to-night  captains  of  steamboats  who  first  went  with  us 
there.  Storms  came,  and  we  did  not  reach  the  point  we  de 
sired.  At  that  time  General  C.  F.  Smith  was  in  command. 
He  was  a  man  indeed  :  all  the  old  officers  remember  him  as  a 
gallant  and  excellent  officer  ;  and  had  he  lived,  probably  some 
of  us  younger  fellows  would  not  have  attained  our  present 
positions.  But  that  is  now  past.  We  followed  him  the 
second  time,  and  then  came  the  landing  of  forces  at  Pittsburg 
Landing.  Whether  it  was  a  mistake  in  landing  them  on  the 
west  instead  of  the  east  bank,  it  is  not  necessary  now  to  dis 
cuss.  I  think  it  was  not  a  mistake.  There  was  gathered  the 
first  great  army  of  the  West,  commencing  with  only  twelve 
thousand,  then  twenty,  then  thirty  thousand,  and  we  had  about 
thirty-eight  thousand  in  that  battle  ;  and  all  I  claim  for  that 
is,  that  it  was  a  contest  for  manhood  :  there  was  no  strategy. 
Grant  was  there,  and  others  of  us,  all  young  at  that  time,  and 
unknown  men,  but  our  enemy  was  old,  and  Sidney  Johnston, 
whom  all  the  officers  remembered  as  a  power  among  the  old 
officers,  high  above  Grant,  myself,  or  anybody  else,  led  the 
enemy  on  that  battle-field,  and  I  almost  wonder  how  we 
conquered.  But,  as  I  remarked,  it  was  a  contest  for 
manhood — man  to  man — soldier  to  soldier.  We  fought,  and 
we  held  our  ground,  and  therefore  accounted  ourselves  victo 
rious. 


470  SHERMAN    AND   HIS    CAMPAIGNS. 

"  The  possession  of  the  Mississippi  River  is  the  possession 
of  America,  and  I  say  that  had  the  Southern  Confederacy  (call 
it  by  what  name  you  may) — had  that  power  represented  by 
the  Southern  Confederacy  held  with  a  grip  sufficiently  strong 
the  lower  part  of  the  Mississippi  River,  we  would  have  been 
a  subjugated  people  ;  and  they  would  have  dictated  to  us  if  we 
had  given  up  the  possession  of  the  lower  Mississippi.  It  was 
vital  to  us,  and  we  fought  for  it  and  won.  We  determined  to 
have  it ;  but  we  could  not  go  down  with  our  frail  boats  past 
the  batteries  of  Vicksburg.  It  was  a  physical  impossibility  ; 
therefore  what  was  to  be  done  ?  After  the  Tallahatchie  line 
was  carried,  Vicksburg  was  the  next  point.  I  went  with  a 
small  and  hastily  collected  force,  and  repeatedly  endeavored 
to  make  a  lodgment  on  the  bluff  between  Vicksburg  and 
Haines'  Bluff,  while  General  Grant  moved  with  his  main  army 
so  as  to  place  himself  on  the  high  plateau  behind  Vicksburg ; 
but  '  man  proposes  and  God  disposes,'  and  we  failed  on  that 
occasion.  I  then  gathered  my.hastily  collected  force  and  went 
down  further  ;  and  then,  for  the  first  time,  I  took  General  Blair 
and  his  brigade  under  my  command. 

"  On  the  very  day  I  had  agreed  to  be  there  I  was  there,  and 
we  swung  our  flanks  around,  and  the  present  governor  of  Mis 
souri  fell  a  prisoner  to  the  enemy  on  that  day.  We  failed.  I 
waited  anxiously  for  a  co-operating  force  inland  and  below  us, 
but  they  did  not  come,  and  after  I  had  made  the  assault  I 
learned  that  the  depot  at  Holly  Springs  had  been  broken  up, 
and  that  General  Grant  had  sent  me  word  not  to  attempt  it. 
But  it  was  too  late.  Nevertheless,  although  we  were  unable 
to  carry  it  at  first,  there  were  other  things  to  be  done.  The 
war  covered  such  a  vast  area  there  was  plenty  to  do.  I  thought 
of  that  affair  at  Arkansas  Post,  although  others  claim  it,  and 
they  may  have  it  if  they  want  it.  We  cleaned  them  out  there, 
and  General  Grant  then  brought  his  army  to  Vicksburg.  And 
you  in  St.  Louis  remember  well  that  long  winter — how  we 
were  on  the  levee,  with  the  waters  rising  and  drowning  us  like 
muskrats  ;  how  we  were  seeking  channels  through  Deer  Creek 
and  Yazoo  Pass,  and  how  we  finally  cut  a  canal  across  the 


AT  HOME.  471 

peninsula,  in  front  of  Vicksburg.  But  all  that  time  the  true 
movement  was  the  original  movement,  and  every  thing  ap 
proximating  to  it  came  nearer  the  truth.  But  we  could  not 
make  any  retrograde  movement.  Why  ?  Because  your  peo 
ple  at  the  North  were  too  noisy. 

"  We  could  not  take  any  step  backward,  and  for  that  reason 
we  were  forced  to  run  the  batteries  at  Yicksburg,  and  make  a 
lodgment  on  the  ridges  on  some  of  the  bluffs  below  Vicksburg. 
It  is  said  I  protested  against  it.  It  is  folly.  I  never  protested 
in  my  life — never.  On  the  contrary,  General  Grant  rested  on 
me  probably  more  responsibility  even  than  any  other  com 
mander  under  him  ;  for  he  wrote  to  me,  '  I  want  you  to  move 
on  Haines'  Bluff  to  enable  me  to  pass  to  the  next  fort  below- 
Grand  Gulf.  I  hate  to  ask  you,  because  the  fervor  of  the 
North  will  accuse  you  of  being  rebellious  again.'  I  love  Grant 
for  his  kindness.  I  did  make  the  feint  on  Haines'  Bluff,  and 
by  that  means  Grant  ran  the  blockade  easily  to  Grand  Gulf, 
and  made  a  lodgment  down  there,  and  got  his  army  up  on  the 
high  plateau  in  the  rear  of  Vicksburg,  while  you  people  here 
were  beguiled  into  the  belief  that  Sherman  was  again  repulsed. 
But  we  did  not  repose  confidence  in  everybody.  Then  fol 
lowed  the  movements  on  Jackson,  and  the  4th  of  July  placed 
us  in  possession  of  that  great  stronghold,  Vicksburg,  and  then, 
as  Mr.  Lincoln  said, '  the  Mississippi  went  unvexed  to  the  sea.' 

"From  that  day  to  this  the  war  has  been  virtually  and 
properly  settled.  It  was  a  certainty  then.  They  would  have 
said,  '  We  give  up  ;'  but  Davis  wrould  not  ratify  it,  and  he  had 
them  under  good  discipline,  and  therefore  it  was  necessary  to 
fight  again.  Then  came  the  affair  of  Chickamauga.  The 
Army  of  the  Mississippi,  lying  along  its  banks,  were  called  into 
a  new  field  of  action,  and  so  one  morning  early  I  got  orders  to 
go  to  Chattanooga.  I  did  not  know  where  it  was,  hardly.  I 
did  not  know  the  road  to  go  there.  But  I  found  it,  and  got 
there  in  time.  And  although  my  men  were  shoeless,  and  the 
cold  and  bitter  frosts  of  winter  were  upon  us,  yet  I  must  still 
go  to  Knoxville,  one  hundred  and  thirteen  miles  further,  to  re 
lieve  Burnside.  That  march  we  made.  Then  winter  forced 


472  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

us  to  lie  quiet.     During  that  winter  I  took  a  little  exercise 
down  the  river,  but  that  is  of  no  account." 

General  Buell  has  since  published  a  lengthy  reply  to  this 
speech,  showing,  by  official  documents :  I.  That  as  early  as 
the  3d  of  January,  1862,  he  himself  proposed  to  General  Hal- 
leek  the  identical  plan  of  operations  that  was  subsequently 
followed  ;  II.  That  General  Halleck  had  at  that  time  neither 
formed  nor  adopted  any  plan  of  operations  for  the  ensuing 
campaign.  General  Buell  also  endeavors  to  prove  that  the 
delays  which  occurred  in  the  execution  of  the  plan  were  not 
chargeable  to  him. 

The  prime  object  of  General  Sherman's  remarks,  however, 
was  simply  to  award  credit  which  he  supposed  due  to  one  who 
had  become  his  enemy.  To  that  end  he  stated  the  facts  as 
they  came  within  his  knowledge,  and  could  hardly  have  been 
expected  to  be  cognizant  of  the  confidential  dispatches  quoted 
by  General  Buell. 

From  St.  Louis,  General  Sherman  went  to  Chicago,  Colum 
bus,  and  other  places,  on  his  way  home,  everywhere  heartily 
greeted  by  the  people  and  the  returned  soldiers,  and  every 
where  compelled,  in  spite  of  himself,  to  satisfy  the  desire  of 
the  crowd  for  a  speech. 

After  his  return  to  St.  Louis,  General  Sherman  was  present, 
with  General  Grant,  at  a  banquet  given  to  a  party  of  English 
capitalists,  consisting  of  Mr.  James  McHenry,  the  Hon.  T. 
Kinnaird,  Sir  Morton  Peto,  and  others,  at  the  Southern  Hotel, 
on  .Thursday  night,  September  14th,  1865.  General  Grant, 
who  was  present,  having  been  in  vain  called  upon  to  reply  to  a 
toast,  General  Sherman  said  : — 

"  GENTLEMEN — I  regret  exceedingly  that  my  commanding 
general  will  not  respond  to  the  sentiment.  As  a  citizen  of  St. 
Louis,  rather  than  as  an  officer  in  the  army,  I  will  thank  these 
gentlemen  for  the  kindly  mention  they  have  made  of  General 
Grant,  the  whole  army,  and  myself.  I  believe  it  is  sincere.  I 
believe  they  appreciate  and  realize  the  fact  that  General 


AT   HOME.  473 

Gr  ant,  as  the  representative  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States 
has  had,  from  the  beginning  to  the  end,  but  one  single  pur 
pose  in  view.  He  has  not  sought  to  kill,  slay,  and  destroy, 
but  resolved  on  the  first  day  of  the  war  that  this  country 
should  live  one  and  inseparable  forever.  He  felt  as  we  all 
should  feel,  prepared  for  this  very  occasion,  when  honorable 
gentlemen  may  come  from  abroad,  and  not  have  occasion  to 
blush  that  the  sons  of  Englishmen  permitted  anarchy  and 
downfall  in  the  country  intrusted  to  them.  And  notwith 
standing  the  spirit  of  the  press  at  one  time  in  England,  I  be 
lieve  then  and  now  every  true  Anglo-Saxon,  every  Irishman, 
and  every  Scotchman  rejoiced,  and  rejoice  now,  that  we  are 
men,  and  that  we  did  not  permit  our  country  to  break  in  two 
or  many  sections.  And,  moreover,  I  believe  every  foreign 
nation — France,  Spain,  Germany,  and  Kussia — have  as  much 
interest  in  our  national  existence  as  we  have  ourselves ;  and 
now,  that  peace  is  once  more  attained,  these  gentlemen  come 
of  their  own  accord,  generously  and  kindly,  to  see  for  them 
selves  whether  we  merit  the  assistance  which  they  have  in 
abundance  to  develop  the  resources  of  our  country,  yet  new, 
with  forests  still  standing  on  nine-tenths  of  it.  They  seem  to 
be  impressed  favorably,  and  I  have  no  doubt,  in  their  influen 
tial  stations  abroad,  they  will  induce  thousands  and  millions 
to  think  and  feel  as  they  do.  They  have  seen  this  day  the 
iron-clads  stripped  of  their  armor.  They  have  seen  your  levee 
for  three  miles  lined  with  peaceful  steamboats  loaded  with 
corn  and  oats  to  go  to  that  Southern  country  with  which  we 
have  been  at  war.  They  see  the  lieutenant-general  of  all  our 
armies  dressed  as  a  citizen  at  this  table,  and  they  will  carry 
abroad  a  perfectly  comprehensive,  clear,  and  mathematical 
intelligence  that  we  are  at  peace,  that  we  want  peace,  and  that 
we  will  have  it,  even  at  the  expense  of  war. 

"  But  I  am  well  assured  that  there  is  no  nation  that  desires 
war  with  us  ;  that  every  question  that  can  p.ossibly  arise  can 
be  adjusted  by  statesmen,  by  merchants,  by  men  of  intelli 
gence  and  public  citizens,  assembled  together  just  as  you  are, 
discussing  just  as  you  would  the  affairs  of  the  Pacific  Railroad, 


474  SHERMAN    AND    HIS    CAMPAIGNS. 

or  any  thing  else — adjusting  differences,  striking  the  balance, 
and  paying  it  out  in  bank  when  called  for.  Therefore,  gentle 
men,  I  am  glad  to  see  you  among  us,  and  I  know  the  people 
of  St.  Louis  are  glad  to  see  you.  You  can  see  in  one  hour 
what  you  could  not  procure  by  reading  one  thousand  columns 
of  closely  printed  matter  in  the  London  Times.  There  are 
things  seen,  things  felt  within,  which  cannot  be  described. 
Even  Shakspeare  fails  to  convey  a  full  and  intelligent  descrip 
tion  of  many  thoughts,  and  no  author  can  convey  a  description 
of  a  place  or  locality  that  will  give  you  in  a  month  of  reading 
what  you  acquire  to-day  by  simply  running  back  and  forth  by 
our  city,  and  traversing  it  right  and  left  in  carriages. 

"  You  have  seen  the  streets  of  the  city  and  the  form  and 
manner  of  building,  arid  the  character  of  the  buildings  ;  and 
you  have  seen  where  but  a  few  years  ago  there  was  nothing 
but  a  wild  prairie,  and  where,  as  has  been  stated,  forty  years 
ago  there  was  but  a  French  village  of  four  thousand  inhabit 
ants,  and  you  find  yourself  in  a  palace — in  a  room  which  will 
compare  favorably  with  any  on  earth.  From  these  facts,  you 
can  arrive  at  conclusions  in  regard  to  the  future.  Whether 
vivid  or  not,  it  is  for  the  future.  The  present  you  have  seen 
for  yourselves.  You  have  seen  the  material  resources  of  the 
country.  The  people  of  the  country  have  heard  the  kindly 
words  which  you  have  spoken,  and  I  know  we  receive  it  in  the 
plain  British  meaning.  I,  therefore,  simply,  gentlemen,  beg 
to  assure  you  of  my  respect — a  respect  which  all  educated 
officers  in  the  army  bear  to  England,  and  ah1  nations  that  act 
fairly,  manfully,  and  without  concealment." 


CONCLUSION.  475 


CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

CONCLUSION. 

WHEN  Count  Segur,  in  giving  his  graphic  account  of  Napo 
leon's  great  Russian  campaign,  declared  it  was  impossible  to 
comprehend  the  great  events  of  history  without  a  perfect 
knowledge  of  the  character  and  manners  of  the  principal  actors, 
he  disclosed  a  profound  knowledge  of  his  art.  Such  know 
ledge  of  Sherman,  however,  can  only  be  had  by  being  associated 
with  him  both  at  home  and  in  the  field.  If  we  form  our  esti 
mate  of  General  Sherman's  character  and  manners  from  his 
brilliant  but  hasty  letters  and  military  reports  alone,  or  from 
the  record  of  his  military  career,  or  from  such  descriptions  of 
him  as  have  been  given  by  army  correspondents,  or  from  all 
these  sources  of  information  together,  we  will  be  likely  to  have 
a  very  imperfect  idea  of  the  man.  The  country,  however,  and 
the  world  will  probably  agree  in  according  him  military  genius 
of  a  high  order.  Indeed,  this  judgment  can  hardly  be  with 
held  without  obliterating  the  most  brilliant  achievements  of 
the  war,  still  fresh  in  the  memory  of  all. 

It  has  been  the  fortune  of  but  few  eminent  men  like  General 
Sherman,  to  receive  both  the  applause  and  abuse  usually  ac 
corded  to  greatness,  in  the  short  space  of  four  years.  It  is  too 
early  to  write  his  history.  Fifty  or  a  hundred  years  hence  he 
will  be  better  understood  than  now,  and  more  appreciated. 

In  personal  appearance  and  manners,  General  Sherman  is 
not  essentially  different  from  other  men  of  American  education 
and  culture.  At  this  writing,  he  is  past  forty-five  years  of  age, 
of  tall  and  commanding  form ;  and  a  stranger,  introduced  to 
him  for  the  first  time,  without  any  previous  knowledge  of  his 


476  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

real  character,  would  be  more  impressed  by  his  individuality 
than  by  his  personal  presence.'  His  head  is  large  and  well- 
developed,  and  covered  with  straight  auburn  hair.  His  eyes 
are  dark  hazel,  large  and  piercing.  He  wears  his  hair  care 
lessly,  and  his  beard  short-cropped.  The  pictures  of  him  in 
the  shop  windows  hardly  do  justice  to  his  actual  personal  ap 
pearance,  the  deep  lines  of  his  face  giving  him  the  aspect  of  a 
man  of  rather  harsh  and  repulsive  manners,  not  consonant 
with  his  ordinary  habits  and  character. 

General  Sherman  always  aims  at  what  is  practical,  solid, 
and  useful,  and  not  to  what  is  merely  specious  and  attractive. 
His  historical  researches  have,  accordingly,  been  of  greater 
use  to  him  in  actual  experience  than  those  of  many  a  more 
widely-read  student.  He  seems  to  have  read  history  for  the 
useful  lessons'  it  imparts  ;  to  learn  what  men  have  said  and 
done  in  the  past,  which  may  be  used  as  guides  for  the  future, 
just  as  he  would  judge  of  the  topography  of  a  country  on  the 
far  side  of  a  river,  which  he  cannot  see,  by  carefully  surveying 
the  side  he  can  see.  In  conversation  he  is  clear,  direct,  com 
prehensive,  and  intelligent.  In  social  life  he  is  exceedingly 
agreeable,  polite,  and  hospitable,  and  is  very  fond  of  children, 
generally  selecting  a  dancing  partner  from  the  little  girls.  His 
action  in  the  case  of  the  boy  Howe,  wounded  at  Vicksburg, 
and  who  showed  such  remarkable  presence  of  mind  amid 
danger,  illustrates  his  appreciation  of  boys  who  give  evidence 
of  uncommon  ability  and  promise.  Young  Howe  was  sent  to 
a  naval  school,  at  his  suggestion  ;  and  two  other  youths  were 
selected  by  him,  for  meritorious  conduct  in  the  field,  and  sent 
to  the  Government  academy  at  West  Point. 

During  the  autumn  of  1863,  General  Sherman  sent  for  his 
family  to  visit  him  at  his  military  camp  on  the  Big  Black,  in 
Mississippi,  to  enjoy  their  society  for  a  month  or  more,  while 
his  corps  was  being  prepared  for  other  operations.  On  the 
way  back  his  eldest  boy,  "Willie,  was  taken  ill  and  died.  He 
had  been  made,  by  vote  of  the  Thirteenth  Eegiment  United 
States  Infantry  (his  father's  old  regiment),  an  honor ary  ser 
geant  at  nine  years  of  age.  This  regiment  escorted  the  re- 


CONCLUSION.  477 

mains  of  the  little  sergeant,  and  bestowed  the  same  honors  as 
if  he  had  been  such  officer  in  fact,  which  so  touched  the  heart 
of  the  father  that  he  wrote  the  following  letter  of  acknowledg 
ment,  which  is  worthy  of  preservation  : — 

"  GAYOSO  HOUSE,  MEMPHIS,  TENN., 
October  4tli — Midnight. 

"  CAPTAIN  C.  C.  SMITH, 

Commanding  Battalion,  Thirteenth  Regulars  : 

"  MY  DEAR  FRIEND — I  cannot  sleep  to-night  till  I  record  an 
expression  of  the  deep  feelings  of  my  heart  to  you  and  to  the 
officers  and  soldiers  of  the  battalion  for  their  kind  behavior 
to  my  poor  child,  I  realize  that  you  all  feel  for  my  family 
the  attachment  of  kindred,  and  I  assure  you  all  of  full  reci 
procity. 

"  Consistent  with  a  sense  of  duty  to  my  profession  and  of 
fice  I  could  not  leave  my  post,  and  sent  for  my  family  to  come 
to  me  in  that  fatal  climate  and  in  that  sickly  period  of  the 
year  ;  and  behold  the  result !  The  child  that  bore  my  name, 
and  in  whose  future  I  reposed  with  more  confidence  than  I 
did  in  my  own  plans  of  life,  now  floats  a  mere  corpse,  seeking 
a  grave  in  a  distant  land,  with  a  weeping  mother,  brother, 
and  sisters  clustered  about  him.  But  for  myself,  I  can  ask 
no  sympathy.  On,  on  I  must  go  to  meet  a  soldier's  fate, 
or  see  my  country  rise  superior  to  ah1  factions,  till  its  flag 
is  adored  and  respected  by  ourselves  and  all  the  powers  of 
the  earth. 

"  But  my  poor  Willie  was,  or  thought  he  was,  a  sergeant  of 
the  Thirteenth.  I  have  seen  his  eye  brighten  and  his  heart 
beat  as  he  beheld  the  battalion  under  arms,  and  asked  me  if 
they  were  not  real  soldiers.  Child  as  he  was,  he  had  the  en 
thusiasm,  the  pure  love  of  truth,  honor,  and  love  of  country 
which  should  animate  all  soldiers. 

"God  only  knows  why  he  should  die  thus  young.  He  is 
dead  ;  but  will  not  be  forgotten  till  those  who  knew  him  in  life 
have  followed  him  to  that  same  mysterious  end. 

"  Please  convey  to  the  battalion  my  heartfelt  thanks ;  and 


478  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

assure  eacli  and  all  that  if  in  after  years  they  call  on  me  or 
mine,  and  mention  that  they  were  of  the  Thirteenth  Kegulars 
when  my  poor  "Willie  was  a  sergeant,  they  will  have  a  key  to 
the  affections  of  my  family  that  will  open  all  it  has — that  we 
will  share  with  them  our  last  blanket,  our  last  crust. 

"  Your  friend, 

"  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

'Major-General." 

General  Sherman  is  a  thorough  organizer,  and  believes  in 
the  necessity  of  adapting  means  to  proper  ends.  He  is  no 
fatalist ;  but,  like  Napoleon,  seems  to  think  "  the  gods  gener 
ally  favor  the  strongest  battalions  ;"  nevertheless,  he  prefers  to 
have  them  well  appointed,  disciplined,  and  handled  in  battle, 
lest  the  gods  might  happen  to  help  the  other  side.  But  he 
is  not  one  of  those  cool,  scientific,  methodical,  and  tenacious 
men,  bent  on  owing  every  thing  to  tactics  and  nothing  to  for 
tune,  and  calculating  every  thing,  even  the  chances  of  hazard  ; 
nor  yet  does  he  rush  into  battle  relying  chiefly  on  the  inspira 
tion  of  his  own  genius  and  the  happy  chances  of  fortune. 
Different  from  all  this,  his  theory  is,  so  far  as  it  can  be  deduced 
from  his  military  operations,  first  to  have  a  properly  appointed 
and  duly  proportioned  army  equal  to  the  undertaking  in  hand  ; 
next,  to  school  his  army  in  tactics,  so  as  to  make  it  capable  of 
quick  and  accurate  movement ;  th^n  to  accustom  it  to  battle 
in  minor  engagements  and  secondary  victories  ;  and  finally,  to 
strike  home  for  grand  results.  And  in  doing  this,  General 
Sherman  hesitates  at  no  detail  of  preparation  however  trifling, 
and  never  loses  sight  of  the  idea  that  every  thing,  after  all, 
must  depend  on  the  head  that  plans  and  the  hand  that  guides 
the  whole.  He  has  a  constitution  of  iron  and  nerves  of  steel ; 
and  his  thoughts  come  to  him  with  the  quickness  of  the  light 
ning  and  as  clear  as  the  light.  Before  starting  out  for  battle 
or  on  a  campaign,  he  always  makes  himself  acquainted  with 
every  road,  stream,  and  farm-house  on  his  line  of  march  ;  and 
having  these,  he  calculates,  with  surprising  accuracy,  the  to 
pography  of  the  country  though  he  never  saw  it.  He  was 


CONCLUSION.  479 

three  years  studying  the  route  of  his  campaigns  through 
Georgia  and  the  Carolinas  ;  not  that  he  had  any  reason  to  be 
lieve  he  would  be  called  upon  to  lead  an  army  over  it,  but 
because  he  saw  in  the  dim  future  such  a  campaign  would 
eventually  be  necessary  to  put  down  the  rebellion.  He  was  so 
impressed  with  this  idea  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  war,  that 
he  obtained  from  the  Census  Bureau  in  Washington  a  map, 
made  at  his  own  request,  of  the  Cotton  States,  with  a  table 
showing  the  cattle,  horses,  and  products  of  each  county,  ac 
cording  to  the  last  census  returns  reported  from  those  States  ; 
so  that  afterwards,  when  the  time  for  such  enterprise  arrived, 
he  was  practically  familiar  with  the  resources  of  the  whole 
country  on  his  line  of  march. 

General  Sherman's  military  orders  and  letters  are  models  of 
composition  ;  and  those  written  and  issued  by  him  during  his 
operations  from  Chattanooga  to  Raleigh  would,  without  much 
alteration,  make  an  instructive  hand-book  of  war.  His  habit 
is  to  look  at  every  thing  from  a  military  standpoint ;  and  he 
invariably  touches  the  salient  point  of  his  subject  in  the  cen 
tre.  By  both  natural  gift  and  education  a  soldier,  he  possesses 
a  soldier's  strength,  and  a  soldier's  high  sense  of  honor ;  and 
is  not  without  a  soldier's  foibles.  Straight-forward,  high- 
minded,  just,  and  honorable  himself,  he  has  no  patience  with 
such  as  resort  to  trickery  or  subterfuge  to  accomplish  their 
ends.  Of  the  trade  of  politicians  he  knows  but  little,  and  ever 
seemed  careless  to  learn.  He  was  once  nominated  for  public 
office,  some  years  ago,  in  California.  His  good-natured  but 
sarcastic  reply  was  :  "  Gentlemen,  I  am  not  eligible  ;  I  am  not 
properly  educated  to  hold  office."  To  understand  the  full 
force  of  the  expression,  it  must  be  remembered  it  was  uttered 
in  San  Francisco  ten  years  ago.  This  nomination  was  the 
commencement  of  his  political  career,  and  his  reply  was  the 
end  of  it. 

General  Sherman's  master  qualities  are  of  the  military 
order.  His  military  estimate  of  men  requires  the  most  heroic 
proportions  ;  his  written  orders  are  luminous  of  the  inspiration 
of  his  own  matchless  genius  ;  and  when  his  directions  to  sub- 


480  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

ordinates  in  command  are  given  orally,  they  are  absolutely 
irresistible  ;  and,  estimating  difficulties  by  his .  own  ability  to 
overcome  them,  he  usually  winds  up  by  saying  :  "  And  this 
must  be  done  at  any  expense  of  life  or  horseflesh."  He 
speaks  rapidly  and  distinctly,  without  hesitation,  and  using  the 
fewest  words  possible.  He  is  no  orator,  but  with  practice 
could  easily  become  a  public  speaker  of  more  than  ordinary 
power. 

General  Sherman,  in  moral  resources  and  in  that  peculiar 
power  to  inspire  confidence  and  command  men,  is  not  unlike 
the  popular  idea  of  Andrew  Jackson,  who,  as  all  the  world 
knows,  never  hesitated  to  "  take  the  responsibility,"  and  do 
what  he  thought  to  be  right,  no  matter  who  opposed.  His 
marvellous  power  over  his  troops  in  the  field  consists  in  his 
being  able  to  make  them  feel  they  are  the  best  troops  in  the 
world,  taking  good  care  to  make  them  so  by  never  allowing 
them  to  be  unnecessarily  beaten,  and  by  being  himself  equal 
to  the  high  courage  of  his  army  and  the  occasion  at  the  proper 
moment.  When  he  commanded  the  Fourth  Corps,  it  was,  in 
his  estimation,  the  best  corps  in  the  Armies  of  the  United 
States  ;  afterwards  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  the  best 
army  in  the  West,  because  it  was  his  ;  and,  finally,  when  he 
had  two  other  armies  under  his  command,  they  were  all  best. 
"  Show  me,"  said  Napoleon,  "  the  best  officer  in  the  regiment," 
"  Sire,  they  are  ah1  good."  "  Well,  but  point  out  to  me  the 
best."  "  Sire,  they  are  all  equally  good."  "  Come,  come,  that 
is  not  an  answer  ; — say,  like  Themistocles,  '  I  am  the  first,  my 
neighbor  is  the  second.'  '  "  Sire,  I  mention  Captain  Moncey, 
because  he  is  absent — he  was  wounded."  "  What,"  said  Na 
poleon,  "  Moncey,  my  page,  the  son  of  the  marshal  ?  Men 
tion  another."  "  Sire,  he  is  the  best."  "  Well,  then,  he  shall 
have  the  decoration." 

General  Sherman  seems  to  have  had  a  similar  regard  for 
such  as  were  wounded  or  disabled  while  serving  in  his  com 
mand.  His  letter-books  show  many  instances  of  this,  which 
the  following  extract  from  a  letter  written  to  a  wounded  officer 
will  sufficiently  illustrate  : — 


CONCLUSION.  481 

"  I  see  you  desire  promotion,  and  to  be  returned  to  duty  in 
the  field.  Indeed  will  I  aid  you  all  in  my  power  to  obtain 
what  you  merit  and  must  have.  The  loss  of  your  hand  is  no 
objection,  and  in  your  case  is  an  evidence  of  title  to  promo 
tion — with  your  one  arm  you  are  worth  half  a  dozen  ordinary 
men.  Your  left  hand,  guided  by  a  good  head  and  willing 
heart,  can  wield  the  sword  to  good  purpose.  I  inclose  you  a 
strong  letter  to  Governor  Todd,  urging  your  promotion." 

General  Sherman's  favorites  among  his  officers  were  such  as 
could  do  the  best.  He  was  always  severe  on  such  as  sought 
personal  advancement  by  unfair  means.  The  following  letter 
written  by  him  from  Atlanta,  under  date  of  July  25th,  1864, 
directed  to  Colonel  Hardie  at  the  War  Office  in  Washington, 
is  of  itself  more  descriptive  of  General  Sherman's  method  of 
treatment  in  such  cases  than  any  description  we  could  give  : — 

"  I  have  your  dispatch  of  yesterday  announcing  the  ap 
pointment  of  General -  as  major-general.  I  am  not  ob 
jecting  to  this  appointment,  but  I  wish  to  put  on  record  this 
my  emphatic  opinion,  that  it  is  an  act  of  injustice  to  officers 
who  stand  at  their  post  in  the  day  of  danger  to  neglect  them 
and  advance  such  as  Generals  -  -  and  -  — ,  who  left  us 
in  the  midst  of  bullets  to  go  to  the  rear  in  search  of  personal 
advancement.  If  the  rear  be  the  post  of  honor,  then  we  had 
better  change  front  on  Washington." 

In  further  illustration  of  General  Sherman's  characteristics 
in  the  field,  the  following  incident  is  given.  When  General 
Halleck  ordered  a  junction  of  the  Armies  of  the  Ohio  and 
Tennessee  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  in  the  spring  of  1862,  it  was 
a  part  of  his  plan  to  destroy  as  much  as  possible  of  the 
Charleston  and  Memphis  Railroad  between  Corinth  and  luka, 
in  order  to  embarrass  the  enemy  in  collecting  his  forces  and 
supplies  at  the  former  place.  This  had  been  twice  attempted 
by  General  Sherman  without  success.  It  was  now  determined 
to  make  another  attempt,  and  break  the  road  east  of  luka, 

31 


482  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

when  he  started  for  that  purpose  up  the  river  with  two  gun 
boats  and  a  detachment  of  infantry  under  command  of  Gen 
eral  Fry,  and  a  hundred  picked  cavalry  selected  from  the 
third  battalion  of  the  Fourth  Illinois  Cavalry,  under  command 
of  Major  Bowman,  on  transports,  and  landed  in  the  night  at 
Chickasaw,  above  the  mouth  of  Bear  Creek,  and  quietly  in 
vested  the  town  while  the  inhabitants  were  asleep.  Before 
daylight  General  Sherman  had  succeeded,  by  some  means,  in 
finding  an  intelligent  negro  acquainted  with  the  country  and 
the  roads,  and  from  information  derived  from  him  quickly 
sketched  a  map  of  the  country  for  the  use  of  the  cavalry.  All 
things  being  arranged  for  the  start,  he  called  General  Fry  and 
Major  Bowman  one  side  and  gave  them  their  orders  :  "  The 
object  of  this  expedition  is,"  said  Sherman,  "  to  destroy  the 
railroad-bridge  across  Bear  Creek  and  the  tressel-work  on  this 
side.  I  have  tried  twice  to  break  that  road — it  must  be  done 
now  at  any  cost — it  is  worth  millions  to  the  Government — to 
fail  now  will  be  a  disgrace  to  us  all.  Major,  I  expect  you  to 
surprise  the  guards,  seize  the  bridge  and  burn  it.  I  will  look 
for  the  smoke  about  noon.  General  Fry,  you  march  out  on 
the  pike  and  prevent  the  enemy  from  sending  forces  from  luka, 
to  cut  off  the  retreat,  and  if  you  hear  fighting  by  the  cavalry, 
burn  the  turnpike  bridge  and  hurry  on  to  the  support  of  the 
cavalry." 

The  work  was  done  precisely  as  ordered,  and  our  troops 
returned  to  the  gunboats  the  same  night,  a  part  of  the  infantry 
having  marched  thirty-four  miles. 

It  will  be  seen,  by  the  foregoing,  there  is  much  in  Sherman's 
manner  and  style  of  command  to  remind  the  reader  of  Soult : 
"  I  have  chosen  you,"  said  that  consummate  general,  address 
ing  himself  to  that  most  daring  officer,  Major  Dulong — "  I 
have  chosen  you,  from  the  whole  army,  to  seize  the  Ponte 
Neva,  which  has  been  cut  by  the  enemy.  Select  a  hundred 
grenadiers  and  twenty-five  horsemen ;  endeavor  to  surprise 
the  guards  and  secure  the  passage  of  the  bridge.  If  you 
succeed,  say  so ;  but  send  no  other  report — your  silence  will 
suffice." 


CONCLUSION.  483 

General  Sherman  seems  to  comprehend  the  value  of  time  in 
war.  Every  thing  that  he  says  in  the  presence  of  his  officers, 
and  all  that  he  does,  inspires  all  around  him  with  the  idea 
that  not  a  moment  must  be  lost.  Above  all  his  other  excellences 
shine  his  promptitude,  celerity,  and  immeasurable  activity. 
Always  ready  for  the  start,  indefatigable  on  the  march,  omni 
present  in  battle,  relentless  in  pursuit,  unfailing  in  mental 
resources,  fruitful  of  expedients,  enthusiastic  in  victory,  he 
seems  to  carry  his  army  in  his  hand  and  push  it  forward  with 
irresistible  power.  In  all  military  movements  his  strict 
punctuality  is  observable.  In  his  own  words,  he  "  is  always 
on  time  ;"  whether  starting  from  Vicksburg  to  Chattanooga  on 
an  hour's  notice,  or  turning  to  the  relief  of  Knoxville,  or  mov 
ing  down  on  Dalton  on  the  very  day  appointed,  or  in  the  great 
marches  to  the  sea  and  through  the  Carolinas. 

"  Tell  my  old  friend,  D.  D.  Porter,  to  look  out  for  me  about 
Christmas,"  he  wrote  from  Gaylesville  ;  four  days  before  that 
time  his  army  occupied  Savannah.  His  chief  quartermaster 
and  chief  commissary  were  told  to  expect  him  on  the  North 
Carolina  coast  on  the  15th  of  March.  On  the  14th  he  entered 
Fayetteville  and  communicated  with  the  sea. 

It  will  probably  be  the  judgment  of  history  that  the  deliver 
ance  of  the  country  was  not  due  so  much  to  the  foresight  and 
ability  of  the  administration  and  Congress  as  to  the  skill  of 
our  generals  in  the  field,  and  the  courage  of  our  troops,  whom 
no  dangers  could  daunt  and  no  hardships  dishearten.  Grant 
was  made  lieutenant-general  to  remedy  the  internal  errors  of 
the  War  Department  at  Washington,  and  Sherman's  capture 
of  Atlanta  saved  the  presidential  election  and  stimulated  the 
patriotism  of  the  people.  While  Sherman  was  leading  his 
conquering  legions  to  the  sea,  Congress  was  hesitating  about 
filling  up  pur  decimated  ranks  by  a  general  draft,  rendering 
the  great  result  doubtful  at  the  very  threshold  of  eventful 
triumph.  "  Give  us  a  universal  draft,"  wrote  Sherman  from 
the  battle-field  near  Atlanta  ;  "  any  man  who  can  fight  and 
won't  fight  now,  ought  to  be  made  to  fight,  or  be  banished  or 
denationalized." 


484  SHERMAN   AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Mr.  Lincoln,  Mr.  Stanton,  and  General  Halleck  had  jointly 
and  severally  managed  the  war  until  the  military  establish 
ment  had  been  well-nigh  destroyed,  and  the  resources  of  the 
country  well-nigh  exhausted.  No  one  understood  this  better 
than  Mr.  Lincoln  himself,  and  none  were  more  free  to  acknow 
ledge  it.  "  You  know,"  he  declared  to  Mr.  Stanton.  "  we  have 
been  trying  to  manage  this  war  thus  far,  but  without  success. 
I  promised  General  Grant,  when  he  accepted  his  present  office, 
he  should  not  be  interfered  with  in  his  military  plans  and 
operations  by  mere  civilians.  I  think  we  will  be  obliged  to 
let  Mr.  Grant  (as  Mrs.  Grant  calls  him)  have  his  own  way  ;" 
and  this  simple  declaration  was  worth  forty  thousand  men  in 
the  field. 

"  When  you  were  about  to  leave  Atlanta  for  the  Atlantic," 
wrote  Mr.  Lincoln  to  General  Sherman,  "  I  was  anxious,  if  not 
fearful.  Now,  the  undertaking  being  a  success,  the  honor  is 
all  yours,  for  I  believe  none  of  us  went  further  than  to  acqui 
esce."  "  Not  only,  he  continued,  "  does  it  afford  the  obvious 
and  immediate  military  advantages,"  etc.,  but  "it  brings  those 
who  sat  in  darkness  to  see  a  great  light." 

The  preacher  tells  us,  "  no  man  can  serve  two  masters,"  and 
the  maxim  is  as  true  in  war  as  in  religion.  General  Sherman 
found  it  comparatively  easy  to  co-operate  with  the  President ; 
his  honest,  candid,  out-spoken,  and  enterprising  character 
were  such  as  Mr.  Lincoln  most  needed  and  most  admired. 
Sherman's  practical  character,  his  knowledge  of  business,  his 
quickness  of  perception,  and  rapidity  of  execution,  his  clear 
statement,  his  ready  answers,  his  accurate  and  varied  intelli 
gence  on  all  subjects,  whether  as  to  the  qualities  of  a  horse, 
the  proper  keel  of  a  steamboat,  the  length  and  depth  of  a 
river,  the  outfit  of  an  army,  or  the  laws  of  war,  were  precisely 
those  qualities  that  charmed  Mr.  Lincoln,  whose  mind  ever 
recurred  to  what  was  useful  rather  than  ornamental.  Even 
Sherman's  frank,  bold,  and  honest  opposition  to  measures 
favored  by  Mr.  Lincoln  himself  pleased  him,  especially  in  re 
gard  to  matters  connected  with  the  army,  such  as  trade  in 
cotton  and  negro  recruiting  by  Massachusetts  agents  ;  and  no 


CONCLUSION.  485 

one  enjoyed  Sherman's  peculiar  spice  more  than  he  did.  Mr. 
Lincoln  sought  that  light  which  conies  from  above,  but  he  did 
not  arrogantly  despise  the  wisdom  of  man.  He  greatly  ad 
mired  Sherman,  and  Sherman  in  turn  strove  earnestly  and 
honestly  to  execute  his  policy. 

But  not  so  with  Mr.  Stanton,  who  is  liable  to  false  impres 
sions  beyond  most  men,  is  arrogant  and  proud  of  his  arro 
gance,  as  if  it  were  a  virtue  ;  fond  of  power,  and  unscrupulous 
in  its  exercise  ;  tenacious  of  his  opinions,  and  holding  on  to 
them  with  a  tenacity  in  proportion  to  their  grossiiess,  and  often 
rash  in  the  exercise  of  his  enormous  power,  he  will  appear  to 
the  reader  in  strange  contrast  with  the  mild  and  judicious 
character  of  Mr.  Lincoln.  But  he  was  probably  the  man  for 
the  place  for  the  time  being.  It  was  the  boast  of  Prince  Met- 
ternich  that  he  served,  during  the  period  when  Napoleon  was 
upturning  thrones,  as  the  grand  high-constable  for  all  the 
crown-heads  of  Europe,  and  Mr.  Stanton  has  been  ours  during 
our  own  great  civil  war.  Such  a  man  was  necessary,  and  he 
will  take  his  place  in  the  history  of  the  country.  But  if  Sher 
man  disliked  Stanton  because  he  could  not  understand  him, 
Stanton  in  turn  hated  Sherman  ;  and  the  personal  collision 
which  came  at  last  makes  it  necessary  for  the  reader  to  make 
the  acquaintance  of  both.  Like  Castor  and  Pollux  among  the 
constellations,  it  is  difficult  to  look  at  one  without  seeing  the 
other.  If  Mr.  Stanton  is  a  great  organizer  of  war — "  like 
Carnot" — he  fights  battles  like  a  Brutus.  "  I  little  dreamed," 
wrote  Sherman  to  General  HaUeck,  "  when  you  warned  me  of 
the  assassin  Clark  being  on  my  track,  he  would  turn  up  in 
the  direction  and  guise  he  did."  Caesar's  last  speech — "  Et 
tu  Brute" — was  more  terse,  but  not  more  expressive  than 
this. 


General  Sherman  was  born  of  New  England  parents,  and 
descended  from  New  England  stock.  He  was  probably  all  the 
better  for  being  born  in  the  then  far  West,  amid  the  wilds,  the 
hardships,  and  primitive  people  of  the  frontier.  The  children 
of  New  England,  like  cereals,  are  often  improved  by  trans- 


486  SHERMAN   AND   HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

planting.  On  the  western  slope  of  the  Alleghany  Mountains 
the  lands  are  richer,  the  rivers  larger  and  longer,  the  lakes  are 
magnificent,  the  prairies  are  almost  boundless,  and  the  climate 
is  salubrious.  There  is  ample  room  for  all,  food  for  all,  work 
for  all,  and  happiness  for  all.  It  was  good  fortune  and  happi 
ness  to  be  born  in  such  a  country.  Society  there  was  less 
conventional  than  in  any  other  section  of  the  country ;  reli 
gious  denominations  were  more  tolerant,  religious  creeds 
pinched  the  conscience  less,  and  the  population  was  more 
transient.  In  early  times  in  the  West,  men  seemed  to  forget 
for  awhile  the  creeds  to  which  they  were  educated.  Presby 
terians  often  became  Methodists  or  Baptists,  and  Baptists  be 
came  Presbyterians  ;  and  some  of  each  became  Catholics,  and 
Catholics,  in  turn,  became  Protestants,  according  to  the  cir 
cumstances  of  each  case.  The  ways  to  heaven  were  regarded 
like  railways — the  traveller  ready  to  start  on  his  momentous 
journey  would  generally  take  the  first  train  of  cars  that  came 
along,  without  special  inquiry  as  to  the  character  of  the  parties 
who  owned  the  stock  and  run  the  road,  taking  his  chances  of 
making  connections  with  the  great  "  highway"  as  he  neared 
his  eternal  home.  Sherman's  parents  were  Episcopalians,  but 
the  Episcopal  Church  was  not  well  adapted  to  small  settle 
ments  in  the  backwoods  ;  or  if  well  adapted,  was  unable  to 
keep  track  of  all  its  flock  scattered  throughout  the  broad  ex 
panse,  and  hence  the  family  availed  themselves  of  such  pious 
advantages,  for  awhile,  as  the  Presbyterian  Church  could 
afford.  But  General  Sherman,  while  he  has  a  sincere  admira 
tion  for  good  Christians,  has  a  most  provoking  disregard  for 
religious  creeds,  regarding  them  as  a  sort  of  relative  good  or 
necessary  evil,  depending  more  or  less  upon  the  intelligence, 
honesty,  and  general  excellence  of  the  men  who  instruct,  lead, 
and  control  the  religious  impulses  of  the  human  heart  in  their 
respective  "  commands."  His  appreciation  of  a  Christian  sol 
dier  may  be  inferred  from  the  following. 

"  At  my  last  interview  with  Mr.  Lincoln,"  he  wrote  to  Mr. 
James  E.  Yeatman  of  the  United  States  Sanitary  Commission, 
May  21,  1865,  "  on  his  boat  anchored  in  James  Eiver,  in  the 


CONCLUSION.  487 

midst  of  the  army,  your  name  came  up  as  one  spoken  of  to  fill 
the  office  of  commissioner  of  refugees,  freedmen,  etc.,  and  I  vol 
unteered  my  assertion  that  if  you  would  accept  office,  which 
I  doubted,  the  bureau  could  not  go  into  more  kind  and  chari 
table  hands  ;  but  since  that  time  the  office  has,  properly 
enough,  been  given  to  General  Howard,  who  has  held  high 
command  under  me  for  more  than  a  year  ;  and  I  am  sure  you 
will  be  pleased  to  know  that  he  is  as  pure  a  man  as  ever  lived, 
a  strict  Christian,  and  a  model  soldier,  the  loss  of  an  arm  at 
testing  his  service.  He  will  do  all  that  one  man  can  do,  if  not 
forced  to  undertake  impossibilities,"  etc. 

General  Howard,  it  is  well  known,  has  been  pious  and  ex 
emplary  from  his  boyhood,  was  ever  faithful  and  devoted  in 
the  discharge  of  his  religious  duties,  and  this  even  while  a 
student  at  West  Point.  He  carried  his  religious  principles 
with  him  into  the  army,  and  was  guided  and  governed  by 
them  in  all  his  relations  with  his  officers  and  men.  No  matter 
who  was  permitted  to  share  his  mess  or  partake  of  his  repast, 
whether  the  lowest  subaltern  of  his  command  or  General 
Sherman  himself,  no  one  thought  to  partake,  if  General  How 
ard  were  present,  without  first  the  invocation  of  the  Divine 
blessing,  himself  usually  leading,  like  the  head  of  a  family. 
General  Sherman  seems  greatly  to  have  admired  the  Christian 
character  of  General  Howard,  making  frequent  mention  of  him 
in  his  correspondence  in  terms  similar  to  those  above  quoted ; 
and  not  only  as  a  Christian  but  as  a  soldier,  preferring  him 
and  promoting  him  to  the  command  of  one  of  his  armies. 

From  the  same  letter  from  which  the  last  extract  was  taken, 
we  make  a  further  extract  in  regard  to  the  Andersonville  pris 
oners  and  the  conclusion  of  the  war  : — 

"  I  was  as  glad  as  you  could  have  been  to  learn  that  those 
boxes  of  stores,  prepared  by  you  with  so  much  care  and 
promptness  for  the  Andersonville  prisoners,  reached  them  at 
last.  I  don't  think  I  ever  set  my  heart  so  strongly  on  any 
one  thing  as  I  did  in  attempting  to  rescue  those  prisoners ; 
and  I  had  almost  feared  instead  of  doing  them  good  I  had 


488  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

actually  done  them  harm,  for  they  were  changed  from  place 
to  place  to  avoid  me,  and  I  could  not  -with  infantry  overtake 
railroad  trains.  But  at  last  their  prison-doors  are  open ;  and 
I  trust  we  have  arrived  at  a  point  when  further  war  or  battle, 
or  severity,  other  than  the  punishment  of  crime  by  civil  tribu 
nals,  is  past. 

"  You  will  have  observed  how  fiercely  I  have  been  assailed 
for  simply  offering  to  the  President  *  terms'  for  his  approval 
or  disapproval,  according  to  his  best  judgment — terms  which, 
if  fairly  interpreted,  mean,  and  only  mean,  an  actual  submis 
sion  by  the  rebel  armies  to  the  civil  authority  of  the  United 
States.  No  one  can  deny  I  have  done  the  State  some  service 
in  the  field,  but  I  have  always  desired  that  strife  should  cease 
at  the  earliest  possible  moment.  I  confess,  without  shame,  I 
am  sick  and  tired  of  fighting — its  glory  is  all  moonshine  ;  even 
success  the  most  brilliant  is  over  dead  and  mangled  bodies, 
with  the  anguish  and  lamentations  of  distant  families,  appeal 
ing  to  me  for  sons,  husbands,  and  fathers.  You,  too,  have 
seen  these  things,  and  I  know  you  also  are  tired  of  the  war, 
and  are  willing  to  let  the  civil  tribunals  resume  their  place. 
And,  so  far  as  I  know,  all  the  fighting  men  of  our  army  want 
peace  ;  and  it  is  only  those  who  have  never  heard  a  shot,  never 
heard  the  shrieks  and  groans  of  the  wounded  and  lacerated 
(friend  or  foe),  that  cry  aloud  for  more  blood,  more  vengeance, 
more  desolation.  I  know  the  rebels  are  whipped  to  death,  and 
I  declare  before  God,  as  a  man  and  a  soldier,  I  will  not  strike 
a  foe  who  stands  unarmed  and  submissive  before  me,  but 
would  rather  say — '  Go,  and  sin  no  more.'  " 

In  another  letter,  to  Chief-Justice  Chase,  written  about  the 
same  time,  General  Sherman  says  : — 

"  I  have  had  abundant  opportunities  of  knowing  these  people 
(the  people  of  the  South),  both  before  the  war,  during  its  ex 
istence,  and  since  their  public  acknowledgment  of  submission 
to  the  national  authority,  and  I  have  no  fear  of  them,  armed 
or  disarmed,  and  believe  that  by  one  single  stroke  of  the  pen, 


CONCLUSION.  489 

nine-tenths  of  them  can  be  restored  to  full  relations  with  our 
Government,  so  as  to  pay  taxes  and  live  in  peace  ;  and  in  war 
I  would  not  hesitate  to  mingle  with  them  and  lead  them  to 
battle  against  our  national  foes.  But  we  must  deal  with  them 
with  frankness  and  candor,  and  not  with  doubt,  hesitancy,  and 
prevarication.  The  nine-tenths  would,  from  motives  of  self- 
interest,  restrain  the  other  mischievous  tenth,  or  compel  them 
to  migrate  to  some  other  country,  like  Mexico,  cursed  with 
anarchy  and  civil  war." 

And  in  a  letter  to  General  Schofield,  under  date  of  May  28, 
1865,  General  Sherman  wrote  on  the  same  subject : — 

"  I  have  watched  your  course  in  North  Carolina  and  approve 
it.  Maintain  peace  and  good  order,  and  let  law  and  harmony 
grow  up  naturally.  I  would  have  preferred  to  leap  more 
directly  to  the  result,  but  the  same  end  may  be  attained  by  the 
slower  process  you  adopt. 

"  So  strong  has  become  the  National  Government,  by  reason 
of  our  successful  war,  that  I  laugh  at  the  fears  of  those  who 
dread  that  rebels  may  regain  some  political  power  in  their 
several  States.  Supposing  they  do,  it  is  but  local,  and  can  in 
no  way  endanger  the  whole  country. 

"  I  think  I  see  already  signs  that  events  are  sweeping  all  to 
the  very  conclusion  I  jumped  at  in  my  '  terms,'  but  I  have  re 
frained  from  discussing  them  on  their  merits,  till  in  after  times 
when  it  may  be  demonstrated  that  the  plan  sketched  by  me 
was  at  least  in  the  right  direction  and  constitutional,  whether 
popular  or  not.  The  people  of  this  country  are  subject  to  the 
constitution,  and  even  they  cannot  disregard  it  without  a  revo 
lution,  the  very  thing  we  have  been  fighting  against." 

Such  were  General  Sherman's  views  and  sentiments,  as 
stated  by  himself,  in  the  midst  of  stirring  events  of  the  times. 
They  may  be  popular  or  unpopular,  but  no  one  will  dispute 
the  sincerity  with  which  they  were  uttered.  A  more  honest 
man  than  General  Sherman  does  not  live,  and  he  is  as  gen- 


490  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

erous  as  he  is  honest.  Let  those  who  shall  come  after  us 
judge  the  man  and  his  actions.  To  this  test  all  men  must 
submit.  Time  ever  withers  the  laurels  of  the  selfish  and 
base,  but  freshens  the  beauty  of  virtue.  Sherman  can  afford 
to  wait. 


APPENDIX. 


i. 

TESTIMONY   OF   GENERAL   SHERMAN 

BEFORE  THE  COMMITTEE  ON  THE  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR,  RELATIVE 
TO  THE  TRUCE. 

EXAMINED  BY  THE  CHAIRMAN  : 

Question.  What  is  your  rank  in  the  army  ? 

Answer.  I  ani  major-general  in  the  regular  army. 

Q.  As  your  negotiation  with  the  rebel  General  Johnston,  in 
relation  to  his  surrender,  has  been  the  subject  of  much  public 
comment,  the  committee  desire  you  to  state  all  the  facts  and 
circumstances  in  regard  to  it,  or  which  you  wish  the  public  to 
know. 

A.  On  the  15th  day  of  April  last  I  was  at  Raleigh,  in  com 
mand  of  three  armies,  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  and  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  ;  my  enemy  was 
General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  of  the  Confederate  army,  who 
commanded  fifty  thousand  men,  retreating  along  the  railroad 
from  Raleigh,  by  Hillsboro',  Greensboro',  Salisbury,  and  Char 
lotte.  I  commenced  pursuit  by  crossing  the  curve  of  that  road 
in  the  direction  of  Ashboro'  and  Charlotte.  After  the  head  of 
my  column  had  crossed  the  Cape  Fear  River  at  Aven's  Ferry, 
I  received  a  communication  from  General  Johnston,  and  an 
swered  it,  copies  of  which  I  most  promptly  sent  to  the  War 
Department,  with  a  letter*  addressed  to  the  secretary  of  war, 
as  follows. 


492  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

I  met  General  Johnston  in  person,  at  a  house  five  miles  from 
Durham's  Station,  under  a  flag  of  truce.  After  a  few  prelim 
inary  remarks,  he  said  to  me,  since  Lee  had  surrendered  his 
army  at  Appomattox  Courthouse,  of  which  he  had  just  been 
advised,  he  looked  upon  further  opposition  by  him  as  the 
greatest  possible  of  crimes  ;  that  he  wanted  to  know  whether 
I  could  make  him  any  general  concessions  ;  any  thing  by 
which  he  could  maintain  his  hold  and  control  of  his  army,  and 
prevent  its  scattering  ;  any  thing  to  satisfy  the  great  yearning 
of  their  people.  If  so,  he  thought  he  could  arrange  terms 
satisfactory  to  both  parties.  He  wanted  to  embrace  the 
condition  and  fate  of  ah1  the  armies  of  the  Southern  Confed 
eracy  to  the  Eio  Grande, — to  make  one  job  of  it,  as  he 
termed  it. 

I  asked  him  what  his  powers  were, — whether  he  could  com 
mand  and  control  the  fate  of  all  the  armies  to  the  Rio  Grande. 
He  answered  that  he  thought  he  could  obtain  the  power,  but 
he  did  not  possess  it  at  that  moment ;  he  did  not  know  where 
Mr.  Davis  was,  but  he  thought  if  I  could  give  him  the  time, 
he  could  find  Mr.  Breckinridge,  whose  orders  would  be  obeyed 
everywhere,  and  he  could  pledge  me  his  personal  faith  that 
whatever  he  undertook  to  do  would  be  done. 

I  had  had  frequent  correspondence  with  the  late  President 
of  the  United  States,  with  the  secretary  of  war,  with  General 
Halleck,  and  with  General  Grant,  and  the  general,  impression 
left  upon  my  mind  was,  that  if  a  settlement  could  be  made, 
consistent  with  the  constitution  of  tlie  United  States,  the  laws 
of  Congress,  and  the  proclamation  of  the  President,  they  would 
not  only  be  willing,  but  pleased  to  terminate  the  war  by  one 
single  stroke  of  the  pen. 

I  needed  time  to  finish  the  railroad  from  the  Neuse  Bridge 
up  to  Raleigh,  and  thought  I  could  put  in  four  or  five  days  of 
good  time  in  making  repairs  to  my  road,  even  if  1  had  to  send 
propositions  to  Washington.  I  therefore  consented  to  delay 
twenty-four  hours,  to  enable  General  Johnston  to  procure 
what  would  satisfy  me  as  to  his  authority  and  ability,  as  a 
military  man,  to  do  what  he  undertook  to  do.  I  therefore 


APPENDIX.  493 

consented  to  meet  him  the  next  day,  the  17th,  at  twelve  o'clock 
noon,  at  the  same  place. 

We  did  meet  again ;  after  a  general  interchange  of  courte 
sies,  he  remarked  that  he  was  then  prepared  to  satisfy  me  that 
he  could  fulfil  the  terms  of  our  conversation  of  the  day  before. 
He  then  asked  me  what  I  was  willing  to  do.  I  told  him,  in 
the  first  place,  I  could  not  deal  with  anybody  except  men 
recognized  by  us  as  "belligerents,"  because  no  military  man 
could  go  beyond  that  fact.  The  attorney-general  has  since  so 
decided,  and  any  man  of  common  sense  so  understood  it  be 
fore  ;  there  was  no  difference  upon  that  point  as  to  the  men 
and  officers  accompanying  the  Confederate  armies.  I  told 
him  that  the  President  of  the  United  States,  by  a  published 
proclamation,  had  enabled  every  man  in  the  Southern  Con 
federate  army,  of  the  rank  of  colonel  and  under,  to  procure 
and  obtain  amnesty,  by  simply  taking  the  oath  of  allegiance 
to  the  United  States,  and  agreeing  to  go  to  his  home  and  live 
in  peace.  The  terms  of  General  Grant  to  General  Lee  ex 
tended  the  same  principles  to  the  officers,  of  the  rank  of  brig 
adier-general  and  upward,  including  the  highest  officer  in  the 
Confederate  army,  viz.,  General  Lee,  the  commander-in-chief. 
I  was,  therefore,  willing  to  proceed  with  him  upon  the  same 
principles. 

Then  a  conversation  arose  as  to  what  form  of  government 
they  were  to  have  in  the  South.  Were  the  States  there  to 
be  dissevered,  and  were  the  people  to  be  denied  representa 
tion  in  Congress?  Were  the  people  there  to  be,  in  the  com 
mon  language  of  the  people  of  the  South,  slaves  to  the  people 
of  the  North  ?  Of  course,  I  said  "  No ;  we  desire  that  you 
shall  regain  your  position  as  citizens  of  the  United  States,  free 
and  equal  to  us  in  all  respects,  and  wish  representation  upon 
the  condition  of  submission  to  the  lawful  authority  of  the 
United  States,  as  defined  by  the  Constitution,  the  United 
States  courts,  and  the  authority  of  the  United  States  sup 
ported  by  those  courts."  He  then  remarked  to  me  that  Gen 
eral  Breckinridge,  a  major-general  in  the  Confederate  army, 
was  near  by,  and  if  I  had  no  objection,  he  would  like  to  have 


494  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

him  present.  I  called  his  attention  to  the  fact  that  I  had,  on 
the  day  before,  explained  to  him  that  any  negotiations  between 
us  must  be  confined  to  belligerents.  He  replied  that  he  un 
derstood  that  perfectly.  "But,"  said  he,  "  Brecldnridge, 
whom  you  do  not  know,  save  by  public  rumor  as  secretary  of 
war,  is,  in  fact,  a  major-general ;  I  give  you  my  word  for  that. 
Have  you  any  objection  to  his  being  present  as  a  major-gen 
eral?"  I  replied,  "I  have  no  objection  to  any  military  officer 
you  desire  being  present  as  a  part  of  your  personal  staff."  I, 
myself,  had  my  own  officers  near  me  at  call. 

Breckinridge  came,  a  stranger  to  me,  whom  I  had  never 
spoken  to  in  my  life,  and  he  joined  in  the  conversation  ;  while 
that  conversation  was  going  on  a  courier  arrived  and  handed 
to  General  Johnston  a  package  of  papers ;  he  and  Breckin 
ridge  sat  down  and  looked  over  them  for  some  time,  and  put 
them  away  in  their  pockets  :  what  they  were,  I  know  not,  but 
one  of  them  was  a  slip  of  paper,  written,  as  General  Johnston 
told  me,  by  Mr.  Reagan,  postmaster-general  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy  :  they  seemed  to  talk  about  it  sotto  voce,  and 
finally  handed  it  to  me.  I  glanced  over  it :  it  was  preceded  by 
a  preamble  and  closed  with  a  few  general  terms.  I  rejected  it 
at  once. 

We  then  discussed  matters  ;  talked  about  slavery,  talked 
about  every  thing.  There  was  a  universal  assent  that  slavery 
was  as  dead  as  any  thing  could  be ;  that  it  was  one  of  the 
issues  of  the  war  long  since  determined  ;  and  even  General 
Johnston  laughed  at  the  folly  of  the  Confederate  government 
in  raising  negro  soldiers,  whereby  they  gave  us  all  the  points 
of  the  case.  I  told  them  that  slavery  had  been  treated  by  us 
as  a  dead  institution,  first  by  one  class  of  men  from  the  initia 
tion  of  the  war,  and  then  from  the  date  of  the  emancipation 
proclamation  of  President  Lincoln,  and  finally  by  the  assent 
of  all  parties.  As  to  reconstruction,  I  told  them  I  did  not 
know  what  the  views  of  the  administration  were.  Mr.  Lincoln, 
up  to  that  time,  in  letters  and  telegrams  to  me,  encouraged  me 
by  all  the  words  which  could  be  used  in  general  terms,  to 
believe,  not  only  in  his  willingness,  but  in  his  desires  that  I 


APPENDIX.  495 

should  make  terms  with  civil  authorities,  governors,  and  legis 
latures,  even  as  far  back  as  1863.  It  then  occurred  to  me 
that  I  might  write  off  some  general  propositions,  meaning 
little  or  much,  according  to  the  construction  of  parties — what 
I  would  term  "glittering  generalities" — and  send  them  to 
Washington,  which  I  could  do  in  four  days.  That  would 
enable  the  new  President  to  give  me  a  clue  to  his  policy  in  the 
important  juncture  which  was  then  upon  us  :  for  the  war  was 
over  ;  the  highest  military  authorities  of  the  Southern  Con 
federacy  so  confessed  to  me  openly,  unconcealedly,  and  re 
peatedly.  I  therefore  drew  up  the  memorandum  (which  has 
been  published  to  the  world)*  for  the  purpose  of  referring 
it  to  the  proper  executive  authority  of  the  United  States,  and 
enabling  him  to  define  to  me  what  I  might  promise,  simply  to 
cover  the  pride  of  the  Southern  men,  who  thereby  became 
subordinate  to  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  civil  and  military. 
I  made  no  concessions  to  General  Johnston's  army,  or  the 
troops  under  his  direction  and  immediate  control ;  and  if  any 
concessions  were  made  in  those  general  terms,  they  were  made 
because  I  then  believed,  and  now  believe,  they  would  have 
delivered  into  the  hands  of  the  United  States  the  absolute 
control  of  every  Confederate  officer  and  soldier,  all  their 
muster-rolls,  and  ah1  their  arms.  It  would  save  us  all  the 
incidental  expense  resulting  from  the  military  occupation  of 
that  country  by  provost-marshals,  provost-guards,  military 
governors,  and  all  the  machinery  by  which  alone  military 
power  can  reach  the  people  of  a  civilized  country.  It  would 
have  surrendered  to  us  the  armies  of  Dick  Taylor  and  Kirby 
Smith,  both  of  them  capable  of  doing  infinite  mischief  to  us, 
by  exhausting  the  resources  of  the  whole  country  upon  which 
we  were  to  depend  for  the  future  extinguishment  of  our  debt, 
forced  upon  us  by  their  wrongful  and  rebellious  conduct.  I 
never  designed  to  shelter  a  human  being  from  any  liability 
incurred  in  consequence  of  past  acts  to  the  civil  tribunals  of 
our  country,  and  I  do  not  believe  a  fair  and  manly  interpreta- 

*  See  the  original  truce,  page  394. 


496  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

tion  of  my  terms  can  so  construe  them,  for  the  words  "  United 
States  courts,"  "  United  States  authorities,"  "  limitations  of 
executive  power,"  occur  in  every  paragraph.  And  if  they 
seemingly  yield  terms  better  than  the  public  would  desire  to 
be  given  to  the  Southern  people,  if  studied  closely  and  well  it 
will  be  found  that  there  is  an  absolute  submission  on  their 
part  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  either  through 
its  executive,  legislative,  or  judicial  authorities.  Every  step 
in  the  programme  of  these  negotiations  was  reported  punctu 
ally,  clearly,  and  fully,  by  the  most  rapid  means  of  communica 
tion  that  I  had.  And  yet  I  neglected  not  one  single  precau 
tion  necessary  to  reap  the  full  benefits  of  my  position,  in  case 
the  Government  amended,  altered,  or  absolutely  annulled 
those  terms.  As  those  matters  were  necessarily  mingled  with 
the  military  history  of  the  period,  I  would  like,  at  this  point, 
to  submit  to  the  committee  my  official  report,  which  has  been 
in  the  hands  of  the  proper  officer,  Brigadier-General  Rawlings, 
chief  of  staff  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States,  since  about  the 
12 th  instant.  It  was  made  by  me  at  Manchester,  Virginia, 
after  I  had  returned  from  Savannah,  whither  I  went  to  open  up 
the  Savannah  River,  and  reap  the  fruits  of  my  negotiations 
with  General  Johnston,  and  to  give  General  Wilson's  force  in 
the  interior  a  safe  and  sure  base  from  which  he  could  draw 
the  necessary  supply  of  clothing  and  food  for  his  command. 
It  was  only  after  I  fulfilled  all  this  that  I  learned  for  the  first 
time,  through  the  public  press,  that  my  conduct  had  been 
animadverted  upon,  not  only  by  the  secretary  of  war,*  but  by 
General  Halleck  and  the  press  of  the  country  at  large.  I  did 
feel  hurt  and  annoyed  that  Mr.  Stanton  coupled  with  the  terms 
of  my  memorandum,  confided  to  him,  a  copy  of  a  telegram  to 
General  Grant,  which  he  had  never  sent  to  me.  He  knew,  on 
the  contrary,  that  when  he  was  at  Savannah,  I  had  negotia 
tions  with  civil  parties  there,  for  he  was  present  in  my  room 
when  those  parties  were  conferring  with  me  ;  and  I  wrote  him 
a  letter,  setting  forth  many  points  of  it,  in  which  I  said  I 

*  See  page  418. 


APPENDIX.  497 

aimed  to  make  a  split  in  Jefferson  Davis'  dominions,  by  segre 
gating  Georgia  from  their  course.  Those  were  civil  negotia 
tions,  and,  far  from  being  discouraged  from  making  them,  I 
was  encouraged  by  Secretary  Stanton  himself  to  make  them. 

By  coupling  the  note  to  General  Grant  with  my  memoran 
dum,  he  gave  the  world  fairly  and  clearly  to  infer  that  I  was 
in  possession  of  it.  Now  I  was  not  in  possession  of  it,  and  I 
have  reason  to  know  that  Mr.  Stanton  knew  I  was  not  in  pos 
session  of  it.  Next  met  me  General  Halleck's  telegram,*  in 
dorsed  by  Mr.  Stanton,  in  which  they  publicly  avowed  an  act 
of  perfidy — namely,  the  violation  of  my  terms,  which  I  had  a 
right  to  make,  and  which,  by  the  laws  of  war  and  by  the  laws 
of  Congress,  is  punishable  by  death,  and  no  other  punish 
ment.  Next,  they  ordered  an  army  to  pursue  my  enemy, 
who  was  known  to  be  surrendering  to  me,  in  the  presence  of 
General  Grant  himself,  their  superior  officer ;  and,  finally,  they 
sent  orders  to  General  Wilson  and  to  General  Thomas — my 
subordinates,  acting  under  me,  on  a  plan  of  the  most  magnifi 
cent  scale,  admirably  executed — to  defeat  my  orders,  and  to 
thwart  the  interests  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States. 
I  did  feel  indignant — I  do  feel  indignant.  As  to  my  own 
honor,  I  can  protect  it.  In  my  letter  of  the  15th  of  April,  I 
used  this  language  :  "  I  have  invited  Governor  Yance  to  return 
to  Raleigh,  with  the  civil  officers  of  his  State."  I  did  so  be 
cause  President  Lincoln  had  himself  encouraged  me  to  a 
similar  course  with  the  governor  of  Georgia,  when  I  was  at 
Atlanta.  And  here  was  the  opportunity  which  the  secretary 
of  war  should  have  taken  to  put  me  on  my  guard  against 
making  terms  with  civil  authorities,  if  such  were  the  settled 
policy  of  our  Government.  Had  President  Lincoln  lived,  I 
know  he  would  have  sustained  me. 

The  following  is  my  report,t  which  I  desire  to  have  incor 
porated  into,  and  made  part  of,  my  testimony : 


*  See  page  433.  f  See  Chapters  XXVI.  to  XXX.,  ante. 

32 


498  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

Q.  Did  you  have,  near  Fortress  Monroe,  a  conference  with 
President  Lincoln ;  and  if  so,  about  what  time  ? 

A.  I  met  General  Grant  and  Mr.  Lincoln  on  board  a  steam 
boat,  lying  at  the  wharf  at  City  Point,  during  the  evening  of 
the  27th  of  March ;  I  resumed  my  visit  to  the  President  on 
board  the  same  steamer  anchored  in  the  stream  the  following 
day,  General  Grant  being  present  on  both  occasions. 

Q.  In  those  conferences  was  any  arrangement  made  with 
you  and  General  Grant,  or  either  of  you,  in  regard  to  the. 
manner  of  arranging  business  with  the  Confederacy  in  regard 
to  terms  of  peace  ? 

A.  Nothing  definite  ;  it  was  simply  a  matter  of  general  con 
versation,  nothing  specific  and  definite. 

Q.  At  what  time  did  you  learn  that  President  Lincoln  had 
assented  to  the  assembling  of  the  Yirginia  rebel  Legislature  ? 

A.  I  knew  of  it  on  the  18th  of  April,  I  think  ;  but  I  procured 
a  paper  with  the  specific  order  of  General  Weitzel,  also  a  copy 
of  the  amnesty  proclamation  on  the  20th  of  April. 

Q.  You  did  not  know,  at  that  time,  that  that  arrangement 
had  been  rescinded  by  the  President  ? 

A.  No,  sir ;  I  did  not  know  that  until  afterwards ;  the  mo 
ment  I  heard  of  that  I  notified  General  Johnston  of  it. 

Q.  Then  at  the  time  you  entered  into  this  arrangement  with 
General  Johnston,  you  knew  that  General  Weitzel  had  ap 
proved  of  the  calling  together  of  the  rebel  Legislature  of  Yir 
ginia,  by  the  assent  of  the  President  ? 

A.  I  knew  of  it  by  some  source  unofficially  ;  I  succeeded  in 
getting  a  copy  of  the  paper  containing  General  Weitzel's  order 
on  the  20th  or  21st  of  April.* 

Q.  But  at  the  time  of  your  arrangement  you  did  not  know 
that  that  order  had  been  rescinded  ? 

A.  No,  sir ;  I  learned  that  several  days  afterwards,  and  at 
once  sent  word  to  General  Johnston. t 

Q.  At  the  time  of  your  arrangement  you  also  knew  of  the 
surrender  of  Lee's  army,  and  the  terms  of  that  surrender  ? 


*  See  page  420.  ,  f  See  page  426. 


APPENDIX.  499 

A.  I  had  that  officially  from  General  Grant ;  I  got  that  at 
Smithfield,  on  the  12th  of  April. 

Q.  I  have  what  purports  to  be  a  letter  from  you  to  John 
ston,  which  seems  to  imply  that  you  intended  to  make  the 
arrangement  on  the  terms  of  Lee's  surrender.  The  letter  is 
as  follows.* 


A.  Those  were  the  terms  as  to  his  own  army ;  but  the  con 
cessions  I  made  him  were  for  the  purpose  of  embracing  other 
armies. 

Q.  And  the  writings  you  signed  were  to  include  other  armies? 

A.  The  armies  of  Kirby  Smith  and  Dick  Taylor,  so  that 
afterwards  no  man  within  the  limits  of  the  Southern  Confed 
eracy  could  claim  to  belong  to  any  Confederate  army  in  ex 
istence. 

Q.  The  President  addressed  a  note  to  General  Grant,  per 
haps  not  to  you,  to  the  effect  of  forbidding  officers  of  the 
army  from  entering  into  any  thing  but  strictly  military  arrange 
ments,  leaving  civil  matters  entirely  to  him  ? 

A.  I  never  saw  such  a  note  signed  by  President  Lincoln. 
Mr.  Stantoii  made  such  a  note  or  telegram,  and  says  it  was  by 
President  Lincoln's  dictation :  he  made  it  to  General  Grant, 
but  never  to  me  ;  on  the  contrary,  while  I  was  in  Georgia,  Mr. 
Lincoln  telegraphed  to  me  encouraging  me  to  discuss  matters 
with  Governor  Brown  and  Mr.  Stephens. 

Q.  Then  you  had  no  notice  of  that  order  to  General  Grant. 

A.  I  had  no  knowledge  of  it,  officially  or  otherwise. 

Q.  In  the  published  report  of  your  agreement  there  is  nothing 
about  slavery,  I  believe  ? 

A.  There  was  nothing  said  about  slavery,  because  it  did 
not  fall  within  the  category  of  military  questions,  and  we  could 
not  make  it  so.  It  was  a  legal  question,  which  the  President 
had  disposed  of,  overriding  all  our  action.  We  had  to  treat 
the  slave  as  free,  because  the  President,  our  commander-in- 


*  See  page 


500  SHERMAN  AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

chief,  said  lie  was  free.  For  me  to  have  renewed  the  question 
when  that  decision  was  made,  would  have  involved  the  ab 
surdity  of  an  inferior  undertaking  to  qualify  the  work  of  his 
superior. 

Q.  That  was  the  reason  why  it  was  not  mentioned  ? 

A.  Yes,  sir ;  subsequently  I  wrote  a  note  to  Johnston,  stat 
ing  that  I  thought  it  would  be  well  to  mention  it  for  political 
effect,  when  we  came  to  draw  up  the  final  terms  with  pre 
cision  :  that  note  was  written  pending  the  time  my  memoran 
dum  was  going  to  Washington,  and  before  an  answer  had  been 
returned. 

Q.  At  the  time  you  entered  into  these  negotiations  was 
Johnston  in  a  condition  to  offer  any  effective  resistance  to 
your  army  ? 

A.  He  could  not  have  resisted  my  army  an  hour,  if  I  could 
have  got  hold  of  him  ;  but  he  could  have  escaped  from  me  by 
breaking  up  into  small  parties,  or  by  taking  the  country  roads, 
travelling  faster  than  my  army,  with  trains,  could  have  pur 
sued. 

Q.  Then  your  object  in  negotiating  was  to  keep  his  army 
from  scattering  into  guerrilla  bands  ? 

A.  That  was  my  chief  object ;  I  so  officially  notified  the 
War  Department. 

Q.  And  not  because  there  was  any  doubt  about  the  result 
of  a  battle  ? 

A.  There  was  no  question  as  to  the  result  of  a  battle,  and  I 
knew  it ;  every  soldier  knew  it.  Johnston  said,  in  the  first 
five  minutes  of  our  conversation,  that  any  further  resistance 
on  his  part  would  be  an  act  of  folly,  and  all  he  wanted  was  to 
keep  his  army  from  dispersing. 

BY  MB.  LOAN: 

Q.  In  your  examination  by  the  chairman  you  stated  that 
you  were  acting  in  pursuance  of  instructions  from  Mr.  Lin 
coln,  derived  from  his  letters  and  telegrams  at  different 
times  ? 

A.  Yes,  sir. 


APPENDIX.  501 

Q.  Have  you  any  of  these  letters  and  telegrams  which  you 
can  furnish  to  the  committee  ? 

A.  I  can  furnish  you  a  copy  of  a  dispatch  to  General  Hal- 
leek  from  Atlanta,  in  which  I  stated  that  I  had  invited  Gov 
ernor  Brown  and  Vice-President  Stevens  to  meet  us  ;  and  I  can , 
give  you  a  copy  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  answer,  for  my  dispatch  was 
referred  to  him,  in  which  he  said  he  felt  much  interested  in 
my  dispatch,  and  encouraged  me  to  allow  their  visit :  but  the 
letter  to  which  I  referred  specially  was  a  longer  letter,  which  I 
wrote  to  General  Halleck  from  my  camp  on  Big  Black,  Mis 
sissippi,  at  General  Halleck's  instigation,  in  September,  1863, 
which  was  received  in  Washington,  and  submitted  to  Mr. 
Lincoln,  who  desired  to  have  it  published,  to  which  I  would 
not  consent.  In  that  letter  I  gave  my  opinions  fully  and  frankly, 
not  only  upon  the  military  situation,  but  also  the  civil  policy 
necessary.  Mr.  Lincoln  expressed  himself  highly  pleased  with 
my  views,  and  desired  to  make  them  public,  but  I  preferred 
not  to  do  so. 

Q.  And  by  subsequent  acts  he  induced  you  to  believe  he 
approved  of  these  views  ? 

A.  I  know  he  approved  of  them,  and  always  encouraged  me 
to  carry  out  those  views. 

BY  THE  CHAIRMAN  : 

Q.  The  following  is  a  letter  published  in  the  newspapers, 
purporting  to  have  been  addressed  by  you  to  Johnston,  dated 
April  21,  1865  * 


This  is  the  letter  in  which  you  say  that  it  would  be  well  to 
declare  publicly  that  slavery  is  dead  ? 
A.  Yes,  sir  ;  that  is  the  letter. 

BY  MB.  LOAN: 

Q.  Will  you  furnish  the  committee  a  copy  of  the  letter 

See  page  410. 


502  SHERMAN  AND   HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

written  by  you  to  Mr.  Stanton,  in  January  last,  from  Sa 
vannah  ? 
A.  I  will  do  so. 

THE  CHAIRMAN: 

Q.  And  when  the  manuscript  of  your  testimony  is  prepared 
it  will  be  remitted  to  you  for  revision,  and  you  can  add  to  it 
any  statement  or  papers  that  you  may  subsequently  desire  or 
consider  necessary. 

A.  I  have  the  above,  and  now  subjoin  copies  of  letters  from 
my  letter-book,  in  the  order  of  the  bringing  in  the  questions 
revised  by  fhis  inquiry  : — 

"  HEADQUARTERS  MIDDLE  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
In  the  Field,  Raleigh,  N.  C.,  April  18,  1865.   * 

"  To  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  U.  S.  GRANT,  or  MAJOR-GENERAL   HALLECK, 
Washington,  D.  C.  : 

"GENERAL — I  inclose  herewith  a  copy  of  an  agreement  made  this 
day  between  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  and  myself,  which,  if  approved 
by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  will  produce  peace  from  the  Po 
tomac  to  the  Rio  Grande.  Mr.  Breckinridge  was  present  at  the  confer 
ence  in  the  capacity  of  a  major-general,  and  satisfied  me  of  the  ability 
of  General  Johnston  to  carry  out  to  the  full  extent  the  terms  of  this 
agreement ;  and  if  you  will  get  the  President  to  simply  indorse  the 
copy,  and  commission  me  to  carry  out  the  terms,  I  will  follow  them  to 
the  conclusion.  You  will  observe  that  it  is  an  absolute  submission  of 
the  enemy  to  the  lawful  authorities  of  the  United  States,  and  disperses 
his  armies  absolutely  ;  and  the  point  to  which  I  attach  most  importance 
is,  that  the  disposition  and  dispersement  of  the  armies  is  done  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  prevent  them  breaking  up  into  a  guerrilla  crew.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  can  retain  just  as  much  of  an  army  as  we  please.  I 
agree  to  the  mode  and  manner  of  the  surrender  of  armies  set  forth,  as 
it  gives  the  States  the  means  of  suppressing  guerrillas,  which  we  could 
not  expect  them  to  do  if  we  strip  them  of  all  arms. 

"  Both  Generals  Johnston  and  Breckinridge  admitted  that  slavery  was 
dead,  and  I  could  not  insist  on  embracing  it  in  such  a  paper,  because  it 
can  be  made  with  the  States  in  detail.  I  know  that  all  the  men  of  sub 
stance  South  sincerely  want  peace,  and  I  do  not  believe  they  will  resort 
to  war  again  during  this  century.  I  have  no  doubt  but  that  they  will 
in  the  future  be  perfectly  subordinate  to  the  laws  of  the  United  States. 


APPENDIX.  503 

The  moment  my  action  in  this  matter  is  approved,  I  can  spare  five  corps, 
and  will  ask  for  and  leave  General  Scho'field  here  with  the  Tenth  Corps, 
and  go  myself  with  the  Fourteenth,  Fifteenth,  Seventeenth,  Twentieth, 
and  Twenty-third  corps,  via  Bnrkesville  and  Gordonsville,  to  Frederick 
or  Hagerstown,  there  to  be  paid  and  mustered  out. 

"  The  question  of  finance  is  now  the  chief  one,  and  every  soldier  and 
officer  not  needed  ought  to  go  home  at  once.  I  would  like  to  be  able 
to  begin  the  march  North  by  May  1 . 

"  I  urge  on  the  part  of  the  President  speedy  action,  as  it  is  important 
to  get  the  Confederate  armies  to  their  homes,  as  well  as  our  own. 
"  I  am,  with  great  respect, 

"  Your  obedient  servant, 

"W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

tb  Major-General  commanding." 

"  HEADQUARTERS  MILITAEY  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
In  the  Field,  Raleigh,  N.  C.,  April  18,  18G5. 

"GENERAL  H.  W.  HALLECK,  Chief  of  S  to/,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

"GENERAL — I  received  your  dispatch  describing  the  man  Clark  de 
tailed  to  assassinate  me.  He  had  better  be  in  a  hurry  or  he  will  be  too 
late.  The  news  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  death  produced  a  most  intense  effect 
on  our  troops.  At  first  I  feared  it  would  lead  to  excesses,  but  now  it 
has  softened  down,  and  can  easily  be  quieted.  None  evince  more  feel 
ing  than  General  Johnston,  who  admitted  that  the  act  was  calculated  to 
stain  his  cause  with  a  dark  hue;  and  he  contended  that  the  loss  was 
most  severe  on  the  South,  who  had  begun  to  realize  that  Mr.  Lincoln 
was  the  best  friend  the  South  had. 

"  I  cannot  believe  that  even  Mr.  Davis  was  privy  to  the  diabolical 
plot,  but  think  it  the  emanation  of  a  lot  of  young  men  of  the  South,  who 
are  very  devils.  I  want  to  throw  upon  the  South  the  care  of  this  class 
of  men,  who  will  soon  be  as  obnoxious  to  their  industrious  class  as  to  us. 

"  Had  I  pushed  Johnson's  army  to  an  extremity,  it  would  have  dis 
persed  and  done  infinite  mischief.  Johnston  informed  me  that  General 
Stoneman  had  been  at  Salisbury,  and  was  now  about  Statesville.  I 
have  sent  him  orders  to  come  to  me. 

"  General  Johnston  also  informed  me  that  General  Wilson  was  at  Co 
lumbus,  Ga.,  and  he  wanted  me  to  arrest  his  progress.  I  leave  that  to 
you.  Indeed,  if  the  President  sanctions  my  agreement  with  Johnston, 
our  interest  is  to  cease  all  destruction.  Please  give  all  orders  necessary, 
according  to  the  views  the  Executive  may  take,  and  inform  him,  if  pos 
sible,  not  to  vary  the  terms  at  all,  for  I  have  considered  every  thing,  and 


504  SHERMAN   AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

believe  that  the  Confederate  armies  are  dispersed.     We  can  adjust  all 
else  fairly  and  well. 

"  I  am  yours,  etc., 

"  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

"  Major-General  commanding." 

Lest  confusion  should  result  to  the  mind  of  the  committee 
by  the  latter  part  of  the  above  letter,  I  state  it  was  addressed 
to  General  Halleck,  as  chief  of  staff,  when  he  was  in  the  proper 
"  line  of  order"  to  the  commander-in-chief.  The  whole  case 
changed  when,  on  the  26th  of  April,  he  became  the  command 
er  of  the  separate  division  of  the  James. 

As  stated  in  my  testimony,  General  Grant  reached  Kaleigh 
on  the  24th,  and  on  the  25th,  on  the  supposition  that  I  would 
start  next  day  to  chase  Johnston's  army,  I  wrote  to  him  the 
following  letter,  delivered  in  person  : — 

"  HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
In  the  Field,  Raleigh,  N.  C.,  April  25,  1865. 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  U.  S.  GRANT — Present : 

"  GENERAL — I  received  your  letter  of  April  21,  with  inclosures,  yes 
terday,  and  was  well  pleased  that  you  came  along,  as  you  must  have 
observed  that  I  held  the  military  control,  so  as  to  adapt  it  to  any 
phase  the  case  might  assume. 

"It  is  but  just  that  I  should  record  the  fact  that  I  made  my  terms 
with  General  Johnston  under  the  influence  of  the  liberal  terms  you  ex 
tended  to  the  army  of  General  Lee,  at  Appomattox  Courthouse,  on  the 
9th ;  and  the  seeming  policy  of  our  Government,  as  evinced  by  the 
call  of  the  Virginia  Legislature  and  governor  back  to  Richmond,  under 
yours  and  President  Lincoln's-  very  eyes.  It  now  appears  that  this 
last  act  was  done  without  any  consultation  with  you,  or  any  know 
ledge  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  but  rather  in  opposition  to  a  previous  policy 
well  considered. 

"  I  have  not  the  least  desire  to  interfere  in  the  civil  policy  of  our 
Government,  but  would  shun  it  as  something  not  to  my  liking.  But 
occasions  arise  when  a  prompt  seizure  of  results  is  forced  on  military 
commanders  not  in  immediate  communication  with  the  proper  authority. 
It  is  possible  that  the  terms  signed  by  General  Johnston  and  myself 
were  not  clear  enough  on  the  point  well  understood  between  us — that 
our  negotiations  did  not  apply  to  any  parties  outside  the  officers 


APPENDIX.  505 

and   men   of  the  Confederate  armies,  which  could  easily   have   been 
remedied. 

"  No  surrender  of  any  army,  not  actually  at  the  mercy  of  the  an 
tagonist,  was  ever  made  without  '  terms,'  and  those  always  define  the 
military  status  of  the  surrendered.  Thus  you  stipulated  that  the  officers 
and  men  of  Lee's  army  should  not  be  molested  at  their  homes  so  long- 
as  they  obeyed  the  laws  at  the  place  of  their  residence.  I  do  not  wish 
to  discuss  these  points  involved  in  our  recognition  of  the  State  govern 
ments  in  actual  existence,  but  will  merely  state  my  conclusion,  to  await 
the  solution  of  the  future. 

"  Such  action,  on  one  point,  in  no  manner  recognizes  for  a  moment 
the  so-called  Confederate  government,  or  makes  us  liable  for  its  debts  or 
acts.  The  laws  and  acts  done  by  the  several  States  during  the  period 
of  rebellion  are  void,  because  done  without  the  oath  prescribed  by  the 
constitution  of  the  United  States,  which  is  a  condition  precedent.  We 
have  a  right  to  use  any  sort  of  machinery  to  produce  military  results ; 
and  it  is  the  commonest  thing  for  military  commanders  to  use  the  civil 
government,  in  actual  existence,  as  a  means  to  an  end.  I  do  believe  we 
could  and  can  use  the  present  State  governments  lawfully,  constitution 
ally,  and  as  the  very  best  possible  means  to  produce  the  object  desired, 
viz.,  entire  and  complete  submission  to  the  lawful  authority  of  the 
United  States. 

"  As  to  punishment  of  past  crimes,  that  is  for  the  judiciary,  and  can 
in  no  manner  or  way  be  disturbed  by  our  acts;  and,  so  far  as  I  can,  I 
will  use  my  influence  that  rebels  shall  suffer  all  the  personal  punishment 
provided  by  law,  as  also  the  civil  liabilities  accruing  from  their  past 
acts. 

"  What  we  now  want  is  the  new  form  of  law,  by  which  common  men 
may  regain  their  position  of  industry,  so  long  disturbed  by  the  war. 

"  I  now  apprehend  that  the  rebel  army  will  disperse,  and  instead  of 
dealing  with  six  or  seven  States,  we  will  have  to  deal  with  numberless 
bands  of  desperadoes,  headed  by  such  men  as  Moseby,  Forrest,  Red  Jack 
son,  and  others,  who  know  not  and  care  not  for  danger  and  its  conse 
quences. 

"  I  am,  with  great  respect, 

"  Your  obedient  servant, 

"W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

"  Major-General." 

On  the  same  day  I  wrote  and  mailed  to  the  secretary  of  war 
the  following : — 


506  SHERMAN   AND  HIS   CAMPAIGNS. 

"HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
In  the  Field,  Raleigh.  N.  C.,  April  25,  1865. 

"  HON.  E.  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War,  Washington  : 

"  DEAR  SIR — I  have  been  furnished  a  copy  of  your  letter  of  April 
21st,  to  General  Grant,  signifying  your  disapproval  of  the  terms  on 
which  General  Johnston  proposed  to  disarm  and  disperse  the  in 
surgents,  on  condition  of  amnesty,  etc.  I  admit  my  folly  in  em 
bracing,  in  a  military  convention,  any  civil  matter  ;  but,  unfortunately, 
such  is  the  nature  of  our  situation,  that  they  seem  inextricably  united, 
and  I  understood  from  you  at  Savannah  that  the  financial  state  of  the 
country  demanded  military  success,  and  would  warrant  a  little  bending 
to  policy. 

"  When  I  had  my  conference  with  General  Johnston,  I  had  the 
public  example  before  me  of  General  Grant's  terms  to  Lee's  army,  and 
General  WeitzePs  invitation  to  the  Virginia  Legislature  to  ass&mble. 
I  still  believe  that  General  Grant,  of  the  United  States  Army,  has  made 
a  mistake ;  but  that  is  none  of  ray  business.  Mine  is  a  different  task  ; 
and  I  had  flattered  myself  that  by  four  years  of  patient  and  unremit 
ting  and  successful  labor,  I  deserved  no  reminder  such  as  is  contained 
in  the  last  paragraph  of  your  letter  to  General  Grant, 

"  You  may  assure  the  President  that  I  heed  his  suggestion. 
"  I  am,  truly,  etc., 

"  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

"  Major-General,  commanding." 

The  last  sentence  refers  to  the  fact  that  General  Grant  had 
been  sent  to  Raleigh  to  direct  military  movements.  That  was 
the  first  time  in  my  life  I  had  ever  had  a  word  of  reproof  from 
the  Government  of  the  United  States,  and  I  was  naturally  sen 
sitive.  But  all  I  said  to  any  one  was  to  General  Meigs,  who 
came  with  General  Grant :  "  It  was  not  kind  on  the  part  of 
Mr.  Secretary  Stanton."  The  fact  known  did  not  gratify  my 
military  conduct.  The  first  interview  with  General  Johnston 
followed,  and  the  terms  of  capitulation  were  agreed  upon  and 
signed,  and  General  Grant  started  for  Washington  bearing  the 
news. 

When,  on  the  28th  of  April,  I  received,  in  the  New  York 
Times,  the  most  extraordinary  budget  of  Mr.  Stanton,  which  for 
the  first  time  startled  me,  I  wrote  to  General  Grant  this  letter  : 


APPENDIX.  507 

"  HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
In  the  Field,  April  28,  1865. 

"  LIEUT.-GENERAL  U.  S.  GRANT,  General-in-Chief,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

"  GENERAL — Since  you  left  me  yesterday,  I  have  seen  the  New  York 
Times  of  the  24th  inst.,  containing  a  budget  of  military,  news,  authenti 
cated  by  the  signature  of  the  secretary  of  war,  which  is  grouped  in 
such  a  way  as  to  give  very  erroneous  impressions.  It  embraces  a  copy 
of  the  basis  of  agreement  between  myself  and  General  Johnston,  of 
April  18th,  with  eonjmentaries,  which  it  will  be  time  enough  to  discuss 
two  or  three  years  ncnce,  after  the  Government  has  experimented  a 
little  more  in  the  machinery  by  which  power  reaches  the  scattered 
people  of  the  vast  country  known  as  the  South.  But,  in  the  mean 
time,  I  do  think  that  my  rank  (if  not  past  services)  entitle  me.  at  least, 
to  the  respect  of  keeping  secret  what  was  known  to  none  but  the 
cabinet,  until  further  inquiry  comes  to  be  made,  instead  of  giving 
publicity  to  documents  I  never  saw,  and  drawing  inferences  wide  of  the 
truth. 

"  I  never  saw,  or  had  furnished  me,  a  copy  of  Mr.  Stanton's  dispatch 
to  you  of  the  3d  of  March,  nor  did  Mr.  Stanton,  or  any  human  being, 
ever  convey  to  me  its  substance,  or  any  thing  like  it ;  but,  on  the  con 
trary,  I  had  seen  General  Weitzel's  in  relation  to  the  Virginia  Legis 
lature,  made  in  Mr.  Lincoln's  very  person,  and  had  failed  to  discover 
any  other  official  hints  of  the  plan  of  reconstruction,  or  any  idea  calcu 
lated  to  allay  the  fears  of  the  people  of  the  South,  after  the  destruction 
of  their  armies  anil  civil  authorities  would  leave  them  without  any 
government  at  all. 

"  We  should  not  drive  a  people  to  anarchy,  and  it  is  simply  impos 
sible  for  one  military  power  to  waste  all  the  masses  of  this  unhappy 
country. 

"  I  confess  I  did  not  want  to  drive  General  Johnston's  army  into  bands 
of  armed  men,  going  about  without  purpose,  and  capable  only  of 
indefinite  mischief. 

'*  But  you  saw,  on  your  arrival  at  Raleigh,  that  I  had  my  armies  so 
disposed,  that  his  escape  was  only  possible  in  a  disorganized  shape  ;  and, 
as  you  did  not  choose  to  direct  military  operations  in  this  quarter,  I 
infer  that  you  were  satisfied  with  the  military  situation. 

'•  At  all  events,  the  moment  I  learned,  what  was  proper  enough,  the 
disapproval  of  the  President  I  wished  in  such  manner  to  compel  the 
surrender  of  Johnston's  whole  army  on  the  same  terms  as  you  had 
prescribed  to  General  Lee's  army,  when  you  had  it  surrounded,  and  in 
your  absolute  power. 


508  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

"  Mr.  Stanton,  in  stating  that  my  order  to  General  Stoneman  was 
likely  to  result  in  the  escape  of  '  Mr.  Davis  to  Mexico  or  Europe,'  is  in 
deep  error. 

"  General  Stoneman  was  not  at  Salisbury  then,  but  had  gone  back  to 
Statesville.  Davis  was  supposed  to  be  between  us,  and  Stoueman  was 
beyond  him. 

"  By  turning  towards  me  he  was  approaching  Davis ;  and,  had  he 
joined  me  as  ordered,  I  then  would  have  had  a  mounted  force  needed 
for  that  and  other  purposes.  But  even  now  I  don't  know  that  Mr. 
Stanton  wants  Davis  caught.  And  as  my  official  papers,  deemed  sacred, 
are  hastily  published  to  the  world,  it  will  be  imprudent  for  me  to  state 
what  has  been  done  in  this  respect. 

"  As  the  editor  of  the  Times  has  (it  may  be)  logically  and  fairly 
drawn  the  inference  from  this  singular  document,  that  I  am  insubordinate, 
I  can  only  deny  the  intention.  I  have  never  in  my  life  questioned  or 
disobeyed  an  order,  though  many  and  many  a  time  I  have  risked  my 
life,  my  health,  and  reputation  in  obeying  orders,  or  even  hints,  to 
execute  plans  and  purposes  not  to  my  liking.  It  is  not  fair  to  withhold 
from  me  plans  and  policy  (if  any  there  be),  and  expect  me  to  guess  at 
them  ;  for  facts  and  events  appear  quite  different  from  different  stand 
points.  For  four  years  I  have  been  in  camp,  dealing  with  soldiers,  and 
I  can  assure  you  that  the  conclusion  at  which  the  cabinet  arrived  with 
such  singular  unanimity  differs  from  mine.  I  have  conferred  freely  with 
the  best  officers  in  this  army  as  to  the  points  involved  in  this  controversy, 
and,  strange  to  say,  they  were  singularly  unanimous  in  the  other  con 
clusion,  and  they  will  learn  with  pain  and  sorrow  that  I  am  deemed 
insubordinate  and  wanting  in  common  sense  ;  that  I,  who  have  labored 
day  and  night,  winter  and  summer,  for  four  years,  and  have  brought 
an  army  of  seventy  thousand  men  in  magnificent  condition  across  a 
country  deemed  impassable,  and  placed  it  just  where  it  was  wanted 
almost  on  the  day  appointed,  have  brought  discredit  on  the  Govern 
ment. 

"  I  do  not  wish  to  boast  of  this,  but  I  do  say  that  it  entitled  me  to 
the  courtesy  of  being  consulted  before  publishing  to  the  world  a  pro 
position  rightfully  submitted  to  higher  authority  for  adjudication,  and 
then  accompanied  by  statements  which  invited  the  press  to  be  let  loose 
on  me. 

"  It  is  true  that  non-combatants — men  who  sleep  in  comfort  and 
security,  while  we  watch  on  the  distant  lines — are  better  able  to  judge 
than  we  poor  soldiers,  who  rarely  see  a  newspaper,  hardly  can  hear 
from  our  families,  or  stop  long  enough  to  get  our  pay.  I  envy  not 


APPENDIX.  509 

the  task  of  reconstruction,  and  am  delighted  that  the  secretary  has  re 
lieved  me  of  it. 

"  As  you  did  not  undertake  to  assume  the  management  of  the  affairs 
of  this  army,  I  infer  that,  on  personal  inspection,  your  mind  arrived  at 
a  different  conclusion  from  that  of  Mr.  Secretary  Stanton.  I  will  there 
fore  go  and  execute  your  orders  to  the  conclusion,  and  when  done,  will, 
with  intense  satisfaction,  leave  to  the  civil  authorities  the  execution  of 
the  task  of  which  they  seem  to  me  so  jealous  ;  but,  as  an  honest  man 
and  soldier,  I  invite  them  to  follow  my  path,  for  they  may  see  some 
things  and  hear  some  things  that  may  disturb  their  philosophy. 
"  With  sincere  respect, 

"W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
"  Major-General  commanding. 

"  P.  S. — As  Mr.  Stanton's  singular  paper  has  been  published,  I  de 
mand  that  this  also  be  made  public,  though  I  am  in  no  way  responsible 
to  the  press,  but  to  the  law  and  my  proper  superiors. 

"W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
"  Major-General  commanding." 

Since  my  arrival  at  "Washington,  I  have  learned  from  Gen 
eral  Grant  that  this  letter  was  received,  but  he  preferred  to 
withhold  it  until  my  arrival,  as  he  knew  I  was  making  towards 
Washington  with  my  army.  Upon  my  arrival,  I  did  not 
insist  on  its  publication  till  it  was  drawn  out  by  this  inquiry. 
I  also  append  here  the  copy  of  a  letter  from  Colonel  T.  S. 
Bowers,  assistant  adjutant-general,  asking  me  to  modify  my 
report  as  to  the  point  of  violating  my  truce,  with  my  answer. 

"  HEADQUARTERS  ARMIES  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
Washington,  May  25,  1865. 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Commanding  Military  Division  of 
the  Mississippi : 

"  General  Grant  directed  me  to  call  your  attention  to  the  part  of  your 
report  in  which  the  necessity  of  maintaining  your  truce  at  the  expense 
of  many  lives  is  spoken  of.  The  general  thinks  that  in  making  a  truce 
the  commander  of  an  army  can  control  only  his  own  army,  and  that 
the  hostile  general  must  make  his  own  arrangements  with  other  armies 
acting  against  him. 


510  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

"  While  independent  generals  acting  against  a  common  foe  would 
naturally  act  in  concert,  the  general  claims  that  each  must  be  the  judge 
of  his  own  duty,  and  responsible  for  its  execution. 

"  If  you  should  wish,  the  report  will  be  returned  for  any  change  you 
may  deem  best. 

"  Very  respectfully, 

"  Your  obedient  servant, 

"  T.  S.  BOWERS, 
"  Assistant  Adjutant-General." 


"  HEADQUAKTERS  MILITAKY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
Washington,  D.  C.,  May  26,  1865. 

"  COL.  T.  S.  BOWERS,  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  Washington,  D.  C.: 

"  COLONEL — I  had  the  honor  to  receive  your  letter  of  May  25,  last 
evening,  and  I  hasten  to  answer.  I  wish  to  precede  it  by  renewing  the 
assurance'  of  my  entire  confidence  and  respect  for  the  President  and 
Lieutenant-General  Grant,  and  that  in  all  matters  I  will  be  most  willing 
to  shape  my  official  and  private  conduct  to  suit  their  wishes.  The  past 
is  beyond  my  control,  and  the  matters  embraced  in  the  official  report 
to  which  you  refer  are  finished.  It  is  but  just  the  reasons  that  actuated 
me,  right  or  wrong,  should  stand  on  record ;  but  in  all  future  cases, 
should  any  arise,  I  will  respect  the  decisions  of  General  Grant,  though  I 
think  them  wrong. 

"  Suppose  a  guard  has  prisoners  in  charge,  and  officers  of  another 
command  should  aim  to  rescue  or  kill  them,  is  it  not  clear  the  guard 
must  defend  the  prisoners  as  a  safeguard  ?  So  jealous  is  the  military 
law  to  protect  and  maintain  good  faith  when  pledged,  that  the  law  ad 
judges  death,  and  no  alternative  punishment,  to  one  who  violates  a 
safeguard  in  foreign  ports.  (See  Articles  of  War,  No.  55.)  For  mur 
der,  arson,  treason,  and  the  highest  military  crimes,  the  punishment 
prescribed  by  law  is  death,  or  some  minor  punishment ;  but  for  the 
violation  of  a  "  safeguard,"  death,  and  death  alone,  is  the  prescribed 
penalty.  I  instance  this  to  illustrate  how,  in  military  stipulations  to  an 
enemy,  our  Government  commands  and  enforces  "good  faith."  In  dis 
cussing  the  matter  I  would  like  to  refer  to  many  writers  on  military 
law,  but  am  willing  to  take  Halleck  as  the  text.  (See  his  chapter, 
No.  27.) 

"  In  the  very  first  article  he  states  that  good  faith  should  always  be 
observed  between  enemies  in  war,  because  when  our  faith  has  been 
pledged  to  him,  so  far  as  the  promise  extends,  he  ceases  to  be  an 


APPENDIX.  511 

enemy.  lie  then  defines  the  meaning  of  compacts  and  conventions, 
and  says  they  are  made  sometimes  for  a  general  or  a  partial  suspension 
of  hostilities  for  the  "  surrender  of  an  army,"  etc.  They  may  be  special, 
limited  to  particular  places  or  to  particular  forces,  but  of  course  can 
only  bind  the  armies  subject  to  the  general  who  makes  the  truce,  and 
co-extensive  only  with  the  extent  of  his  command.  This  is  all  I  ever 
claimed,  and  it  clearly  covers  the  whole  case  ;  all  of  North  Carolina 
was  in  my  immediate  command,  with  General  Schofield,  its  department 
commander,  and  his  army  present  with  me.  I  never  asked  the  truce  to 
have  effect  beyond  my  ow7n  territorial  command.  General  Halleck 
himself,  in  his  Order,  No.  1,  demies  his  own  limits  clearly  enough,  viz., 
'  Such  part  of  North  Carolina  as  was  not  occupied  by  the  command  of 
Major-General  Sherman.'  He  could  not  pursue  and  cut  off  Johnston's 
retreat  towards  Salisbury  and  Charlotte  without  invading  my  command  ; 
and  so  patent  was  his  purpose  to  defy  and  violate  my  truce,  that  Mr. 
Stanton's  publication  of  the  fact,  not  even  yet  recalled,  modified,  or  ex 
plained,  was  headed,  *  Sherman's  truce  disregarded,'  that  the  whole 
world  drew  but  one  inference.  It  admits  of  no  other.  I  never  claimed 
that  that  truce  bound  Generals  Ilalleck  or  Canby  within  the  sphere  of 
their  respective  commands  as  defined  by  themselves. 

"  It  was  a  partial  truce  of  very  short  duration,  clearly  within  my 
limits  and  right,  justified  by  events;  and  as  in  the  case  of  prisoners  in 
my  custody,  or  the  violation  of  a  safeguard  given  by  me  in  my  own 
territorial  limits,  I  am  bound  to  maintain  good  faith.  I  prefer  not  to 
change  my  report,  but  again  repeat  that  in  all  future  cases  I  am  willing 
to  be  governed  by  the  interpretation  of  General  Grant,  although  I  again 
invite  his  attention  to  the  limits  of  my  command,  and  those  of  General 
Halleck  at  the  time,  and  the  pointed  phraseology  of  General  Halleck's 
dispatch  to  Mr.  Stanton,  wherein  he  reports  that  he  had  ordered  his 
generals  to  pay  no  heed  to  my  orders  within  the  clearly  defined  area  of 
my  command. 

"  I  am,  yours, 

"  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
"  Major-General  U.  S.  A.,  commanding." 

I  now  add  two  letters  written  to  Mr.  Stanton*  at  Savannah, 
and  the  dispatch  from  Atlanta  mentioned  in  the  body  of  my 
testimony,  with  Mr.  Lincoln's  answer  : 


*  See  pages  323  and  325. 


512  SHERMAN  AND  HIS  CAMPAIGNS. 

"HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
In  the  Field,  Atlanta,  Ga.,  September  15,  1864. 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  HALLECK,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

"  My  report  is  done,  and  will  be  forwarded  as  soon  as  I  get  a  few 
more  of  the  subordinate  reports.  I  am  now  awaiting  a  courier  from 
General  Grant.  All  well,  and  troops  in  fine  healthy  camps,  and  supplies 
coming  forward  finely.  Governor  Brown  has  disbanded  his  militia,  to 
gather  the  corn  and  sorghum  of  the  State.  I  have  reason  to  believe 
that  he  and  Stephens  want  to  visit  me,  and  I  have  sent  them  a  hearty 
invitation.  I  will  exchange  two  thousand  prisoners  with  Hood,  but  no 
more. 

"  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

"  Major-General  commanding." 

"WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  September  17,  1864—10  A.  M. 
"  MAJOR-GENERAL  SHERMAN  : 

"  I  feel  great  interest  in  the  subjects  of  your  dispatch  mentioning 
corn  and  sorghum,  and  contemplate  a  visit  to  you. 

"A.  LINCOLN." 

I  have  not  possession  here  of  all  my  official  records,  most 
of  which  are  out  West,  and  I  have  selected  the  above  from 
my  more  recent  letter-books,  and  I  offer  them  to  show  how 
prompt  and  full  have  been  my  official  reports,  and  how  un 
necessary  was  all  the  clamor  made  touching  my  action  and 
opinions  at  the  time  the  basis  of  agreement  of  April  18  was 
submitted  to  the  President. 


UNIFORM   WITH    "  SHERMAN    AND    HIS    CAMPAIGNS." 

"Grant  and  his  Campaigns:" 


A    MILITARY 

Br  HENEY  COPPEE,  A.  M., 

Editor  of  tbe   "United   States   Service   Magazine," 

WITH  SPLENDID   STEEL  PORTRAITS   OF 

Lieut.-Gen.  U.  S.  Grant,         Maj.  Gen.  W.  T.  Sherman,         Maj.  Gen.  Jas.  L>.  McPherson, 
Maj.  Gen.  Geo.  H.  Thomas,  Maj.  Gen.  Geo.  G.  Meatie,       Maj.  Gen.  P.  H.  Sheridan. 
Maj.  Gen.  E.  0.  C.  Ord,      Brev.  Maj.  Gen.  J.  A.  Rawlins,        and  Maps,  Plans,  &c.,  &c. 

1  Vol.  8vo.  ;  about  500  Pages.    Cloth,  $3  50. 


This  work  is  in  every  particular  trustworthy  and  accurate — written  by  the 
Lieutenant  General's  life-long  friend,  and  with  his  sanction,  frcm  official  doc 
uments,  it  cannot  fail  to  meet  every  requirement  of  the  public  expectation. 

The  following  extracts  from  the  Prefatory  Letter  from  the  Author, 
fully  explain  the  character  and  scope  of  the  work  : 

UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA,  PHILADELPHIA,  July  1,  1865. 

MY  DEAR  SIR  : — It  is  with  peculiar  pleasure  that  I  have  undertaken  to 
write  the  military  biography  of  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  GRANT,  because,  having 
known  him  from  boyhood,  I  have  watched  the  successive  steps  and  symmet 
rical  development  of  his  character,  and  find  in  his  complete  and  rounded  life 
not  a  single  point  which  will  require  me  to  trim  my  pen  for  the  purposes  of 
championship,  extenuation  or  palliation.  We  were  cadets  together,  and  I  now 
see  how  the  c;idct  of  1840  exhibited  qualities,  which  only  needed  fostering  and 
opportunity  to  make  him  the  generalisinio  of  1885.  *  *  *  *  * 

I  have  great  pride  in  knowing  that  I  undertake  the  work,  not  only  with 
General  Grant's  sanction,  but  with  his  promise  of  every  assistance.  He  has  di 
rected  material  and  maps  to  be  put  in  my  hands,  which  cannot  otherwise  be 
obtained,  and  hs  and  the  gentlemen  of  his  staff  have  offered  to  answer  all  ques 
tions,  and  supply  all  I  shall  need  to  make  the  work  a  faithful  historic  ^ecord. 

The  plan  of  my  biography  will  exhibit  a  clear  chronological  history  of  Gen 
eral  Grant's  campaigns  ;  an  occasional  critical  summary  at  the  close  of  a  cam 
paign,  Connecting  its  prominent  events,  and  presenting  its  military  sequence  ; 
and  an  appendix,  containing  the  most  important  dispatches  referred  to  in  the 
icxt.  In  the  course  of  the  narrative  I  shall  try  my  pen  at  sketches  of  the  dis 
tinguished  commanders  who  have  executed  Grant's  plans.  Many  of  them  are 
old  comrades  and  friends  and  I  can  therefore  speak  from  personal  knowledge, 
without  having  recourse  to  loose  fancies  of  rapid  writers,  who  put  themselves, 
but  not  their  heroes,  in  print. 

I  think  I  may  safely  promise  the  public  that  although  the  work  might  have 
been  better  done  by  other  hands,  they  will  find,  in  this  volume,  the  truth  care 
fully  sifted  from  the  great  mass  of  materials,  systematically  digested,  scientifi 
cally  presented  in  a  military  point  of  view,  and  uninfluenced  by  prejudice  of 
any  kind  whatever — 

"  The  story  of  his  life 

From  year  to  year,  the  battles,  sieges,  fortunes 
That  he  had  passed," 

which  interlink  in  iron  chain-work  the  peaceful  youth  with  the  stormy,  success 
ful,  illustrious  manhood  of  our  "  great  captain." 

I  am,  very  sincerely,  yours, 
C.  B.  RICHARDSON,  Esq.  H.  COPPEE. 

Sold  only  by  subscription. 

C.  B.  RICHARDSON,  Publisher,  540  Broadway,  N.  Y. 


O  ^  M  JP  A.  I  Gr  N  S 

OF   THE 

ARMY   OF    THE    POTOMAC, 

FBOM 

Its  Organization  to  the  Close  of  the  War, 

BY  WILLIAM  SWINTON. 

1  "Vol.   8vo.s   atocmt   T'OO   Pages, 

WITH    SPLENDID    STEEL   PORTRAITS    OP    ITS    COMMANDERS, 

Major  General  Geo.  8.  McClellan,       Major  General  Joseph  Hooker, 

A.  E.  Burnside,  "  "        George  G.  Meade, 

AND   MAPS,    PLANS,    «&c., 

PREPARED    BY   COL.    W.   H.    PAINE,    EXPRESSLY   FOR   THIS   "WORK. 


It  is  readily  conceded  that  the  history  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  is  the  history  of  much 
the  largest  and  altogether  the  most  important  section  of  the  war  through  which  the  United 
States  has  just  passed.  Assigned  the  double  duty  of  guarding  the  National  capital  and  captur 
ing  the  capital  of  the  Confederacy,  it  was  the  fortune  of  that  army,  early  named  by  popular 
affection  "  THE  GRAND  AKMY  or  THE  POTOMAC,"  to  meet  on  the  soil  of  Virginia  the  head  and 
front  of  all  the  rebel  power.  Into  that  state,  as  the  Flanders  of  the  war,  each  belligerent  poured 
its  richest  resources,  maintaining  there  its  foremost  army  under  its  foremost  leaders :  and  thus 
was  seen  for  four  years  the  fierce  clinch  and  struggle  of  two  mighty  hosts,  whose  varying  for 
tunes  fixed  the  attention  of  the  nation  and  the  world,  and  with  the  issue  of  whose  struggle  it 
was  always  felt  was  bound  up  the  issue  of  the  war.  And  it  is  a  notable  circumstance  that  as  the 
capture  of  Richmond  was  the  first  distinctive  object  of  the  war,  so  when  through  many  lapses 
and  failures  was  achieved  this  crowning  glory,  the  war  Ceased. 

It  is  this  colossal  drama,  as  it  stands  related  to  the  army  that  was  the  main  actor  therein,  that 
Mr.  Swinton  has  set  forth  in  his  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  It  is  believed  that 
the  work  has  been  composed  under  circumstances  peculiarly  favorable,  both  as  regards  the  in 
tellectual  fitness  of  the  author  and  the  richness  of  the  material  employed.  As  military  editor  of 
the  N.  T.  Times,  and  its  special  war  correspondent  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Mr.  Swinton 
gained  throughout  the  country  the  reputation  of  a  military  writer  and  critic  of  marked  bril 
liancy  and  power.  In  addition,  however,  to  his  knowledge  of  the  campaigns  in  Virginia,  de 
rived  from  a  personal  participation  therein,  Mr.  Swinton  has  been  reinforced  with  the  amplest 
official  material  on  both  sides.  The  Commanders  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  their  sub 
ordinate  officers,  have  with  much  liberality  placed  at  his  disposal  their  full  official  records  and 
reports,  in  large  part  in  manuscript ;  while  for  the  illustration  of  the  doings  of  the  Confede 
rates,  without  a  knowledge  of  which  it  is  hardly  possible  rightly  to  appreciate  our  own  side,  he 
was  fortunate  enough  to  obtain  the  complete  reports  of  the  operations  in  Virginia,  and  collec 
tions  of  documents  and  memoirs  believed  to  be  unique.  With  these  advantages  it  is  confidently 
believed  that  the  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  will  be  the  standard  authentic  history 
of  that  army ;  and  as  such  it  is  commended  to  the  sharers  in  its  toils  and  glories. 

Sold  only  by  subscription. 

C.  B.  RICHARDSON,  Publisher, 

540   BROADWAY,    NEW  YORK. 


CALIFORNIA 


LIBRARY   OF  THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   CALIFORNIA 
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LOAN  DEPT. 

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Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


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